



STUDENT PAPER SERIES

42



Ungoverned spaces. Why some jihadist groups engage in public service delivery more than others

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Master's in International Relations

Academic year 2017-2018



INSTITUT
BARCELONA
ESTUDIS
INTERNACIONALS

ABSTRACT

Since the Peace of Westphalia, states have been the primary actors in the international arena, having been granted legitimacy by internal and external sovereignty. In the contemporary age, however, state's sovereignty has started to be constantly challenged by third, non-state actors that slowly attack its main core, namely the control over a population residing within a delimited territory. Among them, violent non-state actors (VNSAs) challenge the state by not only conquering its land, but also by attempting to exercise governance over its citizens. This paper examines the root causes that lay behind jihadist organisations' decision to engage in public service delivery. It uses previous literature combined with original research to provide a quantitative and qualitative analysis that attempts to understand why some jihadist groups engage more in the provision of services than others. It concludes that the group size and aspiration, as well as the amount of services offered by the incumbent state, are strongly connected with the provision of social services. These three elements underline that political aspirations push over ideological ones, urging the terrorist organisations to do everything they can, including offering services, to win the hearts and minds of the population they aspire to govern.

KEYWORDS: sovereignty, violent non-state actors, public service delivery, governance, terrorism, jihadism.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

BAAD	Big, Allied and Dangerous Database
FSI	Fragile State Index
NSA	Non-State Armed Actors
START	Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism
UCDP	Uppsala Conflict Data Program
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
VNSA	Violent Non-State Actors

1. INTRODUCTION.

The connection between public service delivery and non-state actors occupies a growing body of literature in the international relations field. Despite remaining important actors in the international arena, states do not enjoy an exclusive place anymore, as they increasingly have to deal with a variety of actors that slowly erode their sovereignty.

This fact has led several authors to underline the role of non-state actors as "perforators of sovereignty" (García Segura 1993, 27), as they attack the deep core from which the state derives its legitimacy: its control over a population and of a delimited territory (Glassner 1993). When heavily attacked, states may retreat, leaving behind unprotected parts of their land, as well as the populations that reside in these areas. Despite these territories being seldom defined as "ungoverned spaces", *terra nullius*, or "voids" (Clunan and Harold 2010), violent non-state actors (VNSAs) of different nature - insurgencies, transnational or national organised-crime groups, terrorist groups - provide an order and often engage in some kind of governance.

Many are the examples that can be brought: in Lebanon, Hezbollah is a major provider of social services of different kind, from schools to hospitals to agricultural programmes, while controlling the southern-east region of Lebanon (Love 2010); Italian mafia groups derive their power from a massive control and exploitation of the territory and community, collect taxes, protect the community, and do business with state and non-state actors (Europol); there is strong evidence that even the infamous Islamic State engaged in the offer of public services (Robinson et al. 2017, p. xiv).

This research paper focusses on a specific kind of violent non-state actors, namely jihadist terrorist organisations, and its relationship with governance. In particular, it centred on understanding the root reasons that lie within the involvement of many of these organisations in the delivery of public services to those populations that reside in the areas that they managed to control. The question to which the project attempts to answer, may be summarised as it follows: *Why do some jihadist terrorist groups engage more in public service delivery than others?* To limit the scope of the research, the project concentrated on the period 2010-2013, which was the timeframe in which the majority of the organisations that were chosen were particularly active and were exerting a direct control over a land.

The project was chosen due to the increasing importance that non-state actors have in the international arena. As state sovereignty gets more and more eroded, it is important to focus the attention on these relatively new actors and to question what kind of role it is expected they play, and whether it is necessary to redistribute state competencies. Additionally, the dissertation decided to focus on violent non-state actors, and jihadist groups in particular, due to the attention given by the media and the public to such entities, and because of the primary role that they play in a vast number of conflicts all around the world. The aim is to reach a better understanding of jihadist groups' nature and aspirations,

allowing possible negotiations and the implementation of solutions in conflict situations, so as to guarantee an effective governance and security in those territories that have been abandoned, willingly or unwillingly, by the state.

The project firstly presents a review of a selected number of literature works that attempted to find connections between insurgent organisations and public service delivery. The literature review, aimed at familiarising the reader with the topic of the dissertation as well as identifying the main hypotheses that would answer the research question, has been articulated in two sections, so as to cover both core concepts, such as the ones of violent non-state actors, jihadism, sovereignty, and public service delivery, as well as the literature behind the elaboration of the hypotheses.

The second chapter of the dissertation deals with the enunciation of the research question and of the hypotheses, with their subsequent operationalisation. The project is then structured so as to offer the reader a two-fold research: on the one hand, chapter three and four develop a quantitative analysis, availing themselves of statistical regression models to detect variables that have strong connections with the dependent variable, public service delivery. To do so, a selection of case studies was carried out by picking terrorist groups satisfying specific requirements, and a dataset was subsequently created in order to operationalise the dependent and independent variables. On the other hand, chapter five represents a qualitative analysis of the results, by presenting a case study of one of the groups researched, the Al-Nusra Front, considering that it would have provided a better insight of the phenomenon to both familiar and unfamiliar readers to the topic analysed.

The research outlined three main variables that present a strong correlation with public service delivery: the terrorist group's size, the central state's welfare offer, and the terrorist group's ultimate goal. Despite proving that every terrorist organisation controlling a territory will provide, or attempt to provide, social services, a regression analysis of the dataset created highlighted how bigger groups with state-formation aspirations that reside in a territory whose central state offers already a variety of public services, will be more likely to engage themselves in this provision than other groups.

The results appear to indicate that an increase of a terrorist organisation's engagement in public service delivery has structural and ideological roots: an increasing number of operatives leads to higher chances of survival and therefore to the possibility to consider other activities beyond the fight against the incumbent state. At the same time, evidence appears to point towards the idea that political aspirations supersede ideological and religious views, even when talking about jihadist groups: the terrorist organisations will put aside religious aspirations, often connected with the idea of engaging a "global jihad", in order to reach their primary, political goal, which is the formation of an alternative state. Despite the obvious limitations to the findings, mainly due to the uncertainty pervading the quality of data related to terrorist organisations, to which the project has decided to dedicate a separate

section in Chapter Three, the findings of this research present a first step towards a better understanding of the jihadist phenomenon under a geopolitical perspective, which may be useful to both academic research and public policy.

2. LITERATURE REVIEW

In order to assess the research question properly, a study of relevant literature was carried out on a variety of subjects, including violent non-state actors (VNSAs), sovereignty, terrorism, and public service delivery. The review develops in two parts: first, a conceptual framework that is necessary to identify the main topics of the project; second, a theoretical framework of the literature that has already singled out some key explanatory variables of the phenomenon assessed by this project.

As previously mentioned, the dissertation will analyse international geopolitics from a pluralist perspective: even though states remain the most important actors, they increasingly have to deal with other participants in such a way that they have been constrained to reduce their autonomy. The pluralist perspective does not underline an obvious hierarchy, even though it considers multiple centres of power (Hollis 1992, p. 38): by applying this mind-set, the final project places VNSAs at the same level as states, contemplating their capability to perform the same tasks, including public service delivery.

2.1. Conceptual framework.

A review of some core concepts, such as the ones of violent non-state actors, terrorism, jihadism, sovereignty, and public service delivery, is necessary in order to assess the research question of the dissertation.

Violent non-state actors (VNSAs), also known as non-state armed actors (NSAs), include a wide variety of subgroups, such as, among others, militias, paramilitary groups, organised-crime groups, and terrorist groups. Hofmann and Schneckener (2011, p. 2) define them as:

"distinctive organizations that are (i) willing and capable to use violence for pursuing their objectives and (ii) not integrated into formalized state institutions (...) [and] (iii) possess a certain degree of autonomy with regard to politics, military operations, resources, and infrastructure".

Due to several circumstances, states retreat, leaving the population and parts of their territory behind at the mercy of these actors. These territories are seldom defined by academics as "**ungoverned spaces**" (Clunan and Harold, 2010), *terra nullius* (*idem.*), or black spots (Stanislawski, 2008). The common assumption is that the lack of a state authority equates to anarchy. However, it can be argued that there is evidence suggesting the existence of a social order even in areas where armed groups are present

(Mampilly 2012, p. 28). As they perform elements of governance, VNSAs become "perforators of **sovereignty**" (García Segura 1993, 27) by mining at least one of the three elements that characterise a state, namely (a) the control over a delimited territory, (b) the control over the population residing within the territory, and (c) a government (Montevideo Convention, 1933; Crawford, 2006).

Among violent non-state actors, **terrorist groups** are a widely-studied phenomenon in the literature of international relations. However, as underlined by Brian Phillips (2015, p. 228), there is a surprising lacuna regarding what constitutes a terrorist group per se. The author distinguishes between two types of approaches, namely the exclusive and the inclusive one. The first approach makes a key distinction between groups that hold a territory and groups that do not, defining as "terrorist" only the latter (*ibid.*, p. 231); the second approach, on the other hand, argues that "territory-holding groups that use terrorism have a great deal in common with terrorist groups that do not" (*ibid.*, p. 237). Considering the scope of the project, the dissertation will lean towards an inclusive definition of terrorist groups. Thus, it will define them as those groups that, regardless their territorial control, engage in a terrorist act, which is characterised by three main elements: (i) intentional violence, (ii) the aim to spread fear in a wider audience, and (iii) political motivation (Weinberg and Eubank, 2010; Schmid 2004, p. 382).

The dissertation decided to concentrate its analysis only on terrorist groups inspired by some form of Islam. Regarding this concept, a distinction must be underlined between "Islamism" and "Jihadism". An "Islamist group" is commonly defined as a group that is influenced by the Islamic religion. On the contrary, "**Jihadism**" is generally understood in the academia as a term constructed in Western languages in order to describe those movements that not only are Islamic-driven, but also recur to illegitimate violence (Hegghammer 2014, p. 246).

Jihadist groups mainly developed in the so-called Fourth Wave of modern terrorism, defined by Rapaport (in Weinberg and Eubank, 2010) as the "religious transcendence" phase that started in the 1970s. The Fourth Wave's terrorist organisations differ from previous terrorist groups and guerrillas as they are rooted in a broadly-based mass movement of protest and are grounded in a religious discourse. As underlined by Piazza (2009), jihadist groups differ in specific aspirations, such as domestic or international agenda, and short-term goals. A good majority, mostly al-Qaeda affiliated groups, accompany to specific goals "a global and unified vision of Muslims and see the entire Muslim Umma (global community) as the benefactors of their activities, and the entire world as the audience to their attacks" (*idem.*, 66). On the other hand, some other groups, despite being jihadist, place the Islamic objective in a secondary position with respect to their other, often political, goals.

The last important concept that has to be reviewed is the one of **public service delivery**¹. The definition of this concept presents some difficulty, due to the fact that there are different interpretations, in the academia, of the term "public service". It appears, in fact, that authors differ in the identification of services, with some being more inclusive and some others more exclusive.

Therefore, the dissertation, when defining a public service, will then refer to a "good or ad hoc service that is considered important for a particular community" (Acosta et al. 2013, p. 19). Additionally, for the sake of consistency, in order to match with the data presented in the dataset created, the project decided to limit the number of services. To do so, it referred to the 1994 UNDP's definition of human security (UNDP 1994, p. 3) that expanded the concept of security beyond the idea of protection from external threats, and developed a definition that would put the individual at the centre, instead of the state. As a conclusion, among the services that were kept into consideration there are healthcare, education, provision of personal security (protection from harm), food and water aid, infrastructure, and basic economy.

2.2. Theoretical framework.

When analysing violent non-state actors engaging in public service delivery, the existing literature tends to focus on groups such as militias, warlords, and rebel groups, while identifying some key explanatory variables to this behaviour. As explained in the conceptual review, this paper treats jihadist terrorist groups as a separate entity, as they differ from other insurgencies due to their transnational mix of recruits, support networks, ideology – where religion is strongly embedded into politics –, and view of the map of the world.

Several authors (Mehrotra, 2005; Deininger, 2005; Joshi, 2007) analyse the correlation between the provision of social services and government accountability. **Mehrotra** (2005.) argues that there is a linkage between state failure and the decentralization of the provision of social services. However, the author refers to the delivery of services promoted by the private, still legitimate, sector, not to violent non-state actors.

Following this line, public service delivery is often associated to government legitimacy: **Krasner and Risse** (2014, p. 546), argue that three factors are strictly related to the extent to which external actors, including violent ones, engage in the provision of services: (i) legitimacy, (ii) task complexity, and (iii) institutionalisation. Legitimacy, they argue, will allow single actors to accomplish a variety of tasks even with modestly institutionalised structures. The level of complexity also influences the

¹ In the dissertation, the terms "public service delivery", "public service", "social service" and "welfare", are interchangeable. This is due to the fact that there is no official, unique definition of what a "service" is. Therefore, as authors use different terms in the papers and articles that were used to operationalise public service delivery in the dataset and to identify the hypotheses, this project decided to interchange the terms.

outcome of the provision: the simpler the task, the more likely it will be performed. Finally, the authors argue that "higher legalization increases the prospects for effective service provision" (*ibid.*, p. 547). According to Krasner and Risse's analysis task complexity could influence terrorist groups' likeliness to engage in service provision; at the same time, groups that become more institutionalised and embedded in the system will be more likely to offer services to the population.

Mampilly (2012, p. 28) focusses on economic incentives, state formation, and the rebel groups' behaviour. As an example, he argues that warlords will provide any public good "solely in pursuit of financial gain" (*ibid.*, p. 29). However, warlords are, by definition, politically non-ideological; taking into account economic incentives as the only explanation would not keep into consideration the third characteristic of terrorist groups. Therefore, the inclusion of terrorist groups in the warlord category "reduces the action of complex political actors to little more than the behaviour of criminal syndicates" (*ibid.*, p. 30). For this reason, it is important to include the ideological and political factor when looking for the explanatory causes of jihadists' public service delivery: either state-formation aspirations, or religious affiliation need to play a role in the decision-making process.

Arjona (2016, pp. 22, 28) defines as "wartime social order" a set of institutions present in a war zone, namely an area where at least one non-state armed actor is present. In identifying several typologies of wartime social order, the author defines as "rebelocracy" an area where non-state armed groups intervene by providing, for example, basic services. Among some possible explanations for rebel governance, she argues that armed group's with a long time horizon located in a territory with a low quality of pre-existing local institutions will give birth to a rebelocracy (*ibid.*, p. 42). Short-term horizons are set when the territory is disputed, when the group has no internal order, and when there are no macro-changes in the war (*ibid.*, p. 55): therefore, jihadist groups facing no opposition – aside from the state one –, internally ordered, and in a non-mutating war setting should engage in public service delivery as part of the rebelocracy creation process.

Blomberg, Gaibullov, and Sandler's (2011, p. 19) research found that the size of a terrorist group has a positive connection with the organisation's survival, meaning that an increase in size enhances the chances that the terrorist group will survive. This affirmation is supported also by **Jones and Libicki** (2008, pp. xiv-xv), who underline that bigger groups have a higher chance of being victorious in battle and tend to last longer. This argument can be combined with the ones that had been formulated by Arjona (2016) regarding conflict intensity: in the same way that the author had argued that groups with long-term horizons will be more likely to engage in public service delivery, it is possible to argue that bigger groups, considering their higher chances of survival, will have a long-term horizon, and therefore will be more likely to provide public services.

Another link that can be outlined between public service delivery and terrorist groups relates to the organisations' composition. **Mendelsohn** (2011, pp. 195-196) argues that foreign fighters might hinder the efforts of the jihadi group, not only because they lack of any military training, but also because they do not have barely any knowledge regarding the territory composition and local conditions. According to the author, recent experiences of Al Qaeda in Yemen highlighted the necessity of using local forces instead of foreign fighters, who instead are preferred for more typical terrorist activities such as e.g. suicide bombings. Foreign fighters, Mendelsohn (2011) argues, may become a liability and have a severe negative impact on the local population and the outcome of the conflict: "Sometimes the level of 'foreignness' can be greater than the commonalities, potentially rendering foreign volunteers a divisive factor rather than a force multiplier" (*ibid.*, p. 193). This argument can be applied to public service delivery: as they have no knowledge of local conditions, it is more likely that groups presenting a high percentage of foreign fighters will offer less services than the ones composed primarily by local fighters.

Finally, some authors connect the provision of services by non-state armed groups to the process of state formation. **Mampilly** (2012, p. 38) argues that such embryonic states "exist solely in situations where the incumbent state is no longer able or willing to pose a challenge to non-state political authority". However, the idea that service provision may represent an embryonic state building clashes with some terror groups' ideology. As **Mendelsohn** (2005, p. 56) argues, some terror groups

"confine their attacks to the sovereignty of a specific state (...) [some others] seek to transform the whole system by creating a new world order based on their religion. Such groups challenge the foundations of the IS".

Therefore, it can be hypothesised that terrorist groups that have aspirations of either a separate state or substituting the incumbent state will provide social services, only when they exist and act in a territory where the central state does not represent a menace.

2.3. Research question and Hypotheses.

As stated in the Introduction, the paper aims at examining the following research question:

Q: Why do some jihadist terrorist groups engage more in public service delivery than others?

Starting from the literature review, and the theoretical and conceptual framework delineated in the previous section, the paper outlines six hypotheses:

H1: The less foreign fighters a Jihadist group has, the stronger is its involvement in public service delivery.

This hypothesis keeps into consideration the nature and composition of jihadist groups, and Mendelsohn (2011)'s arguments regarding the possible ineffectiveness of foreign fighters within a terrorist organisation. A positive testing would indicate that attachment to the territory and the knowledge of local conditions influence the provision of services to the local population, thus jihadist groups composed by locals will be more likely to engage in service delivery than the ones formed by foreign fighters.

H2: The higher the conflict intensity, the weaker is the group's involvement in public service delivery.

Basing on Krasner and Risse's (2014) idea of task complexity, Mampilly's (2012) argument regarding the process of state formation, and Arjona's (2016) rebelocracy conditions, this hypothesis argues that, wherever there will be a low conflict intensity – thus it is easier to provide services (low tax complexity) and the incumbent state does not pose a challenge to the jihadist group's authority – there will be high provision of social services.

H3: The more national, delimited, and state-related agenda of jihadist, the greater involvement in public service delivery.

In relation to the argument that the provision of services by non-state armed groups is connected with the process of state formation, as well as Krasner and Risse (2014)'s idea of legitimacy, this hypothesis would argue that if the group has a more national, delimited, and state-related agenda, then it will engage in public service delivery. The argument of this hypothesis is that groups aiming at replacing the incumbent state will attempt to win the hearts and mind of the territory's population by offering more services.

H4: The intervention of external forces influences the degree of involvement of jihadist groups in public service delivery.

As outlined by Arjona (2016, p. 55), jihadist groups that face no opposition aside from the state should engage in public service delivery. The fourth hypothesis of this paper splits into two sub-hypotheses:

H4a. The stronger support of an external force (reduced task complexity), the bigger is the chance the terrorist group will provide social services.

H4b. The stronger the opposition of an external force (increased task complexity), aside of the one of the central state, the less likeliness to provide public services by the terrorist group.

H5: The more central control exerted by the legitimate state, the lesser engagement by the terrorist group in public service delivery.

Considering the political aspirations of some terrorist groups, as outlined by Mendelsohn (2011) and Mampilly (2012), a positive correlation between this hypothesis and public service delivery would indicate that the extent of the control exerted by the central state – expressed in state legitimacy and the country's public service delivery – will affect the extent of public service delivery offered by the terrorist group.

H6: The nature of the terrorist group influences the degree of delivery of public services.

This hypothesis splits into two sub-hypotheses, basing on the arguments provided by Arjona (2016) and Blomberg, Gaibullov, and Sandler (2011):

H6a. Older terrorist groups will provide more services than younger groups;

H6b. Larger terrorist groups will provide more services than smaller groups.

3. DEVELOPMENT OF THE DATASET.

3.1. Development of the database.

The project carried out a selection of cases in order to assess the research question elaborated in the previous section. It was decided to analyse a number of terrorist groups that fulfilled the following requirements:

- a) The group followed the jihadist ideology or were inspired by some form of Islam;
- b) The group was still active² as a terrorist organisation as per the period 2010-2013³;
- c) The groups exerted a control, even minimal, over a territory, during at least one year in the abovementioned period.

As a first step, the project relied on the Big, Allied and Dangerous (BAAD) online database, a platform elaborated by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) of the University of Maryland, United States, which contained narratives related to the most important terrorist organisations. Considering the scope of the project, only groups that were falling under the *Religion* category were chosen, narrowing the number to 57. The second step consisted in picking only those groups that followed or were inspired by some form of jihadist ideology: in this way, the number of cases selected reduced to 45.

² With the term "active", the paper intends groups that were responsible, as per the period 2010-2013, of terrorist attacks or that were still designated as terrorist organisations by the United States. For this reason, it was decided to include some groups, such as Hamas or Hezbollah, despite their slow transitioning towards legitimate politics.

³ As previously mentioned, the period 2010-2013 was chosen as the majority of groups presented enough data available to operationalise the hypotheses. Some of the groups chosen, however, may have their foundation year subsequent to the year 2010. At the same time, the degree of activity, in both terrorist attacks and public service delivery, may have changed over the course of the years.

Subsequently, the groups were matched with the ones presented by the list of actors of the UCDP Event Dataset (GED) Global version 18.1 (2017), a dataset developed by the Uppsala University about armed external and internal conflicts occurring since 1946. The data provided by the Uppsala University resulted to be helpful in the operationalisation of some of the hypotheses: for this reason, groups that did not figure in the dataset, despite many being present in the List of Actors, were excluded from the project.

Additionally, in order to allow better accuracy, the study excluded groups that did not appear in neither the START Narratives, nor in the ones of the Mapping Militants Project by Stanford University and of the Mackenzie Institute. The choice of relying on not one, but three narratives from three different institutes relies in the will to match as many data as possible, as well as to provide the most accurate version. Due to the uncertain nature of terrorist organisation, finding reliable sources represents a difficult task: for this reason, this project decided to compare the different narratives in order to operationalise the explanatory variables as accurately as possible. In this way, the total number of cases was reduced to 19, which are the following:

Table .3.1: List of actors.

<i>group</i>	<i>code</i>	<i>location</i>	<i>f_year</i>
Abu Sayyaf Group	ASG	Philippines	1991
Al-Nusrah Front (Jabhat Al-Nusra)	FSA	Syria	2012
Al-Qa'ida (Core, The Base)	AQ	Pakistan	1998
Al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula	AQAP	Yemen	2009
Al-Qa'ida in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb	AQIM	Algeria	2007
Al-Shabaab	AS	Somalia	2006
Ansar Al-Islam	AAI	Iraq	2001
Boko Haram	BH	Nigeria	2002
Hamas	HAM	Palestinian Territories	1994
Hizballah	HEZ	Lebanon	2009
Hizbul Al Islam	HAI	Somalia	2009
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan	IMU	Pakistan	1998
Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham	IS	Iraq	2004
Jemaah Islamiya	JI	Indonesia	1993
Lashkar-E-Taiba	LET	Pakistan	1990
Mahdi Army	MA	Iraq	2003
Moro Islamic Liberation Front	MILF	Philippines	1978

Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa	MUJAO Mali	2011
Taliban	TAL Afghanistan	1994

3.2. Operationalisation of the hypotheses.

As previously mentioned, the project identified six possible explanations to why some terrorist jihadist groups controlling a territory engage more in public service delivery than others. In order to develop the database, the variables were coded as it follows:

Table .3.2: Codebook.

<i>variable</i>	<i>definition of the categories</i>
name	Name of the group as defined in the BAAD online platform and in the UCDP database.
code	Code of the group.
location	Location of the group as defined in the BAAD online platform.
f_year	Foundation year of the group as defined in the BAAD Narratives.
g_age	Age of the group as per the year 2013.
s_leg	State legitimacy according to the Fragile State Index for the year 2013. As defined by the Fragile State Index (FSI), the indicator "State legitimacy" indicates the representativeness and openness of the government and its relationship with its citizens. The variable is coded by the FSI through a scale ranging from 1 to 10, where 1 indicates high legitimacy enjoyed by the central state, and 10 indicates a low central state legitimacy.
s_psd	Public service delivery offered by the state according to the Fragile State Index for the year 2013. The FSI defines public service delivery in a similar way to the one chosen by this project, intending it as the presence of basic state functions that provide essential services to the people. The variable is coded by the FSI through a scale ranging from 1 to 10, where 1 indicates a high amount of services offered by the central state and 10 a low level of services.
g_size	Approximation of the number of members of a terrorist organisation for the year 2013, as defined in the narratives proposed by START, the Mapping Militants Project, and the Mackenzie Institute. The variable was operationalised as it follows: "1" = between 1 and 1000 members; "2" = between 1001 and 10,000 members; "3" = more than 10,000 members.
g_comp	Composition of the terrorist group. The variable was coded following an analysis of several media sources published in English between January 1, 2010 and December 31,

2013. The media sources were extracted from an online database which presents a constantly-updated version of a high amount of news articles and reports published since 1940.

The search was performed through the following search string:

“(Name of the group) AND (foreign or domestic or regional) fighter*”.

Whenever the search did not give any result, additional research was conducted through the Mackenzie Institute's group narratives. The variable was operationalised as it follows:

"0" = no mention of foreign-fighter presence in the group;

"1" = sources mention the presence of foreign fighters.

d_time Average for the total highest-reliable estimates of total fatalities for the period 2010-2013, operationalised by the UCDP Dataset under the variable *high_est*, whenever the terrorist group was labelled as *side_b* in a conflict.

g_obj As there is no comprehensive database that operationalised the terrorist groups' agenda, it was decided to rely on the narratives presented by the Mapping Militants Project and the BAAD narratives, under the "Goal" section. The variable is coded into two categories:

"1" = objectives limited to national boundaries;

"0" = objectives exceed national boundaries (e.g. global jihad, no state-formation aspirations).

ex_supp Support to the group offered by an external force. The data was calculated by looking at the Mapping Militants Projects and BAAD online database narratives, whether they mentioned external state sponsorship, financing, or training offered to the terrorist group⁴. The variable was operationalised as it follows:

"1" = mention of external support;

"0" = no mention of external support.

ex_opp Opposition of an external force. The data was calculated by looking at the variable *type_of_conflict* operationalised by the UCDP Battle-Related Deaths Dataset. This dataset, part of the Uppsala University project, represents a conflict-year dataset regarding the number of battle-related deaths in the conflicts from 1989-2017. The variable is divided into two categories:

⁴ By operationalising external sponsorship, financing, or training, the project kept into consideration also allegations of external support.

"1" = the conflict is labelled as *type* "5";

"0" = the conflict is operationalised in the UCDP Dataset as *type* 1-3⁶.

Whenever the Dataset was not offering any result, it was decided to rely once again on the BAAD Narratives, operationalising the variable:

"1" = mention of an external military intervention;

"0" = no mention of an external military intervention.

g_psd Public service delivery offered by the terrorist group. The variable was calculated by extracting several media sources in English published between January 1, 2010 and December 31, 2013, from the search engine used to calculate the group composition. The search was conducted by counting the number of articles reporting a positive relationship between the terrorist group and public service delivery. The search string used was the following:

"Group name(s) same ((provid* or suppl* or deliver* or offer* or engag* or build*)
/N5/ (food or water or infrastructure or school* or hospital or education* or health or
public service* or social service*))"

4. ANALYSIS OF THE RESULTS.

Multiple regression analysis was used to test which one of the formulated hypotheses predicted a terrorist group's delivery of public services between the years 2010 and 2013. This model was chosen due to the fact that regression analysis allows a greater control by reducing at minimum the effects of confounding variables through the description of how the changes in each independent variable are related to the dependent variable. In the analysis, variables group goal (*g_obj*), the support to the group offered by an external force (*ex_supp*), as well as the external force's opposition (*ex_opp*), and group composition (*g_comp*) were set to be dummy variables. The analysis was carried out adopting the following steps⁷:

- a) *Step 1*: regression analysis for all the continuous variables (group age *g_age*, state legitimacy *s_leg*, state public service delivery *s_psd*, group size *g_sizw*, and total number fatalities *d_time*);

⁵ "Type 4" is defined as an internationalised internal conflict: side A is always a government and side B is always one or more rebel groups; at least one external government is coded as sideA2nd, therefore enter a conflict to actively support side A.

⁶ "Type 1, 2, and 3" are defined as non-internationalised conflicts.

⁷ For the whole process, see Annex.

- b) *Step 2*: regression analysis by performing a feature selection of the variables, by taking out, one by one, all the continuous variables whose P-value was $> 0.1^8$. The feature selection allowed better accuracy whilst requiring less data;
- c) *Step 3*: regression analysis for the remaining continuous variables (*g_age*, *s_psd*, *g_size*), and the dummy variables (*g_comp*, *obj*, *ex_supp*, *ex_opp*), one at a time.

Table 4.1 and 4.2 summarise the final findings regarding the prediction of public services delivery:

Table 4.1 Regression analysis of the continuous variables and the dummy variable g_obj.

	<i>Coefficients</i>	<i>P-value</i> ⁹
Intercept	39.58957	0.300643
s_leg	1.08681	0.80002
d_time	0.000373	0.87677
g_age	-0.82806	0.108422
s_psd	-8.14008	0.050372
g_size	17.32712	0.012891
g_obj	16.22287	0.058976

Table 4.2: Regression analysis of the variables g_age, s_psd, g_size, and the dummy variable g_obj.

	<i>Coefficients</i>	<i>P-value</i>
Intercept	41.91166	0.107118
g_age	-0.83161	*
s_psd	-7.33569	**
g_size	17.86916	***
g_obj	15.972	**

The model found weak evidence of connection between public service delivery and variables average of deaths over time and state legitimacy, which presented p-values above 0.1 during the first feature

⁸ In statistical analysis, p-values higher than 0.05 indicate a particularly weak evidence of connection between the dependent and the independent variable. For the first feature selection, the project decided to focus on p-values lower than 0.1, which still indicate a positive evidence.

⁹ *** = 99 percent/values below 0.01,

** = 95 percent/values below 0.05.

* = 90 percent/values below 0.1.

For the complete data, see Annex.

selection. In this way, hypothesis 2 and part of hypotheses 5 were excluded as possible explanation to the terrorist groups' behaviour. Additionally, the testing of the remaining continuous variables with the dummy variables external support and opposition, and group composition provided no positive result: consequently, hypotheses 1, 4a and 4b turned out not to directly affect public service delivery.

When service provision was predicted, it was found that group size (H6b, p-value = 0.004), the central state's public service delivery (H5, p-value = 0.02), the group's objective (H3, p-value = 0.04), and the group's age (H6a, p-value = 0.7), listed in terms of importance, were significant predictors.

The analysis demonstrated a positive relation between group size and public service delivery, indicating that the larger the terrorist group, the greater the delivery of services it offered. Additionally, it highlighted a strong evidence of positive connection between the group's objective and the dependent variable. On the other hand, it underlined a negative relationship between public service delivery offered by the state and public service delivery offered by terrorist group: it appeared that the more services the central state was offering (and therefore low indicator registered), the more the services that were provided by the terrorist group. Furthermore, the variable related to the group's age (H6a) - despite presenting a p-value slightly higher than 0.05, which made it less relevant in comparison to the other variables - showed a negative relationship with the dependent variable: the younger the group, the more public service delivery.

Therefore, the analysis confirmed some of the hypotheses (H3 and H6) formulated in the previous chapter, invalidated others (H1, H2, and H4), and finally highlighted a strong link between some of the hypotheses and public service delivery (H5 and H6), however not the one that had been predicted at the beginning. In short terms, a relatively-not-too-old terrorist group, with many members and state-formation aspirations and residing in a territory where the state offers a high degree of social services, will be more likely to provide itself services than other groups.

Regarding the group size, the hypothesis that had been formulated was based on Blomberg, Gaibullov, and Sandler's (2011) research regarding a terrorist group's size and the organisation's survival, as well as on Arjona's (2016) work regarding the relationship between long-term horizons and governance. The model confirmed the initial hypothesis, showing that a bigger terrorist group will probably provide more services than a smaller group.

The second hypothesis that proved to have a connection related to the degree of services offered by the central state. The project had formulated its hypothesis on Mampilly's (2012) argument that embryonic states exist solely whenever the incumbent state is failing, failed, or collapsed. This argument, at least limited to welfare provision, has been proven to be the opposite. The analysis highlighted a negative relationship between the data operationalised by the Failed State Index and public service delivery. Therefore, the model outlined that the more the services are offered by the central state, the higher the

public services delivery offered by the terrorist group. Under the light of these findings, another interpretation needs to be found. Siqueira and Sandler (2006, p. 878) argue that

"when terrorists and the government act contemporaneously, the equilibrium outcome depends on (...) the ability of the government to curb popular support of the terrorists through public spending".

As in our model higher the central's state public service delivery equals to a higher terrorist group's offer of services, Siquiera and Sandler's (*idem*) argument can be reversed: the equilibrium outcome between the state and the terrorist group depends on the ability of the latter to curb popular support, by providing more services than the ones provided by the former. Therefore, a terrorist group will attempt to offer more services than the incumbent state, which explains why the more state services, the more the group's public service delivery.

The last hypothesis confirmed by the analysis was the one related to the aspirations of the terrorist group. The model highlighted that groups with a domestic agenda (operationalised with "1" in the dataset) are expected to engage more in public service delivery. Penzar and Srblijinović (2005, p. 28) underline that ideological organisations tend to control the amount of violence, which

"is usually subordinate to the achievement of other, often political, goals such as acquiring sympathies in public, attracting attention, exerting pressure needed for political negotiations, exhausting the opposing side, and lowering its morale".

It is likely, then, that the terrorist group whose objective is to become a state will subordinate all its actions to the accomplishment of this goal, and will try to gain local support by "stealing" the hearts and minds of the local population from the central government through the supply of social services.

The variable related to the group's age, despite not presenting a connection with public service delivery as strong as the other hypotheses analysed above, deserves a particular mention, as it proved to be the opposite of what had initially been hypothesised: younger groups appear to have engaged in public service delivery more than some older organisations. Different explanations can be provided. Among them, the specific period that was analysed by the project may provide an answer: the years 2010-2013 were the stage of a series of important events, including the Arab Spring or the war in Syria that highly mobilised the Muslim community, making the new-born terrorist groups already competing in size with older ones due to the great affluence of operatives. Another possible explanation is that younger groups are learning from the examples provided by older terrorist groups:

"Groups fighting under the al-Qaeda banner (...) are learning from past mistakes and establishing social services - baking bread and mending wounds - to win the hearts and minds of their constituency" (Zarate and Sanderson, 2013).

In conclusion, the model outlined that a terrorist group of large dimension, thus not worrying about its own survival, will be able to put its goal, state formation, upfront and subordinate all other activities to reach its objective. In order to win the hearts and minds of the population, it will then recur to the delivery of public services, which will be enhanced even more whenever the central state will represent a competitor in the provision.

4.1. Dataset¹⁰ limitations.

As mentioned above, collecting data regarding terrorist organisations may represent a complicated task due to the difficulty of finding reliable and official information. As the aim of this project is to present an analysis as less biased as possible, it was deemed important to underline that some factors may have affected the collection of data and therefore the results presented above:

- a) Some of the variables, such as the group composition or the group's public service delivery (*g_comp*; *g_psd*), were calculated following an analysis of media coverage related to each group: there is the chance, therefore, that groups that received a lot of public attention, such as Al Qaeda or the Islamic State, presented a greater coverage in comparison to smaller, more regional groups.
In addition, it is possible that media sources, especially the ones published by Western countries, may have been biased regarding specific terrorist organisations, and therefore may have deliberately chosen to omit information regarding the groups' public service delivery;
- b) All the variables were operationalised by looking at English sources: it is possible that this choice may have affected the results regarding regional groups, which may receive more media and academic coverage by regional newspapers or institutions;
- c) As previously mentioned, in order to present a standardised research and limit the scope of the analysis it was decided to focus on the period 2010-2013, which was the period in which the majority of the terrorist groups selected were active and that presented the higher amount of data available.

However, the extent of the group's activities may have changed during time, and so the media coverage. In particular, Boko Haram's media coverage regarding its public service delivery during this period resulted surprisingly low, despite the group's notorious engagement in the provision of services. This could be due to a series of reasons, such as, for example, the diminishing of Western interest in the group's activities. However, it was decided to include the group anyway in the research, as it is one of the most common examples of terrorist organisation exerting control over a delimited territory;

¹⁰ For the dataset, see Annex, Table 8.1.

- d) The variables regarding state legitimacy and state public service delivery (*s_leg* and *s_psd*) were calculated by using the data offered by the Fragile State Index. The FSI, however, does not recognise the State of Palestine and codes *s_leg* and *s_psd* for the territory under the case Israel/West Bank. It is possible, therefore, that the results have been slightly altered;
- e) The variable regarding the terrorist groups' public service delivery was calculated through a simple count of the number of articles extracted on the search engine previously mentioned regarding the organisations' engagement in the provision of public services.
In relation to this choice, it is important to highlight the presence of a study conducted by Heger and Fung (2015), the Terrorist and Insurgent Organization Social Services (TIOS) Dataset, which tracked the provision of services by violent non-state actors through a similar system to the one used by this research. Despite the fact it granted a better accuracy regarding the services offered, this project decided not to rely on the TIOS database, as it often did not match with the other databases and narratives used for the research.
- f) The necessity of having enough data for each of the variable selected has implied the use of a high number of databases provided by different organisation. The fact that these databases often did not analyse the same terrorist groups, resulted in the selection of a small number of cases, which represents a problem for the accuracy of statistical analysis using the regression method.

5. CASE STUDY: THE AL-NUSRA FRONT.

In July 2016, news circulated among the public that the Al-Nusra Front, one of the actors involved in the complex Syrian conflict, had decided to change its name and break up the ties with the former terrorist allied Al Qaeda. The group's leader, in a brief recording, thanked Al Qaeda for understanding the group's move, underlining the need to cut ties with foreign aid, so as to protect the Syrian revolution (Shay and Karmon 2016, p. 3).

As explained by Shay and Karmon (*ibid.*, p. 4), this move was essential for the organisation:

"with its break from AQ, Nusra looks to win the hearts and minds of the Syrian people, building an Islamic society from the bottom-up through *dawa* activities providing basic services to earn residents' trust."

Al Nusra's move towards public service delivery was not the result of a sudden political manoeuvre elaborated by its leaders to avoid the group's decline in 2016: records of Al-Nusra's involvement in public service delivery, from the distribution of bread to the setting up of the first hospital camps, date

back since the group's first establishment in 2012. For this and many other reasons, the Al-Nusra Front represents a good case study for proving the results of this project's quantitative analysis.

Formed in November 2012, the Al Nusra Front rapidly grew in the turbulent Syrian background, comprising between 1,001 and 10,000 members just one year after its foundation. The group's size made the organisation an immediate competitor for the actors already playing a role in the Syrian conflict: designated as a foreign terrorist organisation in December 2012 by the United States, it took not much time for the group to become in the Syrian conflict not only a player, but also a close ally of Al Qaeda, despite the latter having had a relative minor role in the war in comparison to its former affiliate, the Islamic State.

Starting from the group's main characteristics, the Al-Nusra Front can be defined as a jihadist organisation: as a matter of fact, not only is the group Islamic-driven, but it has also resorted to violence, being protagonist of a series of deadly attacks since its formation in 2012. As per territory control, the group was reported to share with the Islamic States some strongholds in the north-western region of Syria in December 2013 (Political Geography Now, 2013). By August 2014, the Al-Nusra Front was reputed to be controlling a large part of the area surrounding the Syrian city of Idlib (Political Geography Now, 2014). As shown in the dataset (Table 8.1), the group, despite being composed primarily by Syrian jihadist fighters, also comprised a number of foreign fighters in its ranks. Being an anti-Assad force involved in the Syrian conflict, the group faced important external opposition, while it did not enjoy any support from external state forces as per 2013.

As mentioned above, Al-Nusra scored high in the delivery of the public services reported in the dataset after only one year of activity, surpassing its well-established affiliate Al Qaeda and its competitor in Syria, the Islamic State. The model chosen by this project underlined three main factors that could have influenced the terrorist organisation's higher or lower involvement in the public service delivery: (a) the group's size, (b) the central state's offer of services, and (c) the group's main goal. The next step, therefore, is to see whether these results prove to be true with the Al-Nusra organisation.

As per the first hypothesis, the group's size, Al-Nusra complies with it: as reported by the Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center (ITIC) on September 23, 2013, the estimated number of operatives of the group after only one year of activity was between 6,000 and 7,000. Additionally, the number was expected to be growing. (ITIC. 2013, p. 1).

Regarding the second hypothesis, the degree of social services provided by the central state, the Fragile State Index, as duly reported in the dataset, rates the Syrian government 7/10¹¹ for the year

¹¹ It is important to remember that, in order to read the FSI, the higher the rate, the lower the provision.

2013, indicating a low level of provision. As this data appears to be in contrast with the findings of this project, further research was conducted in order to give it an interpretation.

A possible explanation to this anomaly can be given by looking at the context in which Syria's public service delivery was rated: in 2013, the country had been in a civil war since almost two years, making it harder for the central government to be present through the delivery of public services. Considering that a somewhat-established country like Israel was rated 5.9 in the same year, rating Syria, a country facing a civil war, with 1.1 points more does not appear as negative as it does at first instance. Even more, before the civil war erupted, the regime scored even better, with a 5.6 in 2008, and a 5.5 in 2006, ratings similar to both Israel and Lebanon, two of the countries within which reside two of the most important terror organisations that provide public services: Hamas and Hezbollah. In the words of Adam Coutts:

"most [of the Syrian population] had accepted a decades-long trade off: stability, security and a decent standard of living in return for not openly criticising the government. All this in a region plagued by rampant insecurity, sectarian polarisation, foreign intervention and inadequate social welfare was an attractive option." (Coutts, 2011)

It can be argued, therefore, that the Al-Nusra's Front looks at the pre-war levels and attempts to represent an alternative to the previous' Assad stability, in order not to make the Syrian population regret its uprising.

The last hypothesis that was proven to be strongly connected with public service delivery was the group's aspirations: the more domestic and state-formation aspirations, the more public service delivery. Al-Nusra appears to comply with it: the group's ultimate goal is the creation of an Islamic Caliphate in "the Greater Syria". In order to do this, the organisation is deemed to be more pragmatic than its counterpart, the Islamic State:

"the organisation's goal (...) is to topple the Syrian regime by means of jihad. Only after the regime is toppled will there be talks (...) to decide on an acceptable direction for the new state to take" (ITIC 2013, p. 44).

In these elements resides the main difference between the organisation and the Islamic State: the prioritisation of the fight against Assad in order to topple its government, instead of joining a global jihad, the decision to stick to a grass-roots approach, and a gradual attainment of a Syrian Islamic emirate (Shay and Karmon 2016, pp. 3-4). These elements, then, explain why the Al-Nusra Front is prompter to provide social services than the IS.

To sum up, the example of the Al-Nusra Front appears to confirm the hypotheses identified by the project as the most relevant in connection with public service delivery. A relatively-young group, with

strong state-formation aspiration, a large number of operatives that act within a territory where the central competing state offered a good quantity of social services will provide more public service delivery than other terrorist organisations. The Front's strategy to win the hearts and minds of the average Syrian Muslim was said – at least in 2013 – to be working: in most cases, it was reported that the local residents appeared to be satisfied with their lives, normal once again after the breakout of the war (ITIC 2013, p. 5).

6. CONCLUSIONS.

Public service delivery has always been reputed to fall within the competences of states, which derive their legitimacy through the social contract, consisting mainly in the provision of social welfare and in the protection from threat.

As the years go by, state's presence in the public sphere becomes re-dimensioned, letting other actors leading the way towards the provision of social goods. Non-governmental organisations, companies, violent non-state actors, international and regional organisations: these actors have emerged and played an increasing role in the administration of social services, leading to a slow retreat of the state from the lives of its citizens. These actors are not new in the public arena; what is new is the role they play in the society. In more-troubled territories, where insecurity and instability impose the loss of some of the state land, we additionally assist to the growing presence of terrorist organisations, groups of an intrinsic violent nature, that offer services to an exhausted and fearful population.

This project has attempted to uncover the reasons why some jihadist terrorist organisations engage in public service delivery. Following an operationalisation of the different variables, it outlined that four factors, the group's size, the group's objective, the state's public service delivery and, of minor importance, the age of the group, exert the bigger influence in determining the degree of involvement in the social service provision.

The research underlined the organisations' need to win the hearts and minds of the local population residing in the territory they are controlling, to gain the competition with the central, legitimate state in order to become a new, hopefully jihadist, ruler. A large number of operatives, additionally, has been proven to be necessary in order to ensure high delivery: as the academia shows, the bigger group's greater expectancies of survival increase its long-term horizons, allowing it to engage in activities that go beyond the fight with the incumbent state.

An increasing body of literature highlights the importance and the growing presence of terrorist organisation in public service delivery. The common Western policy of not engaging in negotiations with terrorists has recently been questioned in terms of conflict resolution (Toros, 2008). However, under the light of this research's findings, this policy should be questioned also in terms of human

security. As terrorist groups substitute the state in the social contract, it is mandatory to question whether their elimination would cause further humanitarian crises in the territories they once controlled, provoking in this way an even greater radicalisation among the population, domestic and foreign.

The research has outlined that, whenever possible, terrorist organisations will engage in welfare activities: the dilemma that surges from this related to the necessity of reconsidering these groups' position in the international arena, as they slowly rob the state of its legitimacy. This research has attempted to make clearer the terrorists' motives in relation to public service delivery. As evidence is mounting that many terrorist organisations are moving towards the production of governance, thus not only engaging in violence, a better understanding of the groups' reasons will hopefully allow the understanding of governance in conflict zones and develop *ad-hoc* solutions to protect the human security of the populations who reside in those lands.

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8. ANNEX

Table 8.1: Jihadist groups and public service delivery dataset.

group	code	location	f. year	s. leg	g. age	s. psd	g. size	d. time	ex. sup	ex. opp	g. comp	g. obj	g. psd
Abu Sayyaf Group	ASG	Philippines	1991	7.6	22	6.4	1	72	0	1	1	1	0
Al-Nusra Front	FSA	Syria	2012	9.6	1	7	2	8.5	0	1	1	1	27
Al-Qa'ida	AQ	Pakistan	1998	8.4	15	7.3	1	195.75	0	0	1	0	7
Al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula	AQAP	Yemen	2009	9.3	4	8.7	1	1063.3	0	0	1	0	11
Al-Qa'ida in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb	AQIM	Algeria	1998	7.4	15	5.9	1	310.25	0	1	1	1	7
Al-Shabaab	AS	Somalia	2006	9.5	7	9.8	2	1475.3	1	1	1	1	5
Ansar Al-Islam	AAI	Iraq	2001	8.6	12	7.6	1	7.15	0	1	1	1	0
Boko Haram	BH	Nigeria	2002	8.8	11	9.3	1	1081.5	0	1	1	0	14
Hamas	HAM	Palestinian Territories	1994	6.7	19	5.9	3	15.75	1	0	0	1	65
Hizballah	HEZ	Lebanon	2009	7.2	4	5.6	2	14.75	1	0	0	0	55
Hizbul Al Islam	HAI	Somalia	2009	9.5	4	9.8	2	53.75	1	0	1	1	0
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan	IMU	Pakistan	1998	8.4	15	7.3	2	23.5	0	1	1	1	0
Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham	IS	Iraq	2004	8.6	9	7.6	2	2210.8	1	1	1	0	10
Jemaah Islamiya	Ji	Indonesia	1993	6.4	20	6.1	2	0	0	0	1	1	1
Lashkar-E-Taiba	LET	Pakistan	1990	8.4	23	7.3	2	0	1	0	0	0	30
Mahdi Army	MA	Iraq	2003	8.6	10	7.6	2	0	1	0	0	1	2
Moro Islamic Liberation Front	MILF	Philippines	1978	7.6	35	6.4	3	28.5	1	0	0	1	6
Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa	MUJAO	Mali	2011	6	2	8.5	1	89.5	1	1	1	0	2
Taliban	TAL	Afghanistan	1994	9.4	19	8.8	3	7645	1	1	1	1	20

Table 8.2: Regression analysis process.

a) Regression analysis of all continuous variables.

	<i>Coefficients</i>	<i>P-value</i>
Intercept	64.29041936	0.121799244
	-	
g_age	1.004809685	0.078879185
	-	
s_leg	0.701948647	0.881231797
	-	
s_psd	7.501961628	0.096259108
g_size	13.39671461	0.053711946
d_time	0.001029936	0.699964948

b) Regression analysis of all continuous variables minus *s_leg*

	<i>Coefficients</i>	<i>P-value</i>
Intercept	61.079944	0.072675706
	-	
g_age	0.996227594	0.068761935
	-	
s_psd	7.823578686	0.041413329
g_size	13.28451685	0.045459112
d_time	0.000970381	0.702935609

c) Regression analysis of continuous variables minus *d_time*

	<i>Coefficients</i>	<i>P-value</i>
Intercept	55.11698067	0.056737789
	-	
g_age	0.971302693	0.06453515
	-	
s_psd	7.188593297	0.029604983
g_size	14.17467984	0.019884154

d) Regression analysis of remaining continuous variable with dummy 1 *ex_opp*

	Coefficients	P-value
Intercept	56.62393226	0.056967057
	-	
g_age	0.980234945	0.068275132
	-	
s_psd	6.803085368	0.045602914
g_size	13.2719842	0.035501253
	-	
ex_opp	5.082324525	0.513281432

e) Regression analysis of remaining continuous variable with dummy 2 *g_comp*

	<i>Coefficients</i>	<i>P-value</i>
Intercept	60.79438182	0.030345144
	-	
g_age	0.995433795	0.046799385
	-	
s_psd	5.063599683	0.119559851
g_size	9.224886321	0.135868305
g_comp	-16.9484891	0.101520748

f) Regression analysis of remaining continuous variable with dummy 3 *ex_sup*

	<i>Coefficients</i>	<i>P-value</i>
Intercept	60.71873474	0.051589642
	-	
g_age	0.906988156	0.094685254
	-	
s_psd	7.701174039	0.028231179
g_size	10.83600352	0.172190135
ex_sup	6.444376499	0.522847594

g) Regression analysis of remaining continuous variable with dummy 4 *g_obj*

	<i>Coefficients</i>	<i>P-value</i>
Intercept	57.88366536	0.028272498
g_age	-	0.076803936

	0.831606358	
	-	
s_psd	7.335690189	0.015033237
g_size	17.86915521	0.0034325
	-	
g_obj	15.97200171	0.039688238
