CONTESTED LABELS
The operationalization of the IDP category in South Sudan

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ABSTRACT

Similar in shape to the ‘are refugees migrants’ debate, recent years have seen an emerging discussion about the relationship between the ‘IDP’ and ‘refugee returnee’ labels. The use of labels is known to be problematic yet continues to play a prominent role in policymaking and the humanitarian field. Drawing on an analysis of 20 interviews with professionals working for international organisations engaged in humanitarian operations and a variety of written contents, this paper investigates how, why and with which consequences the IDP population category has been operationalized and contested. A case study from South Sudan, where the debate about the relationship between the IDP and returning refugee labels played a significant role from 2019 onwards, shows that a number of factors shape this debate, including mandates, funding competition and donor structures, organisational politics, the role of individuals and political interests. The research findings suggest that labelling brings unintended consequences, beyond the stated goal of addressing needs in a better targeted manner. An over-reliance on labels as primary indicator of needs in status-based responses and the fragmentation of labels into increasingly competing, rather than nested entities, risks doing harm and constitutes a disservice to the affected populations. The research does not advocate to dismiss labels altogether, but encourages a much more critical engagement with how, why and for whom different labels are employed, along with a needs-based reorientation in the planning and implementation of humanitarian response operations.

Key words: Internally displaced people (IDPs); returning refugees; labelling; politics of international organizations; South Sudan; International Recommendations on IDP Statistics (IRIS); migration
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<td>DTM</td>
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1. INTRODUCTION

Forcible displacement within and across borders has become a defining feature of our times. The number of people forced to flee their homes has increased significantly over the past three decades, exceeding 100 million individuals in 2022 (UNHCR, 2023), of whom 59 million – more than half – are internally displaced persons (IDPs) (IDMC, 2022). By comparison, thirty years ago the number of refugees and asylum seekers was estimated at 17 million (UNHCR, n.d.), and the number of IDPs at 24 million (Deng, 1993, para.75). Whilst the number of refugees, asylum seeker and other people in need of international protection increased fourfold from 2005 to 2022, the number of IDPs classified as ‘of concern to UNHCR’, jumped from as little as six million to over 58 million in the same period, a tenfold increase (UNHCR, n.d.)

Whilst these global statistics provide an insight into the significant scale of the internal displacement phenomenon, they conceal the degree to which determining who is or is not considered as belonging to the IDP population group can be an intensely contested subject. The following examples help to illustrate why.

1. **Amara lives in Country A and holds Country A citizenship. The country experiences political turmoil. Amara faces persecution because she has been outspoken against the government. After hearing of other political activists being detained and tortured, Amara decides to leave Country A. She flees to Country B. Country B applies a prima facie approach to refugee recognition and Amara is soon registered as a refugee with the help of UNHCR. 

   **Amara is a refugee.**

2. **Now imagine the same scenario described above, but instead of fleeing to Country B or C, Amara decides to flee to another part of Country A, an opposition stronghold where she hopes to be out of the reach of her persecutors. She hopes to return to her former habitual residence once the political situation improves. 

   **Amara is an IDP.**

In principle, IDPs and refugees are distinguished in that “border-crossing refugees are intrinsically ‘international’ (...) IDPs instead remain firmly within the ‘domestic affairs’ and national jurisdiction of their own State” (Cantor, 2018, p. 212). But displacement can be complex, as this third scenario reflects:

3. **Amara flees to Country B and spends some time living in a refugee camp. She may hope to eventually be able to start a new life in Country B, to resettle in a third country, or to safely return to Country A. Before any of those options are available to her, she decides to return to Country A, even though it remains unsafe to do so. She returns to Country A, but cannot return to her former habitual residence.**
What do we call Amara now? An IDP? A refugee returnee? Both? Will our answer change if we learn that Amara still holds her food ration card from the refugee camp in Country B and remains officially registered as a refugee there? How will we classify her if she decides to build a new life in another city of Country A, having given up on the option of returning to her former habitual residence? If Amara gives birth, will we consider her child to be internally displaced? Which consequences will it have to be labelled one way or another, and who will take the decision? As soon as one delves into the complex nuances that often mark displacement histories, it becomes apparent that neatly ‘fitting people into boxes’ or assigning labels poses a rather challenging task. And yet, despite the apparent challenges, labelling/ categorization is a process and tool which plays a central role in international politics, and within the humanitarian sector.

Debates about labelling and categorization are not new to the humanitarian field. Conceptual and operational challenges related to the categorization of displaced population groups have received ample attention in the literature, beginning with Roger Zetter’s (1991) work on labelling refugees. Ever since, authors have challenged the ways in which labels get created and imposed, and critically inquired whose interests are served in the process (cf. Betts, 2009; Chimni, 2008; Hamlin, 2021; Jacobs, 2018; Sajjad, 2018; Sigona, 2018). Most of this work has focused on individuals displaced across borders, with less attention paid to labelling and categorization in the context of internal displacement.

To address this gap, the thesis examines the following research question: How, why and with which consequences has the IDP category been operationalised and contested?

The research draws on a case study from South Sudan, where the delineation between the IDP and refugee returnee labels became a subject of intense debate in 2019/2020. Whilst the debate is introduced and contextualised with an overview of the different operationalizations of the IDP label globally from a legal, policy and statistical perspective, the main focus in the empirical section is on contestation in South Sudan’s operational, humanitarian response context and the positioning of different actors involved in collecting, analysing and disseminating information on forcibly displaced populations.

Drawing comparisons to the better-known debate about whether refugees are migrants, the research offers a critical appraisal of labels as artificial constructs. It contends that a new fault line has emerged in recent years with regards to the operationalization of the IDP label, namely a shift in how individuals whose displacement trajectory included a period of displacement abroad are to be classified. This new development is reflected through the emergence of new labels, such as ‘spontaneous refugee returnees in an IDP-like situation’, presented as mutually exclusive from the IDP label. It is argued that this new operationalization is driven by political interests and, in the case of South Sudan, has led to adverse consequences. Rather than resulting in a better targeted response, it has served to obfuscate and distract from the needs of the affected population, and to some people falling off the radar in the humanitarian
programme cycle. In making these arguments, this research contributes empirically to a better understanding of the diverse ways in which the IDP label has been operationalized, extending the literature on the ‘refugee/migrant’ bifurcation to the ‘IDP/refugee returnee’ setting. On a theoretical level, the research demonstrates that a critical engagement with the way labels are formed, employed and contested is vital, to reveal the political and power dynamics at play and recognise that, useful tools as they can be, labels can also bring unintended consequences and risk doing harm. The research also contributes to policy discussions, by drawing out the consequences which different operationalizations and their contestation carry for forcibly displaced populations. Whilst labelling aspires to better target policies and response, it can also lead to exclusions and division. Furthermore, it is often misaligned with the self-understanding of the affected population. And when there is a lack of common vision around what a label entails, labelling can become a source of distraction and confusion. The research inquires whether the contestation surrounding labels can be resolved through a renewed focus on a core humanitarian commitment: namely that response should be provided based on needs, not status.

The thesis is structured as follows: Chapter 1 comprises a literature review which helps to shape the theoretical framework. Chapter 2 outlines the methodology. Guided by the theoretical framework, Chapter 3 explores how the IDP label has been operationalized and contested both globally and in the case of South Sudan. Chapter 4 then delves into the different reasons which drive competing operationalizations of the IDP label. Chapter 5 reflects on the intended and unintended consequences of labels and their contestation, whilst highlighting the research finding’s policy implications. The conclusion summarizes the key arguments and outlines opportunities for future research.
2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The theoretical framework contains four sub-chapters: First, it is established that labels are artificial constructs and that the process of labelling warrants scrutinizing – a recognition which forms the initial impetus for the research. Secondly, it is shown that contestation exists around the correct way to label different population groups in the context of forced displacement, with the refugees/migrants bifurcation presented as a practical example of how contestation manifests. Thirdly, drawing on literature on the politics of international organisations, the role of power is explored as a reason for why contestation arises. The fourth sub-chapter delves into the consequences which labels carry for those who are subject to labelling, as well as the implications if there is a lack of shared understanding of what is behind a label. Each section concludes with some indications of what one would expect to find in an application of the theoretical literature to a concrete case, such as the one in South Sudan explored in the empirical section.

2.1 Labels As Artificial Constructs

What is in a label? Labelling and processes of categorization are commonplace phenomena which help us structure our thoughts and make sense of the world. By attaching a label to someone or placing people into categories, we highlight a particular aspect deemed relevant in a given context. The label “student” highlights that an individual partakes in education and the category “spouse” suggests that an individual is in a formal relationship with a partner. But how formal the education, or the partnership, needs to be for the concerned individual to be described as a student, or a spouse, may well vary by context and based on individual understandings. Furthermore, a single label can have multiple meanings. The category “child” can delineate young individuals from other groups, such as “youth”, or “adults”. But the same label can also be employed to describe someone’s relationship to their parents – in which case being a child is a life-long condition, rather than something temporally bound. What these examples illustrate is that labels and categories are inevitably a simplification of reality (the student is not only a student, the spouse not only a spouse) and that the closer one looks at a given category or label, the more potential meanings, interpretations and definitions one can reveal.

As Bourdieu (1980, cited/translated in Jacobs, 2018, p.134) wrote,

> Every science which pretends to propose criteria which are in the best way anchored in reality should not forget that it does not do anything else than registering a particular state of the struggle of classification, that is to say, a particular state of material and symbolic relations of power between those who have an interest in this or that particular way of classifying and who, just as itself, call upon scientific authority to establish in reality and in reason an arbitrary division which it hopes to impose.
This struggle of classification has been observed also in the field of forced migration studies, where the use of labels and categories has long been acknowledged as being as problematic as it is inevitable. Starting with the seminal paper ‘Labelling Refugees: Forming and Transforming a Bureaucratic Identity’ (Zetter, 1991), there has been critical engagement with the process of labelling, but also an admission that it seems to be an inescapable part of public policy making (ibid., p.59). Problematic as they are and despite their propensity to become contested, we need categories and concepts “to think about the world, to make sense of it, to interpret it and to act in relation to it” (Turton, 2003, p.2; Dahinden et al., 2021, p.538). Policies cannot be formulated without specifying who they apply to, and labels help to provide such specifications.

And yet, the process of categorization and labelling is perceived as problematic for several reasons. It serves as a tool for simplification, but such simplification conceals that several, contrasting identities can co-exist within each label (Zetter, 1991, p.60). The employment of labels relies on conditionality, differentiation, stereotyping and control (ibid., p.59), and is thus tied closely with regulatory functions (Sajjad, 2018, p.46). It also tends to be non-participatory (ibid.). Whilst labels suggest neutrality (Zetter, 1991, p.45), it has been argued that they are neither neutral, nor necessarily based on substantive differences between people’s circumstances (Betts, 2009). This invites a critical reflection about “how, why, and for whom the labels and categories of forced migration exist in the ways they do” (ibid., p.36).

Recognising that the process of labelling is as significant as the labels themselves makes it imperative to question which labels are created, whose labels prevail, and which consequences they carry (Sajjad, 2018, p.57). It has been observed that labels create their own momentum and share a recursive relationship with policy-making processes: labels are tools which aid bureaucratic and policy-making processes, whilst such processes in turn have bearing on the (trans)formation of labels and their meanings (Gupte and Mehta, 2007, p.66; Zetter, 2007, p.180). Since concepts such as ‘refugee’ and ‘IDP’ are relational to the state system and concepts of sovereignty (Betts, 2009, p.51), they can convey politicized meanings and carry political consequences (Zetter, 1991, p.39; Jacobs, 2018, p.134). The question ‘who is a refugee’ (or who is an IDP) might be answered by saying “it is one who conforms to institutional requirements” (Zetter, 1991, p.51). Who gets to define different identities, to control them, and to decide how different categories complement or conflict each other are thus all crucial elements of the debate (Zetter, 1988, pp.105–106).

Based on the above, one can expect to find more than one reading of what any given label means in a particular context, and how it is operationalized by different actors. It is also expected that the struggle of classification is linked to the interests and politics of different actors involved, whilst lacking involvement of those being labelled.
2.2 How Contestation Arises: Operationalizing Refugee And Migrant Labels

Operationalizing a label requires defining what it means in a given context. But even where a definition of the label or category is at hand, in practice there are often many interpretations which, similar to currencies, can carry fluctuating values (Zetter, 1991, p.40). Sometimes, definitions of a term vary by region, and depending on which legal frameworks apply. The case of refugees illustrates this well. There are countries which apply the refugee definition as found in the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol (henceforth referred to as ‘the 1951 Convention’), and others, for example the signatories of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa (1969), or of the Cartagena Declaration on Refugees (1984) in parts of Latin America, which utilize a broader conceptualization of refugee status. The 1951 Convention stresses the element of personal persecution to qualify as a refugee, which has posed barriers for the protection of people at risk from generalized or indiscriminate violence, whilst the two regional conventions make provisions for a broader set of trigger events (Wood, 2021, p.639). However, none of the definitions are static and the precise differences depend on the interpretation and application of each across different places and time (Wood, 2021, p.642). Chimni (2008, p.16) critiques that legal definitions of the term refugee have always been partial and designed to serve state policy. And understandings of the refugee label’s meaning in everyday parlance vary widely, with the term used not only to denote a legal status, but also to describe forcibly displaced populations more broadly, whether they hold an international protection status or not (Zetter, 2007, p.176; Fitzgerald and Arar, 2018).

Whilst legally set criteria may help to make a distinction between who qualifies as a refugee under one regime or another, it may not do much to resolve foundational questions around where the line between refugeehood and other forms of migration ought to be drawn.

If creating a shared understanding of what is meant by a particular label can already be challenging, the issue is further complicated when seeking to determine how different labels relate to one another. Even though the process of labelling attempts to formulate clear cut categories, in practice, a strict delineation can prove challenging. For example, the quest to distinguish between refugees and other migrants is linked to an assumption that there are those who are forced to flee, and others who choose to migrate for other reasons, such as to improve their economic situation. But multiple authors have convincingly argued that most migration combines elements of volition and coercion, rendering the binaries which underpin the refugee/migrant bifurcation questionable (Turton, 2003, pp.9–10; Betts, 2009, p.11; Atak and Crépeau, 2021; Erdal and Oeppen, 2018).

Linked to this, there is substantial debate about how terms such as ‘migrant’ and ‘refugee’ should be understood and weighted in relation to one another (Hamlin, 2021). The arrival of so-called ‘mixed flows’ of refugees and (other) migrants to Europe in 2015/16 triggered intense debates about whether these terms should be understood as distinct or overlapping categories (Atak and Crépeau, 2021, p.136).
An example of a nested understanding of refugees and migrants is offered by OCHCR, for example, which defines migrants as “a neutral term to describe a group of people who have in common a lack of citizenship attachment to their host country”, whilst further specifying that this “is without prejudice to the protection regimes that exist under international law for specific legal categories of people, such as refugees, stateless persons, trafficked persons and migrant workers” (OCHCR, n.d.). The International Organization for Migration (IOM) refers to migrant as “an umbrella term, not defined under international law, reflecting the common lay understanding of a person who moves away from his or her place of usual residence” (IOM, n.d.). By contrast, UNHCR has long been advocating for a clear separation between migrants and refugees and uses the term migrant when referring to people moving for reasons which are not included in the legal definition of a refugee (Edwards, n.d.). To reconcile these different perspectives, UNHCR and IOM have come to an agreement to use the term “refugees and migrants” in the context of mixed movements (IOM and UNHCR, 2022).

Without having received comparable attention in the literature to date, a similar debate has begun to take hold in the context of some humanitarian response operations with regards to the conceptualization of IDPs. Namely, questions have been raised about whether an individual who as part of their displacement trajectory spent some period abroad (i.e. has crossed an internationally recognized state border) can still be considered an IDP if they return to their country, but are neither able to return to their former habitual residence, nor able to relocate based on a free choice and desire in a different part of the country. Considering how contestation has manifested on the question of whether refugees are migrants, one may expect to find different actors positioning themselves in different ways when it comes to operationalizing the IDP category and its relation to other categories, such as refugee and refugee returnee. It is expected that the nested versus distinct approaches reflected in the migrant/refugee debate will also be visible.

2.3 Why Labels Are Operationalized Differently And Contested

Different authors have contended that labelling is an inherently political process, with bureaucratic interests and procedures constituting crucial determinants in the definition of labels (e.g. Wood, 1985; Zetter, 1991; Turton, 2003). Chimni (2008) argues that, “the battle over definitions of the term ‘refugee’ expresses the more obvious aspects of the relationship between knowledge and power” (p.15; cf. also Sajjad, 2018, p.45). Barnett and Finnemore (1999) describe the ability to classify objects and to shift their definition and identity as “one of bureaucracy’s greatest sources of power” (p.710). Whilst international organisations (IOs) present themselves as impersonal, technocratic and neutral entities that serve others, it would be short sighted to neglect the power they exert (ibid., p.708), including autonomously and in ways that were neither intended nor anticipated by states at their creation (ibid., p.699). IOs establish the parameters and boundaries of acceptable action by naming and labelling the social context (ibid., p.711).
Labels only offer the pretence of a ‘value-neutral’ categorization, whilst obscuring the fact that they are results of bureaucratic processes (Sajjad, 2018, p.42). Instead, they serve as “a crucial index of differing assumptions and contradictory political interests” (Zetter, 1991, p.59). Acknowledging UNHCR’s argument that governments may hold an interest in referring to migrants rather than refugees to downplay their protection responsibilities, one author points out that claims about politically motivated rhetoric can also be turned around. The UNHCR is an agency that strives for influence in a crowded landscape of humanitarian and migration actors. It makes perfect sense to launch a campaign that presents a black-and-white world with two kinds of people: the special people—our people, refugees—and the other people, migrants. (Carling, 2015)

Labels can indeed take on a charged political meaning in the context of inter-agency competition. Green and Pécoud (2022) have shown that IOM and UNHCR utilize different textual patterns and terms when speaking about migrants and other displaced populations. Barnett and Finnemore (1999, p.724) observe that bureaucracies are organized around the principle of division-of-labor, where different entities may battle over budgets, resources, and because of distinct internal cultures. Clark (2021) has also spoken of the “pathologies of competition under regime complexity” (p.1133). That competition between UNHCR and IOM exists, including in the realm of mandates, funding and organisational policies, has already been established in the literature (Bradley, 2021, p.254). Unlike for UNHCR, IOM’s constitution does not legally define the populations with whom it is to work. This, combined with its competitive bend, lack of a formal protection mandate, and willingness to question UNHCR’s strict delineation between the refugee and migrant categories has caused contention and concern within UNHCR (ibid., p.265). As Hamlin (2021) observes, “calls by the IOM to remember that refugees are just one flavor of migrant, and that all migrants have rights, work to undermine UNHCR’s central cognitive framework” (p.94).

To compound matters, UNHCR’s growing responsibilities with regards to IDPs since the late 1990s has been perceived to sometimes sit uneasily with UNHCR’s refugee protection mandate for two reasons: firstly, intervening in IDP contexts requires collaboration with some of the same governments whose actions have caused refugees. Secondly, IDP protection has been perceived by some as a measure promoted by powerful states to contain what could become refugee crises (Loescher et al., 2008, pp.109–110). It may thus not come as a surprise that the classification of population groups has been such a central issue of contestation in recent years, including the newly emerging debate about the relationship between refugee returnees and IDPs, which the empirical section will cover.

In addition to recognising IOs as independent actors, the literature also highlights that IOs may contain multiple sources of agency and embody multiple agendas (Barnett and Finnemore, 1999, p.705). Hall and Woods (2018) have shown the influence leaders have on the workings of IOs, despite working in a
constrained environment. The role of the individual should thus not be neglected in the shaping of IO policies, and by extension, the way that different people within each organisation operationalize and contest labels.

Given the above, it is expected that different forms of operationalizing the IDP label can reflect the political interests of particular IOs and that in employing labels, UNHCR will seek to keep as clear a link as possible to its institutional mandate for refugees. It is also expected that, beyond organisational policy, the role of individual leaders and their interests will come to bear on how labels are operationalized and contested.

2.4 Consequences Of Labels And Their Contested Operationalizations

In the process of labelling, delinkage takes place as “an individual identity is replaced by a stereotyped identity with a categorical prescription of assumed needs”(Zetter, 1991, p.44). Such reconstruction of the individual into a programmatic identity defines people in convention images (Wood, 1985, p.6-13). It is non-participatory and closely linked to institutional exercise of power, whilst neglecting the way in which people define and understand themselves (Mayer and Tran, 2022, p.5). The forcibly displaced “tend to lack influence over the narratives that are produced about them” (Green and Pécoud, 2022, p.1), with an “emphasis on passive victimhood” (Pasquetti and Sanyal, 2021, p.12). It is often neglected that migrants are “knowing actors” and “resilient authors of their own lives”(Mayer and Tran, 2022, p.2). Thus, the labels which bureaucracies employ can run counter to how people understand and label themselves. As Hannah Arendt wrote, “In the first place, we don’t like to be called ‘refugees’. We ourselves call each other ‘newcomers’ or ‘immigrants’”(Arendt, 2007, p.264).

It has been argued that categories can be meaningless, or even negative, to the extent that they are reductive and mask heterogeneity within a group (Barutciski, 1998, p.11). And yet, labelling and categorization has implications for the way the needs of people on the move are addressed (Barnett and Finnemore, 1999, p.711; Sigona, 2018). The use of labels is closely intertwined with an understanding of needs, rights, and entitlements, determining who is deserving of protection and the appropriate means for distribution (Zetter, 2007, p.180; Sajjad, 2018, p.41). The separation between forced migration and voluntary migration, however, is flawed, reflecting ad hoc responses to policy concerns (Turton, 2003, p.14) and “designed to distinguish between and prioritize the rights of different groups of people”(Betts, 2009, p.11). When such differentiation leads to some being helped and others ignored, regardless of (equal/greater) need, they can be dangerous (Feller, 2005, p.34). In section 1.2, we have seen that there are different conceptualizations and ways of operationalizing the terms refugee and migrant. Let us consider the consequences associated with each.
Those who reject a nested understanding of the term refugee as a subgroup of a broader category of migrant argue that “it is dangerous, and detrimental to refugee protection, to confuse the two groups” (Feller, 2005, p.27) because blurring the terms takes attention away from refugee’s specific legal protection requirements (Edwards, n.d.). Indeed, recognised refugees enjoy entitlements to forms of support not commonly available to other migrants, for example with regards to shelter and support to meet basic needs. But providing such targeted support would not per se be hindered by describing refugees as a sub-group within the population of migrants. Instead, the fear is that associating refugees with migrants could “undermine public support for refugees and the institution of asylum” (Edwards, n.d.).

By contrast, those who advocate for the use of migrants as an umbrella term, assert that constructions which hierarchise ‘worthiness’ do not fully reflect the complex realities of people on the move (Sajjad, 2018, p.40). The refugee/migrant “binary essentialism can become a very dangerous game” (Hamlin, 2021, p.157), especially when employed to refer to people who have not yet been given any particular legal status. It can reinforce negative conceptualizations of migrants and make it more difficult to address their needs (ibid.). In 2015, AlJazeera decided that it would no longer refer to ‘migrants’ for those moving across the Mediterranean, leading one author to challenge that “instead of rejecting ‘migrant’, we should reclaim it from those who have worked to turn it into a term of abuse” (Vonberg, 2015).

Hamlin observes that the migrant/refugee binary may be a fiction, but “a powerful, enduring, and deeply consequential one” (Hamlin, 2021, p.4). In recent policy making, the distinct approach appears to prevail, as illustrated in the development of two separate Global Compacts (one “on refugees”, the other “for migration”) in 2018. But it has been suggested that in doing so, the refugee label has been instrumentalised to downplay the protection needs of others on the move (Hyndman, 2022; Costello, 2019, p.649).

Given the above, it is expected that labels ought to be created in ways that help identify particular needs of affected populations. At the same time, it is probable that the labels employed constitute a simplification and do not reflect the complexity of individual lived experiences of displacement and its consequences. Further, it is expected that distinctions between different groups, especially when treated as mutually exclusive, can create harm, by excluding some from assistance who are equally in need, or by taking attention away from groups not captured by a particular label.
3. METHODOLOGY

The methodology section explains the epistemological outlook underpinning this thesis, the criteria for case study selection, an outline of reviewed documents and details on conducted interviews. It also includes information on the ethical considerations shaping the project.

3.1 Epistemology

Critical theory is deemed a relevant approach to the study of the topic at hand, given that it allows us to question how knowledge is created and whose interests it serves (Cox, 1981, cited in Betts, 2009, p.34). As Betts outlines, critical theory approaches encompass a broad spectrum of different theories that share the view that theory and concepts are themselves political, not neutral and objective. They invite “exploration of how, why, and for whom the labels and categories of forced migration exist in the ways that they do” (Betts, 2009, p.43). Critical theorists such as Gramsci (1971) and authors of the Frankfurt School, such as Adorno and Horkheimer (1972) highlight that the ideas and concepts which shape people’s perceptions of the world themselves reinforce prevailing power structures. A critical assessment of how categories and concepts shape how people see the world is thus needed to explore how, why and for whom certain concepts and ideas have emerged and become dominant in academia and practice (Betts, 2009, p.43). Following Turton’s (2003) assertion that it is through “questioning of taken for granted assumptions that research can have its most beneficial impact on policy and practice” (p. 15), this thesis aims to illustrate that the IDP label is a complex construct which has been operationalized in different ways by different actors pursuing particular purposes and interests.

3.2 Case Study Selection

The value of single case studies has long been acknowledged in the literature. For example, Gerring (2009) considers them tools which allow to generate hypotheses and provide insights on causal mechanisms, particularly well-suited to qualitative research of an exploratory nature when a subject is encountered for the first time or considered in an intrinsically new way (p. 99). George and Bennett (2005) also advocate for case studies as strong research tools which can consider a large number of intervening variables and identify the conditions which activate particular causal mechanisms. Case studies can accommodate complex causal relations and allow us to explore variables and concepts which are difficult to measure, as is the case in the topic under investigation in this research paper. 

Whilst the author worked in South Sudan from 2017 to 2019, which provided context familiarity and a network to tap into for the research, South Sudan was primarily chosen as a case study because it is the country where the question about the relationship between the population categories ‘refugee returnee’ and ‘IDP’ has been most visibly contested. A document analysis of Humanitarian Needs Overviews
(HNOs)\(^1\) published by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in English between 2014 – 2022 showed that South Sudan, together with Somalia, is the country where the category ‘refugee returnee’ has featured most prominently in the humanitarian programme cycle. However, there is an important distinction between the two countries: in Somalia, when it comes to returnees, only refugee returnees are mentioned as a targeted population, due to IDP returns being extremely limited (OCHA Somalia, 2020, p.47; OCHA Somalia, 2022, p.77) or not mentioned at all (OCHA Somalia, 2021). By comparison, the South Sudan HNOs in 2021 (OCHA South Sudan, 2021) and 2022 (OCHA South Sudan, 2022) distinguish between ‘internal returnees’ and ‘spontaneous refugee returnees’, whilst the HNO 2020 even split the category of ‘spontaneous refugee returnees’ further into those who are ‘in an IDP-like situation’ and those who are ‘in places of return’ (OCHA South Sudan, 2019, p.5). The importance of the South Sudan case study was also affirmed by interviewees, who have worked for years across different humanitarian response contexts and have not seen a comparable degree of discord on the IDP label in other countries (I002; I007; I009). South Sudan thus lends itself particularly well to illustrating how labels continue to be contested in the forced migration field, mirroring the better-known debate about whether refugees are migrants.

### 3.3 Document Review

Besides a review of the academic literature, which informed the above outlined theoretical framework, the research relies on a review of documents produced in the context of humanitarian response operations, as well as global guidance and framing documents. These include:

- **85 HNOs produced between 2014 and 2022** (see Annex 1)
- **Excerpts from the UNHCR Emergency Handbook**
- **The IOM Framework for Addressing Internal Displacement (2017)**
- **Serving and Protecting Together: IOM/UNHCR Framework of Engagement (2022)**, a global-level framework for engagement which commits the two organisations to continue strengthening ties and collaboration across three ‘critical areas’: mixed movements of migrants and refugees, durable solutions for IDPs, and data.
- **IDMC Global Reports on Internal Displacement (GRID)**, published annually to present global stocks and flows of IDPs

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\(^1\) HNOs are produced to support the development of a shared understanding of the impact and evolution of a crisis and inform response planning, presenting a comprehensive analysis of the situation and associated needs. The document is developed jointly by different humanitarian actors (OCHA, 2022a).
- Official websites and press statements of different organizations

3.4 Interviews

The goal was to speak to representatives of the major UN agencies involved in the debate in South Sudan (UNHCR, IOM and the Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)), as well as other actors with a strong role on IDP data globally (the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), the Joint IDP Profiling Service (JIPS) and individuals involved in the Expert Group on Refugee and IDP Statistics (EGRIS/EGRISS²)). Selection took place through a mixture of pre-existing contacts established by the author during their previous work, complemented by snowball referrals which occurred during the research.

A total of 20 interviews were conducted between 28 July 2022 and 16 February 2023. As targeted, respondents included individuals who are, or have been, working for IOM, UNHCR, OCHA, UNMISS, IDMC, JIPS and EGRISS. Among individuals working for UN agencies, seniority ranged from P2 (Programme Officer) up to D1 (directorate) level, with other individuals also possessing long-standing experience in their respective areas of expertise. Fifty per cent of respondents were women. About half of those interviewed have been working in South Sudan, whilst others included regional and global experts on the subject matter. A list of interviewees, omitting personally identifiable information, is provided in Annex 2.

QualCoder, a free and open access software for qualitative data analysis running on python was used to structure the analysis. Each interview was first transcribed and then tagged according to key themes. This allowed for easy access to interview content structured by author and topic all within one application.

3.5 Ethical considerations

The author underwent an ethical clearance process through the Institut Barcelona d'Estudis Internacionals (IBEI) prior to commencing the research. Human subjects research ethical clearance was obtained on 27 July 2022, prior to conducting any interviews. Among other things, the ethical clearance process disclosed that the research topic is closely related to the author’s former work and clarified that the findings presented in the research output do not rely on the author's own experiences, but on findings obtained during the research phase.

² Since renamed as the Expert Group on Refugee, IDP and Statelessness Statistics (EGRISS)
Whilst an assessment of how IDPs in South Sudan self-identify and position themselves in the debate would be a critical complement to the analysis presented in this paper, the author did not opt to directly approach this group of individuals, given the sensitivities and protection concerns in working directly with this affected population. Working with IDPs for the limited scope of a Master thesis would have been difficult to justify from an ethical perspective.

Regarding the list of interviewed respondents, the author opted not to disclose a breakdown of how many individuals have been working for which agency, since this could more easily render study participants who opted to remain anonymous identifiable. More detailed information on the profile of respondents is only included in-text for those respondents who explicitly declared their consent for such information to be conveyed.

4. HOW THE IDP LABEL IS OPERATIONALIZED AND CONTESTED

This first part of the empirical section considers how the IDP label has been operationalized and contested, both globally (3.1 – 3.3) and in South Sudan (3.4 – 3.5). It begins by tracing the evolution of the IDP regime, then outlines three broad approaches to operationalizing the IDP label, and finally introduces the new fault line regarding whether certain individuals ought to be classified as IDPs, refugee returnees, or both. Following some background on the context and conflict in South Sudan, it is then explored how this new aspect of operationalizing the IDP label in distinct ways has played out there.

4.1 Evolution Of The IDP Regime At The Global Level

The recognition of IDPs as a population category in the context of forced migration lagged far behind the formalization of the refugee regime in the period following the Second World War. Whilst a universal refugee definition was formulated in the 1951 Convention, it was only in the early 1990s that the challenges facing IDPs and how to address them became policy priorities (Ferris, 2014, p.4). In 1990, the UN General Assembly assigned to resident coordinators the function of coordinating assistance to IDPs, establishing the post of emergency relief coordinator (ERC) the following year (Cohen and Deng, 1998, p.127). In 1992, the UN Human Rights Commission created the mandate of a Representative of the Secretary-General on IDPs, first held by Dr. Francis Deng (Kälin, 2021, p.850). To create a normative framework on addressing the needs of IDPs, the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement were developed and then presented to the UN Commission on Human Rights in 1998 (OCHA, 2021). They defined IDPs as

persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or
human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized state border (OCHA, 1998, para.2).

Unlike the refugee definition, the definition of an IDP is descriptive rather than legal. The definition is also much broader and more inclusive (Koser, 2007). Whilst the rights of IDPs are implicit in existing human rights and humanitarian law by virtue of the displaced being nationals or residents in the country, the Guiding Principles make these rights more explicit (Kälin, 2021). This ‘soft law’ approach has gradually been transformed into ‘hard law’ as elements of the Guiding Principles have become incorporated in some national laws and regional agreements (Betts, 2009, p.129; Cantor, 2018). An example is the African Union Convention on the Protection of and Assistance to Internally Displaced Persons (known as the Kampala Convention), which was adopted in 2009 and entered into force in 2012 (Abebe, 2016). The Government of Germany has taken the position that the Guiding Principles can be considered customary international law (Kälin, 2010, p.5).

National governments bear the primary responsibility for IDP protection, but where unwilling or unable to meet their responsibilities, the international community can step in. No single UN agency is formally responsible for IDPs (Cohen and Deng, 1998, p.8), which poses challenges because “too often when everyone is responsible for an issue, no one feels accountable”(Ferris, 2015, para 9). Thus, the international community initially “struggled to find appropriate ways of responding to a growing number of internally displaced individuals in the absence of clear institutional mandates” (Ferris, 2014, p. 15). To address this challenge and following a series of other initiatives that sought to address it (cf. Bradley, 2019), the cluster approach was established in 2005 as part of the Humanitarian Reform Process, assigning a variety of agencies different cluster lead responsibilities. The cluster approach aims to strengthen preparedness and technical capacity to respond to humanitarian emergencies by ensuring predictable leadership and accountability in different sectors (e.g. Shelter, Health, Education) and cross-cutting areas (e.g. Protection). The approach is intended for “countries with humanitarian crises which are beyond the scope of any one agency’s mandate and where the needs are of sufficient scale and complexity to justify a multi-sectoral response”(IASC, 2006, p.2).

Clusters are groups of humanitarian organisations, both UN and non-UN, designated by the IASC and assigned clear responsibilities for coordination, including being the ‘first port of call’ and the ‘provider of last resort’ in their thematic area (Ferris, 2014, p.10). The Camp Coordination and Camp Management (CCCM) Cluster is co-led globally by IOM and UNHCR in natural disaster and conflict-induced IDP situations respectively. The CCCM Cluster helps coordinate between various humanitarian actors with regards to services provided to displaced populations within camps, informal settlements, collective centres and other communal settings, and works with the affected population to ensure representation, on-site governance and access to information about services (CCCM Cluster, 2021).

Other clusters focus not only on the internally displaced, but also on the needs of the resident population
and returnees, whilst the responsibility for responding to refugees remains outside the cluster system, under the mandate of UNHCR (IASC, 2006).

Further noteworthy developments in the IDP regime evolution include the publishing of the *IASC Framework on Durable Solutions for Internally Displaced Persons* in 2010 (henceforth referred to as IASC Framework on Durable Solutions), which identified three possible settlement options for the achievement of durable solutions to internal displacement: IDPs’ sustainable return to their former home or habitual residence, integration in the displacement location, or settlement elsewhere in the country, in each case based on a voluntary and informed decision, in safety and dignity. The framework established eight criteria for determining the extent to which a durable solution has been achieved (IDMC, n.d.). Most recently, in 2019, the UN Secretary General established a High-Level Panel on Internal Displacement, tasked with finding solutions to the global internal displacement crisis, including by raising global awareness and improving efforts to assist the affected, both displaced and host communities. The panel was asked to deliver concrete recommendations on how to better prevent, respond, and achieve solutions to internal displacement. Following 18 months of research and consultations, it submitted its report to the UN Secretary-general in September 2021 (UN, n.d.). This report was followed up with UN Secretary-General’s Action Agenda on Internal Displacement (UN, 2022), which calls for stronger international solidarity to address internal displacement as a key requirement for achieving the SDGs and sets out three overarching goals: help IDPs find durable solutions, prevent new displacement crises, and ensure effective protection and assistance for those facing displacement (UN, 2022).

### 4.2 Three Broad Approaches To Operationalizing The IDP Label

Whilst the evolution of the IDP regime described above shows how this population group has become a central focus of international attention over the past thirty years, a closer look at how the IDP label has been operationalized reveals that there is more than one reading of what it means to be an IDP (EU and UN, 2020, para.35). As outlined in the Theoretical Framework, labels are ultimately artificial constructs. It may hence not be surprising to find that they can take different shapes and forms in distinct contexts (legal, policy, data), or when employed by diverse actors. As the former Head of Data Analysis at IDMC points out, the Guiding Principles were not primarily drafted with an eye toward accounting and that applying them always involves active interpretation (I016). It would be misleading to assume that the Guiding Principles speak for themselves and require no elaboration (*ibid.*).

When it comes to IDPs, three basic approaches for determining who to include in the category can be distinguished.

First, approaches which prioritize the mobility aspect are linked closely to the geographic location of the affected individual. Such approaches take the place of habitual residence as a starting point and
regard the individual as internally displaced for the time of absence from the former habitual residence, provided the person is within the country of their former habitual residence – or as “externally displaced” in case of a move to another country (I007). Upon physical return to the former habitual residence, an affected individual stops being considered an IDP and is instead assigned a new label, “returnee”, which is maintained for some unspecified period of time as a tool to flag the potential continued vulnerabilities and humanitarian needs of this population group (ibid.), as illustrated below.

Illustration 4.2.1: Determining IDP status based on geographic location

Displaced from habitual residence (left) to displacement location within the country (right) = IDP

Returned from displacement location (right) to former habitual residence (left) = returnee (no longer IDP)

Source: Author’s own illustration

Second, an alternative approach is to include in the IDP category all those who have been displaced to a location within their country of residence, and who still possess displacement-related needs and vulnerabilities – independent of whether said individual is still in a displacement location or has returned to their former habitual residence. This vulnerability-based approach is less concerned with the geographic location of the IDP, and instead accentuates that vulnerabilities caused by displacement can last beyond the physical return of an IDP. This is grounded in an emphasis on the IASC Framework on Durable Solutions, which highlights that “returning to one’s home or place of habitual residence, moving to another part of the country or choosing to integrate locally often does not amount to a durable solution” (The Brookings Institution, 2010, p.5). Unlike in the right hand side illustration above, the

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3 Whether a durable solution has been achieved is to be determined according to eight criteria: safety and security; adequate standard of living; access to livelihoods; restoration of housing, land and property; access to documentation; family reunification; participation in public affairs; and access to effective remedies and justice. The IASC Framework itself
individual would still be considered an IDP if they continue to face displacement-related vulnerabilities upon return to their former habitual residence, and a former IDP once such vulnerabilities have been resolved.

Thirdly, whilst the Guiding Principles do not promote IDPs as a legal category, some countries have national legislation on IDPs, including Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Colombia, Croatia, El Salvador, Georgia, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Mexico, Niger, Peru, the Russian Federation, Tajikistan and Ukraine (Global Protection Cluster, 2020). National laws can stipulate specific restrictions with regards to the time of displacement and restrict the IDP definition to citizens only, as is for example the case in Bosnia and Herzegovina, where only citizens displaced within the country after 30 April 1991 are counted (EU and UN, 2020, para.60).

In addition to these three main approaches, ambiguity can also exist around how long an individual needs to be displaced to count as an IDP. If, for example, people are asked to evacuate for safety purposes but their homes remain unaffected and they are able to return shortly after, should they be considered IDPs? The Guiding Principles stipulate no minimum requirements in this regard, though it has been observed that short-lived displacements may not necessarily trigger particular needs and vulnerabilities (EU and EGRIS, 2018, p.19; I007). An IDMC staff member recounted a scenario in Chile whereby around 1 million people faced such temporary evacuation in the context of a tsunami warning for about five hours, and an ensuing debate about whether to include them in the year’s annual IDP estimates or not (I019).

The definition in the Guiding Principles is also not clear on whether children born to internally displaced parents after the displacement event should be considered IDPs. A strict reading would disqualify them since they have not themselves been forced or obliged to flee, but a human rights perspective provides strong arguments for their inclusion (EU and UN, 2020, para.61). Operational IDP data collection includes them as a matter of common-sense practice (I013), as those born into displacement along with their parents form part of the population facing displacement-specific vulnerabilities, a stance which has also been advocated for by IDMC (2014). However, for the purpose of IDP statistics, such individuals are considered as IDP-related population, rather than IDPs (EU and UN, 2020, paras78–79).

Some special cases, such as instances of displacement affecting nomadic communities, can pose a unique set of challenges. Given nomadic communities’ traditional mobility, within and in some cases across borders, it can be challenging to apply labels such as IDP or refugee. Should such labels be

acknowledges that “these criteria often mark an ideal that may be difficult to achieve” (The Brookings Institution, 2010, p. 86).
applied when they deviate from traditional routes due to conflict or because climatic change has affected the availability of grazing lands used in the past? As an IDMC staff member pointed out, at the extreme, nomadic communities may give up their nomadic lifestyle and settle in a given location, which in their case, may be the clearest signal of having been displaced (I019).

Whilst the three main approaches outlined above can converge on who is included in the IDP category, discrepancies are likely to occur. For example, approaches which rely on national legislation can designate someone being an IDP for politically motivated reasons, even when from a humanitarian perspective, no displacement-related needs and vulnerabilities persist (I017; I020). And despite the common denominator of the IDP Guiding Principles definition in the first and second approach, they differ in where they draw the end point for inclusion in the IDP population category, with the second approach emphasizing the need for a durable solution to have been achieved. Whilst there is widespread acceptance of the IDP definition as found in the Guiding Principles, there is less agreement on when to stop counting an IDP as displaced (EU and UN, 2020, para.71).

This difference is reflected in the data sphere, linked to the practices of different entities conducting primary data collection in internal displacement contexts. As IOM’s Human Mobility Expert puts it, “the Guiding Principles have both mobility and vulnerability aspects, but the vulnerability and legalistic aspects are even more emphasised (…) Mobility is taken as a fact, and everybody interprets it differently. And then at the end of the day, people are forgetting about the mobility aspect and talk about IDPs as a vulnerable category” (I007). IOM’s Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) takes a mobility-based approach to defining IDPs (ibid.). For those who have returned to their habitual residences (or close vicinity), it uses the label “returnees”, in line with the illustration 3.2.1 above. For individuals who adopt a new habitual residence after displacement and no longer intend to return to their former habitual homes, it uses the label ‘relocated’. DTM methodologies such as mobility tracking, the primary approach used to determine the overall number of IDPs and returnees (thereby establishing what can be used as a sampling frame), collect information through key informants on the basis of groups, which does not lend itself well to assessing on an individual basis if displacement-related vulnerabilities have been resolved. This differs from the approach taken by JIPS, which primarily relies on individual or household-level surveys that seek to measure to what extent durable solutions have been achieved, in line with a vulnerability-based approach (I014).

The International Recommendations on IDP Statistics (IRIS) also promote a vulnerability-based approach, considering as part of the IDP stock three sub-groups: those in locations of displacement, in locations of return, and in other settlement locations. IDPs are only taken out of the stock once they have overcome their displacement-related vulnerabilities – their geographic locations is not determinative (EU and UN, 2020, p.28). The challenge with the vulnerability-based approach is that it
has proven difficult to agree measures related to durable solutions and what it means to be able to fully enjoy ones’ rights (I016, I004).

Given all the above, it is not surprising that one respondent observed that there is no context they ever worked in where the IDP definition is not a challenge (I018). Whether due to different timeframes used to bracket population groups, or because of essential differences in considering the mobility or vulnerability aspects for inclusion in the IDP category, the humanitarian field is rife with fragmented operational data sources. Efforts for consolidated approaches in official statistics remain in their infancy and only few countries have enshrined a legal IDP definition in their laws. In this context, the Guiding Principles play a key role in creating a shared understanding of what it means to be an IDP. But this shared understanding comes with its own ambiguities and divergences, as will be further explored below in the South Sudan case.

4.3 A New Fault Line: IDPs, Refugee Returnees, Both?

In addition to the distinct approaches outlined above, a further divergence in interpretations of the Guiding Principles’ IDP definition can be observed when one assesses how the IDP label stands in relation to other labels, in particular, to the label refugee returnee. Many factors can influence an understanding of which category a displaced person best fits into. Individuals who experienced a period of displacement abroad and then returned to their country of former habitual residence can find themselves in different situations, as illustrated below. If they are still displaced after their return to the country, questions are most likely to arise about whether they ought to be labelled as an IDP (given their internal displacement condition), a refugee returnee (given their nature as formerly displaced abroad), or both (if the two categories are not deemed mutually exclusive, but rather complementary).

Illustration 4.3.1: Scenarios after displacement abroad

Source: Author’s own illustration
Let us reiterate that the Guiding Principles define IDPs as

persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized state border (OCHA, 1998, para.2, emphasis added).

There are two possible readings of this latter element of the IDP definition. Either, one takes it to signify that the individuals displaced are within their country of habitual residence at the moment of taking stock of IDPs. Alternatively, one may interpret that the IDP definition stipulates that an IDP has not crossed an internationally recognized state border at any moment of their displacement trajectory. Such a reading would suggest that anyone who has crossed a border during their displacement journey ought not to be classified as an IDP, even if they at some point find themselves in a displacement-like situation in their country of habitual residence.

For several reasons, individuals to whom the humanitarian community responds under the label ‘IDP’ may have crossed an internationally recognized state border. In some instances, crossing the border and travelling through a neighbouring country may offer a safer route for accessing displacement locations within the country of habitual residence. This happened for example in Nigeria, where some of those fleeing Boko Haram’s violence would travel from Borno State to Adamawa State via Cameroon, and in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), where people escaped a volcano eruption in Goma in 2002 by fleeing to adjacent Rwanda, then returned to DRC via Lake Kivu (IO07). In such cases, a “stay” abroad can be purely transitory. In other cases, individuals will seek refuge abroad for some time and return to the country either spontaneously or in a facilitated manner on a voluntary basis, or involuntarily in the context of deportations or other pushbacks. In the case of spontaneous or involuntary returns, conditions are often not deemed ‘ripe’ for return, increasing the likelihood that individuals are neither able to return to their former habitual residences, nor to relocate (based on a voluntary choice) in a third area.

The Annotations to the Guiding Principles make some explicit provisions for the above scenarios, stating that:

Paragraph 2 is a descriptive identification of the category of persons whose needs are the concern of the Guiding Principles. It highlights two elements: (1) the coercive or otherwise involuntary character of movement; and (2) the fact that such movement takes place within national borders. The second requirement is to be understood in a broad sense. It refers to the place where the displaced persons finds refuge and is also met if displaced persons,
e.g., have to transit through the territory of a neighboring state in order to gain access to a safe part of their own country; first go abroad and then return (voluntarily or involuntarily) to their own country but cannot go back to their place of origin/habitual residence or home for reasons indicated in paragraph 2; or left voluntarily to another part of their country but cannot return to their homes because of events occurring during their absence that make return impossible or unreasonable (Kälin, n.d., pp.19–20, emphasis added).

It is also worth noting that prior to the Guiding Principles’ publication, the most widely used working definition of IDPs identified them as “persons who have been forced to flee their homes suddenly or unexpectedly in large numbers, as a result of armed conflict, internal strife, systematic violations of human rights or natural or man-made disasters, and who are within the territory of their own country” (Cohen and Deng, 1998, p.16, emphasis added). Similarly, the first legal experts’ meeting on the Kampala Convention embraced a definition of IDPs as “Persons or group of persons who are inside internationally recognized state borders of their country but who have been forced or obliged to flee” (Abebe, 2016, p.116, emphasis added), though this was later changed to align the phrasing with the one found in the Guiding Principles. Other early literature on the subject also seemed to support an inclusive reading that does not preclude refugees from becoming IDPs upon return to their country. Cohen and Deng (1998) cite the case of Rwandan returnees from Congo (Zaire) in 1996, many of whom “became internally displaced, either because they feared returning to their villages of origin, where they thought they might face reprisal, or because their homes and lands had been occupied by others” (p.41).

Cantor, founder and Director of the Refugee Law Initiative at the University of London, also notes that whilst IDPs are often cast as not having crossed a border, in practice “there are scenarios where IDPs can also be refugees or when both IDP and refugee law might apply concurrently” (Cantor, 2018, p.212), including in situations where refugees repatriate but then face a situation of internal displacement.

An analysis of the legal and policy framework in the IRIS also acknowledges that former refugees who have returned to their country of origin and who nonetheless are unable to find a durable solution may qualify as IDPs, whilst reiterating the explanations on the broad reading of the element of not having crossed an internationally recognized state border from the Annotations to the Guiding Principles (EU and UN, 2020, paras. 40, 56, 57). It concludes that the “concepts of returning refugees and IDPs are therefore not mutually exclusive, and under certain circumstances, an individual can be both a returning refugee and an IDP” (EU and UN, 2020, para. 57). In principle then, it appears that the Guiding Principles, in conjunction with the Annotations, take an explicit stance in favour of an inclusive reading, and that such a reading has also been standard practice in legal and policy frameworks. However, as one respondent noted, “I doubt many people who are involved in producing IDP data have ever read
the Guiding Principles, let alone the Annotations” (I018). It may thus be naïve to assume that actors in
the field are strongly guided by a nuanced reading of these documents.

A review of documentation and web content by four key actors who have been engaged in the debate
(IDMC, IOM, OCHA and UNHCR) provides further relevant insights into how the Guiding Principles
definition is used and interpreted. In addition, the IRIS, an internationally agreed framework to improve
the production, coordination and dissemination of high-quality, comparable official statistics on IDPs,
which was formulated by EGRiSS and endorsed by the UN Statistical Commission in 2020, play a
relevant role as well. Each is now considered in turn.

Both IOM and IDMC have quite explicitly endorsed an inclusive understanding of the IDP category
that supports a nested interpretation of the IDP category and any other label referring to a previous
displacement abroad, such as “refugee returnee”. IOM’s Framework for Addressing Internal
Displacement (IOM, 2017) specifically states that “Internal displacement is dynamic in nature: anyone
can be, or become, another category of mobile population. Refugees, for instance, often begin as IDPs;
while returning refugees may become IDPs if they are unable to return sustainably to their communities of origin” (IOM, 2017, p.6, emphasis added). Similarly, IDMC’s displacement data
model, developed to indicate how different types of population flows influence the total number of
people displaced at a specific point in time, includes “cross-border returns to displacement” as one of
the flows which adds to the IDP stock – see illustration below.

Illustration 4.3.2: IDMC’s displacement data model

(IDMC, 2021, p.6, info box added)
An IDMC employee confirmed that “when people are registered as refugees or asylum seekers and they return to their home country, and they return to a situation of displacement, then we would count them as internally displaced” (I019).

OCHA, in a section of its website dedicated to exploring the theme of internal displacement, describes IDPs as “people who are forced to flee their homes due to armed conflict, generalized violence, violations of human rights, or natural or human-made disasters, but who remain within their own country” (OCHA, 2021). Whilst this is not as explicit an endorsement of the inclusive reading as is provided by IOM and IDMC, the phrase ‘who remain within their own country’ rather than emphasizing the element of not having crossed a state border could be seen as leaning towards an inclusive reading, though one which remains open to interpretation.

Likewise, UNHCR does not offer an explicit stance on how it reads the Guiding Principles IDP definition, with its Policy on UNHCR’s Engagement in Situations of Internal Displacement referring directly to the Guiding Principles definition (UNHCR, 2019, p.14). On its website, however, UNHCR emphasizes the aspect of not having crossed a border explicitly, stating that “Internally displaced people (IDPs) have not crossed a border to find safety. Unlike refugees, they are on the run at home. IDPs stay within their own country and remain under the protection of its government” (UNHCR, n.d., emphasis added). In its Emergency Handbook, the organisation highlights that “[t]here are two important elements in the IDP definition: the movement is involuntary and takes place within national borders” (UNHCR, n.d.). It further states that “IDPs are also distinct from refugees because they have not crossed an internationally recognized territorial border, and thus do not require a special legal status” (UNHCR, n.d.). The language emphasizing the aspect of not having crossed a border suggests a possibly more exclusionary reading of the Guiding Principles IDP definition.

Whilst the IRIS recognises that the concepts of returning refugee and IDP are not mutually exclusive, as per current legal and policy frameworks (cf. IRIS Chapter 2), its third chapter, which develops the statistical framework, takes a more restrictive approach to the subject which does not align with how organizations such as IOM and IDMC have been operationalizing the IDP label. IRIS excludes persons who have returned from abroad after seeking international protection and other displaced persons returned from abroad after a period of 12 months from the statistical framework and the scope of the recommendations (EU and UN, 2020, para.82). These two groups of people are understood to have taken up usual residence in another country before their return, and are excluded “in order to avoid double counting in official statistics” (EU and UN, 2020, para.86) and, for those who did not seek international protection but stayed outside the country for over 12 months, because “they have changed their country of usual residence and have not been displaced since their return to their country of habitual residence” (EU and UN, 2020, para.88). It is said that both groups “can be counted as IDPs only if they suffer a new displacement after returning to their habitual country of residence” (EU and
UN, 2020, para.89). Its introductory chapter also includes a subtle but consequential rephrasing of the Guiding Principles’ IDP definition. Instead of ‘(…) and who have not crossed an internationally recognized state border’, IRIS refers to IDPs as those “who have remained living in the country’s internationally recognized border’(EU and UN, 2020, emphasis added).

It appears then that the statistical approach does not favour the inclusive reading of the Guiding Principles definition as it has been used by IOM and IDMC, even though the Annotations to the Guiding Principles support an inclusive approach. Ultimately, though, much hinges on where one sets the threshold for a ‘new displacement’, as the IRIS does acknowledge the possibility of being counted once again as an IDP if a new displacement event occurs. One IDP expert explained that the threshold for counting as an IDP after a return from abroad would be the same as for a first displacement: “All these criteria that are included that are from the Guiding Principles (…) need to be satisfied for anyone for re-displacement. A re-displacement is the same as a displacement” (I018). And a former EGRIS Coordinator also conceded that “if you apply that statistical framework as it’s here, a refugee return would be calculated or counted as a refugee return. But of course, if he or she experiences a new displacement, then it will be an IDP” (I017). They further underscored that “it is important to remember that the statistical definition is different than the legal and policy definition” (ibid.) and that exclusion from the official statistics should not be equated with being excluded from receiving support and services, with ‘operational statistics’ still playing an important role. It was also noted that in many contexts, operational data is the only data available on this population group (I012).

With this information on the evolution and operationalization of the IDP label at global level in mind, the analysis now turns to the specifics in the case of South Sudan.

4.4 South Sudan Background

On 9 July 2011, the new Republic of South Sudan declared its independence. This marked the end of a six-year transition period since a Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) had been signed between the Government of Sudan and the South Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) in 2005, ending a decades-long liberation war. The CPA guaranteed a right to self-determination and an overwhelming majority of voters voiced their support for independence in a January 2011 referendum (Johnson, 2016). But the transition proved challenging and by December 2013, violent confrontations between different power factions led by President Salva Kiir and the (former) vice president Riek Machar ensued, triggering a civil war with devastating consequences, as outlined in a timeline compiled by AlJazeera (n.d.). Fighting ceased temporarily, following the signing of a peace accord in August 2015 which provided for Machar’s re-appointment as vice president. Machar briefly returned to the capital Juba in April 2016, but went again into exile as fighting resumed between supporters of both leaders by July 2016. It took until September 2018 for a revitalized peace agreement to be signed,
aiming to end five years of civil war that killed hundreds of thousands and displaced roughly four million people. The agreement envisaged a power sharing government to be installed by May 2019, a deadline which was extended twice. In February 2020, Machar was sworn in once again as vice-president (ibid.). The situation since has been more stable, though the peace has been described as fragile and “at high risk of collapse” (International Crisis Group, 2019, p.35).

As documented by the IDMC Global Internal Displacement Database and UNHCR Refugee Statistics, in 2014, the number of internally displaced South Sudanese was reported at 1,498,000 (IDMC, 2022), with over 600,000 South Sudanese refugees recorded outside the country (UNHCR, 2022), a half a million increase compared to 2013 (ibid.). The displacement crisis continued to worsen, with the number of recorded IDPs peaking at 1.9 million in 2017 (IDMC, 2022), and 2.4 million South Sudanese refugees reported under the mandate of UNHCR in the same year (UNHCR, 2022). Latest available estimates suggest that there remain over 1.3 million South Sudanese IDPs (IDMC, 2022) and over 2.3 million refugees (UNHCR, 2022).

The majority (76%) of South Sudan’s internally displaced are living in dispersed settings within the host community, whilst a quarter (24%) are residing in camps or camp-like settings (IOM DTM, 2022b). A particular feature of the international community’s response in South Sudan has been the establishment of Protection of Civilian (PoC) sites, within or adjacent to the bases of UN peacekeeping forces. These sites initially hosted over 58,000 civilians seeking protection, with 180,000 civilians remaining in six sites as of the latest available update from June 2020 (UNMISS, 2020). As of September 2020, the remaining sites began transitioning to conventional displacement camps, with UN peacekeepers withdrawing from the sites and placing the areas under the sovereign control of South Sudan (Mold, 2020).

The situation throughout the course of the conflict has been dire, not only for those who became displaced, but also for the general population. The IPC analysis has shown food insecurity levels to be substantial in the period 2015-2022 (OCHA, 2022b). The World Food Programme (WFP) estimates that 8.3 million people out of a total population of 12.4 million are severely food insecure (WFP South Sudan, n.d.).

Returns to the country were registered picking up significantly following the finalization of the Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS) in September 2018. Looking at the returnee stock as of June 2022, data suggests that more returnees arrived in the last three months of 2018 (over 280,000) than in the nine preceding months (over 230,000), and about three quarter (74%) of the returnees identified by IOM’s DTM arrived post the signing of the peace agreement (IOM DTM, 2022a). It is in this context that the IDP label became
visibly and strongly contested in South Sudan, as part of a debate about the relationship between the labels ‘IDP’ and ‘spontaneous refugee returnee’.

4.5 IDPs, Refugee Returnees, Both? The Debate In South Sudan

As seen in section 3.1.3, at global level IDMC and IOM explicitly endorse the view that individuals who have been displaced abroad can, upon return to the country, become IDPs (provided they are not able to return to their former habitual residence or relocate to a freely chosen new habitual residence), whilst others, such as UNHCR and OCHA, do not show a clear stance on the subject. The case of South Sudan serves to further illustrate how this debate has played out in a particular country context. Mirroring the contestation on whether refugees are migrants outlined in the theoretical framework, the question became whether someone could simultaneously be (labelled as) a ‘spontaneous refugee returnee’ and an ‘IDP’. Some actors advocated for a nested understanding, whereby the larger group of IDPs also includes some spontaneous refugee returnees (this paper will refer to this as an ‘inclusive’ interpretation of the IDP definition), whilst others considered the two categories to be mutually exclusive.

In South Sudan, the debate about population categories and numbers was driven mainly by two UN agencies: UNHCR and IOM. In 2018, IOM had begun reporting regularly on the number of IDPs and returnees in the country. Its data collection initially covered six of the ten states, reaching full country coverage as of the fourth round of data collection (IOM DTM, 2018). Initially, the data collected did not consider whether any of the IDPs and returnees had previously been displaced abroad, but simply took stock of the number of IDPs and returnees (the latter defined as individuals who had been displaced and since returned to their habitual residence) at a given moment in time. In early 2019, when four rounds of data collection had been completed, identifying 1.2 million IDPs and over 860,000 returnees, UNHCR approached IOM with a request to better account for refugee returnees. UNHCR at the time did not consider returns to South Sudan safe and did not facilitate any such returns, meaning those coming back from abroad did so spontaneously and without outside assistance, making it difficult to track what happened to refugees once they crossed back into South Sudan (I013). In response, IOM agreed to further disaggregate numbers in its data collection, namely, to distinguish among the stock of IDPs between those who had been exclusively displaced within South Sudan versus those who had also spent time displaced abroad and, likewise, among the stock of returnees, between those who had returned to their habitual residence after being displaced within the country, versus those who had returned to their habitual residence after a displacement abroad (Meeting Minutes: IOM and UNHCR Technical Meeting, 28 March 2019, p. 1). The meeting minutes further note that such efforts “to allow for data to be disaggregated to better capture different population categories is welcomed and appreciated by UNHCR” (ibid., p. 2).
The more nuanced disaggregation of IDPs and returnees was thus introduced and reflected in subsequent rounds of data collection, starting with Round 5 published in July 2019 (IOM DTM, 2019). Whilst IOM continued to analyse its findings in terms of the overall IDP and returnee figures, the datasets, which were made publicly available, would allow anyone interested to focus on any desired subset of information, such as “IDPs previously displaced abroad + returnees previously displaced abroad” to assess the situation of refugee returnees (I007).

However, the adjustment in data collection and representation did not mark an end to the discussion, which was only to begin in earnest in the following months, as preparations were under way for the 2020 HPC cycle. In different meetings held throughout the course of 2019, focus shifted to the question of whether those who had spent time displaced abroad should at all be included in the IDP category, or instead be treated as a separate group – namely, ‘spontaneous refugee returnees in an IDP-like situation’ (I002; I013). UNHCR positioned itself strongly in favour of this approach, emphasizing that returns to the country might only be temporary in nature, that people were testing the waters and that there was fluent movement back and forth between South Sudan and the neighbouring countries. Those who were returning to the country would not officially deregister from the refugee camps, maintaining their registration cards (which also serve as ration cards during food distributions), with fluid movement across borders during food distribution periods an acknowledged phenomenon.

The former Head of OCHA in South Sudan recalls the debate as follows: “From an OCHA perspective, we didn't have a sort of strong ideological position necessarily. What we wanted was clarity in the way people were thinking about this” (I006). Meanwhile, from UNHCR’s point of view, “if you had been a refugee and you're inside South Sudan, then you're a refugee returning, not an IDP”, whereas IOM's position was “if you're inside the country and not in your home, then you're internally displaced” (ibid.). This positioning between the three key actors was affirmed throughout the interviews, where respondents described how in IOM’s view, individuals which were inside the country and not in their former home (or a new permanent residence of their choice) were considered IDPs, independent of their previous displacement trajectory (I009, I013). Meanwhile, “UNHCR came up with its own term and its own new category of individual called returned refugee in an IDP-like situation. And they classified or they accounted for that stock of people, that group of people, in that manner” (I016).

Respondents observed that this happened to the disagreement of other actors, with UNHCR holding a minority view (I006; I016). The introduction of the new label triggered surprise and indignation. The former Head of Data Analysis at IDMC and a senior IOM staff indicated that “no one has ever seen this term returned refugees in an IDP-like situation before” (I016) and that the introduction of the label “actually took everyone by surprise” (I002). A UN staff member who is a focal point on displacement also stated to have never come across that type of terminology in their previous years working in humanitarian response contexts (I008). As a senior IOM official said:
by and large, aside from one organisation, which is UNHCR, everyone was of the opinion, professional opinion, that it does not make sense. We've had IDPs, refugees, returnees and host communities (…) these are the key categories for all intents and purposes that our programming was built and developed to support. And those were also the four categories that the government recommends (I002).

Speaking about how the new proposed population categories were perceived by South Sudanese nationals in the government who had experienced displacement, one respondent suggested that it triggered incredulity and surprise at the ability of the humanitarian community to create new terminology:

They have a very clear understanding whether they were refugees, or they were internally displaced people. I mean, we have utilised this terminology so much that we have embedded on them (…) So they were also puzzled. (I005)

Local perceptions and opinions were not taken into account in the way the IDP label was operationalised and contested. As some respondents reflected, humanitarian actors were just using categories without consulting if this corresponded with how people understood themselves and their needs (I010, I016). One pointed out how challenging it proved to convey the newly created labels relating to refugee returnees to local staff, noting that because labels were produced externally, it sometimes took a long time to explain what they meant, based on definitions that came out of these debates and these extra labels, “it became complicated” (I013). Thus, what serves as a linguistic shorthand for policymakers does not necessarily translate into the lived reality of the affected population.

Reception within the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT)4 and among the donor community was also sceptical, with repeated questions being asked about the new categorization, including what value it added (I002). It was perceived that UNHCR “didn't really have much evidence to support their classification” (I016). “But nevertheless, through political leveraging and political levering, they successfully managed to have those people accounted for as such in the HNO” (ibid.).

The debate became closely tied up with perceptions around different organisations’ mandates and responsibilities, and with discussions between the Protection Cluster (led by UNHCR) and the CCCM Cluster (co-led by IOM and UNHCR) (I009). In this politically charged context, the technical teams, including members of IOM’s DTM team and UNHCR Protection and Information Management Officers convened in several follow-up meetings to try and determine possible solutions, at times joined by OCHA and others in Technical Working Group meetings. The negotiations on the subject were

4 The HCT is lead by the Humanitarian Coordinator / Resident Coordinator and comprises the Cluster Lead Agencies (at Country Representative/Director level) and selected operational partners (OCHA, 2017)
further complicated by different propositions being brought to the table at different points in time: initially, it was acknowledged that individuals could be simultaneously refugee returnees and IDPs, later this was denied (I013).

Attempts to harmonize approaches were eventually joined by technical experts from IDMC, who convened a dedicated workshop which however also failed to bring about a solution (I008). Follow-up discussions at the technical and political levels lasted until around June 2021, without a conclusion being reached, as it proved impossible to achieve a shared understanding of the population subgroups. OCHA sat with IOM and UNHCR with an objective of harmonising the datasets, but the exercise failed due to issues related to incompatible tools, definitions and methodologies (I008). The sub-label ‘spontaneous refugee returnees in an IDP-like situation’ was eventually dropped from the HNO, because it was deemed unnecessary and unmeasurable (I007), but the underlying dispute was not resolved, with actors instead agreeing to disagree (I019).

4.6 Chapter Summary

This chapter has delved into the “how” of operationalization and contestation of the IDP label, both globally and in the South Sudan case. It has illustrated that despite a shared reference to the Guiding Principles and its IDP definition, a diversity of interpretations and approaches exist when operationalizing the label. In some cases, this has to do with questions related to what counts as the end of displacement (the physical return to the former habitual residence, or the resolution of the displacement-related vulnerabilities), which in and of themselves are highly contentious. In other cases, the debate arises from different stances on how to deal with individuals who have experienced a period of displacement outside their country of habitual residence, if these individuals return to the country, but cannot return to their former homes or a location where they wish to relocate to. The chapter has illustrated that globally, IDMC and IOM have taken a clear stance on counting such individuals as IDPs, aligned with the Annotations to the Guiding Principles, whilst OCHA and UNHCR have been vaguer on the subject. Meanwhile, within the statistical sphere, an exclusion of these individuals from the IDP category is advocated, in alignment with existing statistical recommendations on refugees and migrants. In the South Sudan case, the same fault line manifests, whereby IOM and IDMC positioned themselves for an inclusive operationalization of the IDP label, OCHA refrained from taking an explicit stance, and UNHCR advocated for an exclusionary approach, classifying any individuals previously displaced abroad as ‘spontaneous refugee returnees in an IDP-like situation’, rather than as IDPs.
5. WHY LABELS ARE OPERATIONALIZED DIFFERENTLY AND CONTESTED

Why did the IDP label become contested in the way it did in South Sudan, at that particular moment in time? The increased scale of returns from outside the country back to South Sudan likely had something to do with why the debate arose when it did. And the ambiguities inherent in the Guiding Principles definition offered a space for contestation to arise. But these factors aside, what were the conditions which brought about the intense discussions which evolved from 2019 onwards?

Analysis of the interviews identified different explanations for the particular operationalisations and associated contestation explored above. These include mandates and organisational politics, funding competition and donor structure, the agency of individual staff members in influential positions, as well as external factors and interests. Each of these is considered in this chapter, inquiring which interests different actors pursued in putting forward their understanding and interpretation of the IDP label.

5.1 Mandates

It has been said that “UN agencies in particular and humanitarians in general often see problems through the prism of their own mandates” (Reindorp and Wiles, 2001, p.27). During this research, many respondents pointed to the role of organisational mandates as a driver of the debate. As one said,

[T]his discussion at the end of the day is political. There's a question of mandate, there are questions of resources that are required and who should have access to those resources. There’s a question of the target population and who should be the gatekeeper of access to the population. (I002)

One respondent observed that “labelling or (…) packaging your people of concern to fit the mandate is something that I think all organizations do” (I002). In a similar vein, the former Head of OCHA in South Sudan observed that how you categorise people has not only a bearing on what assistance they might get, but also on who has the responsibility to provide that assistance: “Weirdly, I think a big part of this even had to do with did anybody other than UNHCR have a right to count people who were, you know, who were refugee returnees and to classify them in a certain way” (I006). This brings to mind Barnett and Finnemore’s (1999) observation that “labeling the social context establishes the parameters, the very boundaries, of acceptable action” (p.711).

As the refugee-mandated agency, UNHCR has a duty to follow up on what happens to refugee returnees after they go back to their country of origin and until they have reached a solution to their displacement situation (I004, I005; I020). Hence, UNHCR was highlighting “the importance of the analysis and representation of data to not result in any negative impact or misrepresentation of the protection environment for affected populations, with specific consideration for the preservation of asylum space in neighboring countries and safeguarding the legal rights of refugees” (Meeting Minutes: IOM and
UNHCR Technical Meeting, 28 March 2019, 2). However, this could not explain why the population categories were presented as needing to be distinct, rather than allowing for a nested view of IDPs and spontaneous refugee returnees. One respondent recalled that different actors perceived that “UNHCR was purposefully being difficult and hindering” IOM’s work in what came across as a territorial battle (I013).

The instrumentalization of the IDP conceptualization thus seems to be intricately linked to questions of mandate, similarly to the debate about whether refugees are migrants. A “lack the flexibility to reach across the aisles to arrive at common solutions” (I008) between different agencies has been observed as a barrier. This recalls Clark’s (2021) reference to the “pathologies of competition under regime complexity”(p.1133). Respondents from different agencies suggested that by insisting on a distinct labelling for spontaneous refugee returnees in an IDP-like situation, UNHCR was able to project itself as the entity in charge, including providing the statistics on this population group (I019, I006, I007, I013). By contrast, for individuals labelled IDPs, this responsibility was to be shared with other actors, as no clear/singular mandate holder exists for IDPs, and coordination lies with OCHA. Therefore, the debate was seen in a way as part of an effort to ascertain and expand one’s mandate (I002, I008), a trait considered a common feature among international organisations (Barnett and Finnemore, 2004).

5.2 Funding Competition And Donor Structure

Closely tied to the mandate question is the question of securing funds (I003, I007), with the fight over resources being a central part of humanitarian responses across the world (I002). As one respondent observed, the humanitarian community “tend to politicize specific caseloads (…) it creates a lot of friction and competition, because (…) all these things are attached to resources and financing” (I001). Another suggested that they “felt at times that certain organisations were using this debate to claim certain responsibilities over a group of people, and [to] raise more funds” (I005). And a third respondent suggested that certain organisations pushed for putting the concept of ‘spontaneous refugee returnees in an IDP-like situation’ into the HNO to “ensure their piece of the pie, which is money for activities that they can only engage in when their mandate is in question or when their responsibilities are relevant” (I013).

This happens in a context where “there’s a push from donors who want to know that their money is being well spent, or who want to know how to prioritise where their money should be spent. Because of course the available funding is finite” (I018). Therefore, definitions and categories are “quite useful (…) because it allows the donor to justify why the funds have been attributed or given to a specific group of people and not to the other” (I005). Narrowing the scope and focusing on a specific population subset can be a means of prioritization in the context of limited funds, whilst labelling people in a particular way can also form an element of attracting funding. The example of the distinct treatment of
and focus on IDPs in PoC sites was cited as one instance where narrowing the scope helped to fundraise in a more targeted manner, albeit “those constructions were a bit fake” (I005).

Several respondents observed how donors play into the sense of competition through the way they allocate funding and even through the way that different donor entities are structured. For example, the United States’ humanitarian assistance is split between the State’s Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration (PRM) and the Bureau of Humanitarian Assistance (BHA)/USAID, two bodies which evolved along distinct trajectories, with PRM traditionally focusing more on refugee-related emergencies, and BHA/USAID focusing on non-refugee humanitarian crises (Konyndyk, 2018; I006; I014). Since “few modern crises fall neatly into a single category (…) the US frequently applies inconsistent response models toward the same emergency” (ibid., p.7). It also plays into the ‘refugees/other’ bifurcation which becomes visible in the ‘refugee/migrant’ and ‘refugee returnee/IDP’ debates. Several respondents further perceived that refugees tend to be more interesting to Western donors, with one confirming that “there's definitely some sort of imbalance in favour of the refugees that are always a little bit more in the focus than the IDPs” (I013, I014). Likewise, it was argued that the refugee term is one which a non-humanitarian audience can better connect with than the term IDP or any other label (I007).

5.3 Organisational Politics Versus The Role Of Individual Staff Members

A senior IOM official, reflecting on how similar attempts to introduce concepts such as ‘spontaneous refugee returnee in an IDP-like situation’ had also been made in other contexts (albeit without gaining the traction as it did in South Sudan), took this as evidence of the debate being triggered by higher politics: “I don't think the country, the country office, comes up with that position by themselves in the oppositions of everyone else (…) it's probably an organisational position, that the country has to toe to” (I002). However, an explanation which relies on mandates, organisational politics and competition over limited funding alone cannot explain why the debate failed to attain similar traction in other countries, which were faced with comparable displacement-and-return dynamics. Thus, the role of individuals within an organisation and particular context should also be considered.

One respondent reflects on the role of individual agency in the debate as follows:

I think sometimes it's not so much linked to the agencies per se, but the particular people who are leading those agencies (…) many times I was doubting whether the person who was speaking was speaking on behalf (…) of the organisation they were representing, or were expressing their personal views. And of course (…) if you are the Deputy of an organisation, your personal views are probably being accepted as the views of the organisation (…) Meaning you as a human being have a huge capacity to influence (…) the position of your organisation. (I005)
The same respondent pointed out that specific staff at that time were the ones who made the debate more prominent, explaining that “tensions between organisations’ mandates will be exacerbated by certain personalities (…) those constructed concepts of refugee returnees and IDP returnees (…) may not have happened with different people” (ibid.). They also stressed that there is no such thing as a static UNHCR or IOM position. Instead, “in each organisation you have people, and those people are the ones driving those positions and that debate” (ibid.).

Others also emphasized that “we shouldn't downplay the role of personalities involved” (I013). “There's always an element of your interpretation of what you think or have been told your organisation’s policy position is, you know, and then there's always going to be an individual interpretation of that” (I006). The relationship between IOM and UNHCR “plays out in some context in a different way than in others, depending more or less on the leadership of each organisation in those contexts and how collaborative they are or not” (I018). Another respondent suggested that it all depends on the balance in between the different organisations and how strong the humanitarian coordinator and OCHA are (I007). Additional weight to the proposition that an interplay between organizational mandates and individual staff positions is at play was lent by a member of the CCCM Cluster, who described how the narrative of the discussion later changed, when “new people came in with a new way of thinking and new way of coordination and not buying in the individual organisation politics” (I009).

5.4 External Factors And Interests

Whilst the elements explored so far may already on their own provide sufficient grounds for the debate to have emerged as and when it did, the political context and the others interests appear to have provided further grounds for its emergence.

Several respondents referred to a keen interest from the Government of South Sudan (GOSS) in the returns back to the country (I008, I016, I006). This includes a desire to send a positive message to the outside world and foreign investors regarding the improved situation in the country (I016). Therefore, the GOSS may have well had an interest in emphasizing the number of returns and downplaying the scale of internal displacement, including the fact that some of those returning to South Sudan found themselves in continued displacement. As one respondent put it, the categorization put forward by UNHCR “was in line with the political agenda in South Sudan, which was that South Sudan was basically back open for business, encouraging foreign direct investment (…) having high numbers of IDPs was seen by the government as something that would not be supportive of that messaging and agenda” (I016).

However, the impact the GOSS had on the debate appears to have been only secondary, to the extent that the GOSS left a space for the discussions to proceed and did not actively intervene by taking any particular stance – something that may have also been related to a lack of capacity. As one respondent
put it, the GOSS “has much more important things to do to keep the country together, than to debate about how they call the people who returned from abroad” (I007). However, such a passive stance may well have been a decisive factor allowing for the debate to manifest in the way it did, since a clear positioning from the side of the government would likely have forced the different actors to align with official government policy.

Meanwhile, from the side of the international community, there were concerns about the kind of messaging which certain types of labels were sending to the neighbouring countries, as well as to donors. The return of individuals from abroad began to raise questions about the number of registered South Sudanese refugees, and whether those needed some downwards revision. This linked to concerns that neighbouring countries might reduce their support for refugees if the spontaneous returns left the impression that international protection was no longer needed (I002, I004, I010). Such concerns shaped up in a context where towards the end of 2019, “a consensus seemed to be forming around the idea that the post-war refugee protection regime was either dead or in critical condition”, with many actors “abandoning the notion of refugee protection more overtly and aggressively than in previous decades” (Hamlin, 2021, p.154). Such concerns help explain why there was such a strong desire to assert the spontaneous nature of returns and make a continued claim to crossborder returnees’ status as refugees, especially on UNHCR’s side, given its refugee protection mandate and concerns about a decrease in support for the refugee protection regime (cf. Hamlin, 2021). Indeed, UNHCR was quick to point out that the returning individuals had not necessarily chosen to relinquish their refugee status and oftentimes continued to hold on to, and make use of, registration cards in accessing assistance in the refugee camps. There was thus a strong interest in emphasizing the spontaneous, and possibly not sustainable, nature of the returns, as well as the fluid nature of cross-border movements. Accordingly, the HNO 2021 observed that data limitations include “overlapping of spontaneous refugee returnees in South Sudan who still hold refugee status in the region and therefore double-counted as refugees and as spontaneous refugee returnees” (OCHA South Sudan, 2021, p.85).

Another external factor which seems to have shaped the debate, albeit indirectly, was the development of the IRIS between 2018-2020, where the question if and how to delineate between IDPs and refugee returnees was also contended. The former Head of Data Analysis at IDMC described the discussions in South Sudan and within EGRISS as not necessarily linked by cause-and-effect, but as constituting two different fronts of discussion with remarkable parallels (I016). Respondents familiar with the IRIS’ development confirmed that concerns about double-counting between the International Recommendations on Refugee Statistics and the Recommendations on Statistics of International Migration, which both existed prior to the development and endorsement of the IRIS, played into the choices made around whom to count (I017; I020). Another respondent closely involved with the process echoed this point, whilst indicating that concern with a steadily increasing IDP stock also played a part:
“There was that political pressure (…) we couldn't develop these Recommendations in a way that would only contribute to further exponentially increasing the numbers” (I018). Since the aspiration is to eventually align the IRIS with operational data collection practices (I020), the decision taken on how to count IDPs in IRIS may thus well have started to trickle down to the field level, and inspired some of the positioning seen in South Sudan.

5.5 Chapter summary

This chapter has delved into the “why” of operationalization and contestation of the IDP label. The interview findings suggest that several factors influenced the timing and manifestation of the debate in South Sudan. Beyond contextual factors, such as an increased number of returns to the country and the relative passivity of the GOSS, it was shown that agency mandates, organizational politics, funding competition and the personalities of different individuals within each agency all contributed to the debate manifesting in the way it did, whilst external factors and interests, including related to a push for improved IDP statistics, and concerns about a dwindling refugee protection space, show to have further exacerbated it.

6. CONSEQUENCES AND IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICYMAKING

As described in the theoretical framework, labels tend to carry consequences for the way the needs of people are addressed, since they “institutionalize and differentiate categories of eligibility and entitlements” (Zetter, 2007, p.180; cf. also Barutckis, 1998). In a best-case scenario, labels can help to articulate needs and focus a humanitarian response in a meaningful way. But as the preceding chapters have shown, labels can also give rise to a unique set of challenges. Zetter’s (1991) observation that labels assume often conflicting, politicized meanings is clearly reflected in how the IDP label has been operationalised and contested globally and in South Sudan, as are Barnett and Finnmore’s (1999) observations on how bureaucracies exert power through their ability to classify and to shift definitions to suit their interests and needs. So, what are the consequences – intended and unintended – of how the IDP label and other labels for forcibly displaced individuals have been operationalized and contested, as manifested in the case of South Sudan? This chapter considers this question, along with implications for policymaking.

6.1 Intended And Unintended Consequences

During the interviews, it was acknowledged that labels can be useful tools, whose application allows to compare different situations and to advocate for the affected population (I016, I007). Well-used, labels should allow to address the particular protection needs of different affected populations in a targeted manner. But unintended consequences can also arise, especially where the operationalization of labels is contested. The division and resulting tension can result in inefficient use of resources, whilst it also triggers the risk of people falling off the radar. Each of these is now considered in turn.
The desire to single out returning refugees can be understood against the backdrop of their stronger position to make a claim to protection by UNHCR (Feller, 2005, p.34). In cases where there is a strong returnee monitoring system in place, employing a specific label can allow UNHCR to keep track of these populations until it is clear if returning refugees have indeed decided to stay (I020). But whilst UNHCR’s institutional commitment was acknowledged, respondents questioned whether singling out refugee returnees and ‘refugee returnees in an IDP-like situation’ led to any actual difference in service provision (I002, I004, I009). As one interviewee noted, “the issue is we get lost when we do not link the definition to what it means in terms of our work” (I011). Another underscored that

we have to be a bit more critical on how we use this labelling (…) and what is the purpose (…) if it's just for the purpose of counting people (…) and we just strictly say OK, because you are inside of the country you are internally displaced, or because you are outside you are a refugee. Or we start creating sub-categories and types of displacement - internal displacement – because we have different interests. (I005)

In South Sudan, different interests seem to have prevailed. As one UN staff member pointed out, regarding “backing up the needs analysis and severity mapping of that subgroup of the population, we couldn't do much because of a lack of the supporting datasets” (I008). A review of the HNO’s description of the needs of IDPs versus refugee returnees in an IDP-like situation also fails to convey meaningful differences that would be particular to just one of the groups, with challenges such as documentation, access to services, housing, land and property, experiences of gender-based violence and inter-communal competition arguably facing both groups (OCHA South Sudan, 2021, p. 30). Ultimately, the preoccupation with labels became delinked from questions of provision of aid (I013).

Instead of focusing the humanitarian response and addressing particular needs, the different labels attached to population groups and their multiple interpretations became a counterproductive distraction in South Sudan. A UN staff member described how in 2019, as preparations were under way for the 2020 HNO, confusion arose due to the discrepancies in numbers and in population groups being reported by different entities. Since agencies were struggling to use the provided datasets in their operational planning, the issues was then raised at the HCT level (I008).

Another respondent also reflects on how the label ‘spontaneous refugee returnee in an IDP-like situation’ muddled rather than clarified the population groups, indicating that

the best judgement for that is when you go to the Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs, the national staff who are working there (…) those who are close to the community, will tell you what is this new way of calling people? At the end of day, we are just serving our
people (…) That element of labelling so much (…) created more confusion and starts losing the point. (I005)

For the CCCM cluster, which has a particular and limited focus on only the IDP population, unlike other clusters who target people in need more broadly, the lack of agreement on who to include in the IDP population group posed a particularly big challenge. It also affected fundraising, “because if we don't have the clear target population then we are not able to plan for them and that means we're not able to address the diverse needs of the population”, a member of the CCCM Cluster in South Sudan explained (I009). Other clusters considered the distinction drawn between IDPs and refugee returnees in an IDP-like situation as unnecessary due to their programming decisions being taken based on people in need, rather than their status (I010). One interviewee suggested that “that second labelling (…) that extra category, subcategory of labelling was creating more divide and more outside treatment than benefits” (I005), further noting that

if we start creating construction, definitions, concepts that rather than being inclusive, become restrictive, I think we are missing the point. And my personal perception was that for a given period of time, and for certain situations in South Sudan, that was the case. The definition was used rather to exclude than to include. (I005)

Whilst acknowledging that for UNHCR as the refugee-mandated agency the label ‘spontaneous refugee returnee in an IDP-like situation’ may carry importance, they suggested that “when it comes to communities, when it comes to a society, the only thing that it creates is divides. And unfair treatment” (I005). This sentiment was also echoed by other interviewees, who pointed out the risks in terms of creating inter-communal tensions, especially considering already existing perceptions that those who had spent time abroad had received privileged assistance and access to resources (I002). It was also observed that labels were dehumanizing and reductionist (I003).

Another unintended consequence of the discord about the labels to be employed is that it can lead to unhealthy competition and inefficient use of resources. One respondent observed its potential to trigger “a lot of waste (…) because everyone is in competition with everyone (…) I think it's insane the positioning that everyone is doing (…) it leads to inefficient response” (I014). On a personal level, in South Sudan the debate created additional work and distracted staff from other important tasks (I010, I013). Furthermore, the debate posed a mental strain (I013) and was demotivating for those involved, since some data collection and consolidation work was dismissed (I009, I010, I016).

An excessive focus on how to ‘correctly’ label can also obscure the needs of those who do not fall within the main categories of contestation – for example those who stayed behind. Which group is most vulnerable is very context specific (I015) and “one problem with defining categories in today’s world
of increased global mobility (…) is that it can serve to obscure the real needs”(Feller, 2005, p.35). Multiple interviewees pointed out that the resident population (often described as “host community”) is by default considered as less vulnerable than displaced and returning populations, but that such assumptions are not always true (I009; I011; I013). Thus, using labels as a shorthand for the articulation of needs can backfire. Other factors such as age, gender, livelihood and so on may be a much stronger indicator for needs (I016).

Finally, the discord about how to label ‘correctly’ created a tangible and manifested risk of some people not being counted and receiving the assistance they required. As one respondents explained,

adding additional categories without means of actually understanding who the specific population groups are, of defining who they are, we are not only potentially limiting their access to humanitarian assistance. They may fall off the radar. (I002)

Such falling of the radar appears to indeed have occurred, due to the misalignment between UNHCR’s and IOM’s understanding and accounting for the different population (sub)categories. If one compares the number of returnees reported by IOM’s DTM in mid-2019, when the HNO 2020 was developed, to the number of returnees reflected in the document, one will note that the figures differ substantially. IOM’s report identified over 1 million returnees, of whom a third were previously displaced abroad (IOM DTM, 2019). By contrast, the HNO 2020 referred to only 526,000 returnees overall, and as little as 54,000 “spontaneous refugee returnees in places of return” (OCHA South Sudan, 2019, p.5). Such discrepancies came about because “the numbers from IOM and the numbers from UNHCR didn't match and they didn't match in a really big way” (I006) and because UNHCR insisted on being the sole data provider for those individuals with a previous displacement trajectory outside South Sudan, despite only holding data from a few areas in the country (I013). Thus, IOM’s data for returns from abroad was not considered and instead, UNHCR provided a (limited) figure based on its verification exercises for spontaneous refugee returnees in places of return (ibid).5

In summary, despite the good intentions which may have underpinned the different operationalizations of the IDP and refugee returnee labels, several unintended and negative consequences emerged, especially because these labels were treated as mutually exclusive, rather than nested.

5 The following year’s HNO reflected a substantially higher returnee figure, comprising 1.1 million internal returnees based on IOM DTM data, and 335,000 spontaneous refugee returnees reported by UNHCR (OCHA South Sudan, 2021). The discrepancy in data thus decreased to about 200,000 individuals (IOM’s DTM had reported over 538,000 returnees from abroad). This makes the discrepancy smaller than the more than half million gap in the HNO 2020, but still signifies a substantial number of people fell off the radar in the country’s key strategic document for the planning of humanitarian response, if one assumes the figures captured by the DTM data collection exercises as reliable.
6.2 Implications For Policymaking: A Needs-based Reorientation?

The commitment to needs-based humanitarian response would suggest that the labels ought not to matter. And yet, there is often a tendency to conflate status and needs (I001; I005; I006; I011; I014). Some needs may indeed be tied up with status (most obviously, the need for international protection in the case of refugees), but more often, such equation of status and need constitute an oversimplification. Yet, this simplification is promoted because it helps with fundraising and advocacy. Against the backdrop of scarce resources, labels are used as tools to help with prioritization.

In such a context, can the humanitarian sector overcome its emphasis on labels, which so often become conflated with perceived needs? One technical expert suggested the possibility of leaving the charged refugee and IDP labels behind completely, proposing to instead talk only about ‘displaced people’ with reference to specific geographically and administratively defined areas (within the country and outside) (I007). Another suggested that the four original population groups (IDP, refugee, returnee and host community) are sufficient to plan and track humanitarian and recovery response (I002). One opined that “labelling is not bad as such, but we should not stop at the labelling. If we stop at the labelling, then we don't address their needs. Label them and then go deeper” (I009).

From the donor side, there have also been past calls to revisit the institutional set-up. Hilary Benn, in his then function as Secretary of State for International Development, voiced doubts in 2004 whether it is “really sensible that we have different systems for dealing with people fleeing their homes depending on whether they happen to have crossed an international border” (Benn, 2004). Whilst initial responses from UNHCR to such calls for a more needs- and protection-focused, rather than mandate-focused approach were at best cautious (cf. Feller, 2005), more recently, there is a stronger push to make this a reality. The UNHCR High Commissioner already acknowledged a decade ago that

> Determining whether to prioritise refugee or IDP programmes sometimes leads to very difficult dilemmas, at a time when our resources are insufficient to cover all the demands on us. But ultimately, our decisions must be driven by the overarching imperative of responding to the most acute needs. Human dignity is not dependent on status. (Guterres, 2012)

And as one UNHCR staff explained, the organisation is in the process of leaving behind its pillar-based response structure (where different pillars related to different population groups of concern to the organization), as part of its new results-based management system. This affects how UNHCR plans, fundraises and reports, with a stronger focus on area-based and thematic approaches – albeit still with a recognition for the particular responsibilities assigned to the organisation under the 1951 Convention (I020). However, the same respondent also conceded that there is some divergence between the rhetoric and practice, with donors still more willing to fund UNHCR’s refugee-related portfolio (ibid.).
It remains to be seen whether the emphasis on labels will be reduced in favour of a re-orientation on needs, but the potential is certainly being acknowledged. As one respondent emphasized, “the bottom line is we need to respond to the affected population”, further elaborating that in an ideal world “everyone would be speaking about needs (...) But it’s not like that because of the agendas, because of the personalities, because of the money, because of the politics and all those things” (I003). As another underlined, the humanitarian community should “begin looking at the affected population broadly without looking at agencies, or this is our area of responsibility, this is our mandate, because it's all our responsibility to address the needs of the affected population” (I009). Moving beyond organisational competition and politics is necessary to pay true attention to the needs of the affected population, and “once we bring down these walls, and work as one UN (...) there is a huge opportunity to reach populations and cover much more” (I001).

And yet, dropping labels entirely seems neither feasible nor desirable. Respondents pointed out the demand for official and operational statistics on IDPs, which inevitably requires defining who is to be included in the measured population group (I017, I018). Meanwhile, one of the most prominent researchers on IDP issues, Elizabeth Ferris, cautioned in 2015 that

> The tendency to lump all those affected by conflicts or disasters into a generic category of "affected communities" or "vulnerable groups" risks overlooking the specific needs of particular groups. (...) IDPs are not always the most vulnerable (...) but they do have displacement-specific needs which must be addressed. Assuming that their needs will be met and their rights upheld because programs for affected populations are being implemented is short-sighted (Ferris, 2015).

She further observes that a decade ago, most international agencies had dedicated units working on IDPs, whilst today many of those units have been dissolved and reference is made much more often to ‘affected populations’ rather than to IDPs specifically, risking a mainstreaming of IDPs “into oblivion”.

Thus, as much as a needs-based orientation sounds promising for contexts where a focus on labels has become a distraction from the actual needs of the affected populations, as was arguably the case in South Sudan, dropping labels entirely may not be the solution either. Instead, the results of this research suggest that labels are likely here to stay and do have some role to play in helping to structure operational responses and policymaking for forcibly displaced populations. However, labels should neither be taken as self-evident and neutral descriptors of population categories, nor entirely conflated with needs. Instead, a critical engagement and use is paramount. Whilst labels do have the potential to guide policymaking, especially in the initial stages of response (I020), they can just as well be instrumentalized in ways that can end up doing harm, as described above. Users of labels should thus
be encouraged to critically assess which labels are in circulation and whether they indeed serve the interests of the affected populations.

7. CONCLUSION

This research has set out to inquire how, why and with which consequences the IDP label has been operationalized and contested, looking at the development of the population category at the global level and illustrating its application in a specific country context, South Sudan. As the analysis has shown, labels are artificial constructs which can be used (and abused) to pursue particular policies, interests and goals. Despite a near-universal recognition of the Guiding Principles’ IDP definition, it has been shown that diverse actors have distinct understandings of what it means to be an IDP, and ways of operationalizing the concept. Different actors have adopted a more geographically or vulnerability-based interpretation when it comes to the end of displacement. Furthermore, the case of South Sudan and developments at the global level, such as the framework put forward by the IRIS, have revealed a new fault line: namely, how the element of not having crossed an internationally recognized state border is to be interpreted, and relatedly, which relationship exists between population categories such as ‘IDP’ and ‘spontaneous refugee returnee’. The resulting contestation has strong parallels to earlier debates in the forced migration field, in particular the question of whether refugees are migrants.

Rather than assuming that the IDP label is self-explanatory, this research has engaged in a critical investigation of how, why and with which consequences it has been operationalized by different actors and in specific contexts. The empirical analysis has shown how power comes into play in articulating and using labels for different population categories, linked to agencies’ mandates and organisational politics. It has been argued that donor structures and funding competition have served to exacerbate unhealthy dynamics between organisations such as UNHCR and IOM. Beyond organisational policy, the research findings suggest that individuals also played an important role in how the debate unfolded in South Sudan. External interests and factors, such as the international community’s concern about messaging to neighbouring countries in a context of decreased commitment to refugee protection norms also played a part.

The expectation that the South Sudan case study would reveal labels to be externally imposed, not fully reflective of the complexity of individual lived experience, open to contestation and instrumentalized in different ways has held true. It has also been shown that the process of labelling, in particular the creation of new labels such as ‘spontaneous refugee returnee in an IDP-like situation’, failed to result in a better targeted response, instead obfuscating humanitarian needs analysis processes and ultimately leading to some affected populations falling entirely off the radar, due to categories being treated as distinct rather than nested.
The research undertaken for this thesis ought to be seen as a theory-extending type of work, as it has shown that theories built around labels as artificial constructs in the refugee context can be meaningfully applied also to internal displacement contexts. Future research could take this extended theory to delve further into a comparative element of debates around the conceptualisation and operationalisation of the IDP label in different humanitarian contexts. Such an approach could help articulate with more precision which of the outlined explanatory variables tend to be most influential in shaping the debate or leading to a particular outcome. Another option for future research would be to design a conjoint experiment to test which attributes drive decisions on who should be considered an IDP, as well as any differences between respondents pertaining to different agencies. During the conception phase for this thesis, such an approach was considered, but ultimately dismissed due to challenges with obtaining a representative respondent sample and “assigning” an agency affiliation in a sector where many individuals work across agencies. Future research could also aim to dive deeper into the ‘black box’ of international organizations to explore in how far institutional policies are echoed or contested within, an aspect of the debate which this research has only been able to cover tangentially.

Inquiring how, why and with which consequences the category of IDP has been operationalised and contested globally and in the case of South Sudan, this research has sought to pinpoint the potential pitfalls of creating constructions, definitions and concepts which are used to exclude rather than include, and which may ultimately do harm to those who are being labelled. It seeks to encourage academics, policymakers and all those engaged in humanitarian response to recognise that useful tools as they are, labels can become politicised and ultimately defeat their stated purpose. It is not a call to abandon labels altogether, but an encouragement to use them with critical awareness and a degree of caution.

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6 Respondents would have been presented with different scenarios of individuals whose displacement trajectory involved some period of stay abroad, but who returned to the country of former habitual residence without reaching their former homes. Varying attributes regarding their current living situation (camp or non-camp setting), the classification abroad (recognised refugee status or not), the length of time spent abroad, and the most recent displacement event they experienced could have formed part of the presented scenarios. Respondents would then have been asked to classify whether the individual in each scenario should be considered an IDP or not. The expectation was that there would be visible differences in how employees of different organisations, such as IOM and UNHCR, would classify the individual cases, in line with organizational approaches to the subject.
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## ANNEXES

### Annex 1: Table Of 85 Reviewed HNOs

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<th>Country</th>
<th>Number of HNOs reviewed for the period 2013-2022</th>
<th>Number of times refugee returnees were mentioned</th>
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<td>Libya</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>85</strong></td>
<td><strong>203</strong></td>
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Somalia and South Sudan emerged as the two countries where refugee returnees were mentioned most frequently – see further analysis and explanations in Methodology section 2.2. \(^7\)

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\(^7\) All HNOs were accessed from:

Humanitarian Response (n.d.) Documents | HumanitarianResponse. Available at:
Annex 2: List Of Interviews

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