




STUDENT PAPER SERIES

47



**Gender-Specific Migration
Patterns in the Context of
Political and Economic Upheaval:**
The case of Tunisia

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ABSTRACT

The aim of this paper is to understand the progressive feminization of migratory flows from Tunisia to Europe over the period 2010-2017. The observed increase in female migration took place in the context of economic crises in both sending and receiving countries. In Tunisia, it coincided with dramatic changes at the political, economic and social level that followed the 2011 revolution. In Europe, the issue of migration experienced another wave of politicization during the same period. In light of those developments, the paper studies the different behavior of male and female migrants. It applies a case-oriented approach, testing seven hypotheses derived from standard migration theories, as well as feminist approaches. The results of multivariate regression analyses confirm the importance of migratory networks and unemployment in receiving countries, while bivariate analysis suggests that the severe impact of the Tunisian economic crisis on women may have been an additional driver of female emigration rates. More importantly, a generation of increasingly well-educated women, with very restricted labor market access in Tunisia, are faced with European migration policies favoring the highly-skilled. Due to a growing demand in immigration countries for services traditionally performed by female workers, as well as the need for highly-skilled workers to support technological change, the trend towards a feminization of Tunisian emigration is likely to last.

Keywords: Tunisia, female, emigration, migratory flows, skilled, economic crisis, migration policies

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Research interest

Globally, migration is on the rise, both in absolute and in relative terms (IOM, 2017). The most important reason by far to leave one's country is to make an income abroad. However, male and female migratory flows do not always develop uniformly. The main interest of this paper is to investigate how migration for various socio-economic, and sometimes political-legal, reasons varies by gender. Following the main direction of international migration movements, the focus lies on migration from poorer to richer countries, taking the example of Tunisia as a sending country and Europe as a receiving region.

The aim of this research is to identify the main factors accounting for a proportional increase in female emigration from Tunisia, and to understand whether it reflects short-term developments or the continuation of a long-term trend.

The choice of that particular case is related to the availability of data disaggregated by gender, age, reason and citizenship for the years 2010-2017. Europe is the main destination for Tunisian migrants. Academic research on the Euro-Mediterranean migration system has up until now concentrated on the large emigration countries Morocco and Turkey, while Tunisia remains an underresearched case. However, Tunisia, which has been undergoing a period of intense political and socio-economic change since 2010, is an interesting case all in itself. The EU's diplomatic efforts culminating in the establishment of a mobility partnership in 2014 underline Tunisia's importance as an emigration country.

1.2 Outline

The paper will start with a background chapter on Tunisia's history as an emigration country, providing the context for the theoretical framework to be presented in the following section. In the next two sections, a set of hypotheses will be developed, and the research design will be presented. The analytical part of the paper is divided into a close-up analysis of key indicators, on the one hand, and multivariate analyses, on the other hand. Finally, results of the analysis will be discussed, before implications and future perspectives are laid out in the conclusions.

1.3 The puzzle

According to Eurostat data on permits issued by 27 European countries, a progressive feminization of Tunisian emigration towards Europe has taken place over the period 2010-2017 (see **Table 1.3**). The same trend is visible, though less pronounced, across large parts of the EU's Southern neighborhood, where feminization was also a result of rising numbers of female refugees fleeing the Syrian conflict. In the case of Tunisia, a look at different visa categories reveals that feminization is not the result of family

reunification but driven largely by migration for education and work reasons. Several events shaped migration during the observation period:

OECD data show that the financial crisis of 2007 and the ensuing recession translated into falling immigration in the countries most affected by the crisis, a situation that also affected Tunisian migrants, both male and female.

2011 saw a short-lived but massive increase of Tunisian emigration against the background of the Jasmin Revolution. 19,036 persons arrived in Italy, of which 86.2 percent were male. The majority arrived in the first months of the year over the Mediterranean Sea. The lack of policing and coastal controls after the fall of the authoritarian regime of Ben Ali, as well as established smuggling networks, provided an opportunity for many potential migrants mobilized by various socio-economic issues ready (Boubakri, 2013). In Italian immigration statistics, the event appeared as an upsurge of six-month-permits in the “other” category (referring mainly to refugees and other humanitarian reasons).

In 2015, the year during which the refugee crisis in the EU’s neighborhood spilled over to Europe, and the economic crisis in Tunisia deepened, there was a notable increase of permits issued to female Tunisians. The increase affected all age groups except for the main migrant group aged 20-34. Rather than refugees, these persons were family members, students and, more rarely, workers. France notably issued 166 student visas to Tunisian women over 60 (compared to zero for the rest of the observation period).

Table 1.3. Feminization of migratory flows towards Europe by citizenship and reason (2010-2017)

GEO / TIME	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
Tunisia	16,032	21,359	20,951	21,508	21,137	20,735	21,554	21,665
female (in %)	28.00	15.86	38.79	38.93	40.27	41.95	42.68	43.44
Tunisia: family reasons	5,827	5,174	12,975	12,925	12,442	12,552	12,567	11,720
female (in %)	53.23	51.18	45.26	44.77	45.92	45.54	45.44	47.81
Tunisia: education reasons	718	766	3,067	3,802	4,314	4,615	4,860	5,019
female (in %)	24.79	26.11	44.96	44.71	45.13	47.09	51.60	51.78
Tunisia: remunerated activities	9,104	3,353	3,410	3,408	2,974	2,524	2,804	3,836
female (in %)	11.95	8.11	13.55	14.47	13.79	17.12	18.26	20.54
Tunisia: other reasons	383	12,066	1,499	1,373	1,407	1,044	1,323	1,090
female (in %)	31.59	2.22	27.55	28.62	31.34	36.21	35.37	38.62
Maghreb	153,360	123,166	149,125	148,556	142,511	142,567	149,082	157,097
female (in %)	43.62	41.74	48.79	48.48	48.98	50.50	50.45	51.76
EU Southern Neighborhood	204,709	179,674	217,632	234,127	246,040	260,545	340,593	271,180
female (in %)	43.62	41.74	48.79	48.48	48.98	50.50	50.45	49.51
World	1,273,147	1,125,932	1,258,732	1,399,452	1,469,189	1,683,179	1,982,352	1,803,408
female (in %)	49.57	49.04	50.87	50.65	48.89	47.50	44.30	44.92

First permits issued by 27 European countries (Eurostat, 2018a). Data are missing for France, 2010-2011.

2. BACKGROUND

2.1 Tunisia's migration history

Tunisia's history as an emigration country begins at its independence in 1956. Previously, during the industrial period of emigration, it was mainly a receiving country for European migrants, in particular from Italy and France. From the late 1950s, facilitated by bilateral labor agreements with France (1963), Germany (1965), Belgium (1969) and the Netherlands (1971), Tunisia started to export workers with mixed skilled levels to the expanding economies in Western Europe, which experienced labor shortages in sectors such as industry, mining, construction and agriculture (Natter, 2015).

After that first period dominated by young males, many European states introduced restrictions to labor migration in the 1970s, which lead to a feminization of migratory flows: migrant workers settled and brought their families via family reunification (Boubakri, 2011). Meanwhile, oil-exporting countries, especially Libya, became new destinations for Tunisian migrants. In the 1980s, Northern and Western European countries, in particular France and the Benelux states (not German-speaking countries), consolidated their status as destinations for family migration. The former labor-exporting countries in Southern Europe became new immigration countries for low-skilled foreign workers, many of whom were absorbed by large informal economies (Geddes & Scholten, 2016).

As a result of further restrictions to migration laws in the 1990s (Italy and Spain only introduced visa requirements in 1990/91 as a prerequisite for joining the Schengen area), migration became increasingly irregular and dependent on business cycles, particularly in countries where migration for work reasons is dominant. This trend continued in the 2000s, which saw substantial immigration during the boom years, reduced by restricted labor market access since 2010 (De Bel-Air, 2016).

2.2 Tunisian migrant stocks

Tunisian migrant stocks have grown continuously over the past decades. Today, UN DESA (2017a) estimates the Tunisian diaspora at 767,155 (see Appendix, **Table A1**). Tunisian estimates, which include those naturalized by their country of residence, are at well over one million. The overwhelming majority of Tunisian emigrants reside in Europe, with France as the most important destination country, followed by Italy, Germany, Belgium, Switzerland, Sweden, the Netherlands and the UK. Non-European destinations include the Maghreb, Libya (not recently), the Gulf states, the US and Canada (Natter, 2015). Only in Europe and North America has the share of female migrants increased since 1990, although in absolute terms men still by far outnumber women. In North America, Germany, the UK and the Gulf states, Tunisian

migrants are disproportionately well-qualified, whereas Tunisians in Italy, for example, are on average less qualified than the Tunisian population at home (De Bel-Air, 2016).

2.3 Trends in Tunisian migratory flows

The (scarce) data on historical flows suggest that Tunisian emigration rates have decreased since 1980, with absolute numbers stable or increasing at slow rates (Brücker et al., 2013). Similar to other traditional sending countries in the MENA region, the share of females among emigrants is on the rise, irrespective of strong short-term fluctuations (DEMIG, 2015a).

Between 2001-2008, over 60 percent of Tunisian emigrants were aged 15-29 at their departure, female emigrants being younger than male ones. France is the most important destination for both sexes. The second most important destination, Italy, shows a conspicuously higher share of male Tunisian immigrants, a fact that is related to the predominance of migration for work reasons in the Italian case: According to departure surveys, the most important motive to move abroad for Tunisian men during the same period was work (73.3 percent), followed by education. Women mainly cited marriage (40.5 percent) and other forms of family reunification, with education slowly gaining ground (Fourati, 2011). Globally, the highest emigration rates are found among the highly-skilled, and Tunisia is no exception (Brücker et al., 2013). Both male and female Tunisian emigrants are better qualified today than in previous decades. Female emigrants stick out as 40 percent of them have higher education, against 21.3 percent of males (Fourati, 2011). Given Tunisian women's low employment rates despite their comparatively high educational attainments, Fourati argues that most female emigrants are likely to have an economic project as well.

3. LITERATURE REVIEW

There is no single theory of migration. Instead, many different approaches co-exist, most of which focus on only one or several aspects of migration. The following section will review the main migration theories, with a focus on approaches that directly or indirectly give rise to gender-specific hypotheses regarding migratory flows. In addition, contributions of feminist research will be reviewed. From this synthetic overview, a range of alternative hypotheses will be derived that can then be systematically applied to the Tunisian case.

For conceptual clarity, it should be mentioned that the main subject of migration theory is international labor migration, that is, the movement of individuals across state borders for the purpose of making a living abroad, either by accessing the labor market or by accompanying a working family member (Awad, 2009). Students, who are not at the center of migration research, may be included insofar as they often have an economic project as well. Theoretically, the above-mentioned definition also includes undocumented migrants and naturalized citizens. However, official statistics that identify migrants through their citizenship do not account for either of the two groups. Refugees are not part of the definition, although they will appear as inflows of foreign population in official statistics of receiving countries.

3.1 Demographic development and migration transitions

Although older versions of migration transitions may be out of fashion today, there can be no doubt that demography, and particularly the size of the working-age population, is a key explanatory factor of migratory flows (Massey, et al., 1998). At the same time, demography is intrinsically related to standard development indicators, such as income, health and education. Historically, economic development processes in Europe were associated with demographic growth, which resulted in migration to capital-abundant urban centers, and regions abundant in land and natural resources (often in the form of colonization). As demographic growth decelerated, and wages rose, emigration declined to be replaced by net immigration from developing countries and urban-to-urban migration (ibid.).

Research confirms that increasing national income initially leads to higher emigration rates. Only once a certain income level is reached emigration declines again (Clemens, 2014). The idea that aid destined for economic development in sending countries could reduce migratory flows has been termed “migration and development mantra” by migration researchers (Castles, et al., 2013, p. 323). In fact, it is not the poorest but rather middle-income countries like Mexico, Morocco, the Philippines and also Tunisia itself that show the highest emigration rates, a phenomenon that can be explained by the fact that certain resources are needed to emigrate (ibid.).

Today, Europe's population is ageing, and natural population growth in the EU (that is, population growth without immigration) turned negative in 2016 (Eurostat, 2018b). Arab societies, in turn, are very young after decades of high birth rates, and they are currently undergoing a transition from high rates to low rates of fertility and mortality. That opens a "window of opportunity" for investment and economic growth, while the working-age population grows at a faster rate than the population of dependents (El-Khory, 2016).

In the case of Tunisia, the fertility rate is already close to replacement levels with 2.3 births per woman in 2016, according to its National Statistics Institute (INS). Life expectancy rose from 42 years in 1960 to 75.4 years in 2016. INS data show that participation in the public education system has also increased steadily, for both girls and boys. Parity has been reached in primary education, while over 60 percent of students in public higher education institutions today are female. Between 2006-2013, the Tunisian labor force grew roughly twice as fast as the total population, a development that is not only related to demography but also to the progressive incorporation of women into the labor market. However, economic growth has not kept up with the growth of an increasingly educated labor force, resulting in unemployment, underemployment and poverty (Awad & Hedayat, 2015).

3.2 Classical and neoclassical models

The traditional approaches rooted in classical and neoclassical economic theory take up issues of employment and income. They argue that migration decisions are based on a purely economic calculation, which takes into account wage differentials (or expected wages), unemployment rates and costs of travel (e. g. transport costs, physical distance, cultural and language barriers, policies, migrant networks...) (Lee, 1966).

The neoclassical model, first applied to international migration by Borjas, introduces complexity by focusing on human capital. Individuals are assumed to decide based on where they will get the highest return for their skills. Relevant variables are, therefore, skill levels, income levels and distribution (skill premia), migration costs, and skill transferability between sending and receiving countries (Bodvarsson & Van den Berg, 2013).

Although the traditional approaches have received much criticism for their narrow economic and rationalist perspective (Massey, et al., 1998), in the Tunisian case, high structural unemployment, lack of adequate employment opportunities, low wages, wage differentials to Europe, and low standards of living are the migration reasons most commonly referred to in the literature (for example Awad, 2009; Bardak, 2015; Bel Hadj Zekri, 2011; De Bel-Air, 2016; Fargues & Fandrich, 2012).

Related issues, prevalent not only in Tunisia but also in other North African countries, are low productivity growth and the lack of employment opportunities for the highly-skilled (Martín, 2010). The

consequence are very high rates of graduate unemployment (29.2 percent in 2015 according to INS data). In general, women are far more affected by unemployment. This gender unemployment gap is found across all age groups, and it is even larger for married women and those living in rural areas (Mansuy & Werquin, 2015). Moreover, women still participate to a much lower degree in the formal labor market (24.3 percent) than men (70.6 percent in 2017 according to ILO data). The situation of Tunisian emigrants reflects women's marginalized role on the labor market: over the period 2001-2008, only 6.6 percent of female emigrants had been in employment before prior to their departure, against 56.4 percent for male emigrants (Fourati, 2011).

3.3 The New Economics of Migration or: migration as a family decision

The New Economics of Migration stays within a rational-choice framework but situates the migration decision at the level of households, families and communities. Temporary migration is perceived as a means to diversify risks (e. g. old age, sickness, unemployment, crop failures) and access investment capital in the form of remittances. Relevant variables are failures in local insurance and credit markets, in addition to remittance flows (Massey, et al., 1998; Taylor, 1999).

The role of sending communities and remittances in migration decisions are also key issues in feminist migration research, which argues that gender norms – such as the male breadwinner model – shape migration decisions. Male migration for remittances is usually favored by societal norms, whereas the autonomous migration of women, and especially mothers, is problematized (Lutz, 2010). Migrant women have to justify their decision and in some cases are unable to exercise it. As Zontini (2010) shows through a study of Moroccan migrants in Barcelona and Bologna, most married women had to overcome significant resistance from their families before emigrating. Although their cases on the surface may look like family migration, most of them came with the intention to earn their own wage and escape social control at home. Depending on their social background, single women emigrated either to pursue an education, or to find a job and support their families at home. A different study of male Senegalese migrants in Italy, in turn, emphasizes that the status associated with responsibility for an extended family at home is extremely important for male migrants sending remittances (Sinatti, 2014).

In the case of female migrants from Tunisia, autonomous migration has become more frequent since the 2000s, although migration for family reasons still dominates among females (Boubakri, 2011). Married women who emigrate alone are the exception and must find arrangements with their families, as a study of Tunisian saleswomen in Italy illustrates (Schmoll, 2005). Most Tunisian emigrants in the 2000s were single at their departure. However, female returnees were more frequently married, divorced or widowed than male returnees, of whom the majority were still single. Between 1975-2008, the share of married women whose

partners live abroad fell from 4.5 percent to 2.9 percent of all married women. 59.9 percent of them were over 40, which suggests that this particular family model is receding (Fourati, 2011).

3.4 Globalization, transnational links and social transformation processes

Globalization theories of migration (in the widest sense) are also essentially economic theories. They take a long-term perspective at aggregate flows, arguing that migration is a consequence of market integration (i. e. trade and investment flows, foreign military interventions to protect investments, colonial ties, transport and communication infrastructure, cultural and ideological links, etc.) (Massey, et al., 1998).

Sassen (1988), whose work is rooted in world systems theory, emphasizes the role of foreign investment: FDI and offshore production at low-cost locations in developing countries disrupt traditional economies as male and female workers previously employed in subsistence agriculture and small-scale production are incorporated into the waged labor market, either as workers on large plantations or in the export-oriented manufacturing sector. That process entails the feminization of waged labor. Since wages are low and working conditions precarious, there is a large pool of unemployed labor in marginalized areas, as well as of highly-skilled people with no employment perspective in urban centers, many of whom are ready to move abroad (Talani, 2015).

Newer versions of globalization theory see migratory flows in the context of an acceleration of cross-border flows of goods, capital, services and people, which are to some extent outside the control of governments. Regulatory power has shifted from sovereign nation-states to multinational corporations, with international financial institutions (IFIs) – strongly influenced by European and US economic interests – providing control mechanisms (Castles, et al., 2013; Talani, 2015).

In a globalized world, migration occurs for two main reasons: Firstly, increased interconnectedness through transport and communication technologies makes migration cheaper, easier and more accessible, even for population groups that in the past would not have had the aspiration or the means to travel (Castles, et al., 2013). In addition, social networks made up of potential migrants, former migrants and non-migrants reduce the cost of migration. Such networks, which are facilitated by family reunification policies in sending countries, contribute to sustain migratory flows over time and may result in a culture of migration in sending communities (Massey, et al., 1998).

Secondly, migration is also part of the social transformation processes spurred by globalization (Castles, 2010): In developing countries, trade liberalization, commercialization of agriculture, destruction of local economies and traditional social orders, and formation of new mega-cities have a profound impact on people's living and working conditions (ibid.). In the case of Tunisia, structural adjustment programs favor(ed) low-skilled and labor-intensive export industries, for which most inputs to be imported.

Meanwhile, employment opportunities in the public sector are waning (Cammett, et al., 2015). The results are noted in the form of high unemployment and poor working conditions due to an evasion of labor law by parts of the formal private sector and a large informal sector (Martín, 2010).

In the MENA region, this transformation was enabled by authoritarian regimes that partially adopted the economic model promoted by IFIs. Bogaert (2013) argues that the Arab uprisings were a result of such authoritarian modalities of globalization. The political and economic instability, and violent conflicts that followed the 2011 revolts have produced both migration and forced displacement.

3.5 Segmented labor markets

Globalization has also led to social transformation processes in industrialized countries, including the rise of global cities with segmented labor markets (Sassen, 1988). The restructuring of employment relations in those economies was related to the closure of non-competitive industries on the one hand, and the expansion of the service sector offering highly-specialized services (e. g. finance, legal services, IT) and basic services (e. g. restauration, cleaning and gardening, care services, call centers), on the other hand. Whereas the primary sector offers well-paid and stable work for highly-skilled workers, the secondary sector is labor-intensive and characterized by low wages and precarious working conditions (Castles, 2010).

According to Piore, modern economies have a structural demand for migrant workers to occupy marginal niches of the labor market not satisfied by native labor supply (Massey, et al., 1998). Migrant workers may be preferred by employers due to their lower bargaining power. From the state's perspective, migrants consume less than they produce (consumer products, public education and health services, insurance benefits, etc.), and they can be excluded from certain rights and entitlements (Sassen, 1988). European governments have actively contributed to create two categories of workers, benefitting mainly their industries during the guest worker period (Massey, et al., 1998) and sectors like agriculture, construction, tourism or domestic work today (Geddes & Scholten, 2016).

Feminist research argues that labor markets are segmented by ethnicity, origin, legal status, and gender: Female migrant workers are overrepresented in “feminized” sectors, including fruit-picking in agriculture, cleaning, domestic and care work, nursing, catering services, entertainment or prostitution. Male migrant workers are more often found in sectors such as construction, manufacturing or transport (Lutz, 2010).

In European receiving countries, the incorporation of women into the labor market was not compensated by a redistribution of unpaid work between men and women, or by a sufficient offer of public services. Moreover, post-industrial societies are ageing, resulting in an additional demand for care work. Feminized work, especially in the domestic and care sector, has therefore been delegated to female migrant

workers (Truong, et al., 2014). Although not limited to certain countries, that phenomenon is most visible in the familist welfare states of Southern Europe, with historically lower rates of female labor market participation and fewer public services than in Northern welfare states (Williams & Gavanas, 2008). Italy hosts a particularly high number of migrant domestic and care workers, including live-in assistants for the elderly, many of whom work informally (Geddes & Scholten, 2016). Irregular migrants and seasonal workers respond flexibly to labor demand in receiving countries. There is, however, a structural demand for female migrant labor in social professions that does not fall even in times of economic crisis (ibid.).

3.6 Policies of sending and receiving countries

Despite the importance of market forces, which are a necessary condition for migration to occur, the sufficient conditions are political and legal (Hollifield, 2012). Hollifield argues that states are crucial to shaping migration outcomes by regulating access to rights for non-nationals. Since the 1970s, destination countries have become increasingly preoccupied with controlling migratory flows. Irregular migration, which in Europe affects mainly the Euro-Mediterranean migration system, increased as migration policies became more restrictive (Castles, et al., 2013). According to the DEMIG policy database, restrictions over the last decades concerned mainly irregular migrants, family members and low-skilled workers, while policies towards refugees, students and highly-skilled workers became more liberal (De Haas, et al., 2016).

That picture applies in particular to the older destination countries in Western and Northern Europe, which are characterized by strong welfare states, small informal economies, and traditions of family migration and settlement. France stands out due to its high number of naturalizations. Especially in the 2000s, France attempted (with mixed results) to shift the focus of its migration policy from family migration to highly-skilled migration for education and work reasons (Geddes & Scholten, 2016).

Italy became an immigration country in the end of the 1970s, at first almost unnoted by the authorities and without a regulatory framework in place. Until the 2000s, there were few targeted attempts to regulate migratory flows, aside from border control, detention and expulsion measures, and regularizations (ibid.). In 1998, Italy joined the Schengen area, after which it sought close cooperation with sending countries, particularly Tunisia and Libya, in order to prevent the departure of migrants at the southern shore, push back boats and ensure readmission by the respective country of departure (Boubakri, 2013). In the case of Tunisia, a substantial part of migration occurs irregularly, which in most cases means that migrants overstay their visas. Studies show that women migrate regularly and irregularly. However, it appears that there are few female Tunisians who arrive irregularly: INS data on migration by region of departure and gender reveal that only a small share of women leave from coastal areas with the highest incidence of irregular migration (ibid.).

As other European destination countries, Italy has undertaken several regularization campaigns (De Haas, et al., 2016). Geddes & Scholten (2016) argue that, in the Italian case, repeated amnesties for migrants employed in the informal sector have, in fact, become the main policy tool for managing migration. In Italy, regularizations and migration quotas have a gender-specific impact because they favor domestic and care workers of certain nationalities, including Tunisians.

Tunisia's emigration policy has up until now been indifferent towards gender (Boubakri, 2011). Until 2011, its main goals were to prevent irregular migration on behalf of European governments, and to facilitate labor migration in order to relieve the labor market and access remittances (Bel Hadj Zekri, 2011). Besides an institutional infrastructure supporting (and as is sometimes criticized, controlling) emigrants before and during their stay abroad, the main instruments were social security agreements and bilateral labor migration agreements with a number of Arab and European destination countries. Bilateral agreements with Italy (1998) and France (2008), for example, allocate certain quotas of visas to Tunisian citizens, in exchange for readmission of irregular migrants (Poussel, 2014). In practice, the selection criteria established by those agreements may be too restrictive to have an impact on migration numbers in Europe (Awad & Hedayat, 2015).

3.7 Feminist approaches to migration theory

Feminist approaches to migration theory do not constitute a separate theory but rather complement existing theories by pointing out biased representations in positivist research (Lutz, 2010). They criticize accounts of migration in which women are either absent or perceived through the lens of traditional gender roles (as receivers of remittances, passive followers of their partners, dependent family members, victims of the false promises of smugglers or human traffickers...) (Boukhobza, 2005). Catarino & Morokvasic (2005) argue that, contrary to common interpretations, many female migrants who came to Europe in the 1970s were not merely dependents but often took up work later.

From a methodological point of view, feminist approaches give more weight to migrants' experiences and attempt to understand how gender identities, discourses, norms and practices shape migration decisions (Lutz, 2010). The variables studied are similar to the ones mentioned in the previous sub-sections: policies, demand for foreign labor, segmented labor markets, migrant networks, remittances, etc. In addition to variables relating to the state and market forces, questions of gender relations, especially gender norms and the distribution of work, are added (Gasper & Truong, 2014).

One example is Khachani's (2011) study of the feminization of Moroccan emigration. The Moroccan case resembles Tunisian migratory history in the second half of the 20th century. However, autonomous female emigration started earlier than in Tunisia, and today over half of Moroccan emigrants headed towards

Europe are female, according to Eurostat data. Khachani argues that the main causes of female migration were economic factors in Morocco (female unemployment) and receiving countries (demand for female migrant labor). The author further identifies sociological and psychological causes: Advances in the area of women's rights and increasing participation of women in the public sphere were accompanied by a progressive change in society's attitude towards female migrants. Liberalization of gender norms in Morocco has thus resulted in more female emigration.

Other accounts of female migration see emigration as a means of escaping social pressure, and repressive gender norms and practices (Aluffi, 2011; Zontini, 2011). Depending on the context, gender norms can therefore act as either drivers or obstacles to female migration.

4. HYPOTHESES

Based on the historical background and literature review presented in the last sections, the following hypotheses can be formulated:

H₁: The number and proportion of female migrants varies according to demographics and changing socio-demographic characteristics of the source population: migration increases as certain age cohorts grow, and as more women participate in higher education and in the labor market.

H₂: Male and female emigration rates vary according to gender-specific unemployment rates in the sending country.

H₃: For female migrants, the performance of feminized export sectors in the sending country is of particular importance, with migration increasing as employment falls.

H₄: Migrants will follow the routes of established migratory networks.

H₅: Male and female emigration rates differ due to different migration projects. Male emigration rates (across all visa categories) will follow business cycles in destination countries more closely than female rates, since female migration occurs more often for family or education reasons.

H₆: Female emigration rates vary according to the labor demand of sectors with a high concentration of female migrant workers, rather than the overall performance of receiving economies.

H₇: Female emigration rates will rise (fall) in response to liberal (restrictive) changes in sending and receiving countries' migration policies.

5. RESEARCH DESIGN

5.1 Method

Based on a very broad theoretical framework, this paper takes a case-oriented approach: The objective is to provide a detailed account of one case, and to identify all (or most) relevant independent variables, instead of focusing on just a few explanatory factors that apply to a larger number of cases (Della Porta, 2008). Despite being designed as a case study, restrictions of space and resources mean that it will be necessary to rely on quantitative indicators wherever those are readily available. A detailed analysis of a series of quantitative (e. g. unemployment rates) and qualitative indicators (e. g. policy changes) represents the main analytical effort of this paper.

In addition, log-linear models will be estimated for each visa category in order to assess how individual variables perform in a multivariate setting. The dependent variable is logarithmically transformed so as to better account for a strong positive skew (due to many countries with few or no Tunisian migrants). To address the issue of reverse causation the dependent variable will be lagged by one year.

5.2 Case selection and data

Tunisia was chosen as a typical case of a migrant-sending country in the Euro-Mediterranean migration system. An advantage of this particular case is strong variation in dependent and independent variables over the observation period.

For pragmatic and theoretical reasons, the paper will focus on France and Italy whenever a more detailed analysis of receiving countries' characteristics seems appropriate or necessary. According to UN DESA (2017a), both countries together currently host 85 percent of the Tunisian diaspora in Europe. France is not only the most important destination for Tunisian emigrants worldwide but also a typical case of a settlement country with a tradition of family migration. Italy, in contrast, is a typical case of a "new" European immigration country, characterized by the importance of low-skilled labor migration, a large informal economy and a more limited role for the state when it comes to regulating migratory flows. A proportional increase in female emigration numbers can be observed in both cases.

Analysis of migratory flows will be based on the number of permits issued by 27 European countries over the period 2010-2017 (approximately 180 observations), as provided by Eurostat. Reliable data on international migration, especially flow data, are scarce. The advantage of Eurostat migration data is that the same methodology is applied to measure migratory flows in all 27 destination countries. Moreover, it is disaggregated by gender, age, reason and citizenship. Downsides of administrative data are bureaucratic

backlogs, unused permits, family permits, and the inability to account for undocumented migration (see control variables).

5.3 Operationalization

Table 5.3 provides a list of variables and indicators. Emigration to other receiving countries and irregular migration are included as control variables to check whether feminization of emigration to Europe is compensated by a relative increase of male migration to other destinations, as well as male migration through irregular channels. The multivariate model includes wealth (GDP per capita at purchasing power parity and constant prices), as well as democracy (Freedom House) as additional controls.

Table 5.3. Operationalization.

Dependent variables		Indicators
y	(a) Emigration counts for different visa categories	(a) First permits issued to Tunisian citizens by 27 European countries (Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, France, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland), disaggregated by gender and reason (Eurostat)
	(b) Emigration rates for different visa categories Emigration rates are defined as ratios of the number of permits by visa category to the number of people in the corresponding age group, resulting in the following emigration rates:	
	- Emigration rate (total) refers to the total number of permits per total population.	
	- Emigration rate (family) refers to permits for family reasons per total population.	(b) Permits, disaggregated by gender and reason (Eurostat) per Tunisian population of the corresponding age group (UN DESA)
	- Emigration rate (education) refers to permits for education reasons per population ages 20- 29.	
	- Emigration rate (work) refers to permits for work reasons per population ages 15-64.	
	- Emigration rate (other) refers to permits for other reasons per total population.	
Independent variables		Indicators
H ₁	(c) Emigration rates	(c) Permits (Eurostat) per Tunisian population (UN DESA)
	(d) Tertiary education enrollment	(d) Tertiary education enrollment rate by gender (INS)
	(e) Labor force participation	(e) Tunisian labor force participation rate by gender (ILO)
H ₂	Unemployment in sending country	Tunisian unemployment rate and employment-to-population ratio by gender (ILO)
H ₃	Performance of feminized export sector in sending country	Employment rate in manufacturing in Tunisia (ILO)
H ₄	Migrant networks	Tunisian migrant stocks in 27 European countries (Eurostat)
H ₅	Unemployment in receiving countries	Unemployment rates in 27 European countries (Eurostat)
H ₆	Labor demand in sectors with high concentration with female migrant workers in receiving countries	Foreign-born unemployment rate by gender in 27 European countries (Eurostat)
H ₇	Migration policy changes in sending and receiving countries	Migration policy changes in Tunisia, France and Italy (DEMIG policy database, OECD, EMN, government sources and literature)
Control variables		Indicators
	Emigration to other destinations	Inflows of Tunisian citizens to OECD countries by gender (OECD)
	Irregular migration	Irregular departures (Tunisian Interior Ministry) and border crossings of Tunisian citizens into the Schengen area (Frontex)

6. RESULTS

6.1 Diversion of migratory flows to other destinations

Among the preferred destinations of Tunisian emigrants are traditional European, North American and Arab immigration countries, as well as Maghreb neighbor countries (Natter, 2015). No reliable and up-to-date statistics are available on Tunisian migratory flows to major non-European receiving countries, such as the UAE, Saudi Arabia and Qatar. **Table 6.1**, therefore, only presents migratory flows to Europe, as well as to 12 OECD destinations not covered by Eurostat data: Between 2010 and 2016, there was substantial and continuous growth of Tunisian migration to other OECD destinations, such as Germany, Canada and the United States. Since 2011, the share of female migrants fluctuated around one third of the total. There is no evidence suggesting that the feminization of migration to 27 European countries was compensated by a “masculinization” of migration to other receiving countries.

Table 6.1. Tunisian migratory flows towards Europe and other OECD destinations by gender

		2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Europe ¹	total	16,032	21,359	20,951	21,508	21,137	20,735	21,554
	female (in %)	28.00	15.86	38.79	38.93	40.27	41.95	42.68
Other OECD destinations ²	total	3,835	4,760	5,107	6,062	7,009	7,264	7,532
	female (in %)	36.98	31.85	33.78	33.29	32.00	32.06	33.28

¹First permits issued by 27 European countries (Eurostat, 2018a).

²Inflows of foreign population to Australia, Canada, Chile, Finland, Germany, Israel, Korea, Mexico, New Zealand, Slovak Republic, Turkey, United States (OECD, 2018).

6.2 Development of irregular migratory flows

The possibility to emigrate is increasingly being considered by Tunisian youth since the 2011 revolution, according to a survey carried out by the Tunisian Forum for Economic and Social Rights (Abdessattar, 2016). Although the dangers and difficulties encountered by irregular migrants are well known, more than half of the survey’s respondents believed that it should not be criminalized. 30.9 percent (78.4 percent male of male respondents and 21.6 percent of female respondents) indicated that they would emigrate irregularly, if there was no regular possibility (ibid.).

Official data on irregular migratory flows are by definition incomplete and vary considerably depending on the source. **Table 6.2** presents data on interceptions of Tunisian migrants travelling without permits, as reported by the Tunisian Interior Ministry (departures) and the European Border and Coast Guard Agency Frontex (arrivals). No data are available on the distribution by gender over the period 2010-2016. However, according to the literature, irregular migration in the Tunisian case is a primarily male phenomenon. In addition, Tunisian authorities reported that only 2 percent of interceptions in 2017

concerned female emigrants (FTDES, 2018). Similarly, UNHCR data indicate that only 2.2 percent of Tunisians who arrived in Italy by sea that year were female adults.

Table 6.2. Irregular migratory flows from Tunisia to Europe

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
Irregular departures ¹	N/A	7,595	1,230	1,120	1,191	1,881	1,053	3,178
Irregular arrivals ²	1,498	28,829	2,717	1,224	1,739	1,061	1,368	6,520

¹Interceptions of irregular departures by Tunisian authorities (Tunisian Interior Ministry as cited in FTDES, 2018).

²Detections of irregular border crossings to the Schengen area (Frontex, 2018).

Irregular migratory flows from Tunisia towards Europe stabilized after the exceptional upsurge in the first half of 2011. Since 2017, numbers are on the rise again. The development of irregular migratory flows over the observation period does not suggest – at least until 2017 – that higher shares of regular female emigrants were accompanied by a disproportionate increase in (male) migration through irregular channels.

6.3 Demographic growth and socio-demographic characteristics

Demographic growth in Tunisia has slowed down notably since the late 1980s, reaching an annual rate of 1.1 percent (2.1 children per woman) in the 2000s, according to INS data. The number of marriages concluded by women aged 15-24 declined at the same time. Since 2007, most women get married at ages 25-29, while before most marriages were concluded at ages 20-24. With the onset of the financial and economic crisis, birth rates (including adolescent birth rates) started to increase again, resulting in higher natural population growth in the 2010s.

Figure 6.3.1 shows that total emigration counts and rates, defined as the number of permits per total population, develop almost uniformly over the period 2010-2017. For the age groups 0-19 and 30-49, emigration counts increase faster than the emigration rates among the corresponding age group due to strong birth rates in previous decades, as well as the recent recovery of birth rates (see Appendix, **Table A2**). The above trend is cancelled out by a contrasting development among Tunisians aged 20-29 who migrate for education reasons: Here, emigration rates are growing faster than emigration counts (and more for women than for men), reflecting negative growth of the age group 15-29 for both sexes since 2012. Overall, purely demographic factors cannot account for the development of migratory flows over the observation period.

Figure 6.3.1 Tunisian emigration counts and rates (estimates) by gender




Figure 6.3.1 based on Eurostat (2018a) & UN DESA (2017b), see Appendix, **Table A3** and **Table A4**.

An analysis of Tunisian emigration rates shows that male rates are higher but also less stable than female rates. As can be seen in **Figure 6.3.2**, that is particularly true for male migrant workers, whose numbers declined sharply after 2010. For female migrant workers, the decline was more moderate and short-lived. Family migration, traditionally the most important entry channel for Tunisian migrants in Europe and still high in absolute terms, is losing its importance for both sexes. Meanwhile, permits issued to female Tunisians for education reasons saw a significant increase in 2012 and have continued to grow ever since. Among students, female emigration rates outpaced male emigration rates as of 2016. Feminization of Tunisian emigration can thus be understood as a combination of higher female education and work migration rates, and lower male work migration rates.

Figure 6.3.2. Tunisian emigration rates (estimates) by gender and reason




Figure 6.3.2 based on Eurostat (2018) & UN DESA (2017b). For a definition of

Female participation in the Tunisia's public education system increased steadily on all levels of education over the past decades. After reaching their highest point in 2010/11, female student numbers and enrollment rates, started to decline again in 2012. Among male students, where enrollment rates are much lower, the downward trend already started several years earlier (see **Table 6.3.1**).

Table 6.3.1. Tunisian tertiary education enrollment rates & emigration rates (estimates) by gender

		2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
Enrollment rate ¹	M	0.16	0.159	0.149	0.136	0.128	0.125	0.114	0.107	N/A
	F	0.244	0.253	0.247	0.232	0.227	0.224	0.211	0.209	N/A
Emigration rate ²	M	N/A	1.721	1.723	1.671	2.089	2.379	2.506	2.456	2.722
	F	N/A	1.291	1.304	1.353	1.676	1.945	2.211	2.589	2.836

¹Enrollment in public higher education institutions per population ages 20-29 (INS, 2018; UN DESA, 2017b).

²Permits for education reasons per 1,000 of population ages 20-29 (Eurostat, 2018a; UN DESA, 2017b).

Figure 6.3.3 shows that a growing share of Tunisians, both male and female, seek higher education outside the country, while student numbers in Tunisia are declining by the thousands each year, a trend that contradicts H₁. Migration for education reason would then not follow from increasing participation in higher education but rather replace it, as more potential students move abroad.

Figure 6.3.3. Tunisian tertiary education enrollment rates and emigration rates (estimates) by gender




Figure 6.3.1 based on Eurostat (2018a), INS (2018) & UN DESA (2017b).

After roughly two decades of slowly increasing participation of women in the formal labor market (and falling participation of men), female labor market participation rates dropped in 2009 in the context of the global recession. Both male and female rates saw small increases in the aftermath of the revolution. However, while male rates have been relatively stable since, female labor market participation rates started to decline again in 2014 (see **Table 6.3.2**). As in the case of tertiary education enrollment and emigration for education reasons, bivariate analysis suggests a negative correlation between labor market participation rates and emigration rates for both sexes.

Table 6.3.2. Tunisian labor market participation rates & emigration rates (estimates) by gender

		2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
Labor force participation rate ¹	M	0.690	0.697	0.703	0.709	0.709	0.708	0.708	0.708	0.706
	F	0.244	0.245	0.245	0.252	0.251	0.249	0.246	0.244	0.243
Emigration rate ²	M	N/A	2.536	1.139	0.809	0.788	0.688	0.557	0.605	0.828
	F	N/A	0.364	0.139	0.124	0.130	0.108	0.112	0.132	0.210

¹Labor market participation per population ages 15+ (ILO, 2018a).

²Permits for work reasons per 1,000 of population ages 15-64 (Eurostat, 2018a; UN DESA, 2017b).

6.4 Gender-specific employment and unemployment patterns in Tunisia

Despite low rates of labor market participation, women were severely affected by the unemployment crisis that characterized the years of the political transition. Total unemployment spiked in 2011. Male rates subsequently fell and stabilized slightly above their 2010-levels. Female rates fell temporarily, only to increase again as the economic situation deteriorated in 2015-2016, raising the gender unemployment gap to about 10 percentage points (see **Table 6.4**).

Table 6.4. Tunisian unemployment rates and emigration rates (estimates) by gender

		2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
Unemployment rate ¹	M	0.113	0.109	0.151	0.147	0.133	0.127	0.126	0.126	0.126
	F	0.188	0.190	0.274	0.257	0.231	0.215	0.224	0.235	0.231
Employment-to-population ratio ²	M	0.612	0.621	0.597	0.605	0.615	0.618	0.619	0.618	0.617
	F	0.198	0.198	0.178	0.188	0.193	0.195	0.191	0.187	0.187
Emigration rate ³	M	N/A	2.536	1.139	0.809	0.788	0.688	0.557	0.605	0.828
	F	N/A	0.364	0.139	0.124	0.130	0.108	0.112	0.132	0.210

¹Unemployment per labor force ages 15+ (ILO, 2018b).

²Employment per population ages 15+ (ILO, 2018c).

³Permits for work reasons per 1,000 of population ages 15-64 (Eurostat, 2018a; UN DESA, 2017b).

Women – especially young university graduates – face significant obstacles in their job search, according to INS data: Women have also been more active than men looking for employment since the beginning of the 2000s, a fact that until 2011 was not reflected by job placements and job creation. **Figure 6.4** shows the trends in employment-to-population ratios (a measure of female employment that also captures low labor market participation rates) and emigration rates. After 2011, both indicators move in opposite directions, which is in line with H₂.

Figure 6.4. Tunisian employment-to-population ratios & emigration rates (estimates)




Figure 6.2 based on Eurostat (2018a), ILO (2018c) & UN DESA (2017b).

6.5 The impact of globalization in Tunisia

France and Italy are not only the primary destinations for Tunisian emigrants, but also the country's first trade partners, and among its largest investors. While exports used to be dominated by the textiles and chemicals (including the phosphate industry), Tunisia's most important export goods today are low-tech industrial goods, textiles and agricultural goods. Industrial production is concentrated along the coast, including the Tunis area (Oxford Business Group, 2016).

Most Tunisian emigrants in the period 2009-2014 originated in the greater metropolitan area of Tunis and the coastal regions (including the governorates of Mahdia, Medenine, Sousse or Nabeul), according to INS data. Female migrants, in particular, tend to be from urbanized areas rather than the country's more rural interior and southern regions.

Table 6.5.1 shows how the direction of migratory flows mirrors the distribution of migrant stocks by destination country (see Appendix, **Table A5** and **Table A6**), with the strongest correlation found in the case of family migration. The results support H_3 regarding the role of migratory networks.

Table 6.5.1. Correlation between Tunisian migrant stocks and emigration rates by reason and gender (2010-2017)

		Total	Family	Education	Work	Other
Correlation coefficient	M	0.80	0.99	0.94	0.51	0.21
	F	0.97	0.94	0.94	0.63	0.96

Permits per 1,000 of population of relevant age group and Tunisian-born population in 27 European countries, 2010-2017 (Eurostat, 2018a, 2018c; UN DESA, 2017b).

As predicted by Sassen's theory of globalization (1988), manufacturing is the most feminized sector in Tunisia, as well as the sector with the highest number of female employees. In absolute numbers, agriculture and the public sector are also important employers for women. Sectors with high shares of female workers include social professions and other services. ILO data show that due to their concentration in manufacturing women are particularly vulnerable to economic crises: There were sharp drops in female employment numbers and rates in 2009, 2011 and 2015-2016, whereas male employment only fell in 2011 (see Appendix, **Table A7** and **Table A8**).

Figure 6.5. Tunisian employment by sector and gender before and after 2010/11




Figure 6.3 based on ILO (2018d).

Figure 6.5 compares sectoral employment for the periods 2000-2010 and 2011-2017. Employment in agriculture is on a downward trend among men and women. The year 2011 represented a turning point, as about 50,000 female workers left the agricultural sector. In the following years, most female jobs were created in the service sector (e. g. wholesale and retail trade, real estate, business and administration).

After 2012, both male and female emigration for work reasons declines as employment in manufacturing increases (and vice-versa) (see **Table 6.5.2**) However, the pattern is not as pronounced as for the employment-to-population ratio, which is a more complete measure of employment. There is no discernible relationship between agricultural and mining employment, and emigration. Measured by short-term aggregate indicators, the hypothesis according to which emigration affects globalized sectors of the economy more than others does not find convincing support.

Table 6.5.2 Tunisian sectoral employment rates and emigration rates (estimates) by gender

		2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
Agriculture and mining employment rate ¹		0.168	0.163	0.142	0.150	0.140	0.136	0.124	0.128	0.128
Manufacturing employment rate ¹		0.155	0.160	0.151	0.153	0.159	0.161	0.156	0.141	0.142
Emigration rate ²	M	N/A	2.536	1.139	0.809	0.788	0.688	0.557	0.605	0.828
	F	N/A	0.364	0.139	0.124	0.130	0.108	0.112	0.132	0.210

¹Sectoral employment per labor force ages 15+ (ILO, 2018d).

²Permits for work reasons per 1,000 of population ages 15-64 (Eurostat, 2018a; UN DESA, 2017b).

6.6 Segmented labor markets and unemployment in receiving economies

Tunisian migrants in European receiving countries occupy different jobs than non-migrants, according to OECD (2008) data. Compared to women born in Italy, for example, Tunisian women are overrepresented in manufacturing, private households, hotels and restaurants. For Tunisian men, manufacturing, construction and agriculture are of particular importance. In France, the sectoral distribution of Tunisian migrants resembles that of non-migrants more closely, particularly so for women. Like women born in France, most of them work in education, health and social work. They are overrepresented in post and telecommunications, hotels and restaurants, personal and domestic services, and, in the case of men, construction.

Unemployment rates among migrants in OECD countries follow similar patterns as total unemployment rates. However, they are typically higher and increase more dramatically in times of crisis (OECD, 2010). During the first years of the financial and economic crisis in Europe, unemployment disproportionately affected male migrants due to their concentration in crisis-affected sectors, such as manufacturing and construction (OECD, 2011). In contrast, sectors with high shares of female migrants, including residential care, domestic work in private households, social professions, and the hospitality sector, were among those with the highest employment growth over the last years (OECD, 2016).

Migration from Tunisia to Europe declined in the aftermath of the recession of 2009. Female emigration rates picked up in 2012 (labor migration only in 2014), when unemployment rates in many European countries had not yet reached their highest level during the observation period. Male emigration rates only started to increase again when unemployment data had already improved (see **Table 6.6**).

Table 6.6. Unemployment rates in receiving countries and Tunisian emigration rates (estimates) by gender

		2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
Total unemployment rate ¹		0.085	0.097	0.098	0.105	0.109	0.103	0.095	0.086	0.075
Foreign-born unemployment rate ¹	M	0.126	0.137	0.134	0.149	0.153	0.141	0.129	0.119	0.109
	F	0.114	0.130	0.142	0.147	0.160	0.146	0.140	0.136	0.122
Emigration rate ²	M	N/A	2.536	1.139	0.809	0.788	0.688	0.557	0.605	0.828
	F	N/A	0.364	0.139	0.124	0.130	0.108	0.112	0.132	0.210

¹Unemployment per labor force ages 15+ (Eurostat, 2018d).

²Permits for work reasons per 1,000 of population ages 15-64 (Eurostat, 2018a; UN DESA, 2017b).

As **Figure 6.6** illustrates (only for female emigration rates), there is a negative correlation between unemployment in receiving countries and labor migration for both sexes, which only partially supports H_5 on the responsiveness of male and female migrants to business cycles. Foreign-born unemployment rates do not add any explicative value.

The pattern described above applies to total and labor migration (not to education and family migration) in most receiving countries. One of the exceptions is the historically most important destination for Tunisian emigrants: France. Labor migration to France has been on an upward trend since 2012 despite persistently high unemployment, whereas numbers in Italy declined over the entire observation period. Given France and Italy's respective migration histories and the strong role of migratory networks in the case of family migration (compared to migration for work reasons), it seems likely that migratory flows redirected themselves from Italy to France during the last years.

Figure 6.6. Unemployment in receiving countries and Tunisian emigration rates (estimates)




Figure 6.4 based on Eurostat (2018a, 2018d) & UN DESA (2017b).

6.7 Selective migration policies in sending and receiving countries

European migration policies during the period 2010-2017 were shaped by the economic situation in receiving countries, as well as the human movements (including refugees) set in motion by the Arab uprisings. In 2011, the EU approached Tunisia for negotiations about a privileged partnership (Boubakri, 2013). In 2014, a mobility partnership agreement was signed by the EU and ten of its member states (Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Spain, France, Italy, Poland, Portugal, Sweden and the United Kingdom): a framework agreement that foresees cooperation in the area of border control in exchange for simplified visa procedures for highly-skilled and temporary migrants (De Bel-Air, 2016; Natter, 2015).

In parallel, members states sought to reach new agreements with the post-revolutionary authorities on the bilateral level. After Frontex had started to assist Italian border control through its operation Hermes in February, an “accelerated repatriation agreement” was signed between Italy and Tunisia as early as April 2011. While the text remains confidential, media sources reported that the agreement offered financial and technical assistance, as well as the exceptional regularization of Tunisians having arrived irregularly that year, in exchange for the resumption of departure controls and readmission of returned migrants (Carrera, et al., 2012). In 2012, Switzerland and Tunisia signed a Memorandum of Understanding aimed at ensuring cooperation in the area of irregular migration and readmission of Tunisian nationals (Awad & Hedayat, 2015).

2010 was one of the few years during which migration policy in the countries covered by the DEMIG policy database (2015b) became more restrictive overall (De Haas, et al., 2016). Italy already began in 2009 to reduce quota allocations for foreign workers and restrict access to family reunification. In France, a major step occurred in 2011, when the list of shortage occupations open for foreign workers was temporarily reduced to 14 (see Appendix, **Table A9**).

Figure 6.7.1. Direction of policy changes and emigration rates (estimates) to Italy by gender and reason




Figure 6.5.1 based on DEMIG (2015b) and author's coding of policy changes, see Appendix, **Table A9**. Red circles indicate a change in labor migration policy with a specific effect on female migrants. Size of emigration rates not to scale.

Figure 6.7.2. Direction of policy changes and male emigration rates (estimates) to France by gender and reason




Figure 6.7.2 based on DEMIG (2015b) and author's coding of policy changes, see Appendix, **Table A9**. Red circles indicate a change in labor migration policy with a specific effect on male migrants. Size of emigration rates not to scale.

Figure 6.7.1 and **Figure 6.7.2** show how predominantly restrictive (coded as -1) or liberal (coded as +1) changes of migration policy in Italy and France related to migratory flows from Tunisia between 2010 and 2017. A key development is the growing restrictiveness of labor migration policy in Italy, which led to an effective reduction of migratory flows. Meanwhile, a liberalization of access conditions for highly-skilled migrants took place in France, followed by an increase of immigration for work and education reasons. This lends weight to the assumption of a displacement effect from Italy to France. Policy changes may also explain an upsurge (or slower decline) of Tunisian migration in 2013, despite a slightly improved macroeconomic situation in Tunisia and a deterioration in many European countries: Regularizations became effective in Italy and France that year, both of them benefitting specifically female migrants. Finally, it appears as though in both countries Tunisian students and asylum-seekers (and other persons belonging to the “other” category) are sensitive to policy changes, whereas family migration is more resilient.

In Tunisia, the revolution’s demands for political participation, as well as prevailing socio-economic conditions, made a liberal change in migration policy more likely after 2010 (Awad & Hedayat, 2015). At the political level, migrants’ rights have gained importance due to the efforts of civil society organizations, who demand, among other things, that the fate of missing migrants be investigated by the government (Poussel, 2014). There have been reforms of the institutional infrastructure for the promotion of labor migration, and new programs have been set up to better support potential emigrants and return migrants (Martín, et al., 2015). Another policy change that symbolizes a positive approach towards emigration was the extension of active (in presidential elections and referenda) and passive voting rights (in legislative elections) to Tunisians abroad (Poussel, 2014).

Nervertheless, from a purely legal perspective, neither a liberal nor a restrictive trend in Tunisia’s emigration policy can be confirmed within the scope of this research. Although the Constitution of 27 January 2014 guarantees every citizen their right to leave (Art. 24) and to return to the country (Art. 25), contradictory legal provisions that treat irregular migration as a criminal offense and restrict migrants’ rights remain in place (Ben Jemia & Ben Achour, 2014). Migration policy continues to be insensitive to gender (ibid.).

6.8 Multivariate analyses of Tunisian migratory flows

Table 6.8 presents the results of multivariate analyses of male and female migration rates for education and work reasons. However, the direction of coefficients remains essentially unchanged across all visa categories (see Appendix, **Table A10**). All models explain at least 40 percent of variation in the dependent variable.

Significant effects are found for migrant stocks and unemployment rates in receiving countries, confirming the results from the bivariate analyses. For example, an increase of unemployment rates in Europe by 1 percent would produce a drop of female migration rates for work reasons by almost 20 percent (compared to only 13.7 percent in the case of males).

In addition, coefficients are positive and significant for foreign-born unemployment rates in receiving countries: Since total and foreign-born unemployment rates are related, this may be a false positive caused by collinearity. However, given that the coefficient stays positive (and, in the case of female education migrants, significant) for all visa categories in bivariate models, it may also indicate that migrants move towards countries with higher foreign-born unemployment rates. This alternative interpretation could be understood in the context of segmented labor markets, with a secondary labor market characterized by precarious employment and a demand for flexible migrant labor. However, for both total and foreign-born unemployment rates, it should be borne in mind that changes in unemployment rates may respond only slowly to changes in labor supply, to an extent that is not fully accounted for by the one-year lag in the dependent variable.

Table 6.8. OLS regression analysis: results

Variables	ln(migration rate, education)		ln(migration rate, work)	
	F	M	F	M
SENDING COUNTRY				
Tertiary education enrollment rate by gender	-113	-3.641	-78.51	-75.3
Labor force participation rate by gender	-2.146	1.194	-1.273	0.581
Unemployment rate by gender	0.224	-0.777	0.067	-0.829
Employment rate in manufacturing	90.65	36.21	30.23	106.1
Employment rate in agriculture	277.5	-27.28	173.5	130
GDP per capita, PPP	0.000	-0.004	-0.001	-0.008
Democracy (Freedom House)	-0.349	-0.342	-0.268	-0.639
RECEIVING COUNTRIES				
Total unemployment rate	-0.188***	-0.106*	-0.191***	-0.137**
Foreign-born unemployment rate by gender	0.220***	0.125***	0.180***	0.142***
GDP per capita, PPP	0.000	0.000	0.000	2.42e-05***
Tunisian migrant stocks by gender	3.54e-05***	2.62e-05***	2.96e-05***	2.62e-05***
Constant	57.31	-35.6	50.09	48.18
Observations	165	160	165	160
R ²	0.63	0.511	0.591	0.495
Adjusted R ²	0.603	0.474	0.562	0.457

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

The effects of variables relating to conditions in the sending country are, without exception, not significant. The reason may be that conditions in destination countries are, in fact, more important for explaining migratory flows. However, it is also possible that variation for those variables where it is limited to the years 2010-2017 is simply insufficient to produce conclusive results. Some variables, like the sector-specific

employment rates, may well be irrelevant. For others, in particular tertiary education enrollment rates and labor market participation rates, estimates are remarkably stable across different visa categories, or when adding (or removing) other variables to the mix: The sign of the coefficient of tertiary education enrollment rates is consistent with the the results of the bivariate analysis. Although to be treated extremely cautiously, it is quite interesting that for both labor market participation and unemployment rates, the signs are inverse for male and female migration rates, which would indicate that labor market access is a strong driver of female – but not male – emigration.

7. DISCUSSION

The analysis of the Tunisian case provides support for short-term economic theories of migration: After the exceptional situation of 2011, during which many male migrants left the country (while others, male and female, returned), Tunisian emigration rates developed as expected with regard to (un)employment rates in both Tunisia and Europe. Female emigration for work reasons picked up earlier, which is in line with the gender-specific impact of the economic crisis in Tunisia, as well as employment in feminized sectors in Europe. The results of the multivariate analyses confirm that male and female migrants both respond to unemployment rates in destination countries. However, as the two cases of France and Italy illustrate, migration policies have the potential to counteract macroeconomic trends. Interestingly, education migration is also strongly driven by economic factors, especially for women, as confirmed by the multivariate analysis. This suggests that students quite often intend to work abroad, or alternatively that, faced with restrictive labor migration policies, migrants choose to enter their destination country as students. As predicted by theories of migrant networks and transnational links, migratory flows closely follow the distribution of migrants across destination countries, with stronger effects found for female migrants.

Short-term indicators measuring the impact of social transformation processes (globalization theory and segmented labor markets) did not deliver convincing results. At the same time, the analysis did confirm the premises of both theories: In Tunisia, women (and men, though to a lesser extent) are moving out of agriculture, and employment in the most feminized sector, manufacturing, is highly volatile. In destination countries, labor markets are segmented by origin, as well as gender. During the economic crisis, sectors with disproportionate shares of female migrant worker saw the largest employment gains, whereas sectors with an overrepresentation of male migrant workers faced the largest losses. The automation of production puts additional pressure on migrant workers without the necessary skills to move from middle-income manufacturing jobs to low-income jobs in the service sector (OECD, 2017).

8. CONCLUSIONS

This paper has shown that the feminization of Tunisian migration towards Europe over the period 2010-2017 is neither a coincidence nor an isolated phenomenon but does, in fact, represent the continuation of a long-term trend. Economic cycles explain an important share of short-term fluctuations in migratory flows by gender. At the same time, migration occurs in the context of structural and technological change in both sending and receiving countries. During the last years, European immigration countries have made their migration policies more selective, thereby benefitting in particular foreign students and highly-skilled workers. In Tunisia, despite their educational achievements, a rising age at marriage and relatively low fertility rates, women face significant disadvantages on the labor market, and labor market participation is currently declining from an already low level. It can thus be concluded that the necessary as well as the sufficient conditions for further growth in female emigration in the medium and long term are present.

The approach taken by this paper was to propose a range of alternative explanations, and to rule out those without empirical support. The focus on one case and the lack of long-term data (prior to 2010) meant that regression analysis could only partially confirm the tentative conclusions drawn from the preceding sub-sections. Due to the choice of research design there can be no generalizations beyond the case under study. Socio-economic similarities between Tunisia and other South Mediterranean countries suggest that a cross-sectional design may be appropriate for further studies. However, the most promising direction for further research at this point appears to be the question of how the political-legal context in both sending and receiving countries (including questions of gender equality that could not be treated in this paper) shape migration outcomes. A major shortcoming of this paper is that the effect of any changes that took place at the level of politics and society after Tunisia's 2011 revolution could not be tested.

What the paper has shown, is that female migrants do not necessarily behave all too differently from male migrants. Quite often, however, dependent and independent variables vary considerably by gender, and those differences must be taken into account for gender-specific outcomes to be understood.

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APPENDIX

Table A1. Stocks of migrants originating in Tunisia by region and country of residence (1990-2017)

GEO / TIME	1990	1995	2000	2005	2010	2015	2017
World	453,933	467,644	480,276	572,919	599,051	752,714	767,155
female (in %)	39.67	40.97	42.11	43.16	41.51	43.22	43.12
Europe	397,891	409,117	420,537	515,068	539,124	581,556	591,664
female (in %)	38.19	39.65	41.03	42.61	41.10	41.56	41.44
Northern America	276,216	285,233	294,250	362,087	359,248	395,285	394,506
female (in %)	41.94	42.64	43.29	45.76	44.14	44.52	44.63
Asia	70,813	73,188	75,563	91,608	107,653	107,671	109,565
female (in %)	25.98	31.92	37.49	37.13	36.88	37.54	37.45
Africa	6,539	9,167	11,908	15,695	19,496	127,397	131,702
female (in %)	46.93	47.16	47.28	45.35	42.60	49.62	49.61
Oceania	44,331	43,779	41,541	35,443	32,971	34,448	34,390
female (in %)	50.84	51.19	50.86	50.02	47.08	47.23	46.80
Latin America and the Caribbean	4,073	4,345	4,943	5,348	5,904	7,609	7,638
female (in %)	49.79	49.02	47.99	43.96	44.09	45.56	45.52

Tunisian migrant stocks (UN DESA, 2017a).

Table A2. Tunisian population by age group and gender (thousands)

AGE / TIME		2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
0-14	M	1,269	1,270	1,280	1,297	1,320	1,344	1,366	1,394	1416
	F	1,211	1,213	1,222	1,239	1,261	1,283	1,305	1,332	1353
15-19	M	497	484	469	455	442	432	424	416	410
	F	475	460	447	435	423	412	403	395	389
20-29	M	1,008	1,015	1,015	1,009	997	982	964	950	936
	F	1,023	1,028	1,025	1,018	1,004	989	971	950	928
30-39	M	752	766	786	808	832	854	875	895	915
	F	805	821	843	867	892	915	937	955	973
40-49	M	687	695	700	704	705	708	714	717	722
	F	708	722	733	741	747	752	759	765	773
50-59	M	506	530	551	569	585	600	617	629	640
	F	509	532	552	570	587	604	622	639	658
60+	M	505	515	529	547	567	588	610	634	658
	F	570	588	607	629	652	679	705	732	760
15-64	M	3,585	3,636	3,680	3,719	3,754	3,787	3,818	3,840	3866
	F	3,672	3,725	3,775	3,819	3,858	3,894	3,927	3,950	3974
Total	M	5,222	5,276	5,332	5,389	5,448	5,509	5,570	5,633	5697
	F	5,300	5,364	5,430	5,497	5,566	5,635	5,703	5,770	5835

Tunisian population in 1,000 (UN DESA, 2017b).

Table A3. Tunisian emigration counts (estimates) by gender and reason

REASON / TIME		2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
All reasons	M	19,366	25,601	12,963	13,238	12,727	12,129	12,393	13,037
	F	9,839	8,625	8,214	8,438	8,577	8,762	9,208	9,859
Family reasons	M	7,794	7,450	7,193	7,208	6,818	6,918	7,022	6,559
	F	6,788	6,235	5,940	5,835	5,762	5,763	5,856	5,864
Education reasons	M	1,735	1,749	1,696	2,108	2,372	2,461	2,368	2,586
	F	1,321	1,341	1,387	1,706	1,953	2,187	2,514	2,694
Work reasons	M	9,093	4,141	2,978	29,32	2,581	2,108	2,310	3,181
	F	1,336	518	468	498	415	436	519	829
Other reasons	M	744	12,263	1,096	990	976	684	859	711
	F	394	531	419	399	447	386	470	472

Permits issued by 27 European countries (Eurostat, 2018a).

Table A4. Tunisian emigration rates (estimates) by gender and reason

REASON / TIME		2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
All reasons ¹	M	3.709	4.852	2.431	2.456	2.336	2.202	2.225	2.314
	F	1.856	1.608	1.513	1.535	1.541	1.555	1.615	1.709
Family reasons ¹	M	1.493	1.427	1.377	1.380	1.306	1.325	1.345	1.256
	F	1.281	1.162	1.094	1.061	1.035	1.023	1.027	1.016
Education reasons ²	M	1.721	1.723	1.671	2.089	2.379	2.506	2.456	2.722
	F	1.291	1.304	1.353	1.676	1.945	2.211	2.589	2.836
Work reasons ³	M	2.536	1.139	0.809	0.788	0.688	0.557	0.605	0.828
	F	0.364	0.139	0.124	0.130	0.108	0.112	0.132	0.210
Other reasons ¹	M	0.142	2.324	0.205	0.184	0.179	0.124	0.154	0.126
	F	0.074	0.099	0.077	0.073	0.080	0.068	0.082	0.082

¹Emigration per 1,000 of population, all ages (Eurostat; 2018a; UN DESA, 2017b).

²Emigration per 1,000 of population ages 20-29 (Eurostat; 2018a; UN DESA, 2017b).

³Emigration per 1,000 of population ages 15-64 (Eurostat; 2018a; UN DESA, 2017b).

Table A5. Stocks of male population born in Tunisia by country of residence

GEO / TIME	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
Belgium	7,399	7,761	8,195	8,548	8,777	8,937	9,205	9,398
Bulgaria	31	58	56	65	77	85	84	98
Czech Republic	507	562	603	642	681	726	745	853
Denmark	575	584	572	576	582	590	619	641
Estonia	6	9	N/A	7	8	13	14	20
Ireland	187	200	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	226	N/A
Greece	527	339	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	480
Spain	2,641	1,803	1,828	1,853	1,888	1,937	2,013	1,855
France	374,650	206,222	209,230	212,741	216,202	219,317	N/A	218,448
Croatia	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Italy	72,153	71,667	71,049	70,814	66,447	63,605	65,220	65,876
Cyprus	24	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	24	N/A	24
Latvia	N/A	N/A	1	1	1	2	3	5
Lithuania	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	8	7	4	3
Luxembourg	493	340	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	592
Hungary	160	N/A	147	177	187	229	278	311
Netherlands	2,799	2,783	2,790	2,841	2,868	2,875	2,914	2,965
Austria	3,156	2,232	2,334	2,387	2,437	2,527	2,635	2,731
Poland	373	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	377
Portugal	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	107	N/A	109
Romania	4	N/A	7	711	726	737	945	1,116
Slovenia	30	37	42	45	41	45	54	58
Sweden	2,552	2,670	2,803	2,975	3,089	3,152	3,236	3,321
Iceland	12	13	15	16	18	20	22	24
Liechtenstein	13	13	13	13	13	15	15	14
Norway	596	598	629	661	676	689	699	703
Switzerland	9,849	6,492	6,677	6,889	7,062	7,254	7,476	7,650

Tunisian-born population in 27 European countries (Eurostat, 2018b).

Table A6. Stocks of female population born in Tunisia by country of residence

GEO / TIME	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
Belgium	4,061	4,299	4,518	4,715	4,876	5,059	5,250	5,452
Bulgaria	10	21	23	25	27	25	30	34
Czech Republic	43	44	46	47	46	50	55	72
Denmark	270	280	284	287	294	297	304	310
Estonia	1	1	-	1	2	2	2	2
Ireland	75	79	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	90	N/A
Greece	188	188	476	436	N/A	N/A	N/A	144
Spain	833	829	852	872	896	967	1,035	904
France	169,636	171,074	172,013	174,859	177,735	175,968	N/A	176,058
Croatia	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Italy	40,471	40,313	40,030	39,892	39,428	38,112	39,176	39,609
Cyprus	14	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	14	N/A	13
Latvia	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Lithuania	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	2	5	4	4
Luxembourg	153	153	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	278
Hungary	29	N/A	29	34	44	62	87	107
Netherlands	1,523	1,545	1,556	1,584	1,599	1,617	1,641	1,699
Austria	958	1,002	1,030	1,072	1,104	1,158	1,229	1,288
Poland	52	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	51
Portugal	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	30	N/A	30
Romania	4	N/A	10	323	325	325	416	511
Slovenia	7	7	6	6	7	8	11	11
Sweden	1,322	1,395	1,455	1,537	1,602	1,682	1,760	1,852
Iceland	4	6	7	6	7	8	8	9
Liechtenstein	5	5	7	7	9	9	9	9
Norway	260	254	276	298	309	325	340	352
Switzerland	3,357	3,357	3,477	3,621	3,770	3,906	4,099	4,309

Tunisian-born population in 27 European countries (Eurostat, 2018b).

Table A7. Male employment in Tunisia by sector (thousands) (2000-2017)

Year	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
Agriculture, forestry and fishing	465	458	451	456	456	449	453	441	423	434	424	406	435	405	400	359	372	375
Mining and quarrying	26	27	27	26	27	29	30	32	34	32	30	29	34	38	38	45	47	47
Manufacturing	300	309	305	299	301	299	304	316	348	334	354	344	350	364	375	366	336	339
Utilities	318	327	333	346	360	372	385	398	408	415	443	444	435	386	324	394	412	418
Construction	238	246	247	255	266	271	282	294	310	325	331	329	325	370	380	381	352	353
Wholesale and retail trade / Repair	115	118	120	124	128	132	136	139	159	163	167	155	167	236	367	329	342	345
Transport / Communication	84	87	89	93	96	99	102	105	122	123	123	109	113	135	155	139	145	146
Accommodation and food services	57	60	61	65	69	72	75	80	59	56	59	57	52	104	105	95	100	100
Finance and insurance	72	75	78	81	82	83	85	85	94	98	99	99	106	35	21	19	19	20
Real estate, business and administration	40	43	46	50	54	56	60	63	46	48	51	48	45	90	92	84	88	88
Public administration and defense	197	199	200	204	211	215	219	225	226	227	239	233	251	214	181	224	234	235
Education / Human health and social Work	120	122	125	127	129	130	131	132	130	130	130	130	130	128	109	135	140	142
Other services	31	31	32	32	33	33	33	34	33	33	33	33	33	32	27	32	24	35
Total	2046	2100	2113	2157	2212	2240	2296	2345	2397	2419	2487	2419	2477	2537	2574	2602	2622	2642

Sectoral employment in 1,000 (ILO, 2018d).

Table A8. Female employment in Tunisia by sector (thousands) (2000-2017)

Year	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
Agriculture, forestry and fishing	167	167	168	173	168	178	177	175	156	156	162	112	124	113	109	96	100	101
Mining and quarrying	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	4	4	4	4	3	3	4	3	4	4	4
Manufacturing	224	232	234	231	223	236	244	257	278	242	255	243	259	271	274	268	241	245
Utilities	4	4	4	4	4	5	5	6	6	6	6	5	5	4	3	4	4	4
Construction	44	47	49	51	51	56	60	63	67	62	63	65	67	76	77	78	72	73
Wholesale and retail trade / Repair	16	16	17	18	18	19	21	21	27	28	30	22	29	44	81	70	73	74
Transport / Communication	18	19	20	21	21	23	25	27	34	35	31	24	31	37	44	40	41	42
Accommodation and food services	10	10	10	11	11	12	14	15	12	11	10	10	9	19	20	18	18	19
Finance and insurance	18	18	19	20	20	22	23	24	28	31	34	36	37	12	8	7	7	7
Real estate, business and administration	25	27	29	32	33	37	40	43	32	32	31	30	27	60	64	57	60	60
Public administration and defense	54	55	58	61	62	69	73	78	84	79	75	76	85	77	67	80	83	83
Education / Human health and social work	69	72	75	80	81	89	95	101	97	97	97	97	97	92	79	97	100	101
Other services	18	19	20	21	2	23	24	26	25	25	25	25	25	23	19	23	23	24
Total	699	689	707	726	717	773	805	838	851	810	823	747	799	831	850	841	828	836

Sectoral employment in 1,000 (ILO, 2018d).

Table A9. Policy changes related to entry and stay of Tunisian citizens in France and Italy

Year ¹	Measure	Direction ²
EU		
	Introduction of border controls along the Balkan route resulting in its “closure” in March 2016.	-1
2016	EU-Turkey statement of 28 March 2016: control of departures by Turkish authorities.	-1
	EU (Operation Sophia) and NATO (Operation Sea Guardian) military maneuvers in the Mediterranean Sea to deter smugglers and irregular migrants.	-1
France		
2007	Circular of 4 July 2007: tightening of procedures for employers hiring foreign workers.	-1
	Law 1631 of 20 November 2007: relaxation of procedures for issuing “employee on mission” and “competencies and talents” residence cards.	+1
	Law 1631 of 20 November 2007 and decree of 18 January 2008: exemption of 30 highly- and medium-skilled professions from labor market tests for work visas procedures. The main areas of employment mentioned are IT (2), building and public works (4), electricity and electronics (4) and mechanical construction and metalwork (4). Only a few service sector professions are mentioned (accounting and controlling, insurance, call centers).	+1
2008	Law 1631 of 20 November 2007: case-by-case regularization of workers of occupations experiencing labor shortages.	+1
	Law 1631 of 20 November 2007: possibility of appeal against the decision to deny entry for asylum seekers.	+1
	Bilateral agreement of 28 April 2008: visa facilitation and quotas reserved for Tunisian students and workers (of which 2,500 for seasonal workers, 1,500 under the “Skills and Talents Card”, 3,500 under the list of shortage occupations and 1,500 for young professionals).	+1
	Law 1631 of 20 November 2007: introduction of language tests and raise of resource requirements for family reunification applicants.	-1
	Bilateral agreement of 28 April 2008: control of departures by Tunisian authorities.	-1
2009	Decree of 24 April 2009: “Visa de long séjour valant titre de séjour” granting temporary or permanent entries to family members of French nationals and migrants, students, trainees, workers and visitors, under certain circumstances.	+1
2010	Decision of 15 September 2009: 10-year residence permit for investors.	+1
	Law 672 of 16 June 2011: transposition of European Blue Card Directive into French law.	+1
2011	Law 672 of 16 June 2011: restrictions for foreigners with higher educational qualifications applying for the change of a student to a work visa.	-1
	Law 672 of 16 June 2011: reduction of list of shortage occupations open for foreign workers to 14, removing in particular those related to construction and IT, while leaving two service sector professions (namely, accounting and controlling, call centers).	-1
2012	Circulars of 31 May 2011 and of 12 January 2012: case-by-case basis consideration of applications for change of visa status by foreign students.	+1
	Law 672 of 16 June 2011: penalization of false relationships for visa purposes, including by refusing (new) residence permits to applicants.	-1
	Decision of the Conseil d’Etat of 26 December 2012: increase of list of shortage occupations open for foreign workers to 30.	+1
	Circular of 28 November 2012: conditional regularization, with a special focus on long-term workers, minors and their families, as well as victims of domestic violence.	+1
2013	Circular 25 June 2013: simplification of procedure for permit renewals, and liberalization of visa procedures for residents aged 60 and older.	+1
	Law 1560 of 31 December 2012: tightening of asylum rules regarding identity controls and identity fraud by asylum applicants.	-1
	Police operations against irregular migration networks.	-1
2014	Law 660 of 22 July 2013: simplification of visa procedures for students.	+1
2015	Decree 921 of 18 August 2014: simplification of visa procedures for researchers and other highly-qualified staff, as well as their dependents.	+1
	Law 274 of 7 March 2016: simplification and liberalization of visa procedures for students, researchers and other highly-qualified staff (under the “talent passport”), as well as their dependents. Exemption from labor market tests.	+1
2016	Introduction of border controls at the French border in November 2015.	-1
Italy		
2007	Quota decree of 9 January 2007: 80,000 for seasonal workers of certain nationalities (including Tunisians).	+1
	Quota decree of 8 November 2007: 80,000 for seasonal workers of certain nationalities (including Tunisians).	0
2008	Quota decree of 30 October 2007: 170,000 for non-seasonal workers (of which 65,000 are reserved for domestic and care workers, other categories being construction, transport and fishery).	+1

2009	Quota decree of 30 March 2009: 80,000 for seasonal workers of certain nationalities (including Tunisians).	0
	Law 125 of 24 July 2008: introduction of tougher sanctions against employers of irregular migrants.	-1
	Legislative Decree 160 of 3 October 2008: new restrictions and higher income requirements for family reunification.	-1
	Quota decree of 3 December 2008: 150,000 for non-seasonal workers (sub-quotas for certain nationalities, including Tunisians, and 105,400 for domestic and care workers).	-1
	Bilateral agreement with Libya of 3 August 2008: control of departures by Libyan authorities.	-1
2010	Quota decree of 1 April 2010: 80,000 for seasonal workers of certain nationalities (including Tunisians).	0
	Law 94 of 15 July 2009: possibility of exemption from labor market tests for employers of highly-skilled workers.	+1
	Legislative Decree 79 of 1 July 2009: regularization of domestic and care workers employed since April 2009. 295,000 applications were filed.	+1
	Law 94 of 15 July 2009: introduction of new income, housing and sanitary requirements for family reunification.	-1
	Quota decree of 29 July 2009: 10,000 for apprenticeships and professional training.	-1
2011	Ministerial decree of 5 April 2011: 6-month residence permits for humanitarian reasons for Tunisian migrants having arrived since the beginning of the year.	+1
	Quota decree of 30 November 2010: 98,080 for non-seasonal workers (sub-quotas for certain nationalities, including Tunisians, and occupations, including 30,000 for domestic and care workers).	+1
	Quota decree of 17 February 2011: 60,000 for seasonal workers of certain nationalities (including Tunisians, only for agriculture and tourism).	-1
	Bilateral agreement with Tunisia of 5 April 2011: control of departures by Tunisian authorities.	-1
	Bilateral agreement with Libya of 17 June 2011: control of departures by Libyan authorities.	-1
	Ministerial decree of 4 June 2010: introduction on obligatory language tests to acquire a long-term residence permit.	-1
	Law 35 of 4 April 2012: simplification of the seasonal work permit procedure for employers through a "tacit approval procedure".	+1
2012	Law 108 of 28 June 2012: transposition of the EU Blue Card directive into Italian law.	+1
	Law 201 of 6 December 2011: unemployed work-permit holders awaiting extension may now seek new jobs for one year instead of 6 months.	+1
	Quota decree of 13 March 2012: 35,000 for seasonal workers of certain nationalities (including Tunisians).	-1
	No quota for non-seasonal workers effective in 2012.	-1
	Legislative decree 109 of 16 July 2012: conditional regularization of undocumented workers. 86% out of 134,600 applications for domestic work.	+1
2013	Quota decree of 19 December 2012: 17,850 for non-seasonal workers (sub-quotas for entrepreneurs, managers freelancers of certain sectors, artists, workers for special projects, certain nationalities, including Tunisians, status changes: including former apprentices or students). New entry conditions for highly-skilled workers, researchers, students and for those working at the 2015 Universal Exposition take effect.	+1
	Legislative decree 108 of 16 July 2012: transposition of EU Directive introducing tougher sanctions against employers of irregular migrants into Italian law.	-1
	Quota decree of 12 July 2012: 13,850 for non-seasonal workers (sub-quotas for entrepreneurs, managers freelancers of certain sectors, artists, workers for special projects, certain nationalities, including Tunisians, status changes: including former apprentices or students).	-1
	Quota decree of 15 February 2013: 30,000 for seasonal workers of certain nationalities (including Tunisians, only for agriculture and tourism).	-1
	Quota decree of 25 November 2013: 17,850 for non-seasonal workers (sub-quotas for entrepreneurs, start-up investors, managers freelancers of certain sectors, artists, workers for special projects, certain nationalities, including Tunisians, status changes: including former apprentices or students).	0
2014	Law 119 of 15 October 2013: possibility of residence and work permits for victims of domestic violence.	+1
	Mare Nostrum rescue operations in the Mediterranean, starting in October 2013 and replaced by the EU-led mission Triton in November 2014.	+1
	Law 97 of 6 August 2013: opening of public sector jobs for some groups of foreign nationals.	+1
	Quota decree of 25 November 2013: creation of a "start-up visa" a specific category of innovative start-up founders in the quota decree, with the program becoming fully operational after publication online in June 2014.	+1
	Law 40 of 4 March 2014: transposition of EU Directive on single permits into Italian legislation.	+1
	Quota decree of 10 April 2014: 15,000 for seasonal workers of certain nationalities (including Tunisians, only for agriculture, tourism and Expo workers).	-1
2015	Quota decree of 29 December 2014: 17,850 for non-seasonal workers (sub-quotas for entrepreneurs, start-up investors, managers, freelancers of certain sectors, artists, workers for special projects, certain nationalities, including Tunisians, status changes: including former apprentices or students).	0
	Circular of 5 May 2015: simplification of Blue Card procedure.	+1
	Quota decree of 2 April 2015: 13,000 for seasonal workers of certain nationalities (including Tunisians, only for agriculture and tourism).	-1

2016	Quota decree of 2 February 2016: 17,850 for non-seasonal workers (sub-quotas for entrepreneurs, start-up investors, managers freelancers of certain sectors, artists, workers for special projects, certain nationalities, including Tunisians, status changes: including former apprentices or students).	0
	Quota decree of 2 February 2016: 13,000 for seasonal workers of certain nationalities (including Tunisians, only for agriculture and tourism).	0
	Law 76 of 20 May 2016: recognition of same-sex unions with effects on family reunification.	+1

¹Refers to year during which the measure is expected to take effect. Executive measures are assumed to be immediately effective, while a six-month time lag is assumed for legislative measures, unless otherwise specified by the relevant documentation.

²Policies that facilitate or liberalize access to permits as compared to the previous year are coded as +1, while restrictive policies are coded as -1. DEMIG POLICY (2015b) and author's coding of migration policy changes related to entry and stay covered by the OECD International Migration Outlook series (2010-2016), the EMN National Policy Report series for France and Italy (2010-2016), as well as data from the websites of the French and Italian Interior Ministries and the respective online legislation registries of France and Italy.

Table A10. OLS regression analysis: results

Variables	Ln(migration rate, all)		Ln(migration rate, family)	
	F	M	F	M
SENDING COUNTRY				
Tertiary education enrollment rate by gender	-229.2	-49.25	-245.9	-34.95
Labor force participation rate by gender	-4.289	0.942	-4.707	1.358
Unemployment rate by gender	0.474	-0.951	0.576	-1.117
Employment rate in manufacturing	168.3	65.74	198.6	57
Employment rate in agriculture	575.9	84.22	637.2	61.8
GDP per capita, PPP	-0.001	-0.008	-0.000458	-0.00849
Democracy (Freedom House)	-0.496	-0.669	-0.465	-0.739
RECEIVING COUNTRIES				
Unemployment rate	-0.371***	-0.196**	-0.399***	-0.238***
Foreign-born unemployment rate by gender	0.359***	0.156***	0.356***	0.177***
GDP per capita, PPP	2.30e-05**	0.000	1.67e-05*	1.42e-05
Diaspora by gender	3.55e-05***	2.66e-05***	3.64e-05***	2.58e-05***
Constant	130.1	24.23	135.4	3.144
Observations	165	160	165	160
R ²	0.558	0.402	0.542	0.43
Adjusted R ²	0.526	0.359	0.509	0.388

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1