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Why Ethnic Parties Deter Violence

Viernes 10 de octubre de 2014, de 14:00 a 16:00
Room Fred Halliday 24.133 - Mercè Rodoreda Building (1st Floor)
Seminario de investigación
Kanchan Chandra (New York University)

This paper argues that, and shows why, ethnic parties can under certain conditions deter armed violence. The argument is based on the observation that, in order to explain armed violence, we must theorize not only about what armed organizations offer to potential recruits but also about why institutionalized channels do not function as effective non-violent alternatives.Ethnic parties often serve as such alternatives.The article introduces a new, party-based explanation for civil war. It also adds to an emerging literature that suggests that the institutionalized mobilization of ethnic identity can have a moderating effect on violence in democratic systems.

Seminar IBEI Chandra