

Abstract

The announcement of long jail sentences for nine independentist leaders on October 14, 2019, sparked a week of protests all over Catalonia that for the first time saw the use of violent tactics on an unprecedented scale with hundreds injured and arrested, which stands in stark contrast to the movement's peaceful identity. The appearance of violence now, as the main puzzle, is even more striking considering the long existence of the movement with high institutionalization. The analysis follows the three factors that have been identified as essential for the development of social movements: organization, frames, and political opportunities. Relying on a case study approach the analysis uses in-depth data from qualitative interviews with a wide range of movement actors. It finds that a loss of cohesion after 2017 led to fragmentation which was accompanied by an organizational downward shift from traditional to new and more radical organizations and individuals. This also coincided with a shift towards frames that ought to defend basic democratic rights and freedoms as well as resistance against police repression. The policing of the movement in the past had the effect of closing down political opportunities, though this was not identified as a sufficient cause. Instead putting the focus on the policing of protest activity enabled to explain the use of coercive tactics by the police forces beyond the limits of official protocols which was a response to interactions with confrontative activists. Confrontative tactics and corresponding coercion by the police finally led to the spiral of violence.

Keywords: social movements, independence movements, secessionism, Catalonia, radicalization, political violence, policing, organizational theory

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Abbreviations

1-O - 1st of October 2017 (referendum)

ANC - Assamblea de Catalunya

ARRO - Áreas Regionales de Recursos Operativos

BLM - Black Lives Matter movement

Brimo - Àrea de Brigada Mòbil

Cecor - Centra Operatiu de Coordinació Policial

CUP - Candidatura d'Unitat Popular

ERC - Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya

ETA - Euskadi Ta Askatasuna

Junts - Junts per Catalunya

Mossos - Mossos d'Esquadra

Omnium - Òmnium Cultural

PP – Partido Popular

La Rosa de Foc: Violent tactics during the October 2019 Protests in Catalonia

1 INTRODUCTION

La Rosa da Foc, the “Rose of Fire”, is what Catalans called their capital Barcelona, pretty as a rose yet set ablaze by escalations in the streets. Originated during the events of the ‘tragic week’ of 1909 the name lingered for the city that has long been the focal point of protest activity (Fernández 2019). Yet none of the dominantly peaceful demonstrations after the *transición* created images as the week of protests of October 2019 that saw thick columns of smoke over the city that brought back the image of Barcelona as the “Rose of Fire.” The demonstrations followed the announcement of harsh jail sentences for 9 leaders of the pro-independence movement that had been arrested for their alleged role in the bid for independence in September 2017. After the sentence was announced on Monday the 14th of October 2019 a week of demonstration ensued that featured patterns of past collective actions such as peaceful mass demonstrations like the “Marchas de la Llibertad”. Yet, the week also saw the use of new and more disruptive actions like the occupation of Barcelona’s airport. The images that dominated however were those of burning trash containers and violent clashes between the police and protesters. These escalations amounted to almost 600 injured including multiple police officers and several protesters losing an eye or testicle due to the use of rubber bullets by the police (LaVanguardia 2019). According to authorities in Barcelona, rioting caused the city an estimated €1.5 million in damages (DW 2019). The display of violence and violent tactics, though limited in scale compared to the majority of peaceful demonstrators, has been a cut with the peaceful identity that had continuously been emphasised throughout the movement’s past. Following a case study approach and using primarily qualitative interviews this paper aims to explain this puzzle following the question: *What explains the use of violent tactics during the week of protest of October 2019 in Catalonia?*

Most movements have seen an explosive and violent early phase that declined with increasing institutionalization (Tarrow 1994). The Catalan independence movement however has major organizations whose founding dates back to the Franco-era, as in the case of the grassroots organization Òmnium Cultural (Òmnium), or even before the civil war like the left-wing independentist party Esquerra Republicana (ERC). Beginning with Artur Mas who came into office in late 2010 Catalonia continuously had presidents that were supporting Catalanist sentiments. Given this high degree of institutionalization the case of violent escalations in Catalonia is deviant to previously studied ones. Additionally dealing with a secessionist movement in an autonomous region where regional and national police forces are operating potentially brings unique dynamics to the policing of protest, unique from previously studied cases even including other secessionist movements (Tilly 1978; della Porta 1995;

Maney 2007). Additionally, the topic addresses a gap in the literature as there is a lack of research on the recent tactical changes in the Catalan independence movement. It also serves to test previous theories on political violence (e.g. Pearlman 2011; Medrano 1994), and applies them to the context of a liberal democracy with low levels of violence. Methodologically, the analysis encompasses data from many sources that have not been included in previous studies such as interviews with various movement actors, including the police and activists that were involved in clandestine-like organizations, a multitude of informal talks, and illustrative data such as graffiti or symbols from the protests.¹

Beside addressing a gap in the literature, the question also has great social relevance as the strive for independence had been an issue that frequently dominated Spanish and even more so Catalan media, discourses, and politics. Putting the focus on the aspect of political violence has great merit in a country where the memory of the horrific terroristic acts and subsequent counter violence in the Basque independence movement still lingers on.

The scope of the analysis is mainly focused on the events of the week of protests that started on the 14th of October 2019. These events, and more precisely its violent escalations, constitute the outcome of interest. The analysis' timeframe also considers the events around the first of October 2017 (1-O) up to October 2019. Outside this main timeframe few references are also made to relevant developments that dated back to the early 2010s when the movement gained momentum and the economic crisis caused a significant wave of contention.

The paper finds that growing fragmentation in the movement and a change of salient frames after the 1-O reduced restraints on violent tactics and left space for more radical groups. These changes responded to policing of the movement on a broader level and ended in a spiral of violence during the week of protest that was accelerated by interactions between protesters with more confrontative tactics and police that likewise responded with more violent tactics.

After giving a brief description and background on the case a theory section will give definitions of key concepts and an overview over relevant previous research on the movement as well as violence in social movements which provides pointers for the empirical analysis. This is followed by stating the theory informed argument of the analysis and giving information about methodology and data. The empirical analysis structurally follows the three main factors identified by McAdam et al. (1996) that influence the development of social movements, starting with *organization* by laying out organizational changes in the movement that led to fragmentation and a loss of cohesion. The next chapter looks at the changing nature of salient *frames* in the movement and their effect leading up to the protests of October 2019. The last chapter stems from the concept of *political opportunities*. It uses the concept in combination with policing of the movement which gives an overview over increasing restraints the movement had to face.

¹ The literature review expands the explanations on the gap in the literature.

Putting the focus on policing of protest activity the chapter then outlines characteristics and tactical approaches of the police forces in Catalonia and later critically evaluates their actions during the week of protest while also considering the perspective of the protesters, how they interacted, and how these dynamics led to violent escalation.

1.1 Background: The Catalan Independence Movement

Actors in the Catalan independence movement like to highlight the historical struggle of Catalonia against Spain and its cultural distinctiveness (ANC 2018). Yet it is reasonable to argue that the roots of the modern independence movement date back to pre-civil war times (Medrano 1994). Preceded by a period of cultural revival these years saw a surge in Catalan nationalism. This nationalism had a bourgeois basis centred around economic interests and a progressive part that was championed by the moderate leftist Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (ERC) party, that is today, again, the leading independentist party in Catalonia. In comparison to today the major Catalan nationalist organizations did however follow more moderate aims that were largely focused on autonomy instead of a complete break and independence from Spain (ibid.). The revolutionary turmoil, the civil war, and later the Franco dictatorship did however mean a break with the previous regional nationalist ambitions. Catalan culture and institutions suffered heavy repression by Franco who attempted to eradicate Catalonia as a nation (Guibernau 2014: 10). Unlike in the Basque independence movement, there was no armed resistance against this repression in Catalonia.² Instead, the first subtle re-establishment of a Catalanist movement began with the founding of Òmnium Cultural (Omnium) in 1961 with the goal to promote Catalan language and other cultural aspects. It was to play a key role in later independentist mobilizations. After Franco's death in 1975 groups like Omnium profited from the sudden increase in political freedom and Catalan institutions came to be re-established. The new Spanish institution of 1978 was however rejected by many Catalan nationalists as they saw Catalan autonomy detrimental to its self-determination goals (Calamur 2017). The new constitution "recognizes and guarantees the right to autonomy of the nationalities" without clearly defining what that means. Still Catalonia gained some autonomy rights. Even though these fell short of what was later granted to the Basque Country, many pro-independence groups faded out in face of increased autonomy (Castañeda & Megens-Sedor 2020: 215). This change created room for the emergence of the far-left Catalan nationalist group Terra Lluire [Free Land] to launch terrorist attacks though with little following and impact and on a much smaller scale than terrorist acts by Basque nationalists (Minder 2017).

Despite somewhat recognising Catalonia as a distinct entity the new constitution placed above all the "indissoluble unity" of Spain which set the basis for the later criminalization of independentist

² It can be argued that this is part of the roots of the nonviolent identity of the Catalan movement.

grievances. Another aspect of the constitution that was implemented by Francoists was article 155 which allowed to strip regions of certain rights and put them under direct control of the central state (Bernat and Whyte 2019: 13). The years after the transition to democracy were in Catalonia determined cautious attempts to increase Catalan autonomy in the existing Spanish constitutional framework. Beginning in the 1990s a trend towards a stronger Catalan identity emerged with many Catalans feeling exclusively or more Catalan than Spanish, thereby creating a social base for a reinvigoration of Catalan nationalism (Serrano 2013; Burg 2015). In this climate the national government of 2000-2004 under José Aznar, of the right-wing Partido Popular (PP), failed to respond to the Catalan demands for more autonomy. In fact, after losing much public support, after a series of highly unpopular actions, the PP started employing an anti-Catalan campaign that was appealing to Castilian patriotism (Bernat and Whyte 2019).³ After a turn to progressive governments in Catalonia and Madrid attempts to achieve more autonomy through constitutional changes seemingly succeeded after a new statute of autonomy had been ratified by both the Catalan and the national Spanish parliament. However, in 2010 the Spanish High Court of Justice did not approve major parts of it putting an indefinite end to Catalonia's strive for more autonomy through institutional, negotiation-based means (Basta 2017). In response Catalonia saw a surge in protest activities and support for independence which had previously been marginal (Dowling 2014). This change was accompanied by the creation of the grassroots organization Assamblea Nacional Catalana (ANC) that, together with Omnium, organized some of the biggest demonstrations in Spanish history in the following years (della Porta et al. 2017). Furthermore, the effects of the financial crisis created economic grievances that could be answered by the independence movement (Serrano 2013). These dynamics of a rapidly growing independentist movement also affected political parties in Catalonia that turned from largely moderate standpoints to outbid each other in their support for independence (Barrio & Rodríguez-Teruel 2017). With Artur Mas, who was elected in 2010, the Catalan independence movement came to be represented in the Catalan government. Though he was initially not in favour of independence he turned towards it in the progress of his term in office and launched the *procés* towards independence (della Porta & Portos 2020: 10). The *procés* included peaceful mass demonstrations and symbolic acts including a multitude of small-scale referenda with the most notable being the "consultation" about independence in 2014. It culminated in the event of the 1st of October 2017 (1-O) when a major, unapproved, referendum was held in Catalonia after which the Catalan government that was comprised of a coalition of Catalan pro-independence parties under President Carles Puigdemont declared Catalonia's independence.

The conservative national government of Mariano Rajoy reacted by sending more than ten thousand policemen to Catalonia and imposed article 155 that put the region under direct control of the central

³ The use of anti-Catalan rhetoric by the PP was also mentioned in a focus group interview with different *independentistas* that was conducted for this study. They mentioned it after being asked what explained the growth of Catalan nationalist sentiments in the early 2000s which previous studies (e.g. statistical analysis or explanations based on economic grievances) could not explain.

state after the politicians defiant bid for independence. In the wake of repression of this process, that was accompanied by significant police violence against peaceful demonstrators (AI 2017), Spanish authorities imprisoned twelve leaders that were supposed to be behind the referendum on the charge of sedition.⁴

Puzzle: The increasing use of violent tactics by the movement in October 2019

The outcome to be explained by this study is the increasing use of violent tactics that could be observed during the week of protest of October 2019 that followed the announcement of the sentence of the 9 independentistas. In line with the definition of violence used here this includes violence towards police officers as well as destruction of private or public property.⁵ The images of the violence dominated the media coverage of the events. Despite a certain bias of the media towards reporting specifically the violent aspects of protests (Brasted 2005), all interviewed respondents, activists, and police alike, have agreed that the degree of violent escalation has been unprecedented.

On 14 October 2019 the sentence for nine pro-independence politicians and civil society leaders was announced charging them with up to 13 years for sedition and the misuse of public funds. In the weeks before the announcement authorities raided offices of the Comitès de Defensa de la República (CDR), a decentralised network of committees that were founded during the 2017 referendum and gained popularity for their commitment to an independent Catalonia.⁶ The raids were based on the suspicion that some members of the CDR were preparing terrorist acts (NYT 2019).⁷ The raids were met with smaller protests in different Catalan cities and took part in raising tempers prior to the announcement of the verdict. Catalonia's president Quim Torra spoke of a continuation of Spanish repression. In his response he tweeted, "They are trying to construct a tale of violence prior to the sentences. They won't achieve it. The independence movement is, and always will be, pacific" (Torra 2019). Soon it would prove however that this statement would no longer account for the whole of the movement.

The highly anticipated verdict was announced in the morning on Monday 14 October. The reaction was almost instantly. People took to the streets and occupied Barcelona's el Prat airport after the new

⁴ Of these 12 arrested independentistas 9 were sentenced to long prison sentences between 9 and 13 years. Those include the presidents of the two big grass-root organizations Omnium and ANC as well as regional politicians.

⁵ See theory section.

⁶ The CDRs were first founded to aid in the organisation of the 2017 referendum and later became a loose network of committees that aimed at achieving Catalan independence. They are highly federalised with no central authority which led them to contain a multifaceted outlook in regard to ideological and organizational backgrounds of their members as well as tactics, according to interview partners. They are however united by their strive for Catalan independence and the characteristic of being a grass root movement.

⁷ Though police claimed to have seized materials that could allegedly be used to build explosives the accusations of terrorism did not hold up in court. 5 out of 7 arrested were released in December 2019 (Publico 2019).

mysterious collective Tsunami Democrático were calling demonstrators to bring the airport to a standstill directing them over the anonymous messenger app Telegram. Despite the police closing roads thousands of protesters had gathered at the airport in the afternoon. In the ensuing chaos many flights were cancelled and regional as well as national police used batons and foam bullets against the protesters injuring some and even attacking journalists (Burgen & Jones 2019a). Throughout the day 131 people received medical care according to Catalan health authorities (Burgen & Jones 2019b).

The next day saw more large protests that were called by different pro-independence groups. Disruptive protest at the airport continued and Protestors blocked freeways. Spanish authorities said they were investigating who co-ordinated the disruption (ElPais 2019a). Though largely peaceful, when the sun had set peaceful demonstrations descended into violent clashes and running battles (Burgen 2019). According to the Spanish government there had been 51 arrests across Catalonia on Monday and Tuesday, 54 regional and 18 national police officers were injured (Burgen & Jones 2019c).

Wednesday continued with demonstrations in Catalonia and tens of thousands protesting in central Barcelona. As before protests were overwhelmingly peaceful during the day. Still the mood changed in the later evening and street violence escalated. Protesters set cars and trashcans on fire to block roads. They also threw projectiles at the police including an incidence where protesters threw acid and a petrol bomb at officers. Police also reported that fireworks had been fired at a police helicopter (WP 2019). Young and confrontational protesters were chanting “oppressors out” and “the streets will always be ours” (ibid.). It appeared that the police were overwhelmed by the numbers and intensity of the protesters which in turn seems to have further emboldened them. The police responded with tear gas, baton charges, projectiles and driving through crowds to disperse them (“carousel”-tactic). Several Spanish politicians condemned the violence by separatists calling it “not a peaceful movement”. Quim Torra stated that, “These actions don’t represent us. We must distance ourselves from violent behaviour.”. The jailed independence leaders likewise called for peaceful protest (DW 2019b).

Thursday followed the previous patterns with large peaceful demonstrations during the day and the worst night of violence yet that also saw sporadic looting of stores and the vandalization of a bank. In addition to the clashes with the police, using the already mentioned tactics on the sides of the protesters and police, came violent confrontations between pro-independence protesters and right-wing groups (Burgen & Jones 2019d). Government officials blamed well organized minority groups for the escalating violence (Ibid.).

On Friday trade unions called for a general strike. The day was the highlight of protesting, more than half a million people who had walked towards the region’s capital converged in the centre of Barcelona (ElPais 2019b). The mood there was calm and festive (Ibid.; OBS). Near the headquarter of the national police at Via Laietana and with the day progressing demonstrations became more confrontational. Radical protesters cut off the police at Via Laietana with a huge burning roadblock and the surrounding

streets saw much fighting and an exchange of missiles between protesters and police in what was called the “Battle of Urquinaona”. Later in the evening the police broke the protesters line, for the first time, using a watercannon followed by nightly cat and mouse battles. Overall damages amounted to €1.5 million due to rioting as well as 182 injured across the region, 152 of them in Barcelona, 83 arrests and multiple officers injured by projectiles (Muozo & García 2019).

Peaceful and violent demonstrations continued on Saturday and Sunday though a continued increase in police present appeared to have restrained the situation. Notable were also the actions by older protesters to refrain younger radicals from violent actions (Burgen & Jones 2019e). The last major demonstration happened on October 26 with a demonstration of 350,000 participants in Barcelona that followed the common pattern of starting of peaceful and later descending into clashes with projectiles, barricades, batons, and the use of police vans (LaVanguardia 2019).

Though largely peaceful the violent clashes in the streets dominated media coverage of the demonstrations. Even though Catalan and Spanish officials highlighted the role of minority groups that were well organised and ready to incite confrontation, the severity of some of the acts of violence put a bad light on the whole of the movement. Previous leaders like the 9 sentenced independentist or the Catalan president Quim Torra failed to assert their influence on the protesters urging them to demonstrate peacefully. Instead, they had to acknowledge (and distance themselves) from the violence that erupted during the week. The protests of October 2019 can be seen as a turning point for the movement as no other previous demonstration could compare in scale and intensity in the turnout but also regarding the confrontational character of tactics employed. Another week of protests and riots in Barcelona that followed the arrest of pro-independence rapper Pablo Hasel, in February 2021, indicates that the protests of October 2019 served as a transformative event (Basta 2017) that opened the door to a potential change in tactical culture and identity within the Catalan independence movement that is detrimental to the pacifistic nature and self-image that the movement used to have prior.⁸ The following analysis seeks to answer the puzzle of what explains the adoption of violent tactics.

1.2 Literature Review

Violence

When discussing violence in social movements it is first necessary to clearly define the term as this key concept is frequently used in everyday conversations with differing meanings applied to it. In social research however it is necessary to arrive at a clear and operative definition that considers the context

⁸ Though the use of violence should not be overestimated especially when comparing the Catalan independence movement to other movements such as the Basque Independence movement where the actions of the Basque terrorist group ETA caused many deaths over their time of action.

that it is applied to. The conventional definition of violence in social science refers to “behaviour designed to inflict physical injury on people or damage to property” (Graham and Gurr 1969: xxvii). In the context of social movements violence takes on a political component.⁹ In this sense (political) violence means a “deliberate infliction of physical injury or damage for political ends”, which can also occur “unintentionally in the course of severe political conflict” (Wilkinson 1986:30).¹⁰ In a broader sense political violence may also be seen as “behaviour that violates the prevailing definition of legitimate political action” (della Porta 1995: 3) though this definition is not operational for social movements. I am thus going to rely on the mentioned definition of violence in a physical way directed against persons or property. This aspect is what clearly differentiates the protests of October 2019 from previous ones and is in line with comparable studies on violence in social movements (Gurr 1970; Wilkinson 1986; della Porta 1995; Muñoz & Anduiza 2019; Sutton et al. 2014; Nassauer 2016).

The Catalan independence movement

It is also necessary to define the Catalan independence movement. Independentist parties have had consecutive majorities in the Catalan parliament in the past years hence the region’s government had been dominated by independentist decision makers. Organizationally the movement has been dominated by the three independentist political parties together with two major grass root organizations.¹¹ At the same time there were young radical protesters dressed in black who were fighting with the police and right-wing counter demonstrators (Burgen and Jones 2019d). There were also elderly citizens walking along the protest marches wearing the yellow ribbon on their clothes.¹² It shows that the Catalan independence movement is a highly diverse one that includes a multitude of ideologies, organizations, and demographics. A social movement is therefore loosely defined as “an organized and sustained effort of a collectivity of interrelated individuals, groups, and organizations to promote or to resist social change with the use of public protest activities” (Neidhardt and Rucht 1991: 450). This definition leans towards a network-based approach to social movements (Diani 1992; della Porta 1995).¹³ Throughout multiple *protest cycles* the movement refrained from using violent tactics even during the peak of

⁹ Since the focus of this paper lies on social movements, I am at this point excluding state or state-sponsored violence though this kind of violence will be referred to in the later analysis.

¹⁰ The occurrence of violence can be spontaneous or unintentional. This might for example result from situational emotional balances between protesters and the police (Nassauer 2016). In this study however I follow the premise that violence was to a significant degree not unintentional and spontaneous. Considering that similar patterns of violence occurred in different Catalan cities makes it unlikely that the same spontaneous dynamics occurred in all of these cases.

¹¹ More on these in the chapter on organization.

¹² The yellow ribbon is a sign that appeared after the referendum of 2017 and stands for solidarity with the “political prisoners” and for Catalan independence in general.

¹³ Network-based approaches also define social movements as “networks of informal interactions between a plurality of individuals, groups and/or organizations, engaged in political or cultural conflicts, on the basis of shared collective identities.” (Diani 1992: 3).

independentist sentiments in 2017.¹⁴ Only in October 2019, after the movement has had stable support for around a decade and had been highly institutionalized, did the use of violent tactics appear on an unprecedented scale and intensity. It consequently makes the case deviant to previous ones and highly relevant for the discourse on violence in social movements.

Recent research on the Catalan independence movement and hypotheses

Many recent studies have dealt with the case of the separatist Catalan movement. Most sought to explain surges in support for independence (Sorens 2005; Burg 2015; Serrano 2013; Lepič 2017; Cuadras-Morató & Rodon 2019; Ubasart-Gonzalez 2020). The ‘procés’ towards independence has also received much attention with a focus on the pivotal referendum in 2017, its explanations and impact (López & Sanjaume-Calvet 2020; Lecours 2018; Maza et al. 2019; Colomer 2018). A key characteristic of this process was competitive outbidding between parties to win hegemony in the pro-independence camp (Barrio & Field 2018; Sanjaume-Calvet & Riera-Gil 2020). Repression of the nonviolent movement in connection to the referendum also created a window of opportunity for broader mobilization and a short-term increase in public sympathy (Balcells et al. 2020). Though a different study did not show evidence that police violence influenced local electoral behaviour (Barcelo 2018). The events of the 1-O also had effects on organizational transformation and relevant frames in the movement (della Porta et al. 2021). While there has been some attention on the Catalan case from the mentioned perspectives virtually no research has been done on violence in the movement. The only exception is della Porta, O’Connor, and Portos (2019). Analysing the timeframe of the *procés* till late 2018, the most important development they identified was the creation of new grassroots organizations that favoured more disruptive tactics and led to fragmentation in the movement. While identifying potential for future violence and an increase in radical actions in late 2018 they still concluded that in contrary to what other theories predicted repression and closing of political opportunities did not lead to serious violent escalation (della Porta et al. 2019). The riots of October 2019 however proved this latter point wrong. This is where this study picks up the case and adds to this gap.

Theory on violence in social movements

¹⁴ Protest cycles are clusters of protest activity within a temporal dimension that might include multiple protests and varying different actors and typically peak at some point (della Porta 2008: 222).

The only time there was serious violence in the history of the Catalan independence movement was done at the hands of the Catalan terrorist group Terra Lluire (“Free Land”). The group was founded in 1978 and mainly active in the 1980s. The group was however not too successful in their attempts to perform terroristic acts – often inflicting casualties on themselves - and did not have much of an impact in terms of policy change (Jimenez 2007). Today’s independence movement also started years after the activities of the group.

Previous research from different disciplines has identified a variety of factors that influence the development and tactical choice of social movements. McAdam et al. (1996) have condensed the different aspects into three main explanatory factors, these are (1) the structure of political opportunities and constraints for the movement; (2) the forms of organization; (3) the collective processes of interpretation, i.e., framing processes (McAdam et al. 1996: 2).

Other studies have put emphasis on different arenas for relational dynamics that lead to radicalization. These likewise appear handy for identifying relevant mechanisms within these factors that might have led to a radicalization of tactics in the Catalan independence movement (Alimi et al. 2015).¹⁵ These arenas are therefore useful for the identification of specific sets of explanatory mechanisms.

Social movements – of course – do not exist in a vacuum. In most cases they exist in and direct their grievances toward the state. Settled in a political environment there are sequential relations and interactions between a movement and state or inter-state institutions (Alimi et al. 2015: 42). Changes in the movement’s political environment that alter the constraints, possibilities, and threats a movement faces have the potential to enable or inhibit its collective action and goal attainment (ibid.). These political opportunities can be of formal, institutional or informal, cultural nature (Kriesi 1989: 295). They might include “regime shifts, periods of political instability, or changes in the composition of elites that may provide an opening for social movements” (della Porta 2008: 223). It can also conversely mean a lack of political opportunities. When groups are closed off from addressing their grievances in a meaningful way through the legitimate political channels their potential of resorting to violence rises (Bosi 2006; Koopmans 2005).¹⁶ This point appears to be especially relevant for the Catalan independence movement which had to deal with the closing of political opportunities as the result of increasing repression in recent years (della Porta et al. 2019; Balcells et al. 2020). Such repression can be seen as part of the broader concept of *policing*. Following this line of thought policing simply means the “governance of domestic dissent” (Wahlström 2015: 1). This definition has been deduced from Tilly’s concept of repression as efforts by authorities that increase the cost of collective action (Tilly 1995). Policing in this understanding can affect institutionalized politics – for example - through legislative changes or judiciary processes (also termed “soft repression”) (Garcia 2014). Such forms of repression “steer the conduct of civil society” (Loader 2000: 344) to protect the dominant political and economic order from disruption (Thörn 2012), which in the case of Catalonia would be the unity of Spain.

There has however been some degree of confusion in the use of the term *policing* in previous research.

¹⁵ Radicalization is a fitting term for the Catalan independence movement, or parts of it, because the former peaceful movement started to adapt violent tactics on top of their conventional repertoire of action (della Porta et al. 2019).

¹⁶ One way this might happen is as a response to injustice or government violence or due to a pleasure in agency and moral commitments to a cause (Wood 2003). Terrorist studies have produced similar conclusions such as that a lack of perceived sense of voice and justice is a crucial reason for terrorism (Moghaddam 2005). In this vein political oppression by the Nassauer regime had been important for the radicalization of Islamic fundamentalists in Egypt that caused individuals to transform their ideology from modernist unto a Jihadist frame and called for violent resistance (Esposito 2002).

While some interpret it in the described broader terms, others rely on a more concrete understanding of the concept which is simply focused on the “handling of protest events” (della Porta & Reiter 1998). Putting the focus of policing “on the ground” enters the relational arena between the movement and state security forces (Alimi et al. 2015; della Porta & Zamponi 2013; Nassauer 2016). These interactions have received much attention in previous research and are a key factor that influences radicalization and political violence (Della Porta 1995; Della Porta and Reiter 1998; Earl 2006; Gillham and Noakes 2007; McPhail, Schweingruber, and McCarthy 1998). There is some connection to the previously mentioned interactions with the state - or rather the political opportunity structure - as police strategies are themselves influenced by political opportunities. The influence asserts itself first through institutional constraints which are then filtered through the police’s construction of external reality (della Porta & Reiter 1998: 9). Applying a focus on the characteristics of the police and how they approach protests can therefore be useful to understand potential patterns that might have led to violent escalations (della Porta 2008: 224). Additionally, policing strategies and tactics are further influenced by interactions with the movement (della Porta & Reiter 1998). So called “interactive violence” is one of the main mechanisms for violent escalation (Tarrow 1998). Two sides struggling for control through actions and counteraction dynamics may result in a spiral of increasing violence (Gibbs 1989). This dynamic is kicked off easily through escalating demonstrations as the police seeks to manage and control protests which also means defending its monopoly on the use of violence (Earl 2006). An example for the spiralling of violence in Spain has been the case of the Basque independence movement that was subject to brutal attacks in the form of killings, kidnappings, and torture at the hands of Spanish police and paramilitary forces just at the beginning of the post-Franco era. The Basque independentist terror group Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) in turn responded with killings and further terror attacks (Muro 2008; Ellison and Smyth 2000). Such series of interactions influence the movements *repertoire of action* (Tilly 1978). Beside concrete actions these are furthermore influenced by how security forces and protesters perceive each other which can go beyond rationalist calculations (White 1993; Oberschall 2004; Davenport et al. 2005).

Previous research has analysed the effect of repression in Catalonia solely with a focus of its impact on public support for the movement with mixed results (Barceló 2018; Balcells et al. 2020; Munoz & Anduiza 2019). It’s effect on behaviour and frames has however been underexplored. Additionally, the causal direction between police repression and violent tactics is not always imminent. A quantitative analysis by Earl, Soule, and McCarthy (2003) has shown that periods of harsh police repression corresponded to situations of increased risk due to increasingly confrontational tactics and protest size (threat-based model) (Davenport 2000; Wahlström 2015). It would therefore be necessary to identify the precise dynamics of violence and counter-violence during the week of protest.

The intra movement arena touches on two aspects of McAdam et al.'s (1996) three main factors for social movements. Firstly, different frames or cultural processes in the movement may point to different lines of actions (McAdam 1996; Benford & Snow 2000; Gamson et al. 1982; della Porta et al. 2021; Hafez 2003; Xifra 2020). To understand these processes that are subject to continuous change and negotiation it is necessary to focus on specific frames and narratives in a particular situation (della Porta 1995). Considering the transformative potential of events like the 1-O (della Porta et al. 2021), it is reasonable to focus on how internal processes like framing might have changed after the referendum. To take the lead in a movement, different groups may compete for ideational as well as mere material power mutually affecting each other's strategies and negotiating values and identities (Gamson 1990; Hirsch 1990; Klandermans 1997; Zwerman, Steinhoff, and Della Porta 2000; McCammon 2003; Zwerman and Steinhoff 2005; Mische 2008; Pearlman 2011; Diani 2012). In this vein the negotiation of frames that impact the movement's peaceful identity would be especially relevant. Such competition also has ramifications for the second aspect of internal processes, organization (or 'mobilizing structures') (McAdam et al. 1996; McCarthy & Zald 1977).

Wendy Pearlman's (2011) organization mediation theory of protest describes this mechanism of radicalization. According to her, competition within the movement has the potential to increase the likelihood of violence as it leads to fragmentation. Nonviolent protest requires coordination and restraint which only cohesive movements can provide. Factional competition on the other hand generates new incentives for violence as authority structures become too weak to restrain escalation (Pearlman 2011; Stoecker 1995). This can happen easily as external influences can affect parts of movements differently. For example, moderate sectors tend to favour institutionalized means of action while more radical parts often take the route of increasingly confrontational tactics (Portos 2019). To analyse the dynamics between such movement sectors Robnett et al. (2015) have introduced classifications into conservative, centrist, and radical movement groups (or 'radical flanks') (Robnett et al. 2015; Tompkins 2015). Hegemonial dynamics between these groups determine what impact these changes may have and to what degree different actors give in to incentives to radicalize their repertoire of action (Cunningham et al. 2017).

The established main factors of McAdam et al. (1996) together with the corresponding explanatory factors are going to serve as pointers for the empirical analysis.

Further explanations for violent radicalization of social movements are interactions with counter movements that seek to undermine a movement's goals (Alimi et al. 2015: 48-9; Cunningham 2003; Alimi and Hirsch-Hoefler 2012). This factor does however not appear significant because there were only minor clashes with counter-protesters, and these also first happened on Thursday after protests had already been escalating for days.

1.3 The Argument

Having used previous research on radicalization in social movements to serve as pointers for the empirical analysis this study makes the following argument on the factors that led to the use of violent tactics on an unprecedented scale during the week of protests of October 2019 in Catalonia. The argument is structured along the three main factors for the development of social movements as identified by McAdam et al. (1996). Following della Porta et al.'s (2019) findings regarding the Catalan independence movement the explanatory mechanisms from the three broad factors follow a logic of relational dynamics between relevant actors within the movement and with authorities (Alimi et al. 2015; della Porta & Diani 2006).

Relying on Pearlman's (2011) organization mediation theory of violence I argue that there has been a loss of cohesion through internal disputes after the 1-O. It was accompanied by an organizational *downward scale shift* (della Porta et al. 2019) that was accompanied by a loss of public trust in the traditional movement organizations and a shift towards local organizations (like the CDRs). Using Robnett et al.'s (2015) distinction between conservative, centrist, and radical movement sectors it meant that the centrist and conservative movement organizations lost power to reiterate the movement's nonviolent identity while space was created for more radical actors to expand the repertoire of action towards violent tactics (Tilly 1978).

Also subject to transformation after the bid for independence were salient frames. Previously relevant proactive democratic-emancipatory frames aimed at achieving self-determination (della Porta et al. 2017), changed to fundamental universal-democratic-rights frames that ought to defend basic democratic rights and freedoms which had implications on collective action by inspiring (violent) resistance (Gamson et al. 1982; Wood 2003; McAdam 1996). In response to the experienced repression during and after the 1-O, frames that were directed against repression also surged which resonated with more radical leftist organizations and thereby reflected the hegemonial organizational changes and general perceptions of the police.

In terms of political opportunities, the most important development for the outcome was the closing of political opportunities through policing of the movement, e.g., due to criminalization of dissent. Though such developments had already been identified by previous studies (Balcells et al. 2020; della Porta et al. 2019) and were therefore not a sufficient explanation for violent escalation. Hence it needed a complementary focus on the policing of protest (della Porta & Reiter 1998; Della Porta & Tamponi 2013; Nassauer 2016). Putting emphasis on characteristics of the police's approach to protest policing I argue that the most relevant mechanism that led to violent escalation where interactive dynamics in terms of violence and counter violence and deteriorating mutual perception (Tarrow 1998; Gibbs 1989).

1.4 Methodology and Data Collection

The analysis uses a case study approach that mainly relies on qualitative interviews for data collection. A case study approach with qualitative interviews is a method that is commonly used to explore the rather sensitive topic of radicalization and violence in social movements (e.g. della Porta et al. 2019; della Porta & Zamponi 2013; Munoz & Anduiza 2019). It allows to account for all the unique factors that influence a social movement such as policing, political opportunities, frames, organizational structure in an in-depth way that is closely connected to its social context. The close connection between conceptualization and operational measures in social context, that was also defining in the creation of relevant concepts in previous research that relied on similar methodological approaches, ensures high construct validity. Typical for qualitative research the analysis relies on a small n-number, though the number is high enough to produce robust results.¹⁷ As sampling cannot be done randomly there must be some selection effect. The sampling was guided by the aim to get a somewhat representative population for the Catalan independence movement, which meant the inclusion of various age groups, ideological orientations, and organizations. A potential selection bias towards interviewing more younger respondents was attempted to balance by also interviewing their parents if possible or at least to have an informal talk about their views and experiences. There is however a bias in selecting respondents that could be interviewed in English due to formal restraints.¹⁸ The close connection to social context in this single-case study makes it potentially more difficult to generalize findings to be applied to different cases resulting in lower external validity.

Data collection

The novelty of this paper is its access to rich and unique data. It foremost relies on semi-structured qualitative interviews for data generation. Relying on a good inside social network served to establish trust and allowed the access to movement activists that would otherwise likely not have agreed to an interview. This includes activists of multiple generations including some that have been engaged in the movement for multiple decades and are perfectly connected. It also includes an Assembly of activists that are engaged in a Comitè de Defensa de la República (CDR), some of which were allegedly involved in the clandestine-like group that called itself Tsunami Democràtic (Tsunami) that coordinated protests after the announcement of the sentence. Having access to these circles is especially unique as no one knows who is behind Tsunami which was even labelled a terrorist organization (LaVanguardia 2019b).

¹⁷ In total a number of 18 interviews were conducted together with a focus group interview and more than a dozen informal talks. The high work intensity of the method in combination with the chosen data collection technique could be seen as a downside of the chosen approach, yet the methodological approach allowed comprehensive in-depth knowledge in the sensitive social context of an established social movement.

¹⁸ Only three semi-structured in-person interviews were done in Catalan, together with the seven written interviews. The focus group interview was done in a mix of Catalan, Spanish, and English with the additional help of a translator.

Interviews with members of this group were done in written form to ensure maximum confidentiality. Later a focus group interview with the Assembly of the CDR was also conducted. Other interviews stem from the demographic of younger activists who were the ones that were seen to be the new growing voice of the movement (EFE 2019). Additionally, representatives of the traditional movement organizations have been interviewed including a member of the national board of the grass root organisation *Assemblea Nacional Catalana* (ANC) and a politician of the Spanish parliament from the left-wing independentist party ERC.¹⁹ Including the perspective of the police, it was also possible to have an interview with a commander (deputy-inspector) of the Catalan anti-riot unit, who in the past worked as an instructor and is now head of the technical unit. This knowledge of tactics and coordination is complemented by accounts of his own experiences from the week of protests. In addition to these formal interviews more informal talks have also been done with additional activists, especially those that were more radical, as well as with members of the police.

In addition to the interviews graffiti that appeared throughout the week of protest have also been used for illustrative purposes and to complement and extend knowledge about views inside the movement. Graffiti have been identified as good indicators for frames and attitudes that are a form of social commentary and contention especially for younger people (Klingman & Shalev 2001; Rafferty 2008; Vanderwood & Chaffee 1994).²⁰ The primary sources are accompanied by secondary sources including statistics, reports, and previous research. Lastly the analysis could also resort to own observations from the protests.

Besides being frequently used in comparable studies qualitative interviews as a data collection technique have many advantages for the research purpose on hand. They have for example the potential to measure issues that are not observable and do so with greater depth (Mosley 2013). Telling a story in an interview is a meaning-making process whereby people “select details of their experience from their stream of consciousness” (Seidman 2006: 7). Interviews can also reveal “emotional dimensions of social experience that are not often evident in behaviour or other forms of data” (Lamont & Swidler 2014: 7). Such emotional dimensions have been identified as important during protests as they can significantly impact if they take a turn towards escalation (Nassauer 2016).²¹

Furthermore the non-standardised, adaptable process of data generation allowed to adapt for each specific participant, for example as a representative of a certain group with special knowledge, to allow some degree of exploration towards emerging issues. This openness of the process allowed to control for a potential theoretic bias that could have affected early hypotheses generation.²²

The artificiality of an interview situation can cause issues of reliability, yet it appeared that it was

¹⁹ These talks, together with two more interviews, were the only ones that have been done over video-call. All other interviews were done in-person.

²⁰ The pictures of the graffiti were taken by Marius Fort (2019).

²¹ Other information that was revealed by the interviews was the ‘traumatic’ effect that the police violence of ‘their’ regional police had on parts of the movement.

²² In the end the data fit well with existing theoretical paradigms.

possible to create comfortable interview situations in each case. No respondent needed to be particularly encouraged to answer which might have to do with their willingness to share their opinions and experiences about an issue that is important to them; it might have also been cultural factors about the way of communicating in Catalonia (Briggs 1986). The aspect that I am a German, studying in Barcelona likely comforted respondents who felt they were not dealing with a peer that was biased against them.²³ From my perspective it appeared therefore that an ‘interviewer-effect’ did not constitute a major issue to the reliability of the answers that were given.

A further potential issue is the risk to truthfulness of answers as each individual’s views are always subjective. Beyond that some might have also had motivations to give certain answers considering their representative role, as in the case of the politician or the Brimo officer, or due to social desirability, for example when talking about the issue of violence. This was addressed by giving specific attention to details, such as tone of voice, and cross-checking different statements of one respondent and in comparison, to those of others. In a similar vein these measures also addressed the fact that past experiences might be remembered differently, and that people have a drive to present themselves in a coherent way (Riessman 1993). What is presented are patterns that emerged from multiple interviews as well as other sources.²⁴ Lastly a focus on individuals that inevitable comes with doing interviews might lead to methodological individualism. In this case individuals were interviewed to both gain their individual impressions as well as to serve as indicators for group attitudes through the identification of emerging patterns. The use of a focus group interview also attempted to address this issue; still it could be argued that it is a risk for the methodological approach.

2 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

2.1 Chapter Organization

The following chapter is going to analyse the organizational structure of the movement and the relations and cohesion between its different groups in the lead up to the protests of October 2019. It follows the logic of Wendy Pearlman’s (2011) organizational mediation theory that emphasises the importance of cohesion within a movement as it inhibits violence by ensuring discipline to create and maintain strategic coherence. If in turn fragmentation occurred, it would weaken the constraints on violence. According to the theory violence might then result from competition within the movement (Pearlman 2011: 14). As will be shown the principles of Pearlman’s theory applied well to the Catalan movement though it was also the case that competition within the movement created space for contestation of existing narratives

²³ In one case I was told by a third party that the reason I was able to do the interview was because of that.

²⁴ The comparison of statements between respondents allowed for example to robustly reconstruct the dynamics of the protests at Barcelona’s airport on the first day of the protests.

and groups leading to the broadening of its repertoire of action towards more radical tactics.²⁵ The analysis of fragmentation focuses on the main independentist organizations along the analytical lines established by Robnett et al. (2015).

Robnett et al. (2015) categorise social movements into radical, moderate, and conservative movement organizations. The distinction is established along the dimensions: goals, strategic orientation, tactical choices, state inclusion, public perception. Along these dimensions the main Catalan political parties that have been in the governing position for many years in Catalonia, ERC and Junts, can be classified as conservative organizations due to state inclusion and strategic orientation. The same could account for Omnium with its recent re-focus on culture. ANC can be classified as a centrist organization being focused solely on independence with little state inclusion. Also, centrist is the leftist independentist party CUP that, even though having close connections to more radical groups and being perceived as much more radical than the other political parties, has still been in a governing coalition with the other pro-independence parties in Catalonia. Despite having a highly diverse identity the CDRs can be classified as a radical group due to their tactical choices as well as public reception and rejection of state inclusion and hierarchies. Other radical groups are for example the far-left youth organizations Arran and la Forja.

The Catalan independence movement is thus comprised of five traditional organizations, two grass root civil society organizations and three political parties. These constitute the centrist and conservative parts of the movement. They are organized together as they have similarities in the essential dimension of tactical choices, whereas radical parts challenged this aspect. The analysis will begin with the two grass root organizations and then transition to the political parties. Secondly it will proceed to the more radical organizations, such as the relatively newly created CDRs as well as more traditional leftist organizations. Finally, this part also includes the mysterious group called Tsunami Democràtic that emerged at the beginning of the week of protest and took an essential role in organizing and coordinating protest activities.

a. Conservative and Centrist Organizations

ANC and Omnium

A major force in the Catalan independence movement and driver for its growth have been the two biggest grass root organizations Asamblea Nacional Catalana (ANC) and Òmnium Cultural (Omnium). Founded in 1961 during the Franco era Omnium's goal was to preserve Catalan culture and language.

²⁵ For the definition of radical tactics, I am relying on della Porta's understanding who argues that radical tactics have "increasing degrees of disruptiveness such as the blocking of motorways, rather than the symbolic performances of the Diadas [National Day of Catalonia]" (della Porta et al. 2019: 3), yet it furthermore includes violent tactics as well.

After the transition to democracy and the turn of the millennium Omnim also started to take a more active role in the Catalan independence movement and was a major force in mobilization and organization in the lead-up to the 1-O referendum (della Porta et al. 2021). Its president Jordi Cuixart Navarro was one of the ‘political prisoners’ arrested for his role in the bid for independence and one of the few civil society leaders that got convicted in the sentence that sparked the October 2019 protests. He shared the faith of Jordi Sànchez Picanyol who was the president of ANC at the time and also got arrested and sentenced to 9 years in prison. ANC gained prominence through the organization of mass demonstrations and actions with high symbolic character such as the longest human chain ever created along the borders of Catalonia in 2013 (Burgen & Hamilos 2013). Both organizations seek to speak to Catalans of all age groups and to always rely on nonviolent means (ANC 2018).

To achieve its core goal of Catalan independence ANC relies on four strategies. It seeks to increase visibility through (nonviolent) mass demonstrations, gives support to individuals that experience repression, attempts to increase coordination with other independentist organizations, and aims to internationalize the conflict.^{26 27}

These strategies are the result of past experiences especially with the 1-O and the repression that followed. Previously Omnim and ANC had always worked and coordinated closely together mainly through informal ways (“short calls”) and through continuous exchanges with the “extended board”. Major demonstrations have been organised together with varying involvement and visibility of each organization depending on the focus of the demonstration. This affected for example the recurring Catalan holidays on which demonstrations take place such as the 11th of September when ANC is more visible and does most of the organisation, or April 23rd which has more of a cultural aspect and is therefore mainly organised by Omnim. Together with the holiday Sant Joan that is organized jointly the two organisations have been organizing the major demonstrations in close cooperation “for many years”. It can be said that the main strength of the two organizations was the organization of mass demonstrations especially those that were annually recurring.

The 1-O and the repression that followed did however change the functioning of the organizations and their cooperation. For once it “put the repression in the middle of everything” creating new sub-objectives. The shared faith of having both their presidents in jail drew Omnim and ANC closer together to fight the arrests. In this aspect cooperation got more intensified. On the other hand, the imprisonments weakened the pro-independence organisations. As Ms. Roviró said “After 3 years I am going to tell you very clearly, the repression works.”. It was a “very big shock” that “put us all in a shock-induced paralysis [Schockstarre]”. The immediate effect was a sudden sense that anybody could

²⁶ A “milestone achievement” for the group was when the UN working group on arbitrary detention (OHCHR) criticised the Spanish authorities for violating the rights of Jordi Cuixart and Jordi Sanchez and criticised their imprisonment (OHCHR 2019).

²⁷ Most information – if not stated otherwise – stems from the interview with Ms. Roviró, national board member of ANC. The interview was conducted in German.

become a target of the repression,²⁸ as well as the effect that it has on an organisation when their president suddenly disappears. Communication with Jordi Sanchez was “very complex” after the imprisonment. For the now leaderless and shocked ANC it “took time to situate ourselves and to organize ourselves”. Despite ANC’s and Omnium’s organisation relying on board members the movement pre-1-O was seen as strongly personalised around the organisations’ presidents as well as politicians like the self-exiled former Catalan president Carles Puigdemont (DEM1,2+). While ANC went into a process of reorganising and adapting to the new situation Omnium partly withdrew from the organisation of mass demonstrations and started to re-focus on its original core identity - cultural events and Catalan language (ANCR, DEM1).²⁹ With Omnium as a ‘centralist’, restrained organisation stepping back, the previous cohesion in terms of strategies and organisation got weakened and some space was created for new organizations with more radical approaches, though this was even more caused by the political parties.

Organization with political parties

The Catalan independence movement contains multiple political parties that overtime have been subject to transformations through the creation of different coalitions with varying names and fluctuating levels of support. In that sense the political landscape of Catalonia’s independence movement differs from those of other countries such as Scotland or Wales that both have a clearly dominant political party representing their independence movements (Lineira & Cetrà 2015). Considering that the Catalan pro-independence political landscape encompasses parties from the far left to the conservative spectrum it seems to be inclined to infighting and fragmentation.

Prior to 2017, leading up to the 1-O there was however an apparent universal sense of unity and cohesion in collective action towards a concrete goal that was felt by official organizations and individual activists alike and that allowed to bridge any potential ideological or political differences in the light of a shared purpose. The essential failure of the bid for independence and the arrests that followed suddenly put an end to the “magnificent cohesiveness” (ANCR). This effect was especially strong for the main political parties. Just like the two grassroots organizations, the two biggest independentist parties ERC and Junts were suddenly leaderless. The loss of its most popular figures weakened these parties, “Before there was a strong personification in the independence movement on Puigdemont and Junqueras.” (DEM1). Even until the 2020 Catalan regional elections Junts’ campaign posters were still showing the face of the self-exiled Puigdemont (beside posters of their candidate Laura Borràs). Both parties had different ways in dealing with the new circumstances and forced reorganisation. It appears that Junts was especially

²⁸ This fear of repression within ANC, Omnium, and the political parties was noticed with disdain by some of the interviewed activists.

²⁹ “What gave strength to Omnium was Jordi. But without him it’s all stopped.” (DEM1)

struggling to adapt to the new situation. According to the politician from ERC her party was the only one to actively rethink its strategy by creating a national conference to discuss the new strategy after the 1-O. She explained ERC's strategy like this:

“We have tried different strategies and that is what has brought us to this situation in that we are now, but our current strategy concerning the process of getting the Catalan republic is right now two ways. One way would be to increase the number of people that support the Catalan republic inside of Catalonia. [...] The other one, and that is what we are doing at the moment, concerning the parliamentary arithmetic and also considering that at the moment there is a so called ‘progressive government’ we are using the strategy of negotiation. This means that there has to be a negotiation between the Catalan and the Spanish government.” (ERCP)

According to her, the far-left party somewhat shares this strategic approach but focuses more on the social movement's aspect. In comparison ERC – as a more *centrist* party - follows a ‘catch-all approach’, as she put it:

“Esquerra has the same strategy with the social movements the difference is maybe that Esquerra is more open [...]. We try that all people are in the social movements and so that they are as big as possible.” (ERCP)

Junts did however not share ERC's largely negotiation-based strategy. The different logics that caused the split were somewhat pre-empted by the behaviour of the two parties' leaders. Puigdemont went to Brussels to attempt to internationalize the conflict (and to avoid imprisonment) out of realization that there is no way of solving the issue together with Spain that “only wants to repress us” (Puigdemont 2019). Uriol Junqueras however “stayed in the country and with that the strategy split up.” (ANCR). These tensions between the parties could already be felt in the Catalan regional elections that were ordered by the Spanish government at the time after they dissolved the Catalan parliament as a consequence of the 1-O referendum. Even though the centre-right unionist Cuidadanos party won the most seats (36) in the election, the winners were the independentist parties led by Junts, with Puigdemont as the candidate for president. The newly elected president of the Catalan parliament at the time, Roger Torrent from ERC, however refused to investiture Puigdemont. Additionally, the force that united all independentist organizations in a cohesive way leading up to the 1-O seems to have disappeared in its aftermath and ideological differences between the conservative Junts and centre-left ERC came afront.³⁰ Squabbles between the parties ensued who went so far in “smashing in each other's heads” that ANC felt the need to step in to mediate between the parties (ANCR). Previously there had been a somewhat formalised round of five for coordination between the major independentist organizations. After the 1-O however, this exchange has been “really difficult” according to Ms. Roviró of ANC. Exchanges

³⁰ These include for example issues of immigration and progressive policies in general.

between the groups still existed, and the politician from ERC stressed that interactions between the youth organizations have been better than ever, yet there was a rift in the cohesiveness that the movement enjoyed before the 1-O. The fragmentation could also be felt during the week of protests of October 2019 when it took the pro-independence parties multiple days to decide on a joint statement in response to the sentence (Burgen and Jones 2019c). Additionally, the organizations were surprised by the severeness of the sentence and the reaction it provoked. The only demonstrations that were properly planned in advance were the ‘Marchas de la Libertad’ [Freedom Marches] from all over Catalonia that culminated on Friday the 18th of October in a mass demonstration in Barcelona.³¹ Yet, the political parties were largely reduced to a limbo between attempting to reiterate the nonviolent identity of the movement while simultaneously avoiding to blame any protesters and failing to criticise the levels of violence in a way that would have satisfied the Spanish government (DW 2019). These reactions from the politicians’ side and their failure to set aside their difference and present the movement in a united way were signs of the fragmentation that had taken place and took part in further increasing the detachment with the parties on the individual level.

Demonstrators on Political Parties

There have been different aspects criticised about the political parties on the individual level, the general theme however was that they grew tired with the repetitive actions of political parties that for them did not achieve any clear results. For many the approach of ‘sit and talk’ did not go far enough. Even a member of ERC’s youth organization criticised her very own party’s strategy of ‘sit and talk’ as “bullshit” which just made the party dependent on the Spanish government which has proven to not be responsive to Catalan demands. As she put it,

“People are fed up. Governments ignoring them and trying to make things peacefully or organizing referendums and getting beaten up because of that. We have seen how we organize referendums or when we try to sit and talk. [...] But that was bullshit! Because we have seen that sitting and talking is getting nowhere. [...] People they don’t know what to vote or what to think about independence because Esquerra is very pro sit and talk they are very very dependent on the Spanish government, and I am from Esquerra but I don’t think like that, I don’t consider that that’s a good option.” (DEM1)

The fear of repression that representatives of ANC, ERC, and Omnium could confirm could also be felt by individual activists who either thought that those in power that are afraid should step down or who connected the politicians’ insistence on nonviolence to their fear of repression. To them there needed to

³¹ Ms. Rociró’s answer to the question if the ‘round of five’ came together after the sentence was: "Yes ... well ... it was very very difficult, because at this moment many people thought it would not be that bad with the sentences."

be a change in the old tactical ways the major organizations have been relying on in favour of more confrontational tactics because “At some point we look like idiots for being peaceful” (DEM7). These sentiments were also mixed with a sense of feeling manipulated by politicians that use Catalanist sentiments to gain power which some saw as the main hindrance for progress in the movement.³² Most did not have many positive words for the political parties which they called “clowns,” “circus”, or “just a game”. In this sense it even appeared that for some the tactical choice to be more confrontational or violent was a decision made in defiance to the political parties’, and to a lesser degree to the civil society organizations’, approach of continuously reiterating the nonviolent character of the movement who in turn went so far as to defame those that were burning trash cans or fighting with the police as either not ‘real Catalans’ or even as provocateurs from the police (Burgen & Jones 2019d; Dem2,5,6,7). Some opinionated respondent criticised that ERC was putting other issues before independence which “annoyed people” (DEM2). She saw this disillusionment with the political parties as a factor that led to the intensity of the protests, “Cause people don’t rely on political parties no more.” Instead of using the established channels of political action the aspect of *pleasure in agency* appears to have influenced many, especially young protesters (Wood 2003).³³ One of them stated it the following way: "I don’t like the politicians that I know. I don’t trust them. I believe in the people! When I saw people in the streets demonstrating I believed in that."(DEM4). The detachment with the political parties and politicians to this point even went so far that some respondents stated they were “not going to go to the next demonstration” even though they are still firm believers in Catalan independence.

A growing sense of dissatisfaction with the political situation in Catalonia has also shown in opinion poll data by the Centre d’Etudis d’Opinió (CEO). While positive evaluation of the political situation has been on a constant downward trend, negative and very negative evaluations have steadily increased (CEO 2021). The same sense of being fed-up, also with the propagated nonviolent way of doing things, could also be seen in graffities from the protests, that align with Pearlman’s findings that coercion instead of concession as a regime’s response to nonviolent forms of protest leads to the conclusion that nonviolence is ineffective and therefore stronger actions are necessary (Pearlman 2011: 18):

- Se’ns Acabat els somriures. – Our smiles are over
- Sense pietat la paciència s’ha acabat. ACAB. Puta Espanya. - Without mercy our patience is gone. ACAB. Bitch [fucking] Spain.
- Ens heu ensenyat que ser paufics No serveix de res – You have taught us to be peaceful. It is useless.

³² “Now all the independentist parties they don’t know what to do. Like Esquerra is very dependent on the Spanish government because they want a chair on the Spanish parliament in the congreso de los diputados, like they want a chair there, they want power there. So, if they want power there things get stuck here.” (DEM8).

³³ From a social psychology perspective young people often have the need to engage in performative acts for self-confidence (Levine 1999: 17).

This *Politikverdrossenheit* seems to have been even stronger for younger and leftist demonstrators.³⁴ It is especially in this far-left area where individuals tend not to believe in political parties and might instead favour direct action. This is in line with the Catalan anarcho-syndicalist tradition that has historically rejected political engagement in favour of direct action (Bookchin 1977; Abello 2009).

The dissatisfaction with political parties and their approaches was also expressed by various graffiti from the protests:

“1312. BCN antifa sols el poble salva al poble. Acab.” - Barcelona Antifa. Only the people save the people. Acab

“Ens heu ensenyat que ser paufics No serveix de res” - You have taught us to be polite. It is useless.

The infighting between the independentist parties, their “shock induced lethargy” together with the fear of further repression as well as the relative unpreparedness for the sentence and individual disillusionment with the established independentist groups left room for other more radical organizations to step up and to expand the repertoire of action beyond what the traditional organizations had limited it to.

b. Radical Organizations

The CDRs

The group that arguably had most influence in mixing things up in the Catalan independence movement post 1-O were the Comitès de Defensa de la República (CDR). They were first founded in July 2017 as Comitès de Defensa del Referèndum with the goal to facilitate the 1-O referendum to achieve a Catalan republic. After the 1-O they continued as a highly federalised organisation under the motto ‘poble a poble i barri a barri’ [village to village and neighbourhood to neighbourhood]. Despite being founded by leftist organisations, the decentralised network encompasses a range of ideologies (Ubieto 2017). According to the statements of an Assembly of a CDR located near Barcelona during a focus group interview the CDR comprises members with transversal backgrounds in terms of age, ideology, economic levels, support for different parties (or no support for political parties at all). Despite these

³⁴ In some cases, I have interviewed demonstrators in their 20s and afterwards their parents. The results of these talks support the idea about a generational difference when it comes to support for political parties. Opinion polls on the Spanish level have also shown that the dissatisfaction with political parties is highest in the age group 18 to 24, thus supporting this claim. In March 2019 67,5% stated they do not have any sympathy for political parties (Ortiz 2019).

claims of transversal characteristics there were some communalities that could be observed in this *Asamblea*. Respondents of the written interview and focus group talk were largely middle aged and ideologically left leaning, indicating a factual lower diversion. Despite indications of party affiliations of some, a general theme has been their dissatisfaction with the political parties, with some indicating having lost faith in politics or not having voted at all. They were unsure about, “Who represents the Catalans?” politically, though the localized form of organization in the CDRs that is largely based on interpersonal relations – as was the case with the members of the participating CDR – seems to answer this question in giving agency to the local and individual level. The internal organization has been compared to an “anarchist form of organization” with low hierarchies (ANCR).³⁵

Even though it must be considered that – due to their decentralised nature – attitudes and tactical preferences differ between different CDRs, they have become known for their new forms of protest that is based on a more confrontational direct-action approach.³⁶

Using these more radical tactics they factually broadened the *repertoire of action* (Tilly 1978) of the movement and offered legitimization for these more radical tactics. The CDR of Barcelona whose Twitter channel went online one month before the protests of October 2019 does for example run discourses that legitimize and advocate for radical forms of protest that implicitly even include violent ones. It has been the first time in the modern Catalan independence movement that these sorts of tactics have been advocated for openly and on a significant scale.³⁷

Those more radical chapters of the CDRs that are enabled through its decentral organization structure to act on their own tactical account, are an example of how smaller groups are able to maintain a certain degree of militancy that bigger, ‘catch all’ groups cannot (Pearlman 2011: 58).

Clandestine-like actions by certain CDR groups have been viewed critically by members of the conservative movement sector. The politician from ERC saw especially acts that are not coordinated with other groups in the movement critical.³⁸ Yet other activists have in turn criticised the politicians’ position on the CDRs whom they believe to fear “because they don’t have any influence on them, or at least don’t receive any support from them”, signs of discontent between the different movement sectors (DEM5,6,7). Spanish authorities even went so far as to accuse members of the CDRs as terrorists.³⁹

³⁵ The way they responded to the interview request reflects this ideology. They agreed in one part to written interviews – to ensure maximum confidentiality as some allegedly have been involved in the organisation of Tsunami Democrático – and also to a focus group talk, as they did not want to be represented by a single person.

³⁶ These more direct tactics include: roadcuts, demonstrations, civil disobedience, fighting with the police, organizing demonstrations (e.g. against the king or the police), the occupation of the office of the PSC in Lleida, the occupying of toll stations, or throwing paint at a police station (Jorro 2018, 2020; Carranco 2018; ElConfidencial 2018).

³⁷ These first little sparks of violent incidences in late 2018 were also observed by della Porta et al. (2019).

³⁸ “If there is no organisation and this is just some people that randomly do it for their own way and with no organisation behind then it makes no sense to do it. Because it won’t lead to anywhere. This is one thing we have seen a lot.” (ERCP)

³⁹ Few weeks before the protests of October 2019 Spanish police forces raided offices of the CDRs in the Barcelona region on account of suspicion of terrorism. The raid was followed with a big media echo and raised tempers and discontent with the security forces in the lead up to the protests. The charges of terrorism later turned out to be false, the court refrained from using the term terrorist (Publico 2019).

The form of decentral organization with low hierarchies and no visible leading individuals that Ms. Roviró from ANC compared to “some form of underground organization” has – according to her – made the coordination between the CDRs and other organizations difficult, “It is always a last minute and loose coordination, and a bit secret, but they do organize demonstrations together”. That even the organization of demonstrations does not always work in a coordinated way (on purpose or not), has become clear during the protests of October 2019. On the 24th of October, for example, CDRs organized a demonstration that took place with notable separation to a demonstration that happened parallel organised by ANC. Unlike the latter the former later saw escalations (LaVanguardia 2019). Overall, the appearance of the CDRs can be seen as another element in the fragmentation within the Catalan independence movement that results from the general dismissive attitude of parts of the CDRs towards the established independentist organizations paired with an ideology that returns agency to the local level as well as a diversification and radicalization of tactics (repertoire of action). This finding is in line with what della Porta et al. (2019) termed an organizational “downward shift”.

Radical tactics and groups

The tactics that created the most popular images in the reports of the protests of October 2019, such as burning trashcans, barricades, and fights with the police, have not been entirely new to Catalonia.⁴⁰ Being dubbed the “world’s capital of anarcho-syndicalism”, Barcelona historically has had a long history of anarchist and communist movements that frequently held major strikes and erected street barricades.⁴¹ Being closed off from political opportunities throughout the 19th century the historical Catalan left-wing movement became disillusioned with politics and instead focused on direct action, creating the anarcho-syndicalist tradition in Catalonia that organizations like the C.N.T. union still rely on (Bookchin 1997: 153). Such historic experiences have the potential to impact present actions through the mechanism of collective memory (Cosser 1992). It is however not just in the pre-Franco era when these kinds of tactics appeared in Catalonia. Throughout the last decade a variety of more radical tactics have been used by movements like the *Indignados* or the *Okupa* movement.⁴² In 2016 an *Okupa* group was to be evicted from a house in Barcelona’s neighbourhood of Gracia that had been occupied for several years. What ensued were four nights of rioting that resembled the riots of October 2019 in terms of tactics, just on a smaller scale and without accompanying mass protests. The resistance against the eviction turned into “full scale rioting, including clashes with the police, erection of fire barricades and property destruction in the neighbourhood of Gracia” (Munoz & Anduiza 2019: 10). Dozens of

⁴⁰ Though the scale of October 2019 has been a new development.

⁴¹ Some members of the CDR liked to interpret their struggle against Spain in a larger arche of historical fight against oppression and class struggle. For them the fight for an independent Catalonia is less about identity but to achieve a stage win embedded in the larger context of class struggle.

⁴² In 2006 the Spanish newspaper *El País* even dubbed Barcelona as the ‘*Okupa*’ capital whose members saw themselves as the “heirs to the CNT-revolution of 1936” (García 2006).

protesters and police were wounded during the five days of riots and protest action continued for two weeks (ibid.). Still, it must be said again that both the Indignados as well as the Okupa movement have largely been nonviolent, nonetheless the appearance of violence followed similar patterns as in October 2019, which suggests that there are radical parts in both movements that were likely also involved in the protest of October 2019. They did also share a rejection of representative institutions captured in the motif “No nos representan” [They don’t represent us] (Miley 2019: 6). Groups that generally have a more radical approach are for example the two far-left youth organizations La Forja and Arran.⁴³ Members of the ‘black block’ and anarchist groups with a higher potential for violence were also present in 2019 (Burgen and Jones 2019d). These influences of radical leftist groups might have had an impact on the escalation of the protests in 2019. While these groups are not representative for the Catalan independence movement at large that has been characterised by a historically more conservative attitude (Medrano 1994; Guibernau 2014), these groups appear to constitute the *radical flanks* of the movement that engaged in violent tactics. Comparing the Basque and Catalan independence movements Diez Medrano (1995) has affirmed that independentist movements with a leftist, anti-capitalist ideology, as in the past embodied by the Basque independence movement, have a higher potential to use violent tactics to achieve their objectives (Medrano 1995; Muro 2008). A shift in terms of organizational power in the movement towards left-leaning groups and ideas could have in turn facilitated a social context with higher potential for violence in Catalonia. A previous quantitative analysis using opinion poll data from Catalonia from October 2019 has identified (far) left-wing ideology as a significant predictor of independentist attitudes which potentially points to a shift in the movement on the individual level towards the left (Kittmann 2020).

The clash between the conservative and more radical leftist elements of the movement could also be felt on the ground during the protests when there were disputes between different protesters over the erection and burning of street barriers (OBS). This also reflected a wider discourse between conservatives and leftists. According to an interview respondent, the former criticised leftist groups for being anti-systemic and violent while the latter called conservatives corrupt and inactive (DEM3).

These disputes as well as the organizational downward shift were also linked to a new generation that started to shape the movement based on their experiences and conclusions (Feixa 2019; Burgen and Jones 2019f). In the end it was mainly young people that engaged in disruptive and also violent acts (and got arrested for it) (ElPeriodico 2019b). These were often organized in the more radical organizations la Forja or Arran.

⁴³ Since October 2018 3 members of La Forja were being investigated on accounts of “damages and coercion” charges that the group denounced as part of repression of the Catalan independence movement by the Spanish state (Llibertat 2018). In another instance on 10 April 2018 two members of la Forja were arrested in the course of an operation against a chapter of the CDRs but were released the following day (Vilaweb 2018).

These youth organizations are also in so far noteworthy as most activists that were arrested during the October 2019 protests were young people (Sanchez 2019).

This new generation has grown up witnessing different forms of repression such as the images of police violence on the 1-O. They also have “less to lose, because they have worse chances in terms of jobs, education etc.” (DEM9).⁴⁴ Finally they experienced the ineffectiveness of the (nonviolent) approaches of the traditional movement organizations, as one mother of a young activist recited her son, “If you get 9 years in prison for peaceful demonstrating and then dissolving the demonstration, Mama, then we might as well burn down the city, maybe then they will understand'.” (DEM8). The phenomenon of young generations taking up agency in defiance to other generations has also been observed in other new social movements (like the Fridays for Future demonstrations) (Feixa 2019). It is another aspect that added to the growing fragmentation.

Tsunami Democrático

A completely new development in the protests of October 2019 was the appearance of a mysterious group that called itself ‘Tsunami Democrático’ (Tsunami). Founded specifically for the occasion of the sentence it organized new forms of protests and directed protesters over the App Telegram to different sites such as the airport of Barcelona. According to Wendy Pearlman’s (2011) organizational mediation theory of protest the appearance of such a new group that is promoting more ‘radical’ tactics can be interpreted as a sign of fragmentation in the movement. This did however not fit the perception of representatives of the traditional, more *conservative*, movement organizations. Tsunami was generally not seen as a competitor which might be due to its narratives and approaches that encompass aspects that individuals and groups with different tactical preferences could agree on. In this vein occupying the airport might have resonated well with the more radical leftist groups while the insistence on nonviolence fit the narrative of the major organizations and political parties. ANC saw Tsunami as a welcomed addition to its own approach that allowed a wider reach of “target groups and people” beyond the typical older audience of ANC. At the same time, it “could react quickly and spontaneously and was able to coordinate many people” (ANCR). The politician of ERC also highlighted the high level of organization of Tsunami with a clear objective, to force Spain to ‘sit and talk’ and to demonstrate disagreement with the sentence while remaining nonviolent. These narratives are clear parallels to the ones that ERC relied on. At the same time, she argued that organizations like Tsunami that do not have any public representatives and therefore no person responsible that can face repression are a model for future organization in the movement, a consequence from experiences of repression, a view that was also shared by other interviewees.

Generally, Tsunami was viewed positively by the major movement organizations and by a large part of individual demonstrators. It is in this latter group however where the collective was also viewed

⁴⁴ Carles Feixa (2019) argues that the issue of a lack of positive prospects for the future and concerns about democratic rights have recently led to the new engagement of youths in the independence movement (EFE 2019).

sceptically. It did not enjoy unilateral trust which the politician of ERC ascribed to the fact that people did not know who was behind it. The dissatisfaction with Tsunami was in parts also rooted in a sense of dissatisfaction and mistrust with the tactical approach of Tsunami. Suspicion and dissatisfaction with Tsunami appeared for example when they told people that were occupying the airport to go home in the evening, which some did not see as a problem. Some on the other hand felt a sense of manipulation, as a respondent who is heavily invested in the movement said, “When you win a battle you don’t go home” (DEM6). The sense of manipulation fell in line with a general mistrust of politicians that were viewed by these respondents to have exploited Catalanist sentiments to gain power. There has also been a rumour that Tsunami was directed by some major politicians. The dissatisfaction expressed falls in line with general dissatisfaction with the movement’s major organizations. Furthermore, there was disagreement with the ‘sit and talk’-goal of Tsunami which did not go far enough for some as they became disenfranchised with the idea and preferred more radical approaches.

Yet, while Tsunami was promoting negotiation and nonviolence, they nonetheless opened the door for new forms of more disruptive protest like the occupation of the airport or the border to France, which set the movement, from day one of the protests, on a course that differed from the way ANC or Omnium had organised demonstrations in the past. For the representative of ANC, it even was a “turning point”, “It was the spark... that in some sense ignited the flame”, it suddenly widened the movements repertoire of action (Tarrow 1978). Additionally, the occupation of the airport, which is the area of competence of a total of three different police forces, provoked a reaction of the police that also had a part in a spiralling effect of violence during the week that was about to unfold.

Conclusion Organization

Overall, there has been a demise in harmony and organization within the movement post 1-O. The major political parties began to squabble with each other over strategies and ideological differences. With that the universal cohesion that was felt in the lead up to the 2017 referendum, the degree of which surprised the interviewed representatives of ANC and ERC alike, was gone. Generally, there are always incentives to diversify tactics within a movement including violent tactics (Cunningham & Fruge 2017). Prior to the 1-O these incentives could however be kept in check by the established *centrist* and *conservative* organizations’ ability to police the movement’s collective identity as collective identity serves to ensure cohesion between movement’s actors (Fominaya 2010). Ms. Roviró of ANC was surprised, “I thought that it was a wonder that we managed to do it peacefully for so many years.” It was likely made possible due to the established organizations’ success in stabilizing the nonviolent identity of the movement as collective identity is the most important predictor of collective action (Klandermans 1984; Van Zomeren, Postmes & Spears 2008). Yet, fragmentation increased also due to a growing individual dissatisfaction with political parties. Political disenchantment and the reduced power of the established

organisations created space for new organizations like the CDRs, or those of on the *radical flanks* of the movement, that followed a different approach and challenged existing narratives about how things ought to be done in the movement through an opening towards more radical tactics thereby increasing the rigid *repertoire of actions* which was previously dominated by the approach of the traditional organizations to conduct peaceful mass demonstrations. The process of emergence of new actors who took over the leading role after 2017 has also been termed *downward shift* (della Porta et al. 2019). It was also accompanied by the growing influence of leftist and younger activists.

The success of social movements depends in part on their ability to disrupt existing practices (Fishman & Everson 2016; Cloward & Piven 1979). In the Catalan case after the 1-O that might have also meant to disrupt the practices of a highly institutionalised movement that was intertwined with the regional government and post 2017 even with the Spanish government through mutual dependence.⁴⁵ Another factor for the strength of social movements is the use of a variety of tactics, that might also include violent ones (Morris 1993). Being only reduced to the strategy and tactics of the major independentist organizations limited this ability. Furthermore, the experience of the ineffectiveness of these methods in turn led to dissatisfaction with these organizations. This has most likely also affected the assessment of costs and potential benefits of different tactical choices (Munoz & Anduiza 2019: 2). Often movements refrain from the use of violence as its use likely leads to a loss in mass support and recognition (Ackerman & Rodal 2008). The Catalan independence movement however already had a wide support base for almost a decade and was nonetheless not achieving any “real progress” which led to a general frustration that was unilaterally shared by all interview respondents, potentially tipping the rational of the cost benefit analysis of violent tactics (at least for some).

2.2 Framing Processes

Beside the aspect of internal organization, framing is another essential factor in social movements (McAdam et al. 1996; della Porta 1995, 2008; Hafez 2003). It is therefore necessary to analyse existing frames and how they might have changed to analyse how they affected collective action and potentially encouraged the use of violent tactics. I will be following Pearlman’s definition according to which “framing is the creative endeavour by which entrepreneurs construct ideas and representations that

⁴⁵ The Spanish minority government depends on the Catalan parties especially the ERC to support it. It’s president Pedro Sanchez also needed their support to be able to get into office. The ERC on the other hand depends on the Spanish government due to its negotiation-based approach to the Catalan issue.

inspire people to take part in collective action” (Pearlman 2011: 23).⁴⁶ Frames are not rigid concepts, however. Instead, they are subject to continuous change and renegotiation through internal and external processes (Goffman 1974). The Catalan independence movement has been no exception to this rule and emphasis has fluctuated between the core arguments for independence: political and economic grievances, cultural, and historical reasons (Dowling 2019). Traditionally the movement – just as other independence movements – relied on national-identity frames which draws legitimization for succession from cultural and historical distinctiveness (Medrano 1994). Around 2011 when the movement started to gain pace it strategically started to shift away from the national-identity frame to be able to incorporate a wider support base in the movement (della Porta et al. 2017: 100). At the same time external influences also impacted issue salience. While the failure of the statute of autonomy supported the political frame the devastating impact of the financial crisis strengthened socioeconomic frames (Ibid.; Serrano 2013). Leading up to the 2014 “consultation” the socioeconomic and political frame came to be summarised together with a “nationalist political orientation based on rights and social justice, and linked to democracy”, what della Porta et al. termed a ‘democratic-emancipatory’ discourse (della Porta et al. 2017: 120-1). Others have termed the legitimizing narratives around the quasi-referendum ‘emancipatory nationalism’ which means the “defence of democracy and popular sovereignty as key principles to legitimize the construction of the modern state” (Guibernau 2014: 8).⁴⁷ Repression in the aftermath of the consultation only strengthened the democratic-emancipatory frames which gained broad support in Catalan society (della Porta et al. 2019). The same narratives continued to be present leading up to the referendum of 2017 though this new protest cycle brought about “radicalization of secessionist frames” (ibid.). After the 1-O a break with the frames that had been present since 2011 appeared and relevant frames changed (della Porta et al. 2021). New frames gained dominance that were focused on the defence of democratic rights and freedoms and were directed against experiences of repression. These changes also corresponded to organizational changes.

a. Evolvement Of Democratic-Emancipatory Frames

The new frames were mainly determined through experiences of police violence and repression that followed the 1-O including the arrests of the 9 independentist leaders. The shock that the political parties and grassroots organizations experienced was channelled into new objectives to protest the arrests and

⁴⁶ The term ‘entrepreneurs’ could in that sense be understood as organizations or popular figures which would be referring to ‘macro-frames’ (Noakes & Johnson 2005). I will first apply this perspective, yet I will show that those were overlapping with the second category ‘individual-frames’ which could be seen through symbolic frames (public campaigns or yellow ribbons worn on clothes) that were relying on the same narratives. They were however established from the conservative and centrist movement organizations. The anti-repression and antifascist frames that will be discussed in the later section however were in some sense connected to the basic-democratic frames but were largely promoted on the individual and radical group’s level. Going even further than that these segments of the movement started to revive class-conflict frames.

⁴⁷ There is a general agreement about the importance of ‘democratic-emancipatory’ frames or ‘emancipatory nationalism’ while both authors put detrimental emphasis on the salience of other frames such as cultural or national-identity ones.

demand amnesty. While previous campaigns by ANC and Omnium advocated for a yes vote in the referendum, following democratic-emancipatory frames, their public campaigns now shifted towards calls for the release of the ‘political prisoners’. Signs and flags saying ‘Llibertat Presos Politics!’ [“Freedom for the Political Prisoners”] issued by Omnium appeared all over Catalonia’s public spaces and on people’s balconies or windows. Even the building of the Catalan government was decorated with a large banner calling for the freedom of the ‘political prisoners’ and exiles.⁴⁸ Also now imminent in public life were yellow ribbons that decorated the streets or were worn on people’s clothes to express solidarity with the ‘political prisoners’ who were seen to have only acted on their democratic rights. The independentist actors were depicting the arrested as “dedicated democrats, committed to the cause of peaceful democratic change to Spain’s fragile post-Franco constitution” (Puigdemont 2019). With this defensive attitude the democratic-emancipatory frames that were previously aimed at the right to self-determination were now transformed into more fundamental universal-democratic-rights frames. This included campaigns to depict the independence movement as one that aims to defend basic democratic rights such as the freedom of expression, freedom of assembly, or freedom in general. One way these frames manifested themselves visually was through additional posters and flags depicting the outline of a face with a red stripe covering the mouth paired with the words “democracia!” [“democracy”] or “llibertat d’expressió” [“freedom of expression”].⁴⁹ In that way the movement shifted from positive (proactive) frames advocating *in favour* of democratic principles like self-determination to negative frames in *defence* of basic rights like freedom of expression. Such a focus on universal-democratic-rights in theory made it possible for a wider audience, that were not in favour of independence but support these universal-democratic-rights, to support the movement. At the same time defending such essential democratic rights also justifies a wider and more radical range of tactics as they are collective action frames that appeal to core beliefs which can legitimate action to defend them (Benford & Snow 2000).⁵⁰ This might happen when organizations like ANC engage in *strategic framing efforts*, such as the campaign to defend democratic rights, which alters the *cultural tool kit* a movement relies on (McAdam 1996). Furthermore, infringements on universal rights are generally perceived as injustice by the authorities which can motivate (violent) resistance (Gamson et al. 1982; Wood 2003).

⁴⁸ This affront against Spanish law finally costed Catalonia’s president Quim Torra his position who got banned from public office for the display of political messages on public buildings and the refusal to remove them (Jones 2020).

⁴⁹ This message replaced the banner at the Generalitat’s building that was calling for the release of the ‘political prisoners’ which Spanish authorities demanded to be taken down.

⁵⁰ Another symbolic frame that appeared – though less frequently – was a pin with the symbol of the freedom-fighting rebels from the movies ‘Star Wars’ in yellow, the colour of the independence movement. It was for example worn by two of the interviewed CDR members. The message it implies is clear, the independentist struggle is seen as the little rebellion that resists the evil empire (the Spanish state) that is trying to crush it. In this scenario there is a clear distinction who the good and who the bad ones are.

b. Anti-Repression And Antifascist Frames

Repressive actions against the Catalan independence movement had already happened during previous protest cycles with impacts on existing frames (della Porta et al. 2017). The repressive turn of Spanish authorities as a response to the ‘quasi-referendum’ on independence of 2014 for example “strengthened the resonance of the democratic-emancipatory frames” which had been developed by pro-independence actors in the previous years (Ibid.: 101). This cycle then led to a “radicalization of frames” as well as justifications for independence (ibid.). The radicalization was however limited to justifying claims for independence and did not impact the tactical choices of the movement or individuals. Despite a radicalization in frames there was no behavioural radicalization, instead the movement put a strong emphasize on non-violence (della Porta et al. 2017, 2019).⁵¹ Despite varying emphasis on the different existing frames these mechanisms continued during the *procés* until the 1-O after which a change in the relevant frames could be observed (della Porta et al. 2019: 66). The change had two major effects 1.) it changed the identity of the movement so that it also became a way of expressing general dissent with repressive authorities without being framed in purely independentist terms which opened its demonstrations to be joined by people that did not necessarily support the claims for independence. 2.) The frames started to have a direct effect on tactical choices (behavioural effect).⁵²

After the 1-O there has been a change in the very issue that was being negotiated in the independence movement which as part of the defence of universal-basic democratic rights also included resistance against police brutality. Naturally, its main goal still is and has been independence for Catalonia. Yet the images of peaceful voters including elderly getting beaten by the Spanish police paired with the subsequent arrests, imposition of article 155, and sacking of the Catalan government re-affirmed existing frames of a fight against a foreign oppressor for the firmer believers in independence, as well as a sense of injustice that also reached audiences that were not necessarily in favour of independence. One activist told an anecdote about a friend, a former unionist Cuidadanos voter, who turned to support the movement because of the unjust actions he observed at the hands of Spanish authorities. Sentiments of injustice may lead more radical protesters to the use of violent tactics (Gamson 1992; Wood 2003). As one graffiti of the protests put it “Aixo ja no va d’independencia” [“Right now it is not about independence”].

Empirical evidence from interviews shows two ways how these injustice frames in connection to the police and in a broader sense influenced tactical choices towards violent tactics. In relation to the police, violence seems to be used in a defensive way as a reaction to past experiences of over-proportional police violence against peaceful demonstrators and voters during the 1-O. “Before we were only protecting us with our bodies and let ourselves get beaten. Now we weren’t taking it anymore, we had

⁵¹ As outlined in the previous section this maintenance of nonviolent tactics could therefore have been a proof of independentist actors’ ability to determine the movement’s collective identity.

⁵² The potential effect on hegemonial relations could be added as a third point.

to actively defend us.” (DEM3), as one respondent argued about the defensive functionality of violence. In the broader sense of fighting injustice violence was also used instrumentally to bring international attention to the Catalan issue.

“I think the idea was to raise awareness internationally. What people say they get frustrated on is that there is a lot of injustice here, but nobody knows about it. Kind of what happened in the US last year [BLM]. The idea of these protests is to raise awareness. It is not violence for violence it’s for people to see, you know.” (DEM1)

The same perceptions of repression and police brutality also resonated in the more left-wing parts of the movement that include the movement’s radical flanks. The same respondent went on, “Why do I want to be in a country where people from that country treat you like that? That was not democratic. It was repressive as fuck. That’s what I was trying to explain, that is fascism.”

Antifascist and anti-systema frames

The antifascist frame was (to some degree) present in nearly all interviews that were conducted.⁵³ This also included the politician from ERC who – like others – pointed out continuations from the Franco-era for example in the judiciary or in the police force.⁵⁴ The consequence is a critical stance on the legitimacy of Spanish democracy and law which are in fact the main factors unionist actors recall in their response to the secessionist challenge. Yet while some were criticising Spanish democracy others went even further to call Spain an all-out “fascist state”. This position was voiced by those nearer to the radical flank of the movement. In the focus group interview with members of a CDR they justified this view – similarly to the ERC politician - with the argument that Spain did not go through any process of ‘de-Franconification’.⁵⁵ One older member took the moment to explain his own experiences with fascism and repression under the Franco regime and made connections to current repression as well as post-fascist continuities in the country.

Originating from the antifascist views another narrative that emerged from the focus group talk was the framing of the Catalan conflict as a (mean for) class conflict. In this vein it was argued that there was political opportunism on both the Catalan and the Spanish side to distract from other issues such as corruption.⁵⁶ With the issue secretly having class war characteristics individual grievances would have been exploited by the bourgeoisie. The proposed reaction to that was independence as it is easier to

⁵³ It was only left out by those with conservative political attitudes.

⁵⁴ “Franco's dictatorship has never been condemned as such in Spain and this means that some people that were in charge of the police during Franco's dictatorship are still in charge today. And this means that some people that were judges during the Franco dictatorship are still judges today and this is not casual, it means that still there is no independence of the powers.” (ERCP)

⁵⁵ In comparison to the de-Nazification process in Germany after World War Two.

⁵⁶ As outlined in the section on internal organization these kind of sentiments of manipulation could also be felt by other activists though the interpretation and expected consequences differed.

tackle these problems on a regional (Catalan) level. The interpretation of the issue as a class conflict was not an isolated incidence in this focus group talk. Besides having been mentioned by other interview respondents it has also been viewed in these terms from critical perspectives (Miley 2019; Bernat & Whyte 2019; Juste 2017; López & Rodríguez 2010). It is also in line with a recent study by della Porta and Portos (2020) that attest the movement a class basis that was more relevant than previously expected (della Porta & Portos 2020). The Indignados movement with its anti-capitalist and anti-institutionalist demands was another earlier example of class-frames appearing in Catalonia (Miley 2019). The subsequent (regional) repression around 2011 coincided with increased demands for independence which has been suspected of being connected issues in the way that “the ongoing polarization for and against the project of Catalan national self-determination has functioned to fend off the spectre of perhaps a more fundamental fissure, along class lines, both in Catalonia and in the rest of Spain.” (Ibid.: 3). The difference compared to the Indignados movement of the past would be a new combination of the independence-frame and class-conflict frames. Just as the defensive universal-democratic rights frame such class-conflict frames also have the potential to justify a more radical repertoire of action by inspiring collective action.

The mentioned frames were not necessarily new ones, but the repressive turn during the 1-O and its aftermath (re-)vitalised them. Additionally, new frames that could serve to justify violence (universal-democratic rights, anti-repression, class-conflict frames) were able to gain hold in a movement environment where the traditional movement organizations had lost leadership which shifted towards new movement actors (‘downward shift’). This shift went in favour of leftist groups and individuals who have always framed the issue in part in antifascist terms. The newly created space and power shift allowed these groups to popularise their interpretation of the struggle. The repressive actions in turn brought anti-repression frames into the centre of the movement where they got greater resonance which likely added to the downward/ radicalization-shift. Overall, there has been some degree of object shift (e.g. dissent about the repression such as the arrest of the ‘political prisoners’ and the defence of universal democratic rights) within the movement that had part in cultural changes that reflected power shifts in the organization of the movement and the break with the taboo of violent actions in 2019 (Van Aelst & Walgrave, 2001).

2.3 Political Opportunities and Policing

Political opportunities are one of the core factors that influence the development of social movements (McAdam et al. 1996). It is closely connected to the concept of policing, the importance of which for social movements had frequently been pointed out (della Porta and Reiter 1998; Earl 2006; Gillham and

Noakes 2007; McPhail, Schweingruber, and McCarthy 1998). Yet there is a vagueness in existing literature on the meaning of the term whereby each understanding relates differently to political opportunities. Some associate it with the actions of security forces during protests “on the ground” (della Porta & Reiter 1996; Peterson 2006; Nassauer 2016), while others interpret it on a broader level whereby policing merely means “governance of domestic dissent” (Wahlström 2015:1), or any efforts by authorities that increase the cost of collective action (Tilly 1995; Garcia 2014).⁵⁷ I am first going to start on the broader level with a description of how *policing of the movement* led to the criminalization of dissent. On the analytical level this had the effect of closing political opportunities for the movement which had a frustrating effect. The *policing of protest* is on the other hand itself influenced by different political opportunities, firstly through “stable opportunities” which include the characteristics and institutional aspects of the police forces (della Porta & Reiter 1998: 9). Therefore, the next section will give an overview over the relevant police forces, how they coordinate with each other, and how they officially approach the policing of protests.⁵⁸ Despite having their official protocols the security forces were heavily criticised for their “inappropriate use of force” (AI 2019). Theoretically this might be the result from the fact that stable opportunities are filtered through the “police’s construction of external reality” and impacted by the actions of social movements (della Porta & Reiter 1998). Applying this idea, the following section will outline how the response of the police to the circumstances (e.g. scale and intensity) and the interactions between police forces and activists led to a spiralling violence that saw police’s and protesters’ tactics escalate to unprecedented degrees. The chapter concludes putting the focus on the protesters side, where the experience of police violence led to changes of perceptions that most importantly caused disenchantment of *conservative* and *centrist* parts of the movement with the regional police, reducing their capacity to restraint radical movement parts.

a. Criminalization Of Dissent

The event that had the most mobilizing effect and was the prime cause of the demonstrations was the announcement of the harsh jail sentences against the 9 independence leaders who received lengthy prison sentences. The verdict was anticipated by all actors including Tsunami, political parties, individuals, and the police. The ensuing demonstrations were foremost an expression of dissent with the sentence. Many interview respondents – including the Brimo officer – explained the degree of escalation with a growing frustration of the independence supporters. The frustration was the result of a long *procés* that did not result in any substantial achievements and instead saw more and more setbacks including the failure of the new statute of autonomy and the bid for independence in 2017 that was followed by a significant repressive turn against the movement (Balcells et al. 2020). In that sense it was less about

⁵⁷ I distinguish the former as *policing of protest* and the latter as *policing of the movement*.

⁵⁸ Most of the evidence in this section comes from a semi-structured interview with a deputy-inspector of the Brimo.

political opportunities in a positive sense but about the closing of political opportunities to achieve results through the regular institutional and democratic ways. Such closing off of political opportunities leads to radicalization as could already be observed in late 2018 (della Porta et al. 2019). The closing of political opportunities happened through the de-politization and criminalization of the existing Catalan grievances (Bernat & Whyte 2020).

Criminalization of dissent has in Spain in-part taken the form of ‘low intensity repression’ which is based on Tilly’s (1995) conceptualization of repression as efforts by the authorities to increase the cost of collective action (Garcia 2014; Tilly 1995). Born out of the experience of the 2012 anti-austerity protests where the use of brute force created image problems, Spanish authorities introduced more subtle forms of repression such as municipal by-laws or personal identity checks and administrative sanctions. Based on these new views unapproved demonstrations were viewed as illegal acts with participants committing offences such as disobedience (Garcia 2014: 304). Through fines and criminal charges repression was thereby individualised. With the 2015 “Law for the Protection of Citizen Safety” these practices had been firmly institutionalised. The law was defined by securitization, new forms of policing and soft repression combined with enhanced surveillance (Calvo & Portos 2019: 2).

Spanish authorities continued these practices during the protests of October 2019 as the experience of the ERC politician has shown who was herself target of such ‘low intensity repression’ showing that this practice is also continuously used against politicians. She did not know however what charges she was facing, “But it would be, I guess for disorders, and I think this might be their problem. [referring to a lack of ‘real’ charges]”. Ms. Roviró of ANC also mentioned one of ANC’s most recent activity was to give legal support to those charged for participating in demonstrations such as the blocking of the border to France. This type of support for individuals facing repression has in fact become one of ANC’s new key activities proving the increase of such individualised ‘low intensity repression’ in Catalonia post 1-O.⁵⁹

The criminalization especially targeted dissent of young people in Catalonia (Calvo & Portos 2019; Bessant & Maria 2019). When states “exclude certain groups or issues from conventional processes of decision-making it pushes people to disrupt the system through dissent” (Pearlman 2011: 11).⁶⁰ The security apparatus then served as a mean to control dissent in Catalonia (Limón & Fernández 2018). The frustration and desperation speaks through statements of protesters:

“We have been in this independence process for seven years we are fed up. All we get is repression from Spain. We’re standing up now. We will get injured, but we are too tired of this.”
(Young man at demonstration, Burgen 2019)

⁵⁹ In another instance in early 2019 16 activists including two mayors of the leftist CUP were illegally detained by Spanish police in Girona (Bernat & Whyte 2019: 13).

⁶⁰ Ms. Roviró described the effects as such: "Possibilities to express dissent have been reduced through the pressure on certain rights; and then it is like a steam kettle and at some point that kettle explodes if it is not possible to release the pressure."

The criminalization of dissent as part of the closing of political opportunities for the movement led to a growing level of frustration that would set protesters in a mindset which would enable violent escalations. The spark needed were however confrontative tactics in October 2019 that would be met by subsequent coercive police tactics which led to a spiralling dynamic of violence. This means that the closing of political opportunities through criminalization of dissent was a necessary but not sufficient factor for the violent escalation.

b. Police Units and Coordination

To understand why dynamics of interactive violence occurred it is necessary to analyse the perspective of the police starting with how they were impacted by the “stable opportunities” such as institutional settings.

Catalonia has its own regional police as guaranteed in its autonomy status, containing a tradition that promotes localism in its police work (Inzunza 2016).⁶¹ The regional police force, the Mossos d'Esquadra (Mossos), is the primary force to police the frequent demonstrations in Catalonia. The Mossos' main organ to deal with protests with higher conflict potential is the central anti-riot unit the Àrea de Brigada Mòbil (Brimo). They might be assisted by the Àreas Regionales de Recursos Operativos (ARRO) which is another organ of the Mossos that serves to support other police units regionally.

During times of large demonstrations such as the protests of October 2019 a temporary coordination centre is formed, the Centra Operatiu de Coordinacio Policial (Cecor), which includes leading members of the police and other emergency services as well as politicians such as the regional interior minister who is the highest decision maker for policing in the autonomous region. The Cecor coordinates the different police units and emergency services and makes tactical and strategic decisions, though if decisions must be made quickly, they are also made by commanding officers. In anticipation of the highly conflictual potential of the announcement of the sentence the Mossos requested support from the Policia Nacional (National Police). The quick escalation of the protests made it necessary for them to aid in public order control.⁶²

Present also was the local Guardia Urbana, Barcelona's city police, which aids in the maintenance of public security but whose tasks usually include less confrontational actions such as traffic control. Interestingly most demonstrators seemed not to mind Guardia Urbana officers as they were even present

⁶¹ The tradition of localism in the regional police (Mossos) serves to ensure a closer connection to the citizens, a factor that Spanish police otherwise does not compare well in (Inzunza & Wikström 2020; Inzunza 2016). The actions of the Mossos during the 1-O are likely an expression of the closer local connections to the citizens, prompting them to use a minimum of force against peaceful voters and demonstrators as the premise of proportional use of force demands from the officers of the Mossos.

⁶² The coordination of the October 2019 protests compares very differently to the coordination during the 1-O. The operation to prevent the 2017 referendum was not commanded by Catalonia's interior minister but by the cornel and senior member of the conservative Spanish interior ministry Diego Pérez de los Cobos who started his career in the Guardia Civil in the highly controversial police campaigns against members of ETA in the Basque Country.

in the ‘backlines’ of the protesters at Plaça Catalunya during the worst day of clashes on Friday the 18th of October and were largely ignored (OBS). Though there were single instances of them getting attacked by protesters they were largely left unbothered, as the statistic of injured officers in table 1. shows, a difference to the protests in support of Pablo Hasel in February 2021 (LaVanguardia 2021).⁶³ This differentiation between Guardia Urbana and other police forces shows that there was not a complete homogenous categorization of the police that would lead to irrational actions and violence against them (Dalgaard-Nielsen 2008). Hence even though there was violence and chaos in the streets protesters’ actions against the police were in parts still tempered and restrained.

The last major police force is the Guradia Civil which in contrast to the previous forces is of military nature. Together with the National Police the Guardia Civil received much critic in Catalonia for their approach and brutality during the 1-O (AI 2017). Despite them having their own anti-riot force the Civil Guard was largely held back during the week of protest.

Table 1. Number of injured officers per police force.

POLICE OFFICERS INJURED

	Mossos d'Esquadra					Guardia Civil					National Police					Local police					Total all police forces
	BCN	GRN	TGN	LLDA	Total	BCN	GRN	TGN	LLDA	Total	BCN	GRN	TGN	LLDA	Total	BCN	GRN	TGN	LLDA	Total	
14.10.2019	39	0	1	12	52	0	0	0	0	0	16	6	0	0	22	0	0	0	0	0	74
15.10.2019	48	2	0	0	50	0	0	0	0	0	16	0	4	0	20	0	0	0	0	0	70
16.10.2019	18	4	0	2	24	0	0	0	0	0	11	0	1	0	12	0	0	0	0	0	36
17.10.2019	5	0	0	0	5	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	2	1	0	0	0	0	8
18.10.2019	10	5	0	3	18	0	0	0	0	0	66	2	10	0	78	0	0	0	0	0	96
19.10.2019	3	0	1	0	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	5
20.10.2019	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Total	124	11	2	17	154	0	0	0	0	0	111	8	15	0	134	2	0	0	0	2	290

(Mossos d'Esquadra)

How the police approaches protests

The following is an explanation of how the Mossos approach protests as outlined by a deputy-inspector of the Brimo.⁶⁴ He pointed out that other police forces might approach protests differently.⁶⁵ Most importantly he stressed the fact that anybody has the right to protest and that the Mossos respect this right. The main principle for policing for the Mossos is to use the minimum amount of force necessary and to only use it against those that commit criminal acts. Following these principles an intelligence unit first assesses escalation potential prior to demonstrations. The actions generally depend on different circumstances such as the size and

⁶³ It points to an increased radicalization of protests, yet it is also important to note that the Pablo Hasel protests were on a much smaller scale and mainly included those from the radical flanks, the restraining effect of centrist and conservative movement actors was therefore missing.

⁶⁴ In the following I will simply be using the term ‘officer’ in reference to the deputy-inspector.

⁶⁵ But since the Mossos have the main competence in policing in Catalonia their approach is the most relevant.

location of the demonstrations. In peaceful demonstrations they are trying to show the least amount of presence possible. During the ‘Marchas de la Llibertad’ on Friday for example there was nearly no police visible (DEM10, OBS). Protests are being assessed continuously, if the Cecor or commanders notice the crowd is getting rowdier the first response is simply to show presence. If this does not help messages might be given via megaphone to tell individuals to stop certain actions. It can be followed by giving visual warnings through the appearance of police in anti-riot gear, adjusting the equipment to the level of escalation. For most demonstrators these warnings are usually enough to motivate them to leave. The general goal is to disperse crowds as smaller groups of people are easier to control. If protesters still do not disperse and act violently the Cecor might decide to “begin the action”.⁶⁶ At this point, after giving multiple verbal and visual warnings, the officers do not distinguish anymore between different individuals but act towards the group as a whole. Psychologically such a categorization through de-individualisation much decreases restraints on violence towards this other group (Nielsen-Dalgaard 2016). “Action” can include tactics seen during the week of protest such as charges, use of batons, or foam bullets and teargas in case the officers cannot engage in a certain space (and have to act from a distance).⁶⁷ An interview respondent admitted that “Usually it is true that they try to be more passive.”, though he also added, “The rubber bullets and tear gas are only for when things go South, but when they go they go all in.” (DEM2). The latter view fits with the views shared by many in Catalonia about the notoriously brutal way of acting of anti-riot units in Spain.⁶⁸

Critic against police actions

The police have received much criticism from pro-independence actors across the board for their actions during the protests of October 2019. All interview respondents felt anger about the police’s tactics. Criticism also came from Catalonia’s president Quim Torra as well as international organisations (AI 2019). According to the Catalan ministry of health over 750 protesters have been injured due to police violence including 71 journalists (OSCE 2019;

⁶⁶ Though commanding officers can also make quick decisions in their own regard if the situation demands it.

⁶⁷ Rubber bullets are banned by the Catalan legislative, therefore Mossos are using foam bullets while the National Police was still allowed to use rubber ones.

⁶⁸ The actions of the police during the 1-O were just one example of excessive use of force that was criticised internationally. Also, in other parts of Spain police violence has caused international critic. This violence has in the past often been directed towards students or anti-austerity protesters (Garcia 2014). A decisive factor in the toughening of police action was the new cycle of demonstrations that started with the rise of the indignados movement. The corresponding police coercion had, according to amnesty International, “contravened international standards of human rights” (AI 2012).

ElNacional 2019). On October 21st, the Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe expressed her concern about the “disproportionate use of force and inappropriate use of antiriot weapons by the police on demonstrators” during the protests. She also expressed her concern for the rights of freedom of expression and peaceful assembly (COE 2019).

The experiences of protesters, international critic, and own observations are in large parts contrary to what the official Brimo protocol of action seems to demand. This includes for example the procedure of giving multiple warnings before using force. Yet many images and accounts of protesters (as well as own observations) have shown that most often there were no warnings. As one respondent described the situation on the first night:

“The first night they just rushed in, it was like a Blitzkrieg. They came down the road at full speed and everybody started running. You just saw the blue lights and that was the only warning, start running or you are gonna get beaten.”

c. Interactive Dynamics

There are however some possible explanations for why the police seemed to have resorted to the apparent excessive use of force that was displayed on social and regular media. One factor was that the Mossos were at the limit of their capacity. Despite having anticipated heavy demonstrations the scale and intensity surprised decisionmakers in the police force. The Brimo officer described it the following way: “I have been in the Brimo since 1999 and I have experienced a lot of things [...] never, never, never in my life have I ever seen something like the day of the sentence.” He explained that they were ready for different conflictual scenarios but not for multiple scenarios at the same time. Additionally, protests happened all over Catalonia which meant that the Mossos, who already did not have enough men, had to shift their officers where the situation seemed most dire.

Every evening the Cedor had to make new assessments and coordination for the next day including assignment of officers as it was not possible to follow regular schedules.⁶⁹ Many areas were deemed high action and high risk which also had to do with the protesters being well organised and coordinated. Spain’s interior minister spoke of a small number of well-organized protesters of about 400 whereas other sources estimated the number to be between 1000 and 2000 (Olmo 2019). The tactical choice to use what the media called the ‘carousel’-tactic appears

⁶⁹ The interviewed Brimo officer was supposed to have holiday during the week of the 14th but upon recognizing the “catastrophe” did not take his days off.

to have been a result of the overwhelming scale of the protests.⁷⁰ Size and heterogeneity of protesters is generally seen as a serious difficulty for police and organizers who aim to control a protest and keep it nonviolent (della Porta & Zamponi 2012). The Brimo officer explained that the unofficial tactic was used to enter spaces with high concentrations of people and to show presence everywhere, hence the constant movement. It also aimed at preventing the construction of barricades. Nonetheless, protesters were able to create what one called “protester-controlled zones” which they attempted to protect using barricades. In one instance – performing the ‘carousel-tactic’ - one van of the ARRO ran over a protester who was behind a trash container that was supposed to become a barricade in the middle of a crossroad. The image of this instance that was shared over social media shocked protesters and increased resentment against the police. In relation to the carousel-tactic one protester articulated the experience: “We just started running cause they were gonna kill us.” (DEM2). On Friday during the so called “Battle of Urquinaona” police officers likewise had the feeling the protesters were out to kill them. “Nos querían matar” [“They wanted to kill us”] said one National Police officer about the clashes on Friday (Puga and Lázaro 2019). The day also saw the highest number of arrests (table 2.) and officers injured with two National Police officers suffering a broken back (Brimo). In-group sentiments due to solidarity with injured comrades and the sheer fear of death raised the stakes for officers and protesters alike which significantly reduces restraints on violence, a potential mechanism that accelerated interactive dynamics of escalations. Emotions have a significant influence on collective behaviour during demonstrations and it is precisely emotions such as tension and fear that are more linked to violence than anger or hate (Nassauer 2010: 5).

⁷⁰ The Brimo officer stated that the term ‘carousel’ was invented by the media and that it was not a tactic that was listed in any tactical manual, yet he later indirectly admitted that it was a conscious tactical decision. It means the tactic of driving police vans with high tempo through crowds and streets with gatherings of protesters to disperse them.

Table 2. Number of arrests made each day by different police departments.

	ARRESTED																				Total all police forces	
	MOSSOS D'ESQUADRA					Guardia Civil					NATIONAL POLICE					LOCAL POLICE						
	BCN	GRN	TGN	LLDA	Total	BCN	GRN	TGN	LLDA	Total	BCN	GRN	TGN	LLDA	Total	BCN	GRN	TGN	LLDA	Total		
14.10.2019	2	0	0	1	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3
15.10.2019	6	0	14	8	28	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	30
16.10.2019	16	3	5	12	36	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	36
17.10.2019	6	5	3	2	16	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	2	0	0	1	0	0	1	19
18.10.2019	18	12	9	18	57	0	0	0	0	0	19	6	1	0	26	2	0	1	0	0	3	86
19.10.2019	13	0	0	0	13	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	3	3	0	0	0	0	3	19
20.10.2019	1	1	0	2	4	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	6
Total	62	21	31	43	157	0	0	0	0	0	24	6	4	0	34	6	0	2	0	0	8	199

(Mossos d'Esquadra)

The dynamics of violence and counter-violence can therefore be seen as a case of “interactive violence” of two sides struggling for control which led to the spiralling of violence (Tarrow 1998; Gibbs 1989). These sentiments compared with the straining experiences throughout the week led to the culmination of escalation on Friday during the “Battle of Urquinaona” (Burgen & Jones 2019d). The day saw heavy clashes between protesters and police in the centre of Barcelona that already started in the afternoon and resulted in the highest number of arrests and injuries of the week.⁷¹ That day the National Police even used up all their rubber bullet ammunition and had to collect them from the street to reuse them (ElConfidencial 2019b). The protesters used a massive fire to box in the National Police in the street in front of their headquarter at the Via Laitana, which was answered with the use of a watercannon, the first use since it was bought in 1994 (Burgen and Jones 2019d). One respondent stated about the police that night, “They were shooting grenades inside of the people. They were really pissed that night.” (DEM9).

Another recounted the chaotic situation at the ‘frontlines’ like this:

“In Urquinaona there were barricades already set up and people with helmets, shields, like homemade shields, and homemade equipment of something of the style of American football armour and some people were handing them eggs so they could throw them. And then they [police] kept coming, you know like Darth Vader army, and they started shooting out of nowhere [...] Some people were behind the barricade and most in a side street [...] And then it started raining, raining teargas.” (DEM2)

⁷¹ Table 1. and 2.

There are varying accounts about who had a greater role in starting and pushing the spiralling violence. In the case of the airport on Monday however it appears that there is merit to the police's version whereby escalation first started on the protesters side.⁷² Though in other situations it appears that the police escalated demonstrations. A member of the interviewed CDR recounted: "The violent acts were always done as an answer to attacks and police violence. Only happen disturbs [unrest] when the anti-disturbs appear." (CDR2).

Many of the pro-independence protesters have furthermore claimed escalation was mainly caused by the actions of the police. There were even rumours backed by alleged video evidence about police officers (or other individuals opposed to the movement) who took on the role of agitators to escalate the protests and put the movement in a bad light.⁷³ According to one respondent it was however mainly *conservatives* that believed in the 'agitator'-thesis, that in its most detailed form argued that the face covered 'radicals' that were erecting barricades and were fighting with the police were all agitators.

In the end the truth about who caused escalations likely lies somewhere in the middle as it is often unclear to what extent coercion by the police is a reaction to protesters' violence or itself the cause of escalations (Wahlström 2011). There were documented cases of the police using excessive force beyond any reasonable protocols. Yet their tactical choices were also determined by the sheer scale and intensity of the protests that did not necessarily allow it to follow the usual protocols. The Brimo officer stressed that the principle of the adjusted use of force was given during the week as "some days were violent, and some were very violent".⁷⁴ It is a common pattern for police to respond to more radical confrontational tactics with harsher measures in an interactive way (Waddington 1991; Peterson & Wahlström 2015; della Porta 1995; McAdam 1982). One more moderate respondent summarized the likely escalation dynamics:

"There were different moments, there were moments when people started to throw rocks. But I am also sure that there were also people throwing rocks to provoke and to create a reaction from the police. And I am also sure that sometimes the police started, and people reacted." (DEM4)

⁷² Accounts from the events at the airport of protesters have matched the accounts from the interview with the Brimo.

⁷³ One video shows how demonstrators expulse an alleged undercover policeman from a demonstration (ElNacional 2019c). Given the man in the video really is an officer it does not necessarily prove the agitator thesis as it is possible that he was undercover to gather intelligence, a practice that the Brimo is relying on at protests (Brimo).

⁷⁴ As can be seen in table 1.

What can be said however is that escalation culminated towards the evening on the first day when tensions heated up at the airport and protesters refused to leave the complex, blocked passengers from entering together with ensuing squabbles, and throwing of objects. The police, whose mission it is to ensure public order, the decay of which was visible for the international audience at the airport, responded with harsh use of force against any kind of protesters, rowdy or passive alike as the evening progressed.⁷⁵ The reports, images, and experiences from the airport set the course for the week to come. About the airport Ms. Roviró of ANC said, "It was the spark... that in some sense ignited the flame." Demonstrators felt empowered by having executed such an innovative and effective strategy.⁷⁶ This strategy also had a degree of confrontativeness that had not been observed before and likely opened the possibility for the breaking of what previously was considered taboos (Van Aelst & Walgrave 2001).

d. Protesters' Change Of Perception Towards The Police

Interactive dynamics of violence were accompanied and partially preceded by deteriorating perceptions of the police. The experiences of police violence of the 1-O were essential in shaping anti-repression and anti-police frames. In that way people in Catalonia were already sensitised towards further police violence. Psychologically such a dismissive mindset leads to positive affirmation of views meaning that police actions were viewed through a more critical lens focusing solely on negative aspects (Evans 1989). In this climate just one month before the sentence national police raided houses of CDR members on the account of suspicion of terrorist acts, accusations that could not be proven later (Publico 2019).⁷⁷ The actions echoed in the media and increased tensions and resentments against the 'Spanish' police.

The experiences of the 1-O did not only change frames about the (Spanish) police, but they also had a behavioural effect. "The worst of the worst was in 2017, that's when people begged down the most. People were just letting themselves get hit and not responding with any violence just putting their hands up." (DEM3). Out of this experience protesters concluded they had to protect themselves from the police. At the same time the carousel tactic endangered demonstrators up

⁷⁵ Which fits their usual protocol of policing. Yet officers were seriously overstretched. Even though they anticipated the airport as a high-risk area they were surprised by the amount of people despite having previously shut down all public transport to the airport.

⁷⁶ "I think that the first mobilization at the airport was a very motivational mobilization because we showed we were capable of doing things like that." (ERCP)

⁷⁷ In another instance in 2018 another member of a CDR, Tamara Carrasco, was arrested and accused by the Guardia Civil of rebellion and terrorism for her alleged role in coordinating CDR activities like roadblocks. The Catalan court later acquitted her from all charges (Altimira 2020).

to the point that they were fearing for their life. It led to the frame of violence, in the form of barricades or fire, as a mean of self-defence to protect each other from the police and to protect the right to demonstrate.

While the 1-O had negative effects on the image of the ‘Spanish’ Police (National Police and Guardia Civil) the opposite effect happened regarding the Mossos. The indulgent and nonviolent way of acting of the regional police was held in high regards by many Catalans. Images of Mossos officers arguing with Guardia Civil officers and apparently obstructing their actions created the perception that it was “our Catalan police that protected us”(DEM1,5-8).⁷⁸ After the terrorist attacks in Barcelona in August 2017, favouring views about the Mossos had previously surged with many Catalans showing gratitude to the Mossos for their swift actions in the time of crisis.⁷⁹ All these favourable feelings however turned into disenchantment, anger, and feelings of betrayal, the “honeymoon” - as Ms. Roviró called it - was over after pro-independence protesters experienced the use of force by the Mossos against them. For ANC and many other activists, the trauma from being beaten by ‘their’ police that ought to protect them, as they did during the 1-O, meant a break with the Mossos. Psychologically emotions like betrayal and anger decrease restraints on aggressive behaviour and therefore have the potential to radicalize tactics (Robertson et al. 2012).

“People were fighting back because they felt betrayed. There was hatred against Mossos because it was like, you are supposed to be our police and you are beating us up now two years after. Why is that happening?” (DEM1)

The change of perception was however mainly felt by those from the *conservative* or *centrist* parts of the movements. These were the individuals that were generally more aligned with the nonviolent approach and identity as propagated by the major movement organizations. This means however that a change in their views regarding the appropriate response to the traumatic police actions had a significant impact in eroding previous restraints that limited more radical parts of the movement from giving in to incentives to expand the tactical repertoire towards violent tactics (Cunningham & Fruge 2017).

⁷⁸ For their comparative passive attitudes, the Mossos were highly criticised from Spanish authorities. Its chief Josep Trapero even faced criminal charges on accounts of sedition and disobedience and had to resign his position. He was later acquitted by the Spanish High Court (Galvez 2020). The sergeant of the Brimo viewed the charges against Trapero as politically motivated, “Another aspect of the political dispute that was going on between the region and the central government”.

⁷⁹ The close relation that was felt between many Catalans and ‘their’ regional police is likely a result of the tradition of localism in its organization and the closer connections to citizens this entails (Inzunza & Wikström 2020).

Those interviewed that could be located more towards the radical flanks, mainly young and left-wing demonstrators, always viewed the police critically and did not differentiate between regional and national police. These were the ones that had much experience with police violence which is why they did not have the same ‘traumatic experience’. Many had observed police violence by the Mossos (or rather the Brimos) at student or leftist demonstrations, those groups the police are generally seen to be biased against.

Attitudes towards the police were further worsened by the perception that they had a firm anti-independentist bias. At least for the regional Mossos this appeared however to be less the case.⁸⁰ Though respondents stated that the Mossos had the mentioned bias against leftist or student demonstrations.⁸¹ The National Police on the other hand has in the past openly shown its sympathy for anti-independentists (ElNacional 2019c). There were also cases where members of the police and military were seen to display Francoist symbols and the fascist salute (Bernat & Whyte 2019: 2).

How the anti-police attitudes took over could also be seen by the countless ACAB (All cops are bastards) graffiti that appeared at the end of the week. Other messages that showed radicalization of attitudes towards the police were:

- Se’ns Acabat els somriures. - Our smiles are over
- La historia ens absoldra. Acab. Poli Idiota Imbecil. Fuck Nazis. – History will absolve us. Acab. Idiots. Police. Asshole.
- La Por Ha canviat de Bandol!!! – The fear has changed the site [on the side of the police and the politicians]
- Fuck Police
- Foc al capital – Fire in the capital

In sum the images of the police beating apparently peaceful crowds of protesters with batons and rubber bullets resonated with anti-police frames that emerged after the 1-O and created active anti-police sentiments that had different effects on different parts of the movement. As outlined protesters from the *conservative* and *centrist* sectors of the movement experienced this as a “trauma” and as disillusionment with ‘their’ (regional) police. In the more radical parts, it

⁸⁰ Based on past attitudes and actions as well as expressed attitudes during the interview and talks.

⁸¹ It could indeed be observed during the student protests against the Bologna reform and the brutal quashing of Indignados demonstrations (20Minutos 2011).

confirmed existing prejudices against the police but also led to a radicalization in frames and behaviour towards the security forces. The spiralling violence then also led to a mutual worsening of perception between protesters and police (White 1993; Davenport et al. 2005). On the side of the police perceptions to the 'out-group' – the pro-independence protesters – might have additionally been influenced by anti-Catalan and anti-leftist biases. More importantly, being overwhelmed by the size, number, and intensity of the demonstrations the police, and especially the Mossos as the primary actor to guarantee social order, resorted to tactics such as the 'carousel'-tactic that were more confrontative which further increased the pace of the spiralling of violence, that was set off by the events at the airport, worsening perceptions and provoking further counter actions (Tarrow 1978).

3 CONCLUSION

The analysis has shown factors that led to violent escalation during the protests of October 2019 in Catalonia, the igniting of the "Burning Rose", in a movement that had been characterised by its peaceful nature. It did so using unique forms of data such as never been done qualitative interviews with a multitude of movement actors as well as additional data generated for example from graffiti that appeared during the protests and secondary data.

One major aspect was the loss of cohesion that occurred after the 1-O. Disputes between the five traditional movement organisations (ANC, Omnium, ERC, Junts, CUP) ensued and, together with the partial withdrawal of Omnium, led to a reduction of power of conservative and centrist movement actors that could restraint more radical tactics. This further diminished through growing individual level dissatisfaction with the parties and the growing impact of a new generation in the movement. It left room for new groups like the CDRs that were more oriented towards the radical (and left) flanks and increased fragmentation and a hegemonial *downward shift* from the more institutionalised level of bigger traditional organisations to the local level and individual agency. Interestingly the appearance of Tsunami Democràtic did not appear to have significantly affected this dynamic, though it took part in setting of a spiral of escalation through the use of confrontational tactics.

These organizational changes were accompanied by changes in frames. Defensive universal-democratic rights frames took the place of the pre-1-O proactive democratic emancipatory ones. Additionally, frames surged that were anti-repression including anti-police and anti-fascist

frames. Such changes in frames were enabled by the organizational changes but in turn also accelerated them as the new frames fit more the agenda of radical (leftist) organisations and pointed to a repertoire of action that went beyond the restricted tactics of the traditional movement organisations. In the causal mechanism frames therefore served as intervening variables which becomes even more clear when considering that they were caused by the repression, as part of policing of the movement, that was experienced during and after the 1-O.

Policing of the movement therefore had a significant impact on radicalization. The two crucial events were thereby the arrests and police violence of the 1-O and the sentencing and police tactics in October 2019. It included the closing of political opportunities through repression and criminalization of dissent. Younger generations were hit hardest by these measures who experienced the ineffectiveness of peaceful demonstrating and who consequently turned to their own tactical approaches. Policing did however also have an “on the ground” component through the actions of the police forces and interactions between them and protesters. On the part of the protesters the more radical parts of the movement already viewed the police through highly critical frames. What tipped the balance however was that those on the centrist and conservative parts of the movement came to be disillusioned with the police due to the ‘traumatic’ experiencing of violence at the hands of ‘their’ regional police. Radical tactics such as the occupation of Barcelona’s airport also provoked reactions by the police that set the protests on a course of spiralling violence. From the part of the police this was accelerated by their use of brute force and tactics that were likely used because of the overcapacity of the police due to the massive scale and intensity of the protests, though, following perceptions of activists’ individual biases of officers might have added on to that. The spiralling dynamics of action, retaliation, and worsening mutual perception culminated in the worst day of violence dubbed the “Battle of Urquinaona” on Friday the 18th of October. The images created by it for the first time seriously questioned the movement’s peaceful identity.

Concluding, it appears that the major causal mechanism that led to this situation was therefore, organizational fragmentation and loss of cohesion together with changes of frames post 1-O that allowed radical parts of the movement to act on their own more radical regard which responded to the policing of the movement and the protests.

The analysis has confirmed previous studies on the Catalan independence movement that highlight the importance of an organizational *downward shift* and the transformative effect of the I-O (della Porta et al. 2019; della Porta et al. 2021) while showing their prolonged impacts. It also gives merit to Wendy Pearlman's (2011) organizational mediation theory of protest in the context of a Western democracy with much lower levels of violence. Combining this theoretical approach with the identification of different movement sectors (Robnett et al. 2015) served to ensure a higher analytical level which can serve as a model for future research on organization in social movements.

In the field of studies on repression the paper supports those that have found repression to have a radicalizing effect (e.g. Sutton et al. 2014; Balcells et al. 2018; Munoz & Anduiza 2019). Furthermore, the behaviour of the Catalan police that responded with increased coercive measures to more confrontational tactics supports the threat-based model of repressive escalation (Davenport 2000). However, it puts in doubt previous claims that identified a demise in violence with increasing institutionalization (Tarrow 1994). The importance of relational dynamics in the argument (e.g. between different movement sectors or police and protesters) furthermore highlights the importance of relational dynamics over political process approaches in social movements.

Considering the impact that the closing of political opportunities had on radicalization in the movement, policies should focus on easing the tensions between Madrid and Barcelona. The recent pardoning of the 9 sentenced independentistas was a good pragmatic step in reducing sentiments of repression. Another step that the current progressive government could attempt could be to revoke the infamous security law of 2015 that greatly increased criminalization of dissent. If the Catalan government can manage to gain significant results from the upcoming talks with Sanchez it could potentially reassert trust in their strategic – negotiation based - approach and re-establish movement cohesion while preventing a turn to direct action as happened previously after the failure of the statute of autonomy.

Confronted with the question if they would engage in the same kind of activism the members of the CDR were unsure and tended to decline. For this reason, another attempt at a renewed statute of autonomy could lastingly qualm the independence issue. It could even be an option to hold a legal referendum on independence. Though it seems difficult to realise it would immediately resolve independentist frames that revolve around democratic rights.

Additionally, future policies and investments from the new funds to ease the economic impacts

of the Covid-19 pandemic need to be spent to provide more optimistic perspectives for the younger generations. Important is also the role of the interior minister as the head of the regional security forces to ensure the premise of measured restraint in the policing of protests. Comparing the differences between the policing of the 1-O and the week of protest has shown the importance that institutional settings (political opportunities) have, specifically if the policing is directed from the central or regional government. As a policy recommendation it suggests the advantage of regional policing over central organization in the context of independence movements in liberal democracies.

Despite a comprehensive approach with rich data there are drawbacks with any methodological approach. A limitation in the data collection was that sampling was not random and there were some selection biases, for example a bias towards English speakers and respondents in and around Barcelona. This has the potential to not adequately represent the target population of the movement, leading to reduced external validity. Truthfulness of answers could have also been an issue due to, for example, social desirability biases due to the sensitiveness of the topic. In this vein internal validity in studies based on interviews is often relatively low. It could however be demonstrated that the causal factors preceded the outcome. Though it cannot entirely be ensured that there were no other confounding effects, the analysis was based on a thorough theoretic foundation and used a rich quantity of data. This close connection between theory and social reality ensured high construct validity. Probably the biggest drawback of a single case approach is however reduced generalizability. Due to the importance of context specific actors and events the findings are most relevant for the context of Catalonia. Yet the advancements in theory testing (e.g. in the areas of policing and organizational changes) can be applied to other cases.

The findings have most relevance for other European secessionist movements like the Scottish or the Flemish independence movement that have been frequently compared to the Catalan case (Lineira & Cetrà 2015). Especially the Flemish case seems comparable as it has some similarities to the Catalan movement such as cultural distinctiveness and identity (Dewulf 2012). Most importantly it is a diverse movement that encompasses multiple organizations with left- and right-wing ideologies together with a militant sector. Following the importance of cohesion, the relations between these groups (conservative, centrist, radical) will be important for its future development. The major difference however has been the impact of policing in

Catalonia which has not been present in the Flemish movement that focuses its efforts more on institutional means. If these fail, there could however – according to the argument - be a radicalization of tactics.

The impact of policing could on the other hand be observed in Northern Ireland where the chaotic Brexit situation has led to a recent increased risks of a surge in political violence. In the past this was furthered by the policing of the involved parties (Mulcahy 2013), now dynamics of interactive violence need to be prevented while there need to be political opportunities to address legitimate grievances to prevent renewed violent escalation.

Future research should focus on the analysis of relevant frames in the Catalan independence movement that controls for differences in age groups and ideology as the radical flanks of the movement are mainly leftist groups. Quantitative analyses could also investigate the impact that the use of violent tactics had on social support for the movement, an issue that is frequently debated. Additionally, more research is needed to investigate if there has been a lasting radicalization in the movement which could mean an analysis of the Pablo Hasel riots of February 2021 and how they compare to the protests of October 2019. Finally, there appears to be a lack of studies in the context of Spain that investigate the policing of protest by focusing on the police's part as this paper has done in parts. On the theoretical level the analysis has shown that future case studies can profit from a holistic approach that consider all three main factors identified by McAdam et al. (1996) that affect social movements and their interaction with each other.

4 INTERVIEWS

CDRF – CDR focus group talk, March 2020, near Barcelona

CDR1 – written interviews, answers received March 2020

CDR2

CDR3

CDR4

CDR5

CDR6

CDR7

Other organisations:

ERCP – Politician of the ERC in the Spanish Congress of Deputies, June 28, 2021, via Zoom call

ANCR – Ms. Roviró national board member of ANC, May 19, 2021, via Zoom call

MOSSOS – International Relations Spokesperson of the Mossos, June 9, 2021, Sabadell

BRIMO – Deputy-Inspector of the Brimo, June 9, 2021, Sabadell

Individual Demonstrators:⁸²

DEM1 – Interview with younger demonstrator, member of ERC, June 6, 2021, Barcelona

DEM2 – Interview with younger leftist, June 23, 2021, Barcelona

DEM3 – Middle aged male, June 11, 2021, Barcelona

DEM4 – Younger female, July 17, 2021, Cerdanyola de Vallès

DEM5 – Elderly women, June 9, 2021, Sabadell

DEM6 – Middle aged women, June 9, 2021, Sabadell

DEM7 – Young female, June 9, 2021, Sabadell

DEM8 – Mother of a young activist, June 5, 2021, Barcelona

DEM9 – Middle aged male, July 18, 2021, Barcelona

DEM10 – Younger female, July 18, 2021, Barcelona

Own Observations: (OBS)

⁸² This classification follows the example of della Porta & Zamponi (2013). Due to the sensitive nature of the issue and fear of individual repression interview respondents wanted maximum discretion.

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