



STUDENT PAPER SERIES

43



Yes We Fear: An issue saliency analysis of the impact of terrorist attacks on electoral campaigning rhetoric in Europe

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Master's in International Security

Academic year 2017-2018



INSTITUT
BARCELONA
ESTUDIS
INTERNACIONALS

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ABSTRACT

Since 2014, the European continent has suffered a great number of terrorist attacks carried out by ISIL, jihadist movements and Islamic lone wolves. The rise of Islamic terrorism has affected various levels of society, instilling fear and incentivizing political parties to act on the matter. While traditional literature on terrorism and party competition focuses on the frame and discourse around the politics of fear, this study contributes with a different perspective on the debate. In this work, the impact of terrorist activities on electoral campaigning rhetoric is assessed through Budge and Farlie's issue saliency theory, which extrapolates party stances from the varying emphases given to different issues. The research introduces the comparison of three sets of pre- and post-attack case studies: France pre and post 2015 November attacks, Germany pre and post 2016 Berlin attack, and United Kingdom pre and post 2017 Westminster attack. Drawing on saliency theory, the analysis of party manifestos from the selected countries uses as baseline the coding system developed by the Comparative Manifesto Project and adds specific codes to draw attention on statements on terrorism. The comparison is based on the study of variations in saliency of terrorism and security issues, measuring party responsiveness to the terrorist threat. The findings reveal that parties react to terrorist attacks by increasing terrorism saliency but right- and left-wing parties differ in their way of setting the agenda around the issue. Right-wing parties resulted more responsive to terrorist activities and prime the issue in their campaigning rhetoric to gain electoral advantage.

KEYWORDS: terrorism, terrorist attack, politics of fear, elections, campaigning rhetoric, party manifesto, issue saliency, agenda-setting, party responsiveness

1. INTRODUCTION

The tragic events of 9/11 have had an immediate and dramatic impact on the levels of public concern about terrorism both in the United States and around the world. The attacks stripped away illusions about the immunity and impenetrability of the country and the fear of terrorism resonated into political campaigns for the 2004 presidential election (Oates, Kaid, and Berry 2010). In fact, as argued by Oates, Kaid and Berry, the aftermath of terrorist attacks affects all levels of the electoral process, from party manifestos, to media coverage, to how much voters are influenced by concerns about terrorism (2010). In the wake of 9/11, the so-called “politics of fear”¹ dominated not only the political agenda of the United States, but elevated security policy to a much bigger scale, establishing security - and counter-terrorism in particular - as dominant arena for the competition between parties (Oates, Kaid, and Berry 2010: 15).

On the other side of the Atlantic, the 2004 Madrid attacks and the 2005 London bombings contributed to the enhanced effects of terrorism on European politics (Oates, Kaid, and Berry 2010), but when the global economic crisis exploded in 2008, economic policy superseded the security debate. Quite abruptly, the tragic return of Islamic terrorism in Europe, with more than 20 attacks carried out since 2014, reignited security concerns for both parties and citizens (Europol, 2018). As first strike to European security, the January and November 2015 Paris attacks resonated across the continent, awakening political participation and establishing a security alert that is still ongoing throughout Europe (Vasilopoulos 2018). The political response was comparable to the 9/11 aftermath, with president Hollande declaring “France is at war” (CNN n.d.). Ever since, and fuelled by a spike in deaths from terrorism, national security has been at the centre of the European political agenda and debate. In 2017, ISIS and terrorism were still leading the Pew Research Center survey on major global threats (Poushter and Manevich 2017).

This paper aims at unravelling the impact of Islamic terrorism on agenda-setting in European politics through the study of parties’ programmes. To solve this puzzle, three cases will be introduced: France pre and post 2015 November attacks, Germany pre and post 2016 Berlin attack, and the United Kingdom pre and post 2017 Westminster attack. Parties’ response and changes in agenda-setting will be assessed through a salience approach to content analysis of party manifestos, comparing the saliency before and after a terrorist attack occurred in national territory. In other words, the impact will be measured based on the quantity of attention devoted to the issues of national security and terrorism in party manifestos, using as guideline the assumptions and framework of saliency theory. The analysis will include the

¹ “Politics of fear” is a concept particularly analysed by Al Gore and Kenneth Prewitt in the 71th volume of the *Journal Social Research* in 2004. The authors agreed on the definition of this phenomenon as a distortion of politics, where leaders use fear to achieve political goals through emotional bias (Gore 2004, Prewitt et al 2004)

comparison of the position of left-wing and right-wing parties vis-à-vis terrorism issues to gain a better understanding of the variables affecting variations in issue saliency.

The relevance of the question “How do terrorist attacks impact electoral campaigning rhetoric and how do candidate parties set their agenda around terrorism?” is illustrated by many reasons. The study of the relationship between terrorist attacks and terrorism saliency in party manifestos contributes to our understanding of how these exogenous events can shape political agendas and the issues that policymakers emphasize. It also suggests which policy makers are more susceptible to alter their agendas to accommodate the terrorism narrative, highlighting that terrorism merits its place near or at the top of many policy maker agendas. Terrorist activities are also a key litmus test for differing party responses. Political parties in modern democracies serve as means to aggregate citizen’s opinions and to link governmental policy to society (Dalton et al. 2011; Miller and Stokes 1963). Accordingly, this research can advance our understanding of the extent to which political parties respond to the issue priorities of citizens by increasing issue saliency. Terrorism is an ideal test case for this process, given the prominence of the phenomenon for the public and the shifting of this issue on and off governmental agendas.

Theoretically, this study could contribute to the development of saliency theory and to the consolidation of terrorism as a pillar of the security discourse in academia. Such research is also timely, in that the terrorist acts studied are not only recent, but simultaneously foreshadow the risks that terrorist groups pose to civilian life. Furthermore, the significance of the study originates from the focus on party manifestos, which are a primary source of political campaigning: a departure from existing works that analyse the impact of terrorist attacks on media, election turnout and election outcomes. Lastly, while the rhetoric of both counter-terrorism and terrorist groups have been studied through frame analysis and critical discourse analysis (e.g. Norris et al 2004, Ryan 2004, Jackson 2018), the understanding of the discourse on terrorism in political competition lacks perspective. The application of issue saliency theory can provide an insight into the positioning of terrorism issues compared to other issues discussed during electoral campaigns. Consequently, understanding the entity of the attention devoted to terrorism by political parties through party manifestos would add new comparative cases to the literature on terrorism and political competition. In turn, findings may suggest an alternative or complementary explanation of the effects of terrorist attacks on electoral rhetoric.

The structure of the paper is the following: firstly, the literature review presents the theoretical relevance of the study with particular attention to the gap left by terrorism and political competition literature, then literature on issue saliency theory is introduced; secondly, the methodological section presents the rationale for the selection of case studies and hypothesis, along with a presentation of the sources and the operationalization; thirdly, the within case analysis and the comparison of the selected cases test the

hypothesis and present the results; finally, some concluding remarks and suggestions for further research.

2. LITERATURE REVIEW

The topic of this study relates mainly to terrorism and political competition scholarships and on the tools of saliency theory as developed by Budge and Farlie (1977, 1983a, 1983b).

2.1. Literature On Terrorism And Politics

To begin, some conceptual clarifications are in order. First of all, it is important to have in mind a general definition of terrorist attack, so that it is possible to understand why the event is politically significant. In *Inside Terrorism*, Bruce Hoffman attempts to define terrorism and terrorist attacks:

We may therefore now attempt to define terrorism as the deliberate creation and exploitation of fear through violence or the threat of violence in the pursuit of political change. [...] Terrorism is specifically designed to have far-reaching psychological effects beyond the immediate victim(s) or object of the terrorist attack. It is meant to instil fear within, and thereby intimidate, a wider “target audience” that might include a rival ethnic or religious group, an entire country, a national government or political party, or public opinion in general. [...] Through the publicity generated by their violence, terrorists seek to obtain the leverage, influence, and power they otherwise lack to effect political change on either a local or an international scale. (Hoffman 2006: 40)

In this, Hoffman highlights the broad psychological effects of an attack and the influence that terrorists gain through such acts. The loss of precious lives is enough to push scholars and practitioners to further develop theories and strategies around terrorism, but the legacy of a terrorist attack is just as alarming. The fear generated affects all levels of society and existing works shows that the emotional reaction of citizens entails, among other consequences, a change in political participation (Vasilopoulos 2018). The impact of terrorism on politics, and on elections in particular, has been studied and assessed by scholars in different instances. Among these, Pape (2003) argued that the threat of a terrorist attack pushes citizens to ask governments to engage in security debates and policies. For this reason, political parties believe that the primacy of security issues such as terrorism in the political programme will benefit them electorally and thus have incentives to make terrorism salient in their agenda. In fact, parties consider issue saliency and electoral success correlated (Iyengar and Kinder, 2010). European scholars found in the 2004 Madrid bombings an apt case study as the terrorist attack occurred few days before Spain’s national elections. Lago and Montero (2006), Bali (2007) and Montalvo (2011) tested the claim that the terrorist attacks affected the choice of Spanish voters and the latter two proved, with different methods, that the bombings have had an important electoral impact, encouraging some voters to switch to the peace-seeking opposition and leading to the unexpected win of the socialist party.

Terrorism saliency is, however, not only influenced by terrorist activities, but also by the dynamics of political competition (Criado, 2017). Studies carried out for electoral outcomes in Israel (Berrebi and Klor, 2006) and Turkey (Kibris, 2011) assessing the impact on voter loyalty revealed that exposure to periods with high level of terrorism increases the vote share of right-leaning parties. As Criado explains, terrorism is “especially rewarding in electoral terms” for right-wing parties because, even though it can be considered a general interest issue, terrorism is more present in the right-leaning agenda, for both ideological and strategic reasons (Criado, 2017: 201). In other words, the issue is said to be at least partially “owned” by right-wing parties. The theory of issue ownership argues that parties “own” certain issues, i.e. are preferred by voters as being more competent than opponents in that issue, and therefore prime them more intensely to obtain electoral advantage (Criado 2017, Budge 1982:149 cited in Dolezal et al 2014: 59). A wide stream of research points to the conclusion that terrorist attacks affect electoral outcomes as they tend to boost vote preference for right-wing candidates and make people more willing to support hard-line policies (Berrebi and Klor, 2008, Hetherington and Suhay 2011, Merolla and Zechmeister 2009).

Terrorism can thus be the object of electoral competition. In another major study on the matter, Oats, Kaid and Berry (2010: 1) examined “how fears about terrorism resonated into election campaigns and voter response across three very different societies”, taking into consideration not only election outcomes but also pre-election activities where parties took a stance on terrorism and counter-terrorism measures. The authors coded the framing of terrorist threat in the 2004 US election campaigns and concluded that, even three years after 9/11, parties remained focused on terrorism and security issues and made great use of emotive appeals for security, especially as regards the right-wing candidate Bush. The authors assume that the explanation behind this “politics of fear” is that, post-attack, citizens feel the need for a strong leadership and thus terrorism becomes a “focal point of fears and concerns” that allows for an exploitation of those concerns by political leaders to seek and maintain power (Oates, Kaid and Berry, 2010: 19-21). As already discovered, the right-wing party proved more effective at creating a resonating message for U.S. voters in the first elections after 9/11.

Electoral competition certainly creates incentives to make certain issues salient, but studies such as Hetherington and Nelson (2003) and Criado (2017) shed light on another factor influencing saliency: incumbency. *Ceteris paribus* the scope of the terrorist attack, terrorism boosts incumbent support and the ideology of the incumbent influences the saliency of terrorism. In fact, as incumbents armed with the right support, the party may have capacity to set the political agenda and thus is incentivised to prime issues it owns. Right-wing parties owning the issue of terrorism make it more salient when incumbent, while during left-leaning governments saliency is lower for both parties (Criado, 2017: 201). After a change towards a right-wing incumbency, terrorism saliency increases for both parties (Criado, 2017: 201). Adding to this, closeness to elections constitutes another incentive to prime the issue of terrorism

more intensely. In other words, parties are expected to mobilize more in periods close to elections, especially if the issue is perceived as salient by the citizens (Criado, 2017).

A lot of work has been dedicated to variables affecting election results, and especially on the impact of a terrorist attack on election outcomes, but literature on political campaigns is more limited and focuses mainly on extra-European countries. In addition, existing studies have relied on different empirical strategies elaborating on voters' information, from the analysis of aggregate data to opinion polls and experimental evidence, but not considering data coming from parties' primary and secondary sources. My work builds on and furthers previous studies on the impact of terrorism on political behaviour and more specifically on election campaigns, but I draw on issue saliency theory to suggest alternative or complementary explanations. Using party manifestos from three different countries affected by a terrorist attack in the last five years, I seek a broader perspective on how terrorism issues shape electoral agenda.

2.2. Literature On Issue Saliency

The attention is now posed on issue saliency literature and focuses on the application of this theory to explain changes in political behaviour. Since the models based on frame analysis or quantitative methods used so far in terrorism literature could be limited in accounting for the bigger picture and for the other issues presented during the campaign, this paper improves on current work by using saliency theory and thus making it possible to compare the saliency of terrorism issues to the attention devoted to other topics tackled in the manifestos (Budge 1982; Budge and Farlie 1983a, 1983b). The theory provided the theoretical knowledge for the widely used dataset created thanks to the CMP, but this article is the first to my knowledge to use such theory to explore the relationship between terrorism and political behaviour.

As I illustrate, saliency theory can illuminate how a crisis such as a terrorist attack may lead to a particular type of campaigning, based how “salient” the issue results in the manifesto². Saliency approaches derive from the idea that parties define their policies “by emphasising certain topics more than others, particularly in public documents and debates” (Budge, 2015: 770). This theory, among the most influential contributes to party competition studies, originates from Budge and Farlie (1983a, 1983b), who expanded earlier studies on electoral strategies by Robertson (1976) and Budge and Farlie (1977). Saliency theory focuses on the “valence nature of political issues as their prevailing feature” and holds as key assumptions that “varying emphases on issues are by and large the only way that parties express their policy differences” (Budge et al 2001:82 cited in Dolezal et al 2014). In other words, it is not about the party positions on certain issues, but it is about the extent to which the party emphasises

² As reported by the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP): “The British label ‘manifesto’ refers to what the rest of the world dubs ‘election program’, i.e. a text issues by political actors on the occasion of elections in order to raise internal and/or external support”. The term is therefore defined as “text published by a political party or presidential candidate in order to compete for votes in national elections” (Volkens et al, 2015: 2)

different issues in the manifesto (Dolezal et al, 2014). Some works, in fact, argued that party stances are better interpreted through salience than issue position (Budge et al. 2001: 6–7 cited in Dolezal et al 2014). According to the theory, the more a party makes a topic ‘salient’, the more likely it is to attract votes from citizens concerned with this topic (Dolezal et al, 2014). Salience can be measured by analysing a variety of political documents, such as electoral manifestos, party programmes, conference speeches (Dolezal et al, 2014: 59). Budge and Farlie consider election manifestos the best source to obtain information on parties’ stances and proposals (1977, 1983a, 1983b) and through the analysis of these documents, Budge formulated some hypotheses or empirical implications that have been tested by Dolezal et al (2014). Among these, central claims are that “parties differ from each other more strongly in terms of issue emphasis than with respect to policy positions” and that they “compete by selective issue emphasis rather than by direct confrontation” (Dolezal et al, 2014: 62).

Notwithstanding these important contributions, this paper presents the first systematic test of European manifestos based on issue saliency in a uniform research design. My work uses the basic assumptions of saliency theory as developed by Budge to formulate hypotheses on the impact of terrorism on political campaigning. I will draw on party competition literature, particularly on issue saliency theory, to identify interpretations for political behaviour post terrorist attack. Practically, the aim is to discover party stances by quantifying their statements to their electorate and, through a classification scheme, measure terrorism saliency.

3. METHODOLOGY

After a brief presentation of the theoretical and analytical framework which guide this study, attention now turns to the methodology used to carry out the analysis. This chapter details the case selection process, along with a discussion on the primary source selected, and proceeds by explaining how the data was collected, drawing on the research method developed by the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP). The rationale for the selection of hypotheses will be provided. This research takes a holistic methodological approach, drawing on a robust variety of sources, extracting variables grounded in the existing terrorism and electoral literature, and generating hypotheses that are internally valid while increasing the potential for extrapolation to future terrorist attacks.

The tragic return of Islamic terrorism can be traced back to May 2014, when returnees from the Syrian Civil War opened fire in the Jewish Museum of Belgium. Ever since, ISIL, Al-Qaeda and Islamist lone wolves carried out various attack, leaving the European continent in a constant state of emergency (Europol, 2018). For this study I selected three major terrorist attacks occurred in three different countries in this time frame. In chronological order, the case studies are: the November 2015 Paris attacks (130 killed), the 2016 Berlin attack (12 killed), the 2017 Westminster attack (5 killed). Therefore, the analysed countries are France, Germany, United Kingdom.

These three countries experienced a series of terrorist attacks in the considered time frame, with France witnessing eight major attacks only between 2014 and 2016. For the sake of this analysis, only one event has been selected as most representative and impactful for the political agenda. In the case of the United Kingdom, the Westminster attack and the Manchester Arena bombings occurred few months apart and, while the Manchester Arena events have been maybe more significant for the international community due to the target, they unfolded only few weeks before the 2017 general elections, thus not able to affect political programmes. As alternatives, the Brussels attacks and the Barcelona attacks could be just as crucial, but elections in those two countries have yet to happen again, as in the former country, or happened right before the attack, as in the latter. Therefore, despite Spain and Belgium being good candidates for this study, the election timeline prevents them from being included in this paper.

I selected these countries because I believe the three mentioned terrorist attacks have been particularly pivotal in reframing the political agenda. These three terrorist acts are not the most deadly occurred in Europe in the past decade but represent a good sample of events affecting public opinion and response, along with the variety of political systems and contexts. In fact, while the selected countries are characterized by a similar socio-economic situation, they differ in terms of electoral system, party organization and political spectrum.

The nonconformity of the case studies can enrich the research providing insight into party competition and party responsiveness. France is an example of a multi-party system with a wide political spectrum, Germany has a multi-party system characterised by a strong bipolarism, while the UK is historically a two-party system. This characterization is relevant for this study because systems respond differently: in two-party systems, the incumbent and the opposition face an intense competition and their positioning does not involve the inter-party bargaining that characterizes multi-party systems. For this reason, it is easier to identify issue ownership in this type of system. On the other hand, multi-party systems normally resort to coalitions, therefore party competition can be less intense (Klüver and Sagarzazu, 2016: 381). Consequently, one could expect parties in multi-party systems to give more emphasis to issues salient to the audience in order to gain electoral advantage. The cross-case comparison can help to shed light on the dynamics of competition in different party systems and the consequent party responsiveness to terrorist attacks.

It is also important to highlight that the positioning of parties in the political spectrum may vary across cases. This means that, although the theoretical framework refers generally to right- and left-wing parties, the selected political parties in the aforementioned countries may also identify as centrists or extremists. For example, in the case of France, Front National is regarded as far-right party, while in Germany, CDU/CSU is historically considered a centre-right party. The research will take these positions into consideration when necessary, but for the sake of the within-case analysis, those parties will be generally identified as right-wing. This is unlikely to significantly impact analyses given that

right-wing and centre-right issue stances are closer to each other than they are to those parties which are historically considered left-wing.

This research develops its argument drawing on primary sources, testing variables extrapolated from terrorism literature and from issue saliency assumptions. My study aims at assessing the impact of selected terrorist attacks on the politics of the country through changes in issue saliency. To this end, the same basic data source that saliency theorists originally analysed will be used: party manifestos. Despite them being the preferred source by Budge and Farlie (1977), I acknowledge that some dimensions of electoral competition may be neglected, leaving aside other sources such as public speeches, conferences and advertisement. As explained by Libbrecht et al, parties could be influenced by media to take a certain stance on issues not mentioned in the official manifesto (2009: 60). Nevertheless, these documents have the advantage of being a primary data source and, being an official written statement, they present a comprehensive picture of the party's stances (Libbrecht et al, 2009). In this context, I will code two manifestos per country, representing the elections before and after the attack.

Thanks to the database created by the Comparative Manifesto Project, party manifestos are easily available on the dedicated website³, together with a booklet on their methodology. Simply stated, to examine issue saliency, i.e. the attention devoted to a specific issue, the CMP splits manifestos into statements (or 'quasi-sentences') that represents a stance (Volkens et al, 2015). Each of these statements is assigned to an issue domain and then percentages are calculated to measure the quantity of quasi-sentences devoted by the party to each issue category compared to the total number of statements. This percentage represents the salience of the issue (Volkens et al 2015, Volkens 2001:34-36). The classification developed by the CMP is complex, including a scheme of 56 major issue categories divided into 7 domains, summarized in Table 2. For this study, I built upon the methods introduced by the CMP and I used a simplified coding scheme focused on terrorism issues and macro general issues. The analysis is thus based on the measure of the percentage of terrorism issues compared to other issues such as other security matters, economic policy, education, international relations. In the theoretical section, I have argued that the saliency of terrorism in party manifestos can be affected by variables related to political system, incumbent parties and timing of elections. With the measure of issue saliency, I will proceed to test a set of hypotheses derived from those variables based on previous terrorism works on data based on the new coding scheme developed for this study, which allows for a more precise measurement of terrorism issues. The selected manifestos are summarized in Table 1 below.

³ <https://manifesto-project.wzb.eu/>

Table 3.1 Summary of selected terrorist attacks and party manifestos				
Country	Terrorist attack	Manifesto Publication Year	Original Party Name (Left-wing in <i>blue</i> , right-wing in <i>red</i>)	International Party Name (Left-wing in <i>blue</i> , right-wing in <i>red</i>)
France	2015 November Paris attacks	2012	Parti Socialiste	Socialist Party
			Front National	National Front
		2017	Parti Socialiste	Socialist Party
			Front National	National Front
Germany	2016 December Berlin attack	2013	Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschland	Social Democratic Party of Germany
			Christlich Demokratische Union	Christian Democratic Union
		2017	Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschland	Social Democratic Party of Germany
			Christlich Demokratische Union	Christian Democratic Union
United Kingdom	2017 May Westminster attack	2015	Labour Party	Labour Party
			Conservative Party	Conservative Party
		2017	Labour Party	Labour Party
			Conservative Party	Conservative Party

3.1. Hypotheses

The first hypothesis refers to the general assumption that a terrorist attack has an impact on the saliency of terrorism. Pape (2003) and Criado (2017) argued that terrorist attacks make terrorism salient for public opinion and therefore political parties respond priming this issue in their agenda to gain electoral advantage. In agreement with Criado (2017), the first hypothesis therefore suggests:

H1: *A terrorist attack increases the saliency of security issues in party manifestos*

The following couple of hypotheses relate to the political ideology of parties. On the one hand, focusing on the relationship between saliency of terrorism and right-wing parties, and in particular on the “issue ownership” of those parties vis-à-vis terrorism issues, the second hypothesis advocates:

H2a: *terrorism issues are more salient in right-wing parties, ceteris paribus attack*

Studies such as Berrebi and Klor (2008), Hetherington and Suhay (2011) and Merolla and Zeichmeister (2009) have found that terrorist attacks usually result in citizens being more willing to vote for right-wing or generally conservative parties. Since terrorism proved more electorally profitable for right-wing

parties, I expect stronger electoral incentives for right-wing parties to prime more intensely terrorism issues. Consistently:

H2b: the increase in the saliency of security issues is greater in right-wing parties than in left-wing parties after a terrorist attack

Acknowledging the role of the right-wing incumbency and issue ownership described by Criado (2017), I expect left-wing parties to make the issue more salient to attempt to close the gap with the opposition in order to increase their electoral chances:

H3: the increase described in H1 is relatively bigger for left-wing parties after a right-wing incumbency.

Lastly, drawing on Criado's analysis on the incentives for saliency, which suggests that parties make terrorism more salient in periods close to elections, I expect the timing of the terrorist attack in relation to the elections to have an impact on the saliency of terrorism:

H4: the increase described in H1 is relatively bigger the more the terrorist attack is close to elections

Summarizing, if these hypotheses were true I would expect parties to prime the issue of terrorism more intensely after a terrorist attack. In particular, right-wing parties are stronger on the issue of terrorism and are thus expected to make it marginally more salient. Conversely, I presume that terrorism will be less pervasive in the political agenda of left-wing parties, but will be made more salient after a right-wing party incumbency. In conclusion, I also expect timing to play a role in the impact of terrorism on political programmes.

To confirm or falsify the proposed hypotheses, I initially apply a simplified CMP methodology to a within case analysis and then proceed to a comparison of the selected cases. Accordingly, to solve the puzzle I will compare three cases: 1) France pre and post 2015 November attacks; 2) Germany pre and post 2016 Berlin attack; 3) United Kingdom pre and post 2017 Westminster attack. First, to determine issue saliency, I code manifestos to obtain the percentage of statements devoted to terrorism. Furthermore, to analyse if the terrorist attack is responsible for an increase in saliency, I compare the manifesto released for the election before and after the event. To verify whether right-wing parties act differently, I compare results for the main right-wing party with the main left-wing party of each country. Finally, I test the impact of timing by comparing the weeks between the terrorist attack and the elections to the results on saliency.

4. FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS

4.1. Context

To begin, a little background on Islamic terrorism in Europe should be helpful to understand the context in which the events unfolded. In the past decade there has been an increase in the frequency of attacks committed by Islamic groups, leading to an increase in casualties, despite acts being less sophisticated

in preparation and execution (Europol, 2018: 5). The reason behind deadlier attacks is that jihadist terrorist, increasingly home-grown, seem to have adopted indiscriminate killing as main pattern. In addition, recent attacks in the European continent have showed a preference for attacking people rather than material targets. According to Europol, this is due to a desire to provoke an emotional response from the general public that would be attenuated in the case of loss of capital or damage to premises (Europol, 2018: 5). The European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report also highlights the role of the “perceived Islamisation of society” in the spreading of violent right-wing extremism, linking the rise of right-leaning movements to the increase in Islamic terrorism (Europol, 2018:6).



4.2. Within-Case Analysis

I will proceed now by doing an in-depth analysis of each case and then compare the three to comparatively test my hypotheses. For the analysis, I use the methodology developed by CMP as a benchmark: starting from their coding system divided in domains, I select the domain devoted to security issues (600) and the domain dedicated to international relations (100). These two domains were chosen as representing general security issues because they include statements regarding military, peace and foreign relations (domain 100), and law and order, negative vision of migration and integration (domain 600). Within the corpus coded under these domains, I identified statements regarding terrorism and coded them differently under the code TER so as to allow a detailed analysis of terrorism saliency and to attempt to isolate terrorism from other security matters such as migration crisis and domestic violence. These statements may specifically mention Islamic terrorism or terrorist attacks, but they may also only include reference to extremism, violent radicalization and counter-terrorism intelligence. The codes are summarized in Table 2.

Table 4.1 Selected codes and domains	
Code	Domain
100	<i>International relations</i> : agreements, European Union, military
200	<i>Freedom and Democracy</i> : human rights, constitutionalism
300	<i>Political System</i> : decentralisation, corruption, parties
400	<i>Economy</i> : market regulation, incentives, growth
500	<i>Welfare and Quality of Life</i> : environment, culture, equality
600	<i>Fabric of Society</i> : migration, integration, law and order
700	<i>Social Groups</i> : agriculture, minorities, middle class
TER	<i>Terrorism specific statements</i>

4.2.1. France



As key event for France, I chose the November 2015 Paris attacks. On Friday, 13 November 2015, three suicide bombers struck outside the Stade de France while in Paris city centre several mass shootings killed 130 people, with another 100 hostages taken and 413 people injured. The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) claimed responsibility for the attacks, which were planned between Syria and Belgium (Vasilopoulos, 2018). This series of coordinated attacks occurred less than a year after the Charlie Hebdo shooting in the same city, but held greater significance for two reasons: on the one hand, the attacks were the deadliest in France since World War Two and the deadliest in Europe since 2004 Madrid bombings; on the other hand, the mass shooting didn't have a target as in the January attacks, but indiscriminately affected people on the street, families inside restaurants and young people at the Bataclan theatre (CNN Library, n.d.). For these reasons, the prompted public response was massive, involving international organisations, governments, landmarks and above all social media, with the slogans "Pray for Paris" and "Peace for Paris".



During the attack, the government was led by President Hollande, winner of the runoff in the 2012 presidential election. Afterwards, the first round of the 2017 French presidential elections was held on 23 April 2017 but resulted in no majority. This round occurred under the state of emergency declared after the November 2015 Paris attacks. The run-off was held on 7 May 2017 between the top two candidates: Emmanuel Macron (En Marche!) and Marine Le Pen (Front National). With 66% of preferences, Macron won and is currently the President of the French Republic (Aisch et al, 2017). The incumbent president François Hollande (Parti Socialiste) previously announced he would not seek reelection. For the first time in the Fifth Republic, no candidate from the traditional left and right parties took part in the runoff. Facing an historical low, both The Republicans and the Socialist Party were overtaken by the far-right party Front National and the new anti-establishment party founded by Macron. In light of these dynamics, I chose the Socialist Party and Front National as case studies for France. Being the incumbent and the traditional left party, the Socialist Party had to be included, in particular for the sake of hypothesis H3. On the other hand, the choice of Front National is due to its rise as main right-wing party and to the internal reform occurred in the historical conservative party, Union for a Popular Movement, changed into The Republicans. Despite Front National being identified as far-right in the political spectrum, the lack of consistency for the centre-right party between the two elections suggested Front National as a better candidate for this study.

The party manifestos analysed thus refer to pre-attack 2012 presidential election and post-attack 2017 presidential election. The results of the CMP coding are summarized in Figure 1 and 2. A first look at data reveals a general increase in attention to security-related issue post attack, as shown by the increase in statements coded under the 600 domain. Both parties followed this trend, but the right-wing party – Front National – proportionally dedicated more space to security and terrorism both before and after the attack. In fact, as Figure 3 illustrates, before the attack, Front National dedicated 4% of the manifesto to issues related to terrorism and counterterrorism, compared to the Socialist Party's 3%. Post attack, 10% of the right-wing manifesto and 7% of the left-wing manifesto regarded terrorism and emergency measures. As reported by the graph below, the November 2015 Paris attacks, among other variables, are responsible for an 7% increase in saliency for Front National and 4% increase for Parti Socialiste. In other terms, while in 2012 Marine Le Pen only mentioned counterterrorism once in her party programme, in 2017 a whole section of the manifesto was devoted to terrorism, Islamic fundamentalism and jihad. On the other hand, the proper issue of terrorism is confined to one paragraph in both manifestos of the Socialist Party, which only adds some statements on the need of an adequate military for counterterrorism purposes post attack. It is also interesting to look at the change in issues normally associated with terrorism, such as migration and integration, as displayed in Figure 4. The analysis highlights how, alongside with terrorism, a negative vision of migration and multiculturalism flourished in 2017, particularly for the right-wing party. This phenomenon, fuelled also by the migration crisis,



surely is an exemplification of issue ownership: security issues, among which terrorism, migration crises and radicalization, are owned by right-wing parties and are thus more salient.



4.2.2. Germany



In Germany, the 2016 Berlin attack occurred after a series of attempts in Hannover, Würzburg and Ansbach and represents the first fatal Islamic attack on German soil (Heil, 2017). The attack followed a similar pattern to the 2014 Nantes attack and the 2016 Nice attack. On Monday, 19 December 2016, Tunisian extremist Anis Amri drove a stolen truck through a Christmas market in the Western part of central Berlin, leaving 12 people dead and 56 injured. The attack is the deadliest of its kind in Germany since 1980, when an attack at Oktoberfest in Munich killed 13 people. The incident exposed the Islamic network operative in northwestern Germany and shed light on the recruitment process going on in the country (Heil, 2017). In this case, the reactions have been mainly negative, as the use of the attack as scapegoat has been twofold: right-wing parties blamed Chancellor Angela Merkel for the generous refugee policy while Eurosceptic politicians criticized the free movement allowed by the Schengen system.

The 2017 German federal elections were held on 24 September 2017 to elect the Bundestag. The two major parties, the centre-right Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union led by Angela Merkel and the left-wing Social Democratic Party, respectively obtained 33% and 20% of the vote (Kirby, 2017). As in the previous 2013 federal election, the incumbent government – composed of the Christian Democratic Union and the Christian Social Union – failed to gain majority of seats and negotiated a grand coalition with the Social Democrats. This latter party, led by former president of the European Parliament Martin Schulz, took long to accept the coalition because of strong reluctance of the party's young wing. I chose CDU/CSU and SPD because they are the two major contemporary political parties in Germany and have been main actors in the political arena for the last decades.



The party manifestos of the 2013 federal election and 2017 federal election are analysed. The results summarized in Figures 5 and 6 display similar results to the French case study: security is more salient in the right-wing party – CDU/CSU – and saliency increases after the considered attack. Already in 2013, the difference between the two parties is visible: CDU/CSU devoted a section to Islamic



extremism and terrorism, while SPD only refers to right extremism and never mention the word “terrorism” (*Terrorismus*) in its manifesto. Figure 7 shows that, post attack, both parties focused more on terrorism. CDU/CSU increased saliency from 3% to 5% and SPD increased from 1% to 3%, therefore both manifestos saw a rise of 2% in statements on terrorism and counterterrorism measures. Nevertheless, CDU/CSU both pre and post attack dedicated more attention to terrorism issues and focused more strictly on Islamic terrorism and extremism. On the other hand, SPD only devoted part of these statements to Islamic fundamentalism, keeping a focus on right-wing extremism. Seen the situation in Germany and in Europe between the two elections, the focus on security-related issues may seem insufficient in percentage, especially compared to France. However, the great length of German party manifestos can justify apparent low percentages, which in nominal terms correspond to a similar amount of statements to France.



4.2.3. United Kingdom

The 2017 Westminster attack, which paved the way for two more attacks occurred before the general elections: the Manchester arena bombing and the London bridge attack. Both attacks caused more deaths and casualties than the Westminster attack, but happened only few days before elections and therefore could not be selected as case studies, as previously mentioned. Nevertheless, the Westminster attack is the first Islamist-related incident in the considered timeframe and therefore is considered to have impacted public opinion and security policy. On Wednesday, 22 March 2017, a rented car was driven into pedestrians outside the Palace of Westminster in London, along the south side of Westminster Bridge and Bridge Street. The attack caused around 50 injured and 5 deaths. As happened for the



previous terrorist attacks occurred in the United Kingdom (Oates, Kaid and Berry, 2010), reaction to the attack expressed shock, but domestic response was contained and not characterised by appeals to fear.



The 2017 United Kingdom general election was held on 8 June 2017, after being announced only two months earlier by Prime Minister Theresa May and only two year after the 2015 general election. The negotiations of UK’s exit from the European Union were expected to be the key issue for party campaigns but featured less than expected. In fact, while the selected attack occurred right before the announcement, two more major terrorist attacks (The Manchester Arena attack and the London Bridge attack) took place during the election campaign, shifting the focus from Brexit to security. The two historical British parties, the Conservative party and the Labour party, argued about the best way to prevent such event to happen again and discussed security failures. The incumbent right-wing Conservative Party, led by Theresa May, remained the largest party in the House of Commons, however the left-wing Labour party gained 30 seats with 40% of the vote, 2% away from the Conservative party (Franklin et al, 2017).


The manifestos analysed were elaborated only two years apart and thus do not differ significantly, as shown by the Figure 8 and 9 summarizing the results. The fact that the 2015 election occurred after the

return of Islamic terrorism in Europe is most likely the reason behind considerable saliency of terrorism already in the pre-attack manifestos. In 2015, terrorism was already playing a role in both manifestos to a point that parties detailed the target of counterterrorism measures: ISIL. Figure 10 illustrates that, pre-attack, the Conservatives dedicated to terrorism efforts 4% of their programme, while 3% of Labour Party's manifesto regards terrorism and extremism. Two years later, both parties increased saliency of terrorism issues of 2%, resulting in respectively 6% and 5% of manifestos devoted to the matter. Together with the timing of the first election, the short time distance between the release of the two manifestos is explanatory for the marginal increase, however, the attacks in France and around Europe between 2015 and 2017 influenced the debate around security which reflected in the manifestos. As far as content is concerned, in the 2017 party programmes, terrorism was partially mentioned correlated to Brexit, putting forward proposals on how to organize counterterrorism efforts outside of European agencies and institutions. Following Oats, Kaid and Berry (2010), parties exploited citizen's major concern, security, leaving aside Brexit to leverage on people's fear to seek and maintain power.



4.3. Cross-Case Analysis

The three case studies explored separately in the previous section raise some intriguing questions on the overall effect of terrorist attacks on electoral campaign rhetoric and each hypothesis warrants a deeper examination. In this section, they will be delved into. Figure 12 summarizes the findings that will be useful to test the hypotheses.



4.3.1. H1

H1: *A terrorist attack increases the saliency of terrorism issues in party manifestos.*

As the results in Figure 12 illustrate, the first hypothesis is confirmed. The comparative analysis of the three case studies support the theory sustained in particular by Pape (2003) and Criado (2017) on the impact of terrorist activities on terrorism saliency. In fact, France, Germany and the UK all witnessed an increase in saliency of terrorism issues in party manifestos after the selected terrorist attack. As displayed in the graph, where the green bar represents the increase in terrorism saliency, political parties, both left and right-wing, responded to terrorist activities by priming this issue in their agenda. According to the theory presented, French, German and British leader made terrorism salient to attract votes from citizens concerned with this topic (Criado, 2017), following the same strategy adopted by Bush and analysed by Oates, Kaid and Berry (2010).

While a correlation between the occurrence of terrorist attacks and increased terrorism saliency may be found, other intervening variables should not be neglected. Above all, terrorist attacks carried out in neighbouring countries can affect national concerns and cause an emotional reaction similar to the response in case of attack in national territory. In addition, as seen in the within-case analysis, the increased saliency of terrorism issues was followed by an increased saliency of general security issues, represented by selected statements coded under the domain 600 and 100, namely statements concerning

military, international peace, law and order, violence. The increased attention devoted to security issue can be related to terrorism as well as to migration and refugees issues, foreign relations with countries such as Russia, the US and North Korea, or engagement in Syria and Israel.

4.3.2. H2

H2a: terrorism issues are more salient in right-wing parties, ceteris paribus attack.

H2b: the increase in the saliency of terrorism issues is greater in right-wing parties than in left-wing parties after a terrorist attack.

As anticipated in the within-case analysis and as shown in Figure 12, terrorism issues are more salient in right-wing parties, confirming H2a. This may not be the most surprising of findings, as the theoretical section already provided strong evidence from Israel and Turkey backing this hypothesis (Berrebi and Klor, 2006, Kibris, 2011). In this study, both pre and post attack, right-wing parties from France, Germany and the UK devoted more space in their party programmes to terrorism issues and more general security issues compared to left-wing parties. This result also supports the issue ownership theory: Front National, CDU/CSU and the Conservative party prime and emphasize terrorism and security issues because historically right-wing parties have been advantaged on those issues while their opponents are less well regarded. (Petrocik, 1996).

While the first part of the hypothesis is confirmed, the second part is rejected, as the results illustrate. Despite terrorism being more electorally profitable for right-wing parties (Berrebi and Klor, 2008, Hetherington and Suhay, 2011 and Merolla and Zeichmeister 2009), the increase in the saliency of terrorism issues is not greater in right-wing parties than in left-wing parties. In fact, data support the hypothesis only for France, where saliency increased by 6% for Front National and 4% for Parti Socialiste. However, in this case, the positioning of Front National in the political spectrum may play a role. Since the right-wing party for France is considered far-right, its extreme stance may have impacted terrorism saliency giving more attention to the issue even compared to a right or centre-right candidate. The analysis of Germany and UK revealed an equal increase for both ideologies, meaning that parties reacted similarly to the rise of terrorist activities. This phenomenon can also be partially explained by the variable of incumbency, tested in H3.

4.3.3. H3


H3: the increase described in H1 is relatively bigger for left-wing parties after a right-wing incumbency.

The analysis of H2 suggests that the increase in the saliency of terrorism is not greater in right-wing parties compared to left-wing parties. The equal increase that occurred for left-wing parties could be explained by the impact of the ideology of the incumbent, as already prompted by Hetherington and Nelson (2003) and Criado (2017). According to the theory, after a right-wing incumbency left-wing parties attempt to gain electoral advantage by priming terrorism, an issue traditionally owned by the

opponents. In this case, the incumbent President of the French Republic was François Hollande, from the Socialist Party, while Angela Merkel and Theresa May both belong to right-wing parties and were incumbent respectively in Germany and the United Kingdom. As illustrated by the results, countries with a right-wing incumbency witnessed an equal increase in terrorism saliency for left- and right- wing parties, while in the country with a left-wing incumbency, the far-right party increased saliency more than the opponent. In the latter case, it is interesting to note that the left-wing party's variation in saliency is bigger than the fellow parties in Germany and the UK. Although H3 is supported by data for the three case studies, further research should be carried out on the impact on the incumbency especially if left-wing parties, if incumbent during a terrorist attack, act as “owners” of the terrorism issue in their re-election bid.

4.3.4. H4

H4: *the increase described in H1 is relatively bigger the more the terrorist attack is close to elections.* Criado (2017) suggested a correlation between closeness of the attack to elections and saliency of terrorism. The table below visually summarize the days elapsing between the terrorist event and the ballot: 527 days for France, 279 days for Germany and 78 days for the United Kingdom. A comparison of these numbers with data on the increase of saliency leads to the rejection of the hypothesis. Despite the great number of days between the Paris attacks and French presidential election, France leads with a 4% and 6% increase in saliency respectively for the left- and right-wing party. The other two countries follow with 2% increase for both parties, regardless of the significant closeness of the attack to the start of the electoral campaign and to elections. Therefore, in these three case studies, the increase in terrorism saliency is not bigger the more the terrorist attack is close to elections.



The effect of the timing of election on saliency can be distorted or influenced by other variables such as media coverage during and after the attack, national sentiment towards tragedies, number of casualties and other ongoing crises. Oates, Kaid and Berry first attempted to draw a connection between terrorism, media coverage and campaigning, arguing that the frame built by media for the events influences the message related to terrorism communicated during the electoral campaign (2010). Secondly, the same study highlighted how countries react differently to threats, both at a political and at an audience level. In fact, the research reveals how even after the London bombings in 2005, terrorism played little role in

electoral manifestos and parties made less use of fear appeal. Among historical explanations, Oates, Kaid and Berry concludes that reactions are related to national perception, perspective and attitudes towards such events (2010). Thirdly, Criado (2017) briefly hinted at a role played by the number of casualties. In this case, the correlation between number of deaths and issue saliency is positive: the more fatalities during the selected terrorist attack, the more attention is devoted to the issue of terrorism. Finally, as already mentioned for H1, other variables should be considered. Not only the selected countries had to face major issues such as Brexit, migration crisis and tension with the European Union, but all three experienced other terrorist attacks.

Overall, the analysis of variations in saliency revealed numerous interesting observations. H1, H2a and H3 were supported by data, while H2b and H4 were rejected on the basis of the obtained results. All in all, the political system seemed not to play a major role, while the positioning of parties in the political spectrum may have affected the findings, along with the aforementioned intervening variables that should be kept in mind in the interpretation of the study.

5. CONCLUSION

The analysis conducted in this paper is helpful to answer the research question “How do terrorist attacks impact the electoral campaigning rhetoric and how do candidate parties set their agenda around terrorism?”. The issue saliency approach allowed for an analysis of variations in saliency of security and terrorism issues, and through this it was possible to test hypotheses based on terrorism, political competition and issue saliency theory. Through the coding of 12 manifestos from three European countries, I assessed the impact of terrorist attacks on political campaigning and the results revealed that parties react to terrorist attacks by increasing terrorism saliency but right- and left-wing parties differ in their way of handling the issue.

While, through H1, the impact of terrorist activities on saliency was confirmed, H2 and H3 made a contribution to the distinction of right-wing and left-wing parties in issue saliency. As seen, right-wing parties have proved more prone to exploit terrorism in their campaigning rhetoric in order to gain electoral advantage, partially due to security issue ownership. The fact that, following an attack, right-wing party manifestos devote more attention to terrorism issues compared to left-wing parties does not necessarily imply that the former parties are more sympathetic towards by such tragedies, but it means that they consider terrorism profitable in electoral terms and thus increase their focus on the matter (Criado, 2017). In the same way, after a right-wing incumbency, left-wing parties dedicate more attention to terrorism to gain advantage in electoral competition, trying to attract right-wing voters. The analysis of H4 revealed that the timing of election does not play a role, but some alternative variables were suggested. The framing of media coverage, national attitude towards terrorist attacks and number of fatalities could impact the response of political parties to terrorist activities and thus their electoral campaigning rhetoric.

Due to the length and scope of this work, it is important to note that it is constrained by a number of limitations. Firstly, as the thesis only analyses three case studies taken from three European countries - namely France, Germany and the United Kingdom - as a proxy for the aggregate stances of political parties in each European country, it does not capture the diversity of the European political scenario. The relatively small number of suitable case studies available for the analysis could impact upon the validity of the results. In fact, as mentioned in the introduction, the number of countries selected is limited to those which experienced elections following a terrorist attack before 2018. Future studies of a larger scale could use a wider range of data sources, involving for example Belgium and Spain, thus making the research more exhaustive. In the same way, in-depth research could provide a more nuanced approach by considering not only the two main political parties in the country but the broader political constellation, considering for example centre-left and centre-right parties or historical coalitions. Such study could also widen the research to include a cross-temporal analysis, exploring the evolvement of terrorism saliency in party manifestos and comparing the variations to other terrorist attacks occurred in the same country. Another limitation lies in the method used to code statements, and thereby saliency, of different issues. This method entails a certain level of subjectivity and could thus influence the reliability of the findings. However, in this case, it offers the most feasible and accurate means of capturing issue saliency in party manifestos.

While this research does not test hypotheses exhaustively, I contribute to the debate by exploring the causal processes linking terrorism saliency in electoral programmes to terrorist attack occurred in national territory. I expect these findings to be useful to gain a better understanding of the instances in which the so-called politics of fear can be used to obtain electoral advantage. I also expect this research to contribute to the ongoing studies on the relationship between terrorism and democracy, which explore the causal links between the two. The increase in terrorism saliency, however, could be influenced by other variables, some of which are briefly outlined in the previous section. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to seek and test all the possible variables behind such variations in saliency, but it is worthwhile to suggest broadening and furthering research on the topic by including other intervening variables. It would also be useful to compare the increase in terrorism saliency with elections outcome, as analysed by Oates, Kaid and Berry in the United States (2010). In fact, since literature on political competition argues that parties increase saliency on issues that are considered to attract voters and be profitable in electoral terms, the greater increase in terrorisms saliency should lead to positive results in the election. Finally, despite Bridge's claim that party stances are better analysed and decoded through issue saliency than issue position (Budge et al. 2001: 6–7), I believe research on electoral studies would benefit from a combination of the two approaches. While issue saliency puts in perspective the stance on terrorism, issue position can allow for an analysis of the statements devoted to the issue. Therefore, a suggestion could be to elaborate a two-step approach in order to profit from points of view of both issue saliency and issue position.

In sum, this work's findings raise some intriguing questions regarding the relationship between terrorism and politics, particularly political competition. Much of the dominant literature on the topic of terrorism and democracy is challenged by the rapid development of terrorist cells and the fearful reactions of democratic countries, in particular the extreme response of some right-wing European parties. The findings contained in this study open multiple interesting avenues for further research projects which call for more detailed and sustained investigation.

Finally, from the results drawn from the three analysed case studies, a number of implications for counter-terrorism policies may be derived. Since literature on terrorism argues that terrorists try to achieve their objectives by pressuring public opinion to ask for political change, it is not clear whether the increased terrorism saliency is the best counter-terrorism strategy. While the increase in saliency has been connected to electoral advantage, it would be insightful to consider the impact of this increase on terrorism. Remembering the definition of terrorism offered by Bruce Hoffman, terrorism is meant to exploit fear "in the pursuit of political change" and it is designed to instill terror (2006: 770). Most importantly, "through the publicity generated by their violence, terrorist seek to obtain the leverage, influence, and power they otherwise lack to effect political change" (Hoffman, 2006: 770). In this sense, as foreseen by Criado, the increase in the saliency of terrorism issues could have "the unintended consequence of increasing the power of terrorists" (2017: 211). In other words, by focusing terrorism in the attempt to gain advantage in the election, political parties promote terrorism's mission: gaining publicity and changing the normal course of politics is precisely what terrorism pursues. Acknowledging the mission of terrorism and the consequent impact of terrorism on electoral campaigning rhetoric, political parties should consider reaching an agreement to exclude or minimize campaigning around terrorism, and therefore its saliency in manifestos, in order to shift audience attention to other topics and, by doing so, weaken terrorists' bargaining power.

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ANNEX

Table I. Coding results for France								
Country	France							
Party	Parti Socialiste				Front National			
Code	Pre		Post		Pre		Post	
100	26	12%	4	5%	32	11%	12	6%
200	19	9%	4	5%	15	5%	9	5%
300	9	4%	3	4%	10	3%	8	4%
400	57	27%	12	16%	67	22%	29	16%
500	76	36%	32	42%	61	20%	38	20%
600	11	5%	11	14%	83	28%	74	40%
700	15	7%	10	13%	31	10%	16	9%
total	213		76		299		186	
TER	6	3%	5	7%	10	3%	18	10%

Table II. Coding results for Germany								
Country	Germany							
Party	SPD				CDU/CSU			
Code	Pre		Post		Pre		Post	
100	228	8%	346	13%	214	8%	137	10%
200	215	7%	157	6%	123	5%	33	2%
300	214	7%	101	4%	178	7%	95	7%
400	747	26%	710	26%	790	31%	445	33%
500	888	31%	746	27%	579	22%	248	18%
600	272	9%	374	14%	400	16%	278	21%
700	309	11%	199	7%	250	19%	104	8%
total	2898		2726		2574		1343	
TER	25	1%	65	3%	77	3%	63	5%

Table III. Coding results for the United Kingdom								
Country	United Kingdom							
Party	Labour Party				Conservative Party			
Code	Pre		Post		Pre		Post	
<i>100</i>	112	11%	100	10%	221	14%	83	8%
<i>200</i>	78	8%	73	7%	64	4%	54	5%
<i>300</i>	65	6%	88	9%	118	7%	70	7%
<i>400</i>	233	23%	199	20%	449	28%	268	27%
<i>500</i>	299	30%	263	26%	422	27%	202	20%
<i>600</i>	144	14%	188	19%	256	16%	177	18%
<i>700</i>	78	8%	98	10%	59	4%	85	8%
<i>total</i>	1009		1010		1589		1010	
<i>TER</i>	35	3%	55	5%	66	4%	60	6%

Table IV. Variations in issue saliency						
Country	France		Germany		United Kingdom	
Party	PS	FN	SPD	CDU	LP	CP
<i>100</i>	-7%	-5%	5%	2%	-1%	-6%
<i>200</i>	-4%	0%	-1%	-3%	-1%	1%
<i>300</i>	0%	1%	-3%	0%	3%	0%
<i>400</i>	-11%	-6%	0%	2%	-3%	-1%
<i>500</i>	8%	0%	-4%	-4%	-4%	-7%
<i>600</i>	9%	12%	5%	5%	5%	2%
<i>700</i>	6%	-1%	-4%	-11%	2%	4%
<i>TER</i>	4%	6%	2%	2%	2%	2%