

## **ABSTRACT**

US-China relations are one of the most complex issues in global politics. Scholars agree that in the past decade US' China policy has undergone a massive transformation: from seeing the PRC as a 'partner' to be engaged with, to labeling China as a 'threat' that the US must out-compete. There is also a consensus among scholars that, while Chinese policy vis-à-vis the US has always been long-term, the US has often been excessively reactive towards Chinese revisionism. However, most accounts of US' China policy in the literature focus exclusively on the executive branch, often ignoring Congress' diverse abilities and initiatives to influence the President's foreign policy.

This thesis seeks to address that gap in the literature by examining the evolution of congressional attitudes towards China since the 2008 financial crisis. This event is intentionally picked as a starting point of the analysis, since the literature considers it a defining moment in contemporary US-China relations. The thesis contemplates different avenues of influence from Congress to shape policy: legislation, congressional hearings in relevant committees, formal powers of advice and consent in the Senate, and swaying public opinion through informal channels.

Overall, the thesis confirms that there was a drastic paradigm shift in congressional attitudes starting in the 115<sup>th</sup> Congress (2016-17), in which lawmakers became increasingly willing to exert their powers to shape policy vis-à-vis China. More importantly, it shows that the common-shared notion of US' China policy being mostly 'reactive' is not sustained when looking at the legislature, which has often proposed changes in policy direction before the executive branch picked up those initiatives. This shift in attitudes is found to be independent of party affiliation and transversal in a myriad of policy areas (e.g., human rights, trade and technology, military issues), and committees (e.g., HFAC, HASC, SFRC, HFSC, SPSCI, etc.).

**Keywords:** *US-China relations, US Congress, engagement policy, strategic competition, US foreign policy, China, East Asia.*

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Finally, I want to dedicate this thesis to the memory of Edward Yang. Your work always speaks directly to the soul, you manage to erase nations' borders by appealing to the most fundamental emotions of the human heart. Thank you for your timeless contemplations about the Taiwanese way of life, for constantly inspiring me, and for showing that politics can be about human connection.

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**LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS**

AI..... Artificial Intelligence

AIIB..... Asian Infrastructure Bank

APEC..... Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation

ARF..... ASEAN Regional Forum

ASEAN..... Association of Southeast Asian Nations

BIS..... Bureau of Industry and Security

BRI..... Belt and Road Initiative

CCP..... Communist Party of China

CRS..... Congressional Research Service

DNI..... Director of National Intelligence

EAS..... East-Asia Summit

FRB..... Federal Reserve Board

FTAAP..... Free Trade Area of the Asia Pacific

GPR..... Global Posture Review

HASC..... House Armed Services Committee

HFAC..... House Foreign Affairs Committee

HFSC..... House Financial Services Committee

HPSCI..... House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence

IP..... Intellectual Property

IPEF..... Indo-Pacific Economic Framework

MFN..... Most Favored Nation

NASA..... National Aeronautics and Space Administration

NDB..... New Development Bank

NPT..... Non-Proliferation Treaty

PLA..... People's Liberation Army

PNTR..... Permanent Normal Trade Relations

PRC..... People's Republic of China

Quad..... Quadrilateral Security Dialogue

S&ED..... Strategic and Economic Dialogue

SASC..... Senate Armed Services Committee

SCO..... Shanghai Cooperation Organization

SED..... Strategic Economic Dialogue

SFRC..... Senate Foreign Relations Committee

SOEs..... State-Owned Enterprises  
SSCI..... Senate Select Committee on Intelligence  
TPP..... Trans-Pacific Partnership  
UK..... the United Kingdom  
UN..... United Nations  
UNHCR..... United Nations Human Rights Council  
US..... United States of America  
WTO..... World Trade Organization

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## 1. INTRODUCTION

US policy vis-à-vis Chinese revisionism and assertiveness has gradually changed over the decades. From engagement policies through the Clinton and Bush administrations, Obama's efforts to 'pivot' towards Asia, to Trump's 'decoupling' and trade war against the PRC, and Biden's strategic competition, the US has become increasingly wary of the PRC's intentions in the global stage. Truthfully, CCP leaders, who once championed hiding China's capabilities and adapting to the US-led international order, soon advocated for more 'assertive' stances regarding military and diplomatic issues when the perceived power gap between the two nations decreased. Similarly, China's unfair trade practices, human rights violations, cyber-espionage, IP theft, and exportation of authoritarianism abroad has prompted US policymakers and members of Congress to adopt combative policies to counter what they now label as the 'China threat'.

This thesis will focus on the role of the US Congress in US-China relations. Article 1 Section 1 of the US Constitution gives Congress all legislative powers, and Section 7 gives the legislature the power to appropriate funds. Given the economic dimension of US-China relations, it is fitting to bring Congress into the analysis of US policy vis-à-vis China. Scholars agree that there is a bipartisan consensus in Congress that views China as the current biggest threat to the US. This thesis will focus on the question: *how have attitudes in the US Congress evolved vis-à-vis China since the 2008 financial crisis?* Though there is literature regarding legislation in specific Congresses regarding China, there is not a comprehensive analysis of how this legislation has evolved in recent years. Moreover, the existing literature does not consider that Congress has multiple avenues of influence in foreign policy aside from direct legislation. The thesis seeks to address that literature gap, providing a temporal analysis of how Congress has reacted to a more assertive China, considering different congressional instruments.

The thesis will be structured as follows: section one presents an overview of the existing literature regarding the evolution of US-China relations over the last three decades, and the formal and informal powers that Congress possess to exert its influence. The second section presents the hypotheses and the qualitative methodology that will be used to address them. The third section outlines the main findings of the analysis, while the last section discusses what these findings contribute to the research question and some concluding remarks, including possible limitations of this study.

## 2. LITERATURE REVIEW

### 2.1 From Partner to Threat: US-China Relations in the Last Four Decades

There is an overwhelming consensus among experts that US policy towards China in the last three decades has not been a success. Scholars have criticized US policymakers in different administrations for their failure to adequately address the challenges posed by China to the economy, national security, etc. These criticisms become even harsher when the analysis of US China policy is made in retrospective.

For example, Kurt Campbell and Eli Ratner (2018) explain the failure of the US strategy towards China in terms of unrealistic expectations about its ability to shape China and its policies. On a similar vein, Cai Xia (2021) succinctly states that the US failed to acknowledge the CCP's "fundamental interests and its basic mentality of using the US while remaining hostile to it" (p. 1).

Although the investigation of this thesis analyzes Congressional activity since the financial crisis in 2008, it would be ill-advised to ignore the previous twenty years of US-China relations that helped shape both the current behavior of the US Congress and the interests and strategy of China. Moreover, to fully grasp the complexity of US policy towards China, it is imperative to dedicate time to understand the political and societal changes that radically transformed the PRC in the last decades.

This section presents an overview of US-China relations since the Tiananmen Square massacre of 1989. This event is used as a reference point in this review because it is the first element of what Rush Doshi labels the 'trifecta', the others being the US victory in the Gulf War, and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 (Doshi 2021). Doshi contends that the trifecta centered the US as China's biggest threat. US global hegemony, and the perception of a wide gap between the two countries' relative power prompted then-President Deng Xiaoping to issue what would become the most consequential political doctrine in the post-Mao era: the *taoguang yanghui*, a twenty-four-character policy that can be translated as "hide our capacity to bide our time." This policy was deceptive by nature, as China needed to pretend being weak so that the US would refrain from attacking it (Cai 2021). Through this doctrine, China sought to blunt US hegemony militarily, politically, and economically.

Meanwhile in the US, President Bill Clinton announced in 1994 that it would reauthorize China's MFN status<sup>1</sup> despite threats in the previous year of not doing so if the PRC's human rights record did not improve (Tucker 1998). Chinese President Jiang Zemin, who continued Deng's *taoguang yanghui*'s policy, did not take these threats seriously and did nothing substantial in human rights matters. By reauthorizing MFN, Clinton effectively 'delinked' trade relations and human rights issues (Lampton 1994). Thus, Clinton began an engagement policy that expanded in his second term through 'strategic dialogues' and placing emphasis on common interests (Lampton 1997). As Joseph Nye (2022)

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<sup>1</sup> Because China is a communist country, normal trade relations with the US needed to be reauthorized every year by Congress and the President by granting the nation MFN status.



explains, “the US sought to create an environment in which China’s rising power would also reshape its behavior.” The rationale was that by integrating in the international order, China’s behavior would be influenced by forces outside of its control (Shambaugh 1996).

In China, however, the US was still seen as Beijing’s main ‘adversary’, in Jiang’s words (2006, p. 311). Through the *taoguang yanghui*’s policy, China joined the NPT, launched the ASEAN Plus Three and the EAS, pushed for PNTR status, and joined both the APEC and the ARF (Johnston 2003). In these institutions, Beijing sought to stall those with US presence and empower those without the US (Doshi 2021).

President George W. Bush continued to pursue an engagement policy with China, seeking to increase economic interdependence and multilateral diplomacy between the two countries (Christensen 2006). In 2001, China joined the WTO, which allowed Beijing’s exports to grow five times faster than the US exports to the rest of the world in five years (Christensen 2009). As early as 2006, disparities between Chinese exports and imports were already substantial. China used the WTO and the UN to influence agenda setting and question the legitimacy of US hegemony (Schweller & Xiaoyu 2011). Jiang’s successor, Hu Jintao, kept emphasizing the importance of *taoguang yanghui* and that China was still weaker compared to the US, who Jintao claimed was “still implementing Westernization and splittist political designs on China” (2016, p. 91).

The Bush administration was concerned with China’s military buildup, asserting that it was at odds with its claims of a ‘peaceful rise’. These concerns prompted the US to outline a strategy to ‘dissuade’ China from blunting US military hegemony (Silove 2016). However, the 9/11 attacks prevented the administration from adopting the ‘hedging’ strategy. In his second term, Bush outlined two strategies to address China: first, the GPR, which was a ‘reorientation’ towards Asia with the goal of dissuading Beijing from adopting hegemonic ambitions, and second, the more comprehensive Asia strategy. Nina Silove (2016) explains that the Asia strategy had two elements: an external balancing act with increased military presence and bolstering alliances with Japan; and an expanded engagement policy with China through the SED that encouraged Beijing to follow a more domestic consumption-led economic model. Through the Asia strategy, China was called to “become a ‘responsible stakeholder’ and strengthen the international system that has enabled its success” (p. 62).

The 2008 financial crisis changed everything. As Doshi explains, Beijing saw the power gap with the US severely decreased, which prompted Chinese elites to timidly revise the Deng doctrine of hiding and binding (Doshi 2021). President Hu called on China to “Actively Accomplish Something”, switch from blunting the US to building capabilities, and turning to create a regional order through ‘peripheral diplomacy’ for constructing a “Community of Common Destiny.” In 2009-2010, China adopted a more ‘assertive’ behavior, especially regarding territorial disputes in the South and East China Seas (Lai 2017).

This overtly revisionist behavior concerned the pro-engagement coalition, which led the Obama administration in 2011 to outline its ‘pivot’ towards Asia (Wang, Roy, et al. 2018). As then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton described, the pivot sought to “strengthen bilateral security alliances, deepening our working relationships with emerging powers, including with China” (Clinton 2011). This ‘forward-deployed’ diplomacy called on China to contribute to global stability and growth. Scholars agree that this ‘pivot’ was outlined after criticisms from US allies for ignoring the Asia-Pacific region after their Middle East entanglements (Campbell & Andrews 2013). Although members of the administration tried to downplay the military dimension of the pivot in favor of the diplomatic and economic dimensions (Davidson 2014), this reorientation towards the Asia-Pacific was not well received in Beijing, which was seen as having “most of the key features of a Cold-War strategy” (Lanxin 2012, p. 117). US scholars responded to Chinese criticisms stating that it was China’s ‘year of assertiveness’ that caused the reorientation (Shambaugh 2013). However, the pivot was also criticized by US scholars such as Aaron Friedberg (2012), who concluded that “the ideological gap between the two nations is simply too great (...) to permit a stable *modus vivendi*” (p. 50). China hawks were increasingly skeptical of engagement policies, considering the trade deficit between the two countries and the little progress made by the S&ED talks.

Both the ‘pivot’ and the TPP negotiations – that excluded China – were seen by the CCP as a strategy of ‘encirclement’ of China. When Xi Jinping rose to the presidency in 2012, he formally abandoned Deng’s *taoguang yanghui* and replaced it with the concept of “Striving for Achievement” (Doshi 2021). This change was incredibly transcendental, as Xi called on China to “have its own great power diplomacy” (Xi 2014, p. 443). Though he continued with Hu’s concepts of ‘peripheral diplomacy’ and ‘Community of Common Destiny’, he was unhappy with the cautiousness of his policies, which led him to purge the ranks of the CCP and the PLA with an ‘anti-corruption’ campaign (Lanxin 2016). He also “reasserted the influence and control the CCP exerts over all domains of public policy and private life” (Rudd 2022). Xi’s response to the ‘pivot’ came in 2013 with the BRI, a set of ostentatious infrastructure investments that would connect China with sixty<sup>2</sup> countries through a Silk Road Economic Belt and a Maritime Silk Road.

Through the BRI, the PRC attempted to solve its overcapacity problems, strengthen its SOEs, and internationalize the renminbi (Sendagorta 2019). What was presented as an ‘altruistic’ project to enhance global connectivity, was in reality a massive strategic initiative to expand its sphere of influence by building a ‘community of friends in its neighborhood and beyond’ and increase its military presence in the Asia-Pacific region (Rolland 2017). Furthermore, the BRI sought to address the divide between rural and urban areas in China that threatened the social stability of the regime (Sendagorta 2019).

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<sup>2</sup> This number has dramatically increased since the launch of the BRI, and as of March 2022 stands at 147 countries (Nedopil 2022).

The BRI was a part of Xi's nationalist 'China Dream' campaign, which sought to transform the PRC into a moderately prosperous state. This campaign also entailed the creation of a 'dual circulation economy', with the goal of transforming China from an unstable export-led economy to a self-reliant nation based on domestic consumption (Lanxin 2016). The 'China Dream' was part of a gigantic soft power campaign to promote Beijing's image abroad, through media, academic institutions, and pop culture (Shambaugh 2015). Moreover, China offered unconditional aid programs focused on South-South partnerships to promote its authoritarian model as an alternative to the US model (Albert 2018). This 'southern strategy' allowed the PRC to build a coalition that endorsed "Chinese concepts such as the 'community of shared future', the party's vision of a China-centric world order (...), and in the process, giving Beijing more power over international discourse" (Rolland 2022).

Though Xi kept emphasizing China's peaceful intentions, he asserted that it "will not sacrifice its rightful and legitimate interests" (Zhang 2014). In his first term, China co-created the NDB, expanded the SCO, founded the AIIB, negotiated the FTAAP as a response to the American TPP proposal, and sought to initiate a "New Asian Security Concept" (Wang & Hu 2019). All these efforts were intended to diminish the presence of the US in the Asia-Pacific region and weaken the US-led international order.

The election of Donald Trump in 2016 produced a deep paradigm shift in US behavior towards China. The pro-engagement coalition fractured as a new bipartisan consensus emerged in Washington. The lack of economic opening eighteen years after China joined the WTO, the national security implications of its technological advantage, its increasingly assertive military operations in the region, and the CCP's consolidation of power were among the reasons why the China hawks turned the tide in the overall sentiment towards China (Sendagorta 2019). The Trump administration classified China as a 'revisionist power' and 'strategic competitor' who threatened the 'American way of life' (The White House 2017). This emphasis on the ideological divide between the two countries became a frequent assessment of US-China relations by engagement skeptics (Friedberg 2018). In fact, these irreconcilable moral differences were echoed by Chinese scholars such as Yan Xuetong (2018).

This new orthodoxy called for a new era of major power competition (Minghao 2019). The Trump administration started a trade war against China, imposing punitive tariffs and investment restrictions, enforced a market principle of 'reciprocity', supported Taiwan more explicitly, relaunched the Quad, and sought to prevent cyber-espionage and IP theft by cracking down Chinese firms such as Huawei (Nathan 2022). Essentially, the US was enacting a process of 'decoupling' with China on technological and national security issues, trade, and infrastructure (Nye 2020). The bipartisan consensus was that China had been "a revisionist power in a status quo guise" (Holslag 2014, p. 104).

Despite this new consensus, Trump's China policy was widely criticized by US scholars. For example, Medeiros (2021) decried what he saw as an "inconsistent, contradictory, and often symbolic" policy,

and he further lamented that his costly strategy hurt American interests and alienated US allies in the Asia-Pacific region and beyond for his unilateralism.

For Xi Jinping, Trump's hostility was a vindication of his belief that the US was trying to contain China. As he entered his second term in 2017, Xi cemented himself as the CCP's biggest ideologue since Mao. Emphasizing social harmony, Xi focused on eradicating poverty in order to achieve the PRC's two centennial goals: to become a moderately prosperous society by 2021<sup>3</sup>, and a fully modern socialist nation by 2049<sup>4</sup> (Mulvad 2019). He continued the 'China Dream' with his 'Made in China 2025' campaign and his project of 'Great Rejuvenation'. This project uses self-victimization in order to antagonize the West and glorify the CCP: China's power was wrongfully stolen during its 'Century of Humiliation' by the West and only the CCP has been able to put the PRC back on track to its destined hegemonic place in the world order (Carrai 2020).

In his second term, Xi moved Chinese economics to the left. According to Rudd (2021), Xi reinvigorated SOEs by targeting private firms for their 'lack of patriotism', reformulated the PRC's industrial policy to up its technological power, and doubled-down on his 'dual circulation economy'. Furthermore, Rudd signals a move to the right in Chinese nationalism by empowering the propaganda apparatus and increasing the PLA's military operations in the South and East China Seas. In sum, Xi's goal was "the consolidation and retention of authority over mainland China, its population (...)" (Erickson 2019). In recent years, the PRC has increased its crackdown of dissenters, tightened authoritarian rule in Hong Kong, and perpetrated ethnic cleansing against the Uyghurs in the Xinjiang region, which the Trump administration classified as 'genocide'.

Beijing saw Joe Biden's victory over Trump in 2020 with relief, with the expectation that he would take a less hostile attitude towards China (Nathan 2022). Biden himself sought to end Trump's erratic policies. Kurt Campbell and Jake Sullivan (2018), who both went on to serve on Biden's administration<sup>5</sup>, laid out a new vision for US-China relations focused on 'strategic competition' that combined domestic investments on infrastructure, making China's access to the market contingent on a principle of reciprocity, restricting the flow of technology to prevent IP theft and cyber-espionage, and assembling a coalition of nations to counter China's global influence.

In reality, Biden's China policy has been as tough as Trump's, if not more. He has maintained the trade tariffs, the diplomatic support for Taiwan, sanctioned Chinese corporations for the Uyghur genocide, and increased the naval patrols in the South China Sea (Nathan 2022). Moreover, the BIS has put new extraterritorial limits on the export of semiconductor chips from China, bringing most Chinese

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<sup>3</sup> The centennial of the CCP.

<sup>4</sup> The centennial of the PRC.

<sup>5</sup> Campbell as National Security Council Coordinator for the Indo-Pacific and Sullivan as National Security Advisor.

companies under a restrictive rule that had been reserved for Huawei in the previous administration. This, alongside the passage of the CHIPS Act, severely hurt Chinese industries. (Bateman 2022).

In addition, Biden has attempted to revitalize the US alliance system that Trump damaged. Under him, the US has pursued a free and open Indo-Pacific strategy and has bolstered the Quad, with special emphasis on US-Japan relations; has negotiated building nuclear-powered submarines with the UK and Australia under the AUKUS pact; has encouraged South Korea to diplomatically realign with the US and Japan with the possibility of transforming the Quad into the Quint; has expanded its relationship with India, the Philippines, and Thailand through ASEAN; and has put forward the IPEF, a contemporary – more timid – version of the TPP (Green 2022).

In Congress, both the Democratic and Republican parties have adopted more hostile positions towards China, especially regarding Taiwan, with high-profile lawmakers such as former Speaker Pelosi (D-CA) visiting the country (Gramer 2023). Congress has also passed the TAIPEI Act, which strengthens support for the country, with wide majorities in both chambers.

However, Biden's China policy has not been exempt from criticism. Jessica Chen Weiss (2022) laments the bipartisan notion that conflict with China is unavoidable and to some, necessary: "Washington must commit (...) to a positive-sum vision of a reformed international system that includes China and meets the existential need to tackle shared challenges." This concern is echoed by some members of Congress, such as Sen. Murphy (D-CT): "my fear is that by acting like military conflict with China is inevitable, you will ultimately make that reality come true" (Gramer 2023). Moreover, former Senator Baucus (D-MT) called for the development of a long-term strategy towards China: "now [US strategy towards China] is pretty much still ad-hoc. We react too much." (Baucus 2023).

Meanwhile, China is facing a severe economic slowdown. Xi's policies against private companies and the CCP's reassertion in SOEs has decreased private-sector confidence, reduced private investment, and diminished productivity, which has produced a decline in consumer demand and hindered the property sector (Rudd 2022). As Daniel H. Rosen (2021) succinctly states: "sustainable economic efficiency and political omnipotence do not go hand in hand." Moreover, overseas investment for BRI projects have severely decreased because of Xi's policies, plummeting the initiative after high-profile failures in places like Sri Lanka (Lu 2023). This slowdown has only worsened as a consequence of the PRC's draconian laws to contain the COVID-19 pandemic (Yanzhong 2023).

This dire economic situation has not stopped China from maintaining its assertive global posture. China still uses its propaganda apparatus to amplify PRC supporters in the West while using its economically successful authoritarian political system as an alternative for many governments in developing countries (Edel & Shullman 2021). Moreover, Xi keeps using its clout in international institutions to undermine the West. For example, China is attempting to make the yuan a powerful currency in Asia through institutions such as the SCO, in an effort to displace the hegemony of the US dollar (Zongyuan 2022).

Regarding the BRI, China has adjusted its grandiose aspirations and has transformed the initiative into a more “flexible, targeted, and organic directions” (Schrader & Cole 2023).

This ‘business-as-usual’ approach to global politics is better understood when taking into account that “the primary audience of China’s foreign policy is domestic”, as Kathy Huang (2022) states. Maintaining its image abroad is an imperative if the PRC wants to keep social stability and prevent further dissenters. On a similar vein, Cai Xia (2022) affirms that Xi Jinping’s behavior is driven by a mix of political anxiety and fear and a self-aggrandizing belief.

## **2.2 What About Congress?**

The previous section makes clear that US-China relations have been extensively discussed in the literature for decades. However, it has also shown that the scholars’ treatment of Congress’ role in US-China relations has been at best anecdotal, and at worst, nonexistent. While the literature did examine the congressional drivers of US China policy during the Clinton years, this attention waned in the following administrations. This section reviews some of the literature on the US Congress that will be used for the analysis of the thesis.

The Constitution assigns a myriad of specific powers to Congress regarding foreign policy. Article 1, Section 1 gives Congress all legislative powers; Section 7 gives the legislature the power to appropriate funds; Section 8 allows Congress to collect duties, regulate foreign commerce, declare war, punish piracy and other offenses, raise and support armies and navies, etc.

Despite these constitutional prerogatives, most scholars agree that Congress exerts its influence through multiple avenues. Scott (1997) outlined four avenues of influence: (1) direct legislative (e.g., passing legislation, appropriating funds, etc.), (2) indirect legislative which entail non-binding resolutions, changes in procedure and requirements for executive agencies; (3) direct non-legislative (e.g., hearings), and (4) indirect non-legislative, in which lawmakers sway public opinion through different channels to shape policy.

Lindsay (1992) contends that Congress wields its power mostly through anticipated reactions. Lawmakers use floor speeches, appearances on TV networks, and increasingly social media, to express support or opposition to executive initiatives. These cues are used by the President as a ‘temperature check’ of the legislature; if he believes that there is no broad support of a specific policy in Congress, he might reconsider it before being defeated in a floor vote (Scott & Carter 2014). If the President refuses to take Congress’ opinion into account, the legislature can use retribution tactics against the executive such as cutting funding (Hersman 2000).

Lindsay (1994) also examined Congress’ procedural capabilities in a subsequent article. Under the ‘new institutionalism’ school of thought, Lindsay concluded that Congress makes procedural rather than

substantive changes in foreign policy. According to him, the legislative branch has five tools to alter procedure: (1) creating new institutions in the executive that will be more responsive to Congress' demands, (2) the legislative veto, (3) enfranchising new – more Congress-aligned – groups into the decision-making process, (4) requiring executive agencies to elaborate reports to explain their actions, and (5) stipulating conditions for executive action.

In the contemporary Congress, individualism plays a big role. Nowadays, because of its low saliency, congressional foreign policymaking stems from 'policy entrepreneurs' (Hersman 2000). These entrepreneurs are often from safe districts and have not to worry about constituency wrath if they dedicate too much time to international affairs (Warburg 2011).

Moreover, policy conditions radically influence Congress' role in foreign policy. Both the policy issue and policy instrument are important. Lindsay (1994) states that strategic and structural issues (e.g., funding, long-term policies) allow Congress to employ different avenues of influence. On the other hand, crises hinder congressional influence and oversight because of their urgency and secrecy (Warburg 2011). Furthermore, we can classify policy instruments in a similar continuum (Scott 1997; Scott & Carter 2014): issues like the use of force, diplomacy, and intelligence are initiated by the President; while foreign aid and issues related to the appropriations process require more congressional interference.

A 2018 CSIS report that measured congressional attitudes on different foreign policy issues found that in issues like trade policy, party polarization is high, and Congress plays a big role in shaping the President's actions. Because trade and economic policies affect all constituencies, lawmakers will be especially wary of deferring power to the executive.

This issue-based difference is relevant in the US-China relations analysis. The CSIS report mentions 'human rights' as one of the areas in which Congress is very active. For example, before her ascension to party leadership, Rep. Nancy Pelosi fiercely criticized China for its brutal handling of the democracy movement in the 80s and 90s and traveled to China in the aftermath of the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre.<sup>6</sup> Current issues such as the Hong Kong protests, and the genocide of Uyghurs open the door for Congressional intervention. Moreover, trade policy has been one of the key issues in US-China relations, so high congressional activity is expected.

McCubbins and Schwartz (1984) reiterate that Congress uses decentralized, less active, and indirect mechanisms that focus on procedure and rules rather to check on presidential powers. Moreover, Warburg (2011) concludes that, due to its culture based on broad-interests, grandstanding, and political confrontation, congressional oversight is reactive and focuses on policy corrections rather than designing foreign policy initiatives. Finally, Scott and Carter (2002) use both congressional activity and

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<sup>6</sup> This example goes in line with Hersman and Warburg's notions about foreign policy entrepreneurs.

assertiveness as a double parameter to come up with four types of Congress: competitive, disengaged, supportive, and strategic.

For all these reasons, it is fitting to dedicate time to analyze what Congress has been doing and saying regarding China. US-China relations have a considerable impact on the everyday lives of constituents, considering its trade dimension, so it is expected that Congress would attempt to exert its influence to shape policy, either substantially or symbolically in policy areas where the legislature is more deferent to the executive. This thesis seeks to address that gap in the literature and provide a comprehensive analysis of Congressional attitudes regarding US-China relations.

### **3. HYPOTHESES & METHODOLOGY**

As stated in the introduction, this thesis will discuss how US congressional attitudes towards China have evolved since the financial crisis. As the literature review showcased, US-China relations became more confrontational as China adopted a more assertive behavior in the global stage. It is thus expected that Congress followed a similar evolution as presidential administrations regarding their attitudes towards China. Hence:

*Hypothesis 1: congressional attitudes towards China have become more hostile since the 110<sup>th</sup> Congress, irrespective of party identification.*

As a reference point, the analysis will be carried out from the 110<sup>th</sup> Congress (2007-8) to the current 118<sup>th</sup> Congress (2023-24). As explained in the literature review, the 2008 financial crisis was a defining moment for Chinese leaders insofar they started perceiving that the US' power was declining, while the PRC was still rising. This shrinking gap of power between the two nations led to the so-called 'year of assertiveness' of China in 2009-10. Picking the 110<sup>th</sup> Congress as the starting point of the analysis makes sense because it will pick up how lawmakers reacted to this new assertiveness and how they moved on from engagement to competition in the succeeding congresses.

For the purposes of this thesis, 'congressional attitude' encompasses the four types of initiatives that the legislature uses to exert its influence, according to Scott (1997): direct legislation, (2) indirect legislation (e.g., changes in procedure and requirements of executive agencies), (3) direct non-legislative instruments (i.e., congressional hearings), and (4) indirect non-legislative instruments (i.e., public statements on Twitter and cable networks).

For direct legislative action, the thesis will compile a database of legislation using [www.congress.gov](http://www.congress.gov). Legislation containing the word 'China' in its title or text from the 110<sup>th</sup> Congress was selected. Due to the high amount of bills that are introduced in Congress but are never voted on, the thesis will only take into consideration legislation that has been voted on at least one chamber. The legislation database was elaborated on an Excel document, with the following information about each piece of legislation: the



Congress when it was introduced, policy area, status of the legislation, vote tallies, the lawmaker who sponsored the legislation, and the specific China mention/provisions. This data is available in the official website of Congress. For indirect legislative action, the focus will be on requirements to executive agencies, non-binding resolutions, and the Senate's advice-and-consent powers during executive appointees nominations.

For direct non-legislative action, the thesis will look at hearings from relevant congressional committees such as the Foreign Affairs, Armed Services, Finance, and Intelligence. The newly created Special Committee on Strategic Competition Between the US and the CCP will be included, although the legislative action in the current 118<sup>th</sup> Congress is very limited yet. The witnesses in these hearings vary from executive appointees such as Secretaries of State and Defense, and other figures such as the Trade Representative and Director of National Intelligence, and other relevant figures for US-China issues. The hearings are accessed through C-SPAN and the official websites of the committees. Finally, for indirect non-legislative action, the thesis will pay attention to prominent public statements by lawmakers on Twitter or national TV (through YouTube). The sample of lawmakers used for this last part comprised of the 165 members of Congress who had sponsored at least one China-related bill included in the legislative database. There were 49 Senators and 116 Representatives. In terms of partisanship, 87 were Democrats and 78 were Republicans.

Lindsay (1994) and Scott & Carter (2014)'s insights on issue-based differences are relevant when analyzing congressional attitudes in US-China relations. According to them, strategic and structural issues such as funding and long-term policies are easy vehicles for Congress to shape policy. Moreover, issues like trade policy are more salient to lawmakers. Thus:

*Hypothesis 2: this negative evolution of congressional attitudes has been different depending on the policy area.*

To address the second hypothesis, the congressional initiatives outlined in the previous paragraphs will be classified in seven areas: economic/trade policy, human rights, international community – encompassing diplomatic and global influence of China –, military issues, technology, sovereignty disputes in Taiwan and/or Hong Kong, and other national security issues such as espionage and cyberattacks. This classification is designed based on two reports elaborated by CRS: (1) China Primer: U.S.-China Relations, and (2) China and the World: Issues for Congress. Moreover, the legislation database will take into consideration both direct legislation (i.e., bills) and resolutions. The latter tend to 'express the sense of Congress' in issues that are not easily subjected to legislative procedures.

These more 'symbolic' resolutions are expected to be extremely prominent among lawmakers, because of the 'congressional culture' that Warburg (2011) describes, characterized by broad-interests, grandstanding, and political confrontation. Congressional resolutions, which have no substantive effect on legislation, qualify as a type of congressional initiative. Thus:

*Hypothesis 3: Congress has attempted to shape US foreign policy vis-à-vis China through alternative instruments more prominently than through direct legislation.*

We can expect that, in addition of grandstanding being more prevalent than direct legislation, the ‘language’ of legislative initiatives might be more muted than on grandstanding and other symbolic efforts made by Congress, in which lawmakers, not being constrained by legislative procedures, could use more aggressive language to appeal their domestic constituencies.

## **4. MAIN FINDINGS**

The legislation database elaborated from [www.congress.gov](http://www.congress.gov) consisted of 231 entries: 138 bills and 93 non-binding legislative resolutions. These pieces of legislation were subject to at least one successful floor vote either in the House or in the Senate.

### **4.1 Direct Legislation**


As specified in the literature review, only bills – which have binding legislative effects – are considered ‘direct legislation’ (Scott 1997). The analysis considers the current 118<sup>th</sup> Congress, which was sworn in in January 2023, so it was not possible to obtain full-Congress data about the current legislature at the time of writing this thesis.

Figure 1<sup>7</sup> shows the distribution of bills throughout the Congresses. The maximum of direct congressional activity is found in both the 116<sup>th</sup> and 117<sup>th</sup> Congresses, with each having 37 China-related bills introduced. This increased activity starts in the 115<sup>th</sup> Congress, which was the first legislature to introduce over 15 China-related bills. Regarding partisanship, though there are significant differences of activity depending on the Congress (see Table 1), the bills introduced throughout the period studied were equally distributed by both the Democratic and Republican parties: both introduced 69 bills. The differences in particular Congresses are mostly a consequence of party-control dynamics.

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<sup>7</sup> All graphs and tables displayed on this thesis were elaborated by the author based on the Excel database of legislation mentioned in the previous section. All data is publicly available at [www.congress.gov](http://www.congress.gov).

**Figure 1: Number of China-related bills introduced for each Congress.**




**Table 1: Number of China-related bills introduced by party for each Congress.**


Congress	GOP	DEM
110th	2	9
111th	1	11
112th	9	0
113th	4	3
114th	5	0
115th	17	1
116th	17	20
117th	12	25

Analyzing the status of the bills introduced, Figure 2 shows that less than half of them eventually become law, with 51,4% of the bills passing one chamber but never being brought for a vote in the consequent chamber of Congress. In fact, the percentage of bills that become laws falls dramatically starting in the 115<sup>th</sup> Congress, moment in which the overall direct congressional activity notably increased (see Figure 3).

**Figure 2: Status of China-related bills introduced in Congress.**




**Figure 3: Percentage of China-related bills introduced in each Congress that became laws.**



Regarding the policy area of the bills, the main three topics are: economy (30,7% of the bills), human rights (16,5%), and military capabilities (15,3%). Figure 4 shows the complete breakdown of policy areas. Looking at how partisanship affects the topic of the bill, some clear differences arise: Democrats introduced 64,8% of the bills regarding economic issues, while Republicans introduced almost 60% of bills regarding human rights. Table 2 shows the party distribution of each policy area identified in Figure 4.

**Figure 4: Most frequent policy areas for introduced China-related bills.**



*Table 2: Distribution of partisanship for each policy area identified in China-related direct legislation.*

<b>Policy area</b>	<b>DEM</b>	<b>GOP</b>
Economy	64,8%	35,2%
Human Rights	40,7%	59,3%
Military	44,8%	55,2%
Technology	36,4%	63,6%
Taiwan	60,0%	40,0%
Espionage	40,0%	60,0%
International Community	50,0%	50,0%

The roll call votes for the bills introduced provide insights about the support coalitions for these pieces of legislation. Notably, 36% of the Senate roll call votes were by unanimous consent, and a big majority of the recorded votes (74%) had more than two-thirds of the Senators voting in the affirmative. Moreover, in the House of Representatives, 30% of the votes were by voice, meaning that there was no recorded vote on the bill. Similar to the Senate, in 64% of the recorded votes the support coalition for the bills surpassed two-thirds of the House.


#### **4.2 Indirect Legislation**

According to Scott (1997), indirect legislative initiatives comprise non-binding resolutions that express the sentiment of Congress, the Senate’s advice and consent powers over executive appointees, and procedural legislation (i.e., requirements to executive agencies such as conditions to be met or reports to be elaborated). Both resolutions and procedural legislation are included in the database elaborated for this thesis. 93 China-related resolutions were found since the 110<sup>th</sup> Congress: 55 passed in the House of Representatives, and 37 in the Senate. One resolution was a concurrent resolution, meaning that it was voted on both chambers.

##### *a) Non-binding Resolutions*


The analysis carried out was similar to that of the direct legislation. Figure 5 shows the distribution of resolutions throughout the Congresses. The 110<sup>th</sup> and 111<sup>th</sup> Congresses saw a very high congressional activity, which was only surpassed in the 116<sup>th</sup> Congress. This is notably different from the distribution of bills, in which congressional activity was limited until the 115<sup>th</sup> Congress.

**Figure 5: Number of China-related resolutions introduced for each Congress.**




The same partisan parity observed for direct legislation is also observed in resolutions: Democrats introduced 49 resolutions, while Republicans introduced 44. The partisan difference of congressional activity depending on the Congress that was observed for direct legislation is not found for resolutions, aside from an abnormal difference in the 111<sup>th</sup> Congress (see Figure 6).

**Figure 6: Number of China-related resolutions introduced by each party for each Congress.**



For policy area, there is a clear difference from direct legislation (see Figure 7). The most repeated topic for resolutions is human rights (36,7%), followed by international community (15,6%). Again, there are differences depending on the party that introduces the resolution: Democrats introduced the majority of resolutions regarding human rights (60%), while Republicans introduced the vast majority of resolutions regarding sovereignty issues such as Taiwan and Hong Kong (63,6%). Table 3 breaks down the party distribution of each policy area identified in Figure 7.

**Figure 7: Most frequent policy areas for introduced China-related resolutions.**



**Table 3: Distribution of partisanship for each policy area identified in China-related non-binding resolutions.**


Policy area	DEM	GOP
Human Rights	60,0%	40,0%
International Community	47,1%	52,9%
Taiwan/Hong Kong	36,4%	63,6%
Military	45,5%	54,5%
Economy	45,5%	54,5%
Espionage	50,0%	50,0%
COVID	0,0%	100,0%
Technology	0,0%	100,0%

In the Senate, 92,3% of the resolutions were agreed by unanimous consent, while in the House, 50% were agreed to by voice vote, and all the resolutions with recorded votes were agreed to with more than 75% of the lawmakers voting in the affirmative.

#### *b) Procedural Legislation*

The analysis found 47 instances in which bills included a provision that required an executive agency to *do* something. The wording is similar in all the bills, for example: the Reciprocal Access to Tibet Act of 2018, which became law, requires the Department of State to report to Congress annually regarding the level of access Chinese authorities granted US diplomats, journalists, and tourists to Tibetan areas in China (Sec.4); or the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2022 (H.R.2471) “prohibits NASA (...) from using funds provided by this division to engage in bilateral activities with China” (Sec.526). Figure 8 shows the distribution of bills that possessed indirect legislative provisions in its texts throughout the Congresses. A spike in congressional activity since the 115<sup>th</sup> Congress can be observed.

*Figure 8: Number of China-related bills containing indirect legislative provisions in its texts for each Congress.*



Notably, the 118th Congress is currently ongoing and has been active for two months at the time of writing this thesis. The number of bills in Figure 8 reflects congressional activity during these months. It is included as a comparative tool against early Congresses in which during its full two years of activity, the number of bills introduced with indirect legislative provisions were equal to the number relating to the first two months of the current Congress.

### *c) Advice and Consent Powers*

To get an accurate grasp of how the Senate exerted its influence in US China policy, this thesis overviewed the confirmation hearings in the SFRC of the five Secretary of States that were nominated since the 110<sup>th</sup> Congress. There is a clear pivot towards China since the 115<sup>th</sup> Congress, which overlaps with the increased congressional activity on direct legislation.

Though Condoleezza Rice was nominated in 2005 – the 109<sup>th</sup> Congress –, she was included in the analysis to capture the sentiment of Congress towards China during the Bush administration, considering that the 110<sup>th</sup> Congress comprised the last two years of his administration. Indeed, during her nomination, Senators labeled China as a ‘challenge’, but appeared optimistic about US-China relations such as nuclear nonproliferation. Six different Senators recognized China as an ‘emerging power.’ However, there were some suspicions about its behavior: Sen. Sarbanes (D-MD) denounced its cheating of trade practices and IP theft (p. 38).

The optimism continued in the nomination of Hillary Clinton in 2009. Sen. Kerry (D-MA) stated that China “offers [the US] extremely important opportunities for a more productive partnership” (p. 3), something echoed by other Senators present. Those with reservations, such as Sen. Webb (D-VA) called on both the US and China to “understand how vulnerable we are to each other right now” after the financial crisis (p. 77).

During Sen. John Kerry’s nomination in the 113<sup>th</sup> Congress, China was fundamentally ignored. This goes in line with what the period of extreme congressional inactivity in direct legislation towards China in the 113<sup>th</sup> and 114<sup>th</sup> Congress.



In the 115<sup>th</sup> Congress, the sentiment was different. Senators used the nomination of Rex Tillerson to condemn China for its sovereignty violations in the South China Sea, its cyber-attacks on the US, and the trade deficit. Still, Senators like Cory Gardner (R-CO) recognized the importance of China in the denuclearization process of North Korea (p. 62).

China played a much bigger role in the nomination of Mike Pompeo a year later. Republicans like Sen. Gardner supported the administration in calling China the biggest threat to the American way of life (p. 43). Sen. Rubio (R-FL) criticized engagement policies and called on the administration to promote democracy against China's authoritarianism (p. 28), while Sen. Young (R-IN) encouraged the building of a coalition of like-minded nations against China (p. 49). Democrats, on the other hand, while agreeing on the China threat, criticized the Trump administration's foreign policy: Sen. Murphy suggested that China's rise was a consequence of America's retreat of the globe (p. 61), something that was echoed by Sen. Shaheen (D-NH).

Virtually every member mentioned China during Anthony Blinken's nomination in the 117<sup>th</sup> Congress. The bipartisan consensus about China's threat to the US remained, and Senators used their questions to outline their different priorities regarding China. For example, Sen. Romney (R-UT) pressed Blinken about Biden's Taiwan policy (p. 25), Sen. Shaheen demanded transparency about the attacks on diplomatic personnel in China (p. 27), Sen. Portman (R-OH) called for a plan to protect the US from IP theft (p. 63), and Sens. Graham (R-SC) and Barrasso (R-WY) called out China's lack of cooperation about the origin of COVID (p. 39). Other Senators, like Murphy and Young, used virtually the same line of questioning of the nominee as they did with Pompeo. The full-confrontational approach of the US against China is evident in this hearing.

This pattern of behavior is also seen in other committees. The SASC's hearings on Secretary of Defense nominees only began to extensively address China during the nomination of Jim Mattis in the 115<sup>th</sup> Congress, in which Senators pressed the nominee about US strategy in the South China Sea amid China's sovereignty violations. Both Mark Esper and Lloyd Austin were similarly called to prioritize China in their administrations' national security strategies. Moreover, Avril Haines was the first DNI nominee to be heavily questioned by the SSCI on US intelligence policy on China, in a hearing where lawmakers led by chairman Warner (D-VA) and Burr (R-NC) labeled China as the US' top cybersecurity threat. It is important to note that the Senate Finance Committee has covered China's unfair trade practices and the trade deficit in nominations for Trade Representative since the Bush administration, though the coverage increased considerably in the 117<sup>th</sup> Congress for Katherine Tai's nomination.

#### **4.3 Direct Non-legislative Initiatives**

According to Scott (1997), members of Congress use direct non-legislative initiatives to offer informal advice, state their preferences, demand information, and consult the priorities of the executive branch.

They mostly do this by conducting hearings on the various congressional committees. This sub-section will present an overview of how China has been treated in congressional committees throughout the Congresses. Because Senate committees were covered in the previous sub-section, this sub-section will focus on the relevant committees on the House of Representatives.

Lawmakers have used the HFAC to hold many hearings on human rights issues in China. The top Republican in the committee, Rep. Ros-Lehtinen (R-FL) was especially adamant in denouncing human rights abuses in China since the 110<sup>th</sup> Congress. Moreover, in the early Congresses, China was mentioned repeatedly when discussing US policy in the Middle East. Lawmakers raised questions about China's relationship with Iran and Iraq, and its role in the genocide of Darfur. The 113<sup>th</sup> and 114<sup>th</sup> Congresses saw muted activity from the committee, with China being relegated to anecdotal mentions regarding North Korea's nuclear program. Lawmakers did use budgetary hearings to discuss China's sovereignty violations in the South China Sea.

Since the 115<sup>th</sup> Congress, China was frequently paired up with Russia, signaling the paradigm change in Congress. Ambassador Nikki Haley was questioned about China's power plays in the UNSC and its influence in the Western hemisphere. Chairwoman Ros-Lehtinen again used budgetary conversations to pressure the Trump administration to side with Congress on issues like trade and Tibet. Furthermore, the committee held a special hearing on the 116<sup>th</sup> Congress about Hong Kong's security law, where China was criticized for its human rights abuses. The PRC was also accused of not cooperating with the US during the COVID pandemic by members of both parties, like Reps. Yoho (R-FL) and Sherman (D-CA).

This increased activity remained during the 117<sup>th</sup> Congress, with the committee holding two specific hearings about US policy regarding China and the Indo-Pacific region. Lawmakers used budgetary conversations to criticize China's role in international organizations like the UNHRC. And in the current 118<sup>th</sup> Congress, the committee is holding hearings on the CCP's aggression in a range of topics (e.g., the Uyghurs genocide, Taiwan, IP theft, exports control...).

The HASC has not been as active. The 110<sup>th</sup> Congress saw an abnormal activity from the committee, holding six hearings on food safety and foreign drug inspection in light of contaminated imports from China. In the following Congresses, China's rapid military modernization and its activity in the region was the main topic of various hearings. The 113<sup>th</sup> and 114<sup>th</sup> Congress did not discuss China outside of budgetary conversations. Like in the HFAC, the HASC increased its oversight of China in the 115<sup>th</sup> Congress, being treated as a 'threat' in the FY2018 Defense Budget Hearing, where lawmakers pressed the administration on a strategy to counter China. Specific hearings about Asia-Pacific security were held in the 115<sup>th</sup> and 116<sup>th</sup> Congresses. Finally, the committee held hearings in the 117<sup>th</sup> Congress about Indo-Pacific policy, China's disinformation campaigns, and national security implications of AI

technology. Mimicking the HFAC, China was paired up with Russia in budgetary conversations by labeling them as ‘threats.’

In the HFSC, China discussions in the early Congresses were limited to the state of global economy and monetary policy, with lawmakers highlighting concerns about China’s purchase of US debt. In the 113<sup>th</sup> Congress, China’s currency manipulation was the main topic of a hearing on monetary policy. Rep. Cleaver (D-MO) cautioned about the commercial imbalances originated by China’s practices. In the 115<sup>th</sup> Congress China was heavily discussed in hearings about foreign investment and national security. Moreover, lawmakers raised concerns to Secretary of Treasury Mnuchin about the impact of the Trump tariffs against China on US jobs.

Monetary policy was again the focus of China discussions in the 116<sup>th</sup> Congress. Rep. McHenry (R-NC) grilled FRB Chair Jerome Powell about the threat of China’s cyberattacks on the banking system in light of the Equifax data breach. In the 117<sup>th</sup> Congress the committee held hearings on China’s role in the global economy after the pandemic and about the national security risks of alternative payment systems owned by China such as WeChat Pay. Moreover, Powell has already appeared in the 118<sup>th</sup> Congress before the committee to discuss China’s economic track after the pandemic.

The HPSCI regularly brought up China’s cyber-program as a potential national security risk before the 115<sup>th</sup> Congress. During this Congress, China was labeled as a likely cybersecurity threat in light of Russian interference in the 2016 election. In the 117<sup>th</sup> Congress there was a special hearing dedicated to China’s ‘digital authoritarianism’, with Rep. Nunes (R-CA) placing heavy emphasis on Huawei. The following Congress had various hearings dedicated to IP theft and espionage, CCP’s disinformation during the COVID pandemic. In these hearings, China was treated as a ‘global threat’ to the US.

Finally, it is notable that Speaker Kevin McCarthy (R-CA) created in the 118<sup>th</sup> Congress the Select Committee on China with broad bipartisan support. Its chair, Rep. Gallagher (R-WI) held a hearing on February with national security professionals and Chinese human rights advocates to discuss a range of topics, from TikTok, IP theft, the spy balloon incident, independent journalism and the CCP’s propaganda apparatus.

#### **4.4 Indirect Non-legislative Initiatives**

As Lindsay (1992, 1994) contends, lawmakers frequently shape policy by swaying public opinion through framing and grandstanding. These are tools to overcome the powers of the executive branch that can shadow the role of Congress, especially in foreign policy. In today’s digital age, members of Congress have a myriad of platforms to influence public opinion, such as national TV, YouTube, and Twitter.

There was a similar evolution of statements made on Twitter. Prior to the 115<sup>th</sup> Congress, mentions of China in tweets were limited to election campaigning (e.g., Sen. Graham's Twitter mentioned China repeatedly during the 2012 election to blast the Obama administration for being 'soft' on China), specific bills (e.g., Rep. Ryan's (D-OH) strong advocacy for his Currency Reform for Fair Trade Act of 2010), or most prominently, human rights issues (e.g., former Speaker Pelosi frequently mentioned Liu Xiaobo to slam China's human rights record).

The paradigm change originated by Trump in the 115<sup>th</sup> Congress made lawmakers start using Twitter differently. Mentions to China were frequent, but contrary to the bipartisan consensus that was observed in the previous subsections, statements on Twitter were hyper-partisan and often expressed support for or criticized the administration. A good example is comparing the Twitter statements of prominent members of each party, such as Sen. Cruz (R-TX) and Rep. McGovern (D-MA). This trend has continued during the Biden administration, with Republicans calling the President 'soft' on China and Democrats applauding the strategic competition doctrine that the executive has put forward. In fact, whereas there was a notable decrease in legislative initiatives in the 117<sup>th</sup> Congress, indirect non-legislative initiatives have continued to grow, and some lawmakers mention China almost daily on their social media.

Paradoxically, this equally intense activity is not mimicked in YouTube, where Republicans outdo Democrats by a large margin. Though the reasons escape the scope of this thesis, YouTube's algorithm shows many videos by Republican lawmakers on TV channels like Fox News in which they regularly repeat and elaborate their Twitter hyper-partisan statements. To be clear, Democrats that appear in videos usually engage in hyper-partisanship too. Notably, there are a handful of lawmakers that use TV appearances to promote bipartisan legislation. For example, Sen. Hawley (R-MO) and Sen. Young illustrate the difference between hyper-partisanship and bipartisanship. On the democratic side, Sen. Cardin (D-MD) is a good example of a bipartisanship promoter. In terms of timeline, the 115<sup>th</sup> and 116<sup>th</sup> Congress started a period of high activity that is still ongoing in the 118<sup>th</sup> Congress, matching the evolution of attitudes described in the previous subsections.

## **5. DISCUSSION & CONCLUDING REMARKS**

Overall, the results outlined in the previous section appear to confirm the first hypothesis. There is a clear shift in congressional attitudes towards China starting in the 115<sup>th</sup> Congress. In the early Congresses, the legislature's activity was reduced to specific issues, such as the contaminated food imports from China in 2008 which led to several committee hearings and legislation to ban said imports. As the literature predicted, this activity mostly came from policy entrepreneurs (Hersman 2000), such as Rep. Ros-Lehtinen who was a leading voice in Congress regarding human rights abuses in China, which explains that in the first two Congresses observed human rights were the most frequent policy

area of non-binding resolutions. In fact, she sponsored more bills during her tenure observed from the 110<sup>th</sup> until the 115<sup>th</sup> Congress than any other lawmaker in the time period analyzed. Unsurprisingly, she was the top Republican in the HFAC. Other policy entrepreneurs regarding China similarly held – or hold – top positions in relevant committees: Rep. McCaul (R-TX), the current chairman of the HFAC, is the second top sponsor of China-related bills; Sen. Rubio, the ranking member of the SSCI, is the top Senate sponsor of China-related bills alongside Sen. Menendez (D-NJ), current chairman of the SFRC.

Aside from policy entrepreneurs sponsoring China-related bills in the low activity Congresses, most of the legislation regarding China in the early Congresses came from specific provisions in ‘bulk’ bills such as Appropriations acts and the Defense Budgets for each fiscal year. Lawmakers used these big bills to shape the executive’s policy decisions regarding China, making abundant use of procedural legislation introducing report requirements, banning executive agencies from using federal funds, establishing conditions to be met before the executive could engage in projects with the PRC, echoing Lindsay’s remarks about New Institutionalism (1994). This was used to advance the legislature’s priorities, which in the early Congresses mostly were human rights in Tibet, the Taiwan issue, and China’s military buildup.

In the 113<sup>th</sup> and 114<sup>th</sup> Congresses, congressional activity was at its minimum, which is counter-intuitive, since these Congresses encompassed the rise of Xi, his outline of the ‘China Dream’, the launch of the BRI, etc. While there were voices in Congress who criticized engagement policies in these Congresses like Sen. Rubio, they were mostly a minority, and the Republican-led Congress did not appear interested in assertively influence Obama’s China policy, while Democrats acquiescently rallied around the administration.

President Trump installed a new orthodoxy in US’ China policy that was picked up by Congress too. All types of congressional activity radically increased in the 115<sup>th</sup> and 116<sup>th</sup> Congresses, with a striking bipartisan consensus about characterizing China as a threat. Although non-legislative activities were hyper-partisan and frequently used China to attack the other party, it is important to note that inside that hyper-partisanship was the common notion about the ‘China threat’ and the failure of engagement policies. This perception has continued during the Biden administration, with Congress often being highly assertive apart from highly active, what Scott and Carter (1997) label a competitive Congress. An example of this assertiveness would be former Speaker Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan, reportedly against the Biden administration’s wishes (Desiderio & Ward 2022). Another indicator of Congress’ increased hostility towards China – albeit counterintuitive – is the percentage of China-related bills that become laws displayed in Figure 3. The fact starting from the 115<sup>th</sup> Congress the percentage radically decreases shows that: (1) the bills introduced stopped being mostly protocollary (e.g., the yearly Appropriations Act or the defense budgets) and started tackling specific issues, (2) the activity stopped coming exclusively from foreign policy entrepreneurs, and (3) that China was an issue that lawmakers could use

electorally, introducing hyper-partisan bills that had no chance of becoming law but that could be promoted on the campaign trail to demonstrate a ‘tough on China’ record.

The differences in policy areas throughout the Congresses appear to support the second hypothesis. Whereas hearings, bills, and resolutions of the early Congresses heavily prioritized human rights abuses and the Taiwan issue, starting in the 115<sup>th</sup> Congress the legislature started to aggressively sponsor economy-related bills and resolutions, and lawmakers started to prioritize the economic aspect of US-China relations in hearings and statements on social media and TV. This is unsurprising, considering that the trade war against China began in the middle of the 115<sup>th</sup> Congress. Since then, the legislature has made technology a heavy priority too. Issues like cyberespionage, IP theft, concerns about Huawei and TikTok, etc., made technology the second most prominent issue in the 117<sup>th</sup> Congress, only behind economy. In the early Congresses, the legislature barely addressed these issues through specific efforts. Moreover, when Congress was at its lowest activity, the sources of influence on policy were hearings and legislation relating to funding and budgetary conversations, in line with Lindsay’s remarks (1994).

To be clear, human rights remain a high priority of Congress, especially in recent years with the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act of 2021, or the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act of 2019, two laws that received broad bipartisan support in both chambers of Congress. Sovereignty issues in Taiwan and Hong Kong continue to be on lawmakers’ minds, with current Speaker McCarthy planning to host Taiwan’s president Tsai Ing-wen in the US (Nakashima & Lee 2023), and chairman of the new Select Committee on China Mike Gallagher authorizing multiple opinion pieces about the need to defend Taiwan (Gallagher 2023). Overall, this expansion in policy areas support the previous conclusion that China-related activity ceased to steam exclusively from policy entrepreneurs, which in this case were heavy human rights advocates such as Rep. Ros-Lehtinen and strong defenders of Taiwan, such as Rep. Smith (R-NJ).

The findings outlined in the previous section seem to support the third hypothesis only partially. Following Warburg’s (2011) description of congressional culture being rooted on grandstanding, political confrontation, and policy corrections, it was expected that the legislature would opt for alternative ways to exert its influence in US’ China policy other than direct legislation. And while it is true that the culture described by Warburg is found in the hyper-partisan statements made *outside* of Congress, the legislature has been consistently active in sponsoring direct legislation regarding US policy vis-à-vis China since the 115<sup>th</sup> Congress, with a bipartisan consensus on how to perceive the PRC. Moreover, Congress’ has not limited itself to policy corrections, but has legislatively taken the initiative in multiple instances like the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act. This is also at odds with the scholar’s notions of US’ China policy as ‘reactive’ or ‘ad-hoc’. Congress has shown to be willing to take the initiative and legislate vis-à-vis China in the recent Congresses. Though lawmakers have used proposals

as a method of grandstanding, which goes in line with Warburg's notions about congressional culture, many of the initiatives have translated into actual legislation<sup>8</sup>.

This also goes against McCubbins and Schwartz (1984) description of congressional oversight as predominantly procedural. While this is an accurate assessment of the early Congresses, the paradigm shift of the 115<sup>th</sup> Congress and the new bipartisan consensus that rose afterwards show that Congress has been proactive in its efforts to shape US policy vis-à-vis China. For example, the number of non-binding resolutions introduced in Congress has been consistently lower than the number of China-related bills introduced since the 115<sup>th</sup> Congress.

One possible explanation can be found in Lindsay's comments about New Institutionalism. He contends that the number one priority for lawmakers is winning reelection. When Trump made China the cornerstone of his foreign policy, constituents all over the country started to pay attention to issues relating to China. Members of Congress naturally picked up the cues from their constituents and began to see China as a winning issue in their reelection campaigns. This explanation would go in line with the conclusion that foreign policy entrepreneurs stopped being the main source of congressional activity vis-à-vis China since the 115<sup>th</sup> Congress.

This thesis has attempted to fill a gap in the literature regarding the role of Congress in US-China relations. The findings show the importance of including Congress in academic discussions about US' China policy, especially since the attitudes of lawmakers have evolved as starkly – if not more – as the executive branch's perceptions about the PRC. While Congress remained deferential and procedural during the late 2000s, Congress started showing the first signs of assertiveness towards the executive's China policy in mid 2010s, mostly through informal channels like hearings and statements. And while the paradigm shift and attitude change of the 115<sup>th</sup> Congress mostly came top-down from the Trump administration; Congress has not remained acquiescent to the executive despite the bipartisan consensus of China's threat. The legislature has initiated many specific efforts to influence China policy and has become increasingly assertive with the executive branch in congressional hearings and statements made outside of Congress.

It is important to address the limitations of this thesis. First, due to the extremely high volume of congressional hearings, the analysis on this type of initiatives focused on a handful of committees that are deemed more relevant in US' China policy. However, if the shift in attitudes is as transversal and uniform as the evidence suggests, it would be interesting to expand the analysis to other committees such as Appropriations, Energy, Oversight, etc. Moreover, the scope of this thesis made it impossible to thoroughly review every Twitter statement or TV appearance by lawmakers and focused on a sample

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<sup>8</sup> One example is Sen. Hawley's (R-MO) proposed ban of TikTok (Shabad 2023). Though initially dismissed as 'grandstanding', the initiative picked bipartisan support in the last weeks and lawmakers on both sides of the aisle grilled TikTok's CEO in the House Energy Committee (Shepardson & Ayyub, 2023).

that accounted for roughly 30% of the Congress. Additionally, because of the nature of the sample, many of the lawmakers chosen were China policy entrepreneurs, so a high activity was expected. It would be useful to review statements and floor speeches from rank-and-file members of both parties to see how this attitude change affected less prominent members of Congress.

Furthermore, the 118<sup>th</sup> Congress was sworn in less than three months ago, and its activity remains limited. It will be interesting to analyze how the new paradigm vis-à-vis China attitudes operates in a divided Congress with a Democratic administration. While it did not entirely affect the activity of the 116<sup>th</sup> Congress, it nonetheless must be analyzed if the bipartisan consensus will remain as strong as it has been in past years.



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## APPENDICES

### Appendix 1: List of legislation consulted for the database

Below is a list of the pieces of legislation that were used for the analysis. For clarity purposes, only the title of the legislation is included. The rest of the data used (date of introduction, status, policy area, vote tallies, party of introduction, and the specific China mention) can be consulted on [www.congress.gov](http://www.congress.gov)

- H.R.2642 – Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2008 (Sec. 1412).
- H.R.2764 – Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008 (Sec. 733).
- H.R.4986 – National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (Sec. 1263).
- H.R.5834 – North Korean Human Rights Reauthorization Act of 2008 (Sec. 3)
- H.R.6 – Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (Secs. 624 & 912).
- S.3001 – Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009 (Sec. 1233).
- H.R.1469 – Senator Paul Simon Study Abroad Foundation Act of 2007.
- H.R.5916 – Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Reform Act of 2008 (Sec. 128).
- H.R.5959 – Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009 (Sec. 504).
- H.R.6646 – To require the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, to provide detailed briefings to Congress on any recent discussions conducted between US Government and the Government of Taiwan and any potential transfer of defense articles or defense services to the Government of Taiwan.
- H.Con.Res.136 – Expressing the sense of the Congress regarding the high level of visits to the United States by democratically-elected officials of Taiwan.
- H.Con.Res.234 – Calling on the Government of the PRC to respect the human rights of refugees from North Korea.
- H.Con.Res.278 – Supporting Taiwan’s fourth direct and democratic presidential elections in March 2008.
- H.Res.1077 – Calling on the Government of the PRC to end its crackdown in Tibet and enter into a substantive dialogue with His Holiness the Dalai Lama to find a negotiated solution that respects the distinctive language, culture, religious identity, and fundamental freedoms of all Tibetans, and for other purposes.
- H.Res.1195 – Expressing the condolences and sympathy to the people of the PRC for the grave loss of life and vast destruction caused by the earthquake of May 12, 2008 in Sichuan Province.
- H.Res.1370 – Resolution calling on the Government of the PRC to immediately end abuses of the human rights of its citizens, to cease repression of Tibetan and Uyghur people, and to end its support for the Governments of Sudan and Burma to ensure that the Beijing 2008 Olympic Games take place in an atmosphere that honors the Olympic traditions of freedom and openness.
- H.Res.32 – A resolution denouncing the practices of female genital mutilation, domestic violence, "honor" killings, acid burnings, dowry deaths, and other gender-based persecutions,



and expressing the sense of the House of Representatives that participation, protection, recognition, and equality of women is crucial to achieving a just, moral and peaceful society.

- H.Res.497 – Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives that the Government of the People's Republic of China should immediately release from custody the children of Rebiya Kadeer and Canadian citizen Huseyin Celil and should refrain from further engaging in acts of cultural, linguistic, and religious suppression directed against the Uyghur people, and for other purposes.
- H.Res.552 – Calling on the Government of the People's Republic of China to remove barriers to United States financial services firms doing business in China.
- H.Res.676 – Declaring that it shall continue to be the policy of the United States, consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act, to make available to Taiwan such defense articles and services as may be necessary for Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability.
- S.Res.255 – A resolution recognizing and supporting the long distance runs that will take place in the People's Republic of China in 2007 and the United States in 2008 to promote friendship between the peoples of China and the United States.
- S.Res.504 – A resolution condemning the violence in Tibet and calling for restraint by the Government of the People's Republic of China and the people of Tibet.
- S.Res.569 – A resolution expressing the sense of the Senate regarding the earthquake that struck Sichuan Province of the People's Republic of China on May 12, 2008.
- S.Res.643 – A resolution calling for greater dialogue between the Dalai Lama and the Government of China regarding rights for the people of Tibet, and for other purposes.
- S.Res.203/H.Res.422 – A resolution calling on the Government of the People's Republic of China to use its unique influence and economic leverage to stop genocide and violence in Darfur, Sudan.
- H.R.1105 – Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009 (Secs. 727 & 7071).
- H.R.2647 – National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (Sec. 1246).
- H.R.2997 – Agriculture, Rural Development, Food, and Drug Administration and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2010 (Sec. 743).
- H.R.3237 – To enact certain laws relating to national and commercial space programs as title 51, US Code, “National and Commercial Space Programs” (Sec. 30701).
- H.R.3288 – Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010 (Sec. 7071).
- H.R.4173 – Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Sec. 1494).
- H.R.5297 – Small Businesses Jobs Act of 2010 (Sec. 1207).
- H.R.6523 – Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011 (Sec.1304).
- S.3104 – A bill to permanently authorize Radio Free Asia, and for other purposes.
- H.R.2410 – Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 2010 and 2011 (Sec. 237).
- H.R.2454 – American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009 (Sec. 3).

- S.1391 – Department of Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (Sec. 1226).
- H.Con.Res.151 – Expressing the sense of Congress that China release democratic activist Liu Xiaobo from imprisonment.
- H.Con.Res.266 – Expressing the sense of Congress that Taiwan should be accorded observer status in the International Civil Aviation Organization.
- H.Con.Res.55 – Recognizing the 30<sup>th</sup> Anniversary of the Taiwan Relations Act.
- H.Res.1324 – Expressing condolences and sympathies for the people of China following the tragic earthquake in the Qinghai province of the PRC on April 14, 2010.
- H.Res.1717 – Congratulating imprisoned Chinese democracy advocate Liu Xiaobo on the award of the 2010 Nobel Peace Prize.
- H.Res.1735 – Condemning North Korea in the strongest terms for its unprovoked military attack against South Korea on November 23, 2010.
- H.Res.226 – Recognizing the plight of the Tibetan people on the 50th anniversary of His Holiness the Dalai Lama being forced into exile and calling for a sustained multilateral effort to bring about a durable and peaceful solution to the Tibet issue,
- H.Res.489 – Recognizing the twentieth anniversary of the suppression of protesters and citizens in and around Tiananmen Square in Beijing, People's Republic of China, on June 3 and 4, 1989 and expressing sympathy to the families of those killed, tortured, and imprisoned in connection with the democracy protests in Tiananmen Square and other parts of China on June 3 and 4, 1989 and thereafter.
- H.Res.605 – Recognizing the continued persecution of Falun Gong practitioners in China on the 11th anniversary of the Chinese Communist Party campaign to suppress the Falun Gong spiritual movement and calling for an immediate end to the campaign to persecute, intimidate, imprison, and torture Falun Gong practitioners.
- H.Res.733 – Expressing condolences to the people and Government of Taiwan in the aftermath of the devastating typhoon that struck the central and southern regions of the island on August 8, 2009.
- H.Res.784 – Honoring the 2560th anniversary of the birth of Confucius and recognizing his invaluable contributions to philosophy and social and political thought.
- H.Res.877 – Expressing support for Chinese human rights activists Huang Qi and Tan Zuoren for engaging in peaceful expression as they seek answers and justice for the parents whose children were killed in the Sichuan earthquake of May 12, 2008.
- S.Res.171 – A resolution commending the people who have sacrificed their personal freedoms to bring about democratic change in the People's Republic of China and expressing sympathy for the families of the people who were killed, wounded, or imprisoned, on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the Tiananmen Square Massacre in Beijing, China from June 3 through 4, 1989.

- S.Res.405 – A resolution reaffirming the centrality of freedom of expression and press freedom as cornerstones of United States foreign policy and United States efforts to promote individual rights, and for other purposes.
- S.Res.544 – A resolution supporting increased market access for exports of United States beef and beef products.
- S.Res.693 – A resolution condemning the attack by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea against the Republic of Korea, and affirming support for the United States-Republic of Korea alliance.
- H.R.1473 – Department of Defense and Full-Year Continuing Appropriations Act, 2011 (Sec. 1340).
- H.R.2055 – Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012 (Sec. 7071).
- H.R.2112 – Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2012 (Secs. 112 & 539).
- H.R.4212 – Drywall Safety Act of 2012.
- H.R.4240 – Ambassador James R. Lilley and Congressman Stephen J. Solarz North Korea Human Rights Reauthorization Act of 2012 (Sec. 3).
- H.R.4310 – National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 (Secs. 1045, 1341, 1271, 1286, & 3119).
- H.R.3012 – Fairness for High-Skilled Immigrants Act of 2011.
- H.R.5326 – Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2013 (House Amendment 1037).
- H.R.6018 – Foreign Relations Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 (Sec. 524).
- H.Con.Res.145 – Calling for universal condemnation of the North Korean missile launch of December 12, 2012.
- S.Res.217 – A resolution calling for a peaceful and multilateral resolution to maritime territorial disputes in Southeast Asia.
- S.Res.356 – A resolution expressing support for the people of Tibet.
- S.Res.476 – A resolution honoring the contributions of the late Fang Lizhi to the people of China and the cause of freedom.
- S. Res.524 – A resolution reaffirming the strong support of the United States for the 2002 declaration of conduct of parties in the South China Sea among the member states of ASEAN and the People's Republic of China, and for other purposes.
- S.Res.557 – A resolution honoring the contributions of Lodi Gyaltsen Gyari as Special Envoy of His Holiness the Dalai Lama and in promoting the legitimate rights and aspirations of the Tibetan people.
- H.R.1960 – National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 (Secs. 233, 1242, 1248, & 1602).
- H.R.3547 – Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014 (Secs. 108, 515, 532, & 7043).

- H.R.3979 – Carl Levin and Howard P. “Buck” McKeon National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015 (Secs. 1252 & 1259).
- H.R.83 – Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015 (Secs. 736 & 7063, Title V).
- H.R.933 – Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2013 (Secs. 501 & 535).
- H.R.3470 – To affirm the importance of the Taiwan Relations Act, to provide for the transfer of naval vessels to certain foreign purposes, and for other purposes.
- S.744 – Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization Act.
- H.Res.599 – Urging the Government of the People's Republic of China to respect the freedom of assembly, expression, and religion and all fundamental human rights and the rule of law for all its citizens and to stop censoring discussion of the 1989 Tiananmen Square demonstrations and their violent suppression.
- H.Res.65 – Condemning the Government of North Korea for its flagrant and repeated violations of multiple United Nations Security Council resolutions, for its repeated provocations that threaten international peace and stability, and for its February 12, 2013, test of a nuclear device.
- H.Res.714 – To reaffirm the strong support of the United States Government for the peaceful and collaborative resolution of maritime and jurisdictional disputes in the South China Sea and the East China Sea as provided for by universally recognized principles of international law, and to reaffirm the vital interest of the United States in freedom of navigation and other internationally lawful uses of sea and airspace in the Asia-Pacific region.
- S.Res.143 – A resolution recognizing the threats to freedom of the press and expression around the world and reaffirming freedom of the press as a priority in the efforts of the United States Government to promote democracy and good governance on the occasion of World Press Freedom Day on May 3, 2013.
- S.Res.167 – A resolution reaffirming the strong support of the United States for the peaceful resolution of territorial, sovereignty, and jurisdictional disputes in the Asia-Pacific maritime domains.
- S.Res.361 – A resolution recognizing the threats to freedom of the press and expression in the People's Republic of China and urging the Government of the People's Republic of China to take meaningful steps to improve freedom of expression as fitting of a responsible international stakeholder.
- S.Res.421 – A resolution reaffirming the strong support of the United States Government for freedom of navigation and other internationally lawful uses of sea and airspace in the Asia-Pacific region, and for the peaceful diplomatic resolution of outstanding territorial and maritime claims and disputes.

- S.Res.451 – A resolution recalling the Government of China's forcible dispersion of those peaceably assembled in Tiananmen Square 25 years ago, in light of China's continued abysmal human rights record.
- H.R.2029 – Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016 (Secs. 730, 531, 541, 7043, 7082, 511).
- S.1356 – National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 (Sec. 1263, 1614, 1673).
- S.2426 – A bill to direct the Secretary of State to develop a strategy to obtain observer status for Taiwan in the International Criminal Police Organization, and for other purposes.
- S.2943 – National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 (Secs. 1271, 1296, 1303, 1669).
- S.754 – To improve cybersecurity in the United States through enhanced sharing of information about cybersecurity threats, and for other purposes (Sec. 402).
- S.Con.Res.38/H.Con.Res.88 – Reaffirming the Taiwan Relations Act and the Six Assurances as cornerstones of the US-Taiwan relations.
- H.Res.337 – Calling for substantive dialogue, without preconditions, in order to address Tibetan grievances and secure for a negotiated agreement for the Tibetan people.
- H.Res.343 – Expressing concern regarding persistent and credible reports of systematic, state-sanctioned organ harvesting from non-consenting prisoners of conscience in the People's Republic of China, including from large numbers of Falun Gong practitioners and members of other religious and ethnic minority groups.
- S.Res.207 – A resolution recognizing threats to freedom of the press and expression around the world and reaffirming freedom of the press as a priority in efforts of the United States Government to promote democracy and good governance.
- H.R.1625 – Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018 (Secs. 756, 760, 529, 534, & 8097).
- H.R.1872 – Reciprocal Access to Tibet Act of 2018.
- H.R.2061 – North Korean Human Rights Reauthorization Act of 2017.
- H.R.244 – Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2017 (Secs. 730, 531, & 7082).
- H.R.2810 – National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018 (Secs. 888, 1259, 1261, & 1656).
- H.R.5515 – John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 (Secs. 1259, 1260, 1261, & 1262).
- H.R.5895 – Energy and Water, Legislative Branch, and Military Construction and Veterans Affairs Appropriations Act, 2019 (Sec. 208).
- H.R.6157 – Department of Defense and Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education Appropriations Act, 2019 and Continuing Appropriations Act, 2019 (Sec. 8096 & House Amendment 838).
- S.2736 – Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 2018.
- S.371 – Department of State Authorities Act, Fiscal Year 2017, Improvements Act (Sec. 613).

- H.R.3180 – Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018.
- H.R.3219 – Make American Secure Appropriations Act, 2018 (Sec. 8091).
- H.R.3320 – To direct the Secretary of State to develop a strategy to regain observer status for Taiwan at the World Health Organization, and for other purposes.
- H.R.3776 – Cyber Diplomacy Act of 2018.
- H.R.5576 – Cyber Deterrence and Response Act of 2018.
- H.R.5841 – Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018
- H.R.6237 – Matthew Young Pollard Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 2018 and 2019.
- H.R.6147 - Interior, Environment, Financial Services and General Government, Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, and Transportation, Housing and Urban Development Appropriations Act, 2019 (Sec. 531).
- H.Con.Res.67 – Urging the Government of the People's Republic of China to unconditionally release Liu Xiaobo, together with his wife Liu Xia, to allow them to freely meet with friends, family, and counsel and seek medical treatment wherever they desire.
- H.Res.1157 – Reaffirming the strong commitment of the US to the countries and territories of the Pacific Islands region.
- H.Res.311 – Reaffirming the 40 years of relations between the United States and the ASEAN, and the shared pursuit of economic growth and regional security in Southeast Asia
- H.Res.407 – Condemning the persecution of Christians around the world.
- H.Res.422 – Urging adherence to the "one country, two systems" policy as prescribed in the Joint Declaration between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and the Government of the People's Republic of China on the Question of Hong Kong.
- H.Res.92 – Condemning North Korea's development of multiple intercontinental ballistic missiles, and for other purposes.
- H.Res.995 – Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives that the Nation now faces a more complex and grave set of threats than at any time since the end of World War II, and that the lack of full, on-time funding related to defense activities puts servicemen and servicewomen at risk, harms national security, and aids the adversaries of the US.
- H.Res.998 – Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives that the United States Navy's total readiness remains in a perilous state due to high operational demands, increased deployment lengths, shortened training periods, and deferred maintenance all while the Navy is asked to "do more with less" as financial support for critical areas waned in the era of sequestration and without consistent Congressional funding.
- S.Res.429 – A resolution commemorating the 59th anniversary of Tibet's 1959 uprising as "Tibetan Rights Day", and expressing support for the human rights and religious freedom of the Tibetan people and the Tibetan Buddhist faith community.

- S.Res.83 – A resolution expressing the sense of the Senate regarding the trafficking of illicit fentanyl into the United States from Mexico and China.
- H.J.Res.31 – Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2019 (Secs. 749, 753, 530, & 538).
- H.R.1158 – Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020 (Secs. 526, 532).
- H.R.133 – Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021.
- H.R.1865 – Further Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020 (Secs. 402, 408, 164, & 901).
- H.R.6385 – William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (Secs. 283, 1260, 1299, 6507 & 9723).
- H.R.7440 – Hong Kong Autonomy Act.
- S.1678 – TAIPEI Act of 2019.
- S.1838 – Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act of 2019.
- S.1970 – National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 (Secs. 1238, 5511, 5512, 5513, & 5706).
- S.2710 – A bill to prohibit the commercial export of covered munitions items to the Hong Kong Police Force.
- S.3201 – Temporary Reauthorization and Study of the Emergency Scheduling of Fentanyl Analogues Act.
- S.3744 – Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act of 2020.
- S.945 – Holding Foreign Companies Accountable Act.
- H.R.1140 – Rights for Transportation Security Officers Act of 2020 (House Amendment 810).
- H.R.1704 – Championing American Business Through Diplomacy Act of 2019.
- H.R.2002 – Taiwan Assurance Act of 2019.
- H.R.2331 – SBA Cyber Awareness Act.
- H.R.2513 – Corporate Transparency Act of 2019.
- H.R.2514 – COUNTER Act of 2018.
- H.R.2615 – United States-Northern Triangle Enhanced Engagement Act.
- H.R.264 – Financial Services and General Government Appropriations Act, 2019 (Sec. 531).
- H.R.353 – To direct the Secretary of State to develop a strategy to regain observer status for Taiwan in the World Health Organization, and for other purposes.
- H.R.3763 – Promoting US International Leadership in 5G Act of 2019.
- H.R.4331 – Tibetan Policy and Support Act of 2019.
- H.R.4863 – US Export Finance Agency Act of 2019.
- H.R.5932 – Ensuring Chinese Debt Transparency Act of 2020.
- H.R.6210 – Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act.
- H.R.6270 – Uyghur Forced Labor Disclosure Act of 2020.
- H.R.7608 – State, Foreign Operations, Agriculture, Rural Development, Interior, Environment, Military Construction, and Veterans Affairs Appropriations Act, 2021.

- H.R.8134 – Consumer Product Safety Inspection Enhancement Act.
- H.R.8405 – American Values and Security in International Athletics Act (Sec. 2).
- H.R.8428 – Hong Kong People’s Freedom and Choice Act of 2020.
- S.178 – UYGHUR Act of 2019.
- H.R.1044 – Fairness for High-Skilled Immigrants Act of 2020.
- S.2547 – Indo-Pacific Cooperation Act of 2019.
- S.2800 – National Aeronautics and Space Administration Authorization Act of 2020.
- S.939 – CONFUCIUS Act.
- H.Res.1033 – Condemning acts by the People's Republic of China and the Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region that violate fundamental rights and freedoms of Hong Kong residents as well as acts that undermine Hong Kong's high degree of autonomy.
- H.Res.1250 – Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives with respect to the principles that should guide the national artificial intelligence strategy of the United States.
- H.Res.273 – Reaffirming the United States commitment to Taiwan and to the implementation of the Taiwan Relations Act.
- H.Res.345 – Responding to widening threats to freedoms of the press and expression around the world, reaffirming the centrality of a free and independent press to the health of democracy, and reaffirming freedom of the press as a priority of the United States in promoting democracy, human rights, and good governance on World Press Freedom Day.
- H.Res.393 – Remembering the victims of the violent suppression of democracy protests in Tiananmen Square and elsewhere in China on June 3 and 4, 1989, and calling on the Government of the People’s Republic of China to respect the universally recognized human rights of all people living in China and around the world.
- H.Res.512/S.Res.458 – Calling for the global repeal of blasphemy, heresy, and apostasy laws.
- H.Res.521 – Commending the Government of Canada for upholding the rule of law and expressing concern over actions by the Government of the People’s Republic of China in response to a request from the United States Government to the Government of Canada for the extradition of a Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd., executive.
- H.Res.543 – Recognizing Hong Kong's bilateral relationship with the United States, condemning the People's Republic of China for violating their obligations to the people of Hong Kong, and supporting the people of Hong Kong's right to freedom of assembly and peaceful protest.
- H.Res.672 – Expressing support of the Three Seas Initiative in its efforts to increase energy independence and infrastructure connectivity thereby strengthening the United States and European national security.



- H.Res.697 – Affirming the significance of the advocacy for genuine autonomy for Tibetans in the People's Republic of China and the work His Holiness the 14th Dalai Lama has done to promote global peace, harmony, and understanding.
- S.Con.Res.13 – A concurrent resolution reaffirming the United States commitment to Taiwan and to the implementation of the Taiwan Relations Act.
- S.Res.221 – A resolution recognizing the 30th anniversary of the Tiananmen Square massacre and condemning the intensifying repression and human rights violations by the CCP and the use of surveillance by Chinese authorities, and for other purposes.
- S.Res.331 – A resolution instructing the managers on the part of the Senate on the bill S.1790 (116th Congress) to insist upon the inclusion of the provisions of S.2118 (116th Congress) (relating to the prohibition of US persons from dealing in certain information and communications technology or services from foreign adversaries and requiring the approval of Congress to terminate certain export controls in effect with respect to Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd.).
- S.Res.368 – A resolution to authorize the production of records by the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs.
- S.Res.406 – A resolution recognizing that for 50 years, the (ASEAN) and its ten members, Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam, have worked with the United States toward stability, prosperity, and peace in Southeast Asia, and expressing the sense of the Senate that the United States will continue to remain a strong, reliable, and active partner in the ASEAN region.
- S.Res.435 – A resolution reaffirming the importance of the General Security of Military Information Agreement between the Republic of Korea and Japan, and for other purposes.
- S.Res.497 – A resolution commemorating the life of Dr. Li Wenliang and calling for transparency and cooperation from the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Communist Party of China.
- S.Res.596 – A resolution expressing the sense of the Senate that the Hong Kong national security law proposed by the Government of the PRC would violate the obligations of that government under the 1984 Sino-British Joint Declaration and the Hong Kong Basic Law and calling upon all free nations of the world to stand with the people of Hong Kong.
- S.Res.96 – A resolution commending the Government of Canada for upholding the rule of law and expressing concern over actions by the Government of the People's Republic of China in response to a request from the United States Government to the Government of Canada for the extradition of a Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. Executive.
- H.R.2471 – Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2022 (Secs. 751, 514, 526, 532, 208, 7030, 7032, 7043, 7057).

- H.R.2617 – Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2023 (Secs. 514, 751, 526, 532, 8143, 208, 7030, 7032, 7043, 7057).
- H.R.3462 – SBA Cyber Awareness Act.
- H.R.3684 – Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (Sec. 40436).
- H.R.4346 – Chips and Science Act (Sec. 10263).
- H.R.4373 – Further Additional Continuing Appropriations and Extensions Act, 2023 (Sec. 7030, 7043, 7057, 7058).
- H.R.6256 – To ensure that goods made with forced labor in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region of the PRC do not enter the US market, and for other purposes.
- H.R.7776 – James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 (Secs. 1251, 1252, 1253, 1257, 1258, 1259, 5502, 5522, 5523).
- S.1605 – National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022 (Secs. 735, 855, 1251, 1338).
- S.4900 – SBIR and STTR Extension Act for 2022 (Sec. 3).
- S.812 – A bill to direct the Secretary of State to develop a strategy to regain observer status for Taiwan in the World Health Organization, and for other purposes.
- H.R.1083 – Southeast Asia Strategy Act.
- H.R.1155/ S.65 – Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act.
- H.R.1157 – Department of State Authorization Act of 2021.
- H.R.1251 – Cyber Diplomacy Act of 2021.
- H.R.1934 – Promoting US International Leadership in 5G Act of 2021.
- H.R.2225 – National Science Foundation for the Future Act.
- H.R.3344 – Transatlantic Telecommunications Security Act.
- H.R.3843 – Merger Filing Free Modernization Act of 2022.
- H.R.4133 – Caribbean Basin Security Initiative Authorization Act.
- H.R.4502 – Labor, Health and Human Services, Education, Agriculture, Rural Development, Energy and Water Development, Financial Services and General Government, Interior, Environment, Military Construction, Veterans Affairs, Transportation, and Housing and Urban Development Appropriations Act, 2022 (Secs. 526, 527, 777).
- H.R.4551 – RANSOMWARE Act.
- H.R.4785 – To support the human rights of Uyghurs and members of other minority groups residing primarily in Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region and safeguard their distinct identity, and for other purposes.
- H.R.4821 – To hold accountable senior officials of the Government of the People's Republic of China who are responsible for or have directly carried out, at any time, persecution of Christians or other religious minorities in China, and for other purposes.
- H.R.5315 – Drone Infrastructure Inspection Grant Act.
- H.R.5497 – BURMA Act of 2021.

- H.R.7314 – AXIS Act.
- H.R.7667 – Food and Drug Amendments of 2022.
- H.R.8294 – Transportation, Housing and Urban Development, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2023.
- H.R.8503 – Securing Global Telecommunications Act.
- H.R.8520 – Countering Untrusted Telecommunications Abroad Act.
- S.1260/ H.R.4521 – US Innovation and Competition Act of 2021.
- S.1867 – COVID-19 Origin Act of 2021.
- S.4216 – North Korean Human Rights Reauthorization Act of 2022.
- S.590 – CONFUCIUS Act.
- H.Res.130 – Condemning the continued violation of rights and freedoms of the people of Hong Kong by the PRC and the Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.
- H.Res.317 – Condemning the ongoing genocide and crimes against humanity being committed against Uyghurs and members of other religious and ethnic minority groups by the People’s Republic of China.
- H.Res.831 – Calling on the US Government to uphold the founding democratic principles of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and establish a Center for Democratic Resilience within the headquarters of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
- H.Res.837 – Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives that Beijing should immediately guarantee the safety and freedom of tennis star Peng Shuai.
- S.Res.120 – A resolution recognizing the Ninth Summit of the Americas and reaffirming the commitment of the US to a more prosperous, secure, and democratic Western Hemisphere.
- S.Res.122 – A resolution reaffirming the importance of US alliances and partnerships.
- S.Res.256 – A resolution expressing the sense of the Senate regarding the need to conduct a comprehensive investigation to determine the origins of COVID-19.
- S.Res.472 – A resolution reaffirming the partnership between the United States and the Dominican Republic and advancing opportunities to deepen diplomatic, economic, and security cooperation between the two nations.
- S.Res.503 – A resolution expressing the sense of the Senate that the Government of the PRC should immediately guarantee the safety and freedom of tennis star Peng Shuai.
- S.Res.874 – A resolution expressing the sense of the Senate that the activities of transnational criminal organizations, including the use of illicit economies, illicit trade, and trade-based money laundering, pose a risk to the interests of the United States and allies and partners of the United States around the world.
- H.R.21 – Strategic Production Response Act.
- H.R.22 – Protecting America’s Strategic Petroleum Reserve from China Act.
- H.Con.Res.9 – Denouncing the horrors of socialism.

- H.Res.104 – Condemning the CCP’s use of a high-altitude surveillance balloon over the US territory as a brazen violation of US sovereignty.
- H.Res.11 – Establishing the Select Committee on the Strategic Competition Between the US and the CCP.
- H.Res.67 – Providing amounts for the expenses of the Select Committee on the Strategic Competition Between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party.

## **Appendix 2: List of hearings consulted for the analysis**

Below is the list of hearings that were consulted to analyze direct non-legislative initiatives by Congress. Since most of the hearings do not have written transcripts, they are available to watch at [www.c-span.org](http://www.c-span.org).

### *House Foreign Affairs Committee*

- US Policy Toward Iraq (January 11, 2007).
- US-China Relations (May 1, 2007).
- US Middle East Policy (October 24, 2007).
- Internet Privacy in China (November 6, 2007).
- US Policy Toward Iran (July 9, 2008).
- Human Rights in China (July 23, 2008).
- US Foreign Policy Priorities (April 22, 2009).
- USAID Fiscal Year 2011 Budget (March 3, 2010).
- Sanctions Against Iran (December 1, 2010).
- US-China Relations (January 19, 2011).
- US Foreign Policy Priorities (March 1, 2011).
- Human Rights in North Korea (September 20, 2011).
- US Development Assistance to China (November 15, 2011).
- North Korea's New Leader and US Policy (April 18, 2012).
- Human Rights Issues in China (May 15, 2012).
- North Korean Nuclear Program (March 5, 2013).
- Human Rights in China (June 3, 2013).
- State Department Fiscal Year 2015 Budget Request (March 13, 2014).
- US-Taiwan Relations (March 14, 2014).
- Foreign Affairs Bills Markup (May 9, 2014).
- Tiananmen Square Protests 25<sup>th</sup> Anniversary (May 30, 2014).
- North Korea Threat Assessment (January 13, 2015).
- House Markup on Taiwan and Interpol (May 20, 2015).
- US Interests at the United Nations (June 16, 2015).
- North Korean Nuclear Tests (January 13, 2016).
- State Department Fiscal Year 2017 Budget Request (February 25, 2016).
- US Policy in the Asia-Pacific Region (April 28, 2016).
- Fiscal Year 2018 State Department Budget (June 14, 2017).
- US-UN Relations (June 28, 2017).
- North Korea Nuclear Program Funding (September 12, 2017).
- State Department Fiscal Year 2019 Budget Request (May 23, 2018).

- Foreign Policy in Western Hemisphere (July 11, 2018).
- State Department Fiscal Year 2020 Budget Request (March 27, 2019).
- Human Rights and Journalism (May 16, 2019).
- House Hearing on Coronavirus Response (February 27, 2020).
- House Foreign Affairs Hearing on China's Security Law in Hong Kong (July 1, 2020).
- Fiscal Year 2021 Foreign Aid Budget Request (July 23, 2020).
- US Drug Policy in Latin America and the Caribbean (December 3, 2020).
- US Policy in the Balkans (December 8, 2020).
- House Foreign Affairs Committee Hearing on Biden Administration Foreign Policy Priorities (March 10, 2021).
- House Hearing on US Policy in China and North Korea (March 19, 2021).
- House Hearing on Global Response to Climate Change (May 12, 2021).
- House Foreign Affairs Committee Hearing on State Department Fiscal 2022 Budget Request (June 7, 2021).
- Hearing on US Leadership and International COVID-19 Response (June 9, 2021).
- US Ambassador to the UN Testifies on Foreign Policy and US Global Leadership (June 16, 2021).
- Deputy Secretary of State Testifies on US policy in the Indo-Pacific Region (April 6, 2022).
- State Department Foreign Policy Priorities and Fiscal Year 2023 Budget Request (April 26, 2022).
- House Hearing on Chinese Communist Party Aggression (February 28, 2023).

#### *House Armed Services Committee*

- Fiscal Year 2008 Defense Budget (February 7, 2007).
- Safety of Food Supply (April 24, 2007).
- Global Security Assessment (July 11, 2007).
- Safety of Food Supply (July 17, 2007).
- Food Safety (October 11, 2007).
- Food and Drug Administration Oversight (January 28, 2008).
- Foreign Drug Inspection (April 22, 2008).
- Foreign Drug Inspection Program (April 29, 2008).
- Military Operations in Europe and Asia (March 24, 2009).
- China's Military Strategy (January 13, 2010).
- Quadrennial Defense Review (July 29, 2010).
- Military Readiness in the Pacific (March 15, 2011).
- National Security Priorities and Defense Spending (October 13, 2011).
- Defense Department Fiscal Year 2013 Budget (February 15, 2012).

- Korean Peninsula Security (March 28, 2012).
- Developments in Syria (April 19, 2012).
- Fiscal Year 2013 Defense Authorization Markup (May 9, 2012).
- Fiscal Year 2014 Defense Authorization Markup (June 5, 2013).
- Fiscal Year 2015 Defense Authorization Markup (May 7, 2014).
- Fiscal Year 2016 Defense Authorization Markup (April 29, 2015).
- Defense Department Cyber Strategies (September 30, 2015).
- Defense Department Fiscal Year 2017 Budget Request (March 22, 2016).
- Fiscal Year 2017 Defense Authorization Markup (April 27, 2016).
- Military Readiness (February 7, 2017).
- Asia-Pacific Security (April 26, 2017).
- Fiscal Year 2018 Defense Budget (June 12, 2017).
- Fiscal Year 2018 Defense Authorization Markup (June 28, 2017).
- National Defense Strategy and Nuclear Posture Review (February 6, 2018).
- US Military Operations in Africa (March 6, 2018).
- Secretary Mattis and General Dunford on 2019 Budget Request (April 12, 2018).
- Fiscal Year 2019 Defense Authorization Markup (May 9, 2018).
- Military Technology (June 21, 2018).
- Defense Department Fiscal Year 2020 Budget Request (March 26, 2019).
- US Military Operations in Asia and the Pacific (March 27, 2019).
- 2020 National Defense Authorization Act (June 12, 2019).
- House Hearing on Special Operations and Disinformation Campaigns (March 16, 2021).
- Defense Department's Use of Electromagnetic Spectrum (March 19, 2021).
- House Hearing on Artificial Intelligence and National Security (March 12, 2021).
- Military Operations in Africa and the Middle East (April 20, 2021).
- Defense Department Fiscal Year 2022 Budget Request (June 23, 2021).
- Defense Intelligence Operations (June 11, 2021).
- Defense and State Officials Testify on US Engagement with Allies (March 1, 2022).
- House Hearing on US Strategy in the Indo-Pacific Region (March 9, 2022).
- Defense Department Fiscal Year 2023 Budget Request (April 5, 2022).

*House Financial Services Committee*

- Global Poverty and the World Bank (May 22, 2007).
- State of the International Finance System (June 20, 2007).
- State of the Economy (July 18, 2007).
- Chairman Bernanke on Financial Regulatory Overhaul (October 1, 2009).
- Financial Services Legislation Markup (October 15, 2009).

- Accounting and Auditing Standards (May 21, 2010).
- International Financial System (September 22, 2010).
- International Financial System (March 20, 2012).
- Monetary Policy and Economy (February 27, 2013).
- International Finance System (December 12, 2013).
- Global Effect of Federal Reserve Policy (January 9, 2014).
- Janet Yellen on Monetary Policy and the Economy (February 11, 2014).
- Financial Stability Oversight Council Report (June 24, 2014).
- Export-Import Bank Reauthorization (June 25, 2014).
- International Financial System (March 17, 2015).
- Monetary Policy and Economy (February 10, 2016).
- International Financial System (July 27, 2017).
- North Korea Nuclear Program Funding (September 13, 2017).
- Foreign Investment and National Security (December 14, 2017).
- International Financial System (July 12, 2018).
- Monetary Policy and the Economy (July 18, 2018).
- International Financial Institutions (December 12, 2018).
- Monetary Policy and the Economy (February 27, 2019).
- International Financial System (April 9, 2019).
- House Financial Services Committee Hearing on Banking Regulations (April 10, 2019).
- International Financial System (May 22, 2019).
- Federal Reserve Chair Jerome Powell Testifies on the State of the Economy (July 10, 2019).
- Financial Stability and the Economy (December 5, 2019).
- Mobile Payment Technology (January 30, 2020).
- Monetary Policy and the Economy (February 11, 2020).
- Treasury Secretary and Federal Reserve Chair Testimony on COVID-19 Economic Recovery (March 23, 2021).
- Monetary Policy and the Economy (July 14, 2021).
- Treasury Secretary Testifies on Global Financial Systems (April 6, 2022).
- Financial Stability Oversight Council Report (May 12, 2022).
- Hearing on Alternative Payment Methods and National Security (September 20, 2022).
- Federal Reserve Chair Testifies on Monetary Policy Report (March 8, 2023).

*House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence*

- National Security Assessment (February 7, 2008).
- Worldwide Security Threats (February 25, 2009).
- Threats to US National Security (February 2, 2012).



- Worldwide Intelligence Threats (April 11, 2013).
- Global Threats to the US (February 4, 2014).
- Cybersecurity Threats (November 20, 2014).
- The Growing Cyber Threat and its Impact on American Business (March 19, 2015).
- Global Threats (February 25, 2016).
- Russian Election Interference (March 20, 2017).
- China's Digital Authoritarianism: Surveillance, Influence, and Political Control (May 16, 2019).
- Hearing on Online Foreign Influence Operations (June 18, 2020).
- House Hearing on US-China Relations Post-Coronavirus (July 1, 2020).
- Department of Homeland Security Intelligence Oversight (October 2, 2020).
- House Hearing on the Spread of Online Misinformation (October 15, 2020).
- House Select Intelligence Committee Hearing on Global Threats (April 15, 2021).
- Intelligence Directors Testify on National Security Threats (March 8, 2022).
- Former Intelligence Officials Testify on National Security (February 8, 2023).

*Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party*

- The Chinese Communist Party's Threat to America (February 28, 2023).
- The Chinese Communist Party's Ongoing Uyghur Genocide (March 23, 2023).

### **Appendix 3. Sample of members of Congress used in this study.**

#### *Senators:*

- Sen. John Barrasso (R-WY)
- Sen. Max Baucus (D-MT)
- Sen. Barbara Boxer (D-CA)
- Sen. Scott Brown (R-MA)
- Sen. Richard Burr (R-NC)
- Sen. Ben Cardin (D-MD)
- Sen. Kent Conrad (D-ND)
- Sen. Bob Corker (R-TN)
- Sen. Tom Cotton (R-AR)
- Sen. Ted Cruz (R-TX)
- Sen. Tammy Duckworth (D-IL)
- Sen. Dick Durbin (D-IL)
- Sen. Russell Feingold (D-WI)
- Sen. Dianne Feinstein (D-CA)
- Sen. Cory Gardner (R-CO)
- Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-SC)
- Sen. Judd Gregg (R-NH)
- Sen. Orrin Hatch (R-UT)
- Sen. Josh Hawley (R-MO)
- Sen. Jim Inhofe (R-OK)
- Sen. Johnny Isakson (R-GA)
- Sen. Ron Johnson (R-WI)
- Sen. Edward Kaufman (D-MA)
- Sen. John Kennedy (R-LA)
- Sen. John Kerry (D-MA)
- Sen. Amy Klobuchar (D-MN)
- Sen. Frank Lautenberg (D-NJ)
- Sen. Patrick Leahy (D-VT)
- Sen. Mike Lee (R-UT)
- Sen. Carl Levin (D-MI)
- Sen. Joe Lieberman (I-CT)
- Sen. Ed Markey (D-MA)
- Sen. Roger Marshall (R-KS)
- Sen. John McCain (R-AZ)
- Sen. Mitch McConnell (R-KY)
- Sen. Bob Menendez (D-NJ)
- Sen. Jeff Merkley (D-OR)
- Sen. Bill Nelson (D-FL)
- Sen. Harry Reid (D-NV)
- Sen. Jim Risch (R-ID)
- Sen. Mitt Romney (R-UT)
- Sen. Marco Rubio (R-FL)
- Sen. Bernie Sanders (I-VT)
- Sen. Chuck Schumer (D-NY)
- Sen. Rick Scott (R-FL)
- Sen. Gordon Smith (R-OR)
- Sen. Jon Tester (D-MT)
- Sen. Pat Toomey (R-PA)
- Sen Jim Webb (D-VA)

*Representatives:*

- Rep. Gary Ackerman (D-NY)
- Rep. Mark Amodei (R-NV)
- Rep. Lou Barletta (R-PA)
- Rep. Andy Barr (R-KY)
- Rep. Howard Berman (D-CA)
- Rep. Eddie Bernice Johnson (D-TX)
- Rep. Gus Bilirakis (R-FL)
- Rep. Ken Calvert (R-CA)
- Rep. Dave Camp (R-MI)
- Rep. Kathy Castor (D-FL)
- Rep. Joaquin Castro (D-TX)
- Rep. Steve Chabot (R-OH)
- Rep. Jason Chaffetz (R-UT)
- Rep. Donna Christensen (D-VI)
- Rep. Judy Chu (D-CA)
- Rep. Emanuel Cleaver (D-MO)
- Rep. Paul Cook (R-CA)
- Rep. Ander Crenshaw (R-FL)
- Rep. Jason Crow (D-CO)
- Rep. Henry Cuellar (D-TX)
- Rep. John Culberson (R-TX)
- Rep. Rosa DeLauro (D-CT)
- Rep. Charlie Dent (R-PA)
- Rep. Teddy Deutch (D-PA)
- Rep. Eliot Engel (D-NY)
- Rep. Adriano Espaillat (D-NY)
- Rep. Eni Faleomavaega (D-AS)
- Rep. Barney Frank (D-MA)
- Rep. Rodney Frelinghuysen (R-NJ)
- Rep. Kay Granger (R-TX)
- Rep. Al Green (D-TX)
- Rep. Parker Griffith (R-AL)
- Rep. Phil Gingrey (R-GA)
- Rep. Gregg Harper (R-MS)
- Rep. Vicky Hartzler (R-MO)
- Rep. Alcee Hastings (D-FL)
- Rep. French Hill (R-AR)
- Rep. Rush Holt (D-NJ)
- Rep. Will Hurd (R-TX)
- Rep. Darrell Issa (R-CA)
- Rep. Hakeem Jeffries (D-NY)
- Rep. Marcy Kaptur (D-OH)
- Rep. Young Kim (R-CA)
- Rep. Peter King (R-NY)
- Rep. Jack Kingston (R-GA)
- Rep. Doug Lamborn (R-CO)
- Rep. Tom Lantos (D-CA)
- Rep. Barbara Lee (D-CA)
- Rep. Sander Levin (D-MI)
- Rep. Ted Lieu (D-CA)
- Rep. Zoe Lofgren (D-CA)
- Rep. Nita Lowey (D-NY)
- Rep. Tom Malinowski (D-NJ)
- Rep. Kathy Manning (D-NC)
- Rep. Jim Marshall (R-PA)
- Rep. Thomas Massie (R-KY)
- Rep. Kevin McCarthy (R-CA)
- Rep. Michael McCaul (R-TX)
- Rep. Tom McClintock (R-CA)
- Rep. Betty McCollum (D-MN)
- Rep. Jim McGovern (D-MA)
- Rep. Buck McKeon (R-CA)
- Rep. Michael McMahon (D-NY)
- Rep. Pat Meehan (R-PA)
- Rep. Gregory Meeks (D-GA)
- Rep. Brad Miller (D-NC)
- Rep. Walter Minnick (R-ID)
- Rep. Alan Mollohan (D-WV)
- Rep. Devin Nunes (R-CA)
- Rep. James Oberstar (D-MN)
- Rep. David Obey (D-WI)
- Rep. John Olver (D-MA)

- Rep. Ilhan Omar (D-MN)
- Rep. Frank Pallone (D-NJ)
- Rep. Bill Pascrell (D-NJ)
- Rep. Nancy Pelosi (D-CA)
- Rep. Collin Peterson (D-MN)
- Rep. Mike Quigley (D-IL)
- Rep. Nick Rahall (D-WV)
- Rep. Silvestre Reyes (D-TX)
- Rep. Scott Rigell (R-VA)
- Rep. Cathy Rodgers McMorris (R-WA)
- Rep. Harold Rogers (R-KY)
- Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-FL)
- Rep. Peter Roskam (R-IL)
- Rep. Lucille Roybal-Allard (D-CA)
- Rep. Edward Royce (R-CA)
- Rep. Steve Russell (R-OK)
- Rep. Tim Ryan (D-OH)
- Rep. Steve Scalise (R-LA)
- Rep. Janice Schakowsky (D-IL)
- Rep. Adam Schiff (D-CA)
- Rep. Kurt Schrader (D-OR)
- Rep. Brad Sherman (D-CA)
- Rep. Michael Simpson (R-ID)
- Rep. Ike Skelton (D-LA)
- Rep. Adam Smith (D-WA)
- Rep. Chris Smith (R-NJ)
- Rep. Lamar Smith (R-TX)
- Rep. Greg Stanton (D-AZ)
- Rep. Bryan Steil (R-WI)
- Rep. Chris Stewart (R-UT)
- Rep. Bennie Thompson (D-MS)
- Rep. Mac Thornberry (R-TX)
- Rep. Dina Titus (D-NV)
- Rep. Juan Vargas (D-CA)
- Rep. Maxine Waters (D-CA)
- Rep. Henry Waxman (D-CA)
- Rep. Jennifer Wexton (D-VA)
- Rep. Susan Wild (D-PA)
- Rep. Joe Wilson (R-SC)
- Rep. Frank Wolf (R-WA)
- Rep. David Wu (D-OR)
- Rep. John Yarmuth (D-KY)
- Rep. Ted Yoho (R-FL)