We use our own and third-party cookies to perform an analysis of use and measurement of our website, to improve our services, as well as to facilitate personalized advertising by analysing your browsing habits and preferences. You can change the settings of cookies or get more information, see cookies policy. I understand and accept the use of cookies.

Is There Really a Turnout Paradox?

Thursday June 25, 2009, at 14:00
Sala Seminario - Planta Baja IBEI
Research seminar
Luis Fernando Medina (University of Virginia)
This paper revisits the turnout paradox and shows that the correct computations of endogenous pivot probabilities provide plausible upper bounds for the cost parameter in high-turnout equilibria. Thus, the widespread view that said equilibria are fragile is overstated. Typically, these equilibria have excessively narrow margins of victory and mixed pure strategy profiles. But with a continuous version of the outcome function and differential costs of voting it is possible to generate realistic equilibria in a voting game with costly voting.