When do Ethnic Organizations Resort to Violence in Democratic Countries? The Mapuche case

Stefania De Santis
Master’s in International Security
Academic year 2016-2017
ABSTRACT

The traditional literature on nationalism and ethnic conflict explains the outburst of civil war and ethnic violence introducing both endogenous and exogenous variables; for example, the characteristics of an ethnic community, its grievances, income variables, the fight for scarce resources, ancient hatreds and master cleavages between communities. However, such explanations focus on the group level of analysis, which is not suitable to disclose the behavioural variation of ethnic organizations within the same community. For the same reason individual-level explanations are also excluded. As a result, to fill this gap, focusing on ethnic organizations as the unit of analysis, the contribution of this paper is to analyse their behaviour to discern the variables that plausibly influence their actions, especially the decision on whether use or abstain from violence. Accordingly, drawing on social movements literature and on ethnic terrorism precepts, the research introduces the comparison of three Mapuche organizations active across Argentina and Chile: the Coordinadora Arauco Malleco, the Resistencia Ancestral Mapuche and the Confederación Mapuche de Neuquén. This comparison concludes that those ethnic organizations featuring an extremist and anti-capitalist ideology, lacking the support of influential and peaceful allies and fearing of being outbid by other organizations are more likely to resort to violence than those that do not show such characteristics.

Keywords

Ethnic organizations, ethnic violence, Argentina, Chile, Mapuche, Coordinadora Arauco Malleco, Resistencia Ancestral Mapuche, Confederación Mapuche de Neuquén.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................. 1

1.1 Relevance of the topic ...................................................................................................... 3

2. THEORY .................................................................................................................................. 5

2.1. Nationalism and ethnic conflict literature, the scholarly debate .................................. 5

2.2 Social movements literature ............................................................................................. 8

3. METHODOLOGY .................................................................................................................. 10

3.1 Dependent variable (DV) and independent variables (IVs) ........................................... 10

3.2 Operationalization ........................................................................................................... 12

3.3 Control variables .............................................................................................................. 13

4. COMPARATIVE CASE STUDIES. ......................................................................................... 14

4.1 The context ....................................................................................................................... 14

4.2 Analysis ............................................................................................................................. 15

   4.2.a) Coordinadora Arauco Malleco – CAM ..................................................................... 15

   4.2.b) Resistencia Ancestral Mapuche – RAM ................................................................. 17

   4.2.c) Confederación Mapuche de Neuquén – CMN ......................................................... 18

5. CONCLUSIONS .................................................................................................................... 22

REFERENCES .......................................................................................................................... 24

FIGURES AND TABLES

Table 1: Comparative Table: CAM-CMN-RAM ........................................................................ 20
1. INTRODUCTION

On July 29th 2014 the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR) condemned Chile for breaching indigenous peoples’ rights and using illegitimately the national legislation after it prosecuted and convicted land rights activists on the grounds of the anti-terrorist law n. 18.314 (IACHR 2014). Since their land dispossession at the end of the XIX century, the Mapuche have been claiming rights on their ancestral territories; however, since 2001 the government has started to criminalize such protests leading to an increase in violent clashes between the police and indigenous groups (Montes 2013). Recently, Argentina started to witness similar violent confrontations, especially in the Patagonian province of Chubut, where the natives are occupying portions of the territory currently owned by the Italian clothing colossus Benetton (Amnesty International 2017). Consequently, on both sides of the Andes such disputes have resulted in high levels of violence, imprisonment of activists, injured victims on both sides and sometimes in death (Pairicán and Álvarez 2011).

Inasmuch governments present this harsh policing strategy as the only viable response to the confrontational stance of the natives; the paper focuses on Mapuche organizations to probe their motives and tactics in order to corroborate if such policy is indeed effective to exacerbate violence.¹

Why are Mapuche organizations resorting to violent means?

The literature on ethnic conflict proposes many explanations regarding the reasons leading ethnic minorities to use violence. However, focusing on either the ethnic group as a whole or on the individual level, this scholarship is not suitable to explain why, despite belonging to the same community, some ethnic organizations use violence to meet their claims whereas other do not. This puzzle is the central focus here; the paper aims at partially filling this gap posing the attention on the organizational level of an ethnic group.

Subsequently, the study focuses on the Mapuche community living in the Southern Cone of Latin America, mainly in the Patagonian areas of Argentina and Chile, known, in Mapudungun (the Mapuche language), as Puelmapu and Gulumapu (Tricot 2011: 7). In both countries they represent the largest share of indigenous peoples; yet, a striking majority of them lives on the Western side of the Andes: there they account for about 87% among the endemic communities (INE 2002), whereas in Argentina for the 21.5% (INDEC 2010).²

¹ Police forces’ violence is not the central focus here since it is presented as a response to Mapuche violence. The objective during the study is to verify whether such governmental tactic is efficient or counter-productive.
² Instituto Nacional de Estadística (2002) “Censo 2002: Síntesis de resultados.” According to the latest reliable data, in 2002 the Mapuche accounted for 87.3% of the indigenous groups in Chile, that is to say, 4% of the total national population.
The Chilean regions hosting the highest number of Mapuche are: Araucanía, Los Ríos, Los Lagos, Bío Bío and the Metropolitan Region (Gobierno de Chile 2015); while in Argentina the most Mapuche populated provinces are: Río Negro, Neuquén and Chubut (INDEC 2010).

To begin, a little background should be helpful to understand the context in which the Mapuche operate.

Following the dispossession of their lands and their relegation to reserves, after the Desert Conquest in Argentina (1878-1885) and the Araucanía Pacification in Chile (1860-1883), the Mapuche began to claim the restitution of their ancestral land (Aylwin 2004: 5-6; Tomaselli 2016: 400). Accordingly, to strengthen their stance and voice their requests, the natives clustered around a number of ethnic organizations on both sides of the Andes (Ameghino 2013; Kropff 2005). Nevertheless, once democracy was re-established in both countries, those organizations voiced their demands in a variety of manners; some chose to use violence against the state and private companies, starting the so-called Mapuche conflict, while other preferred to act peacefully.

Subsequently, the paper aims at unravelling the variables that explain which conditions lead ethnic organizations to act in such divergent ways. To solve this puzzle, the writing introduces three cases: the Chilean Coordinadora Arauco Malleco (CAM) and the Argentinians Confederación Mapuche de Neuquén (CMN) and Resistencia Ancestral Mapuche (RAM), which, despite having similar objectives, e.g. to regain control over ancestral land and rebuild the Mapuche nation, act differently. The CAM uses violence, mainly sabotage actions against forestry and hydroelectric companies in the Araucanía region; the CMN is active in the Neuquén province and refutes violence operating through peaceful demonstrations, public statements, formal complaints and social networks; and the RAM, resorts to violence acting across the Neuquén, Río Negro and Chubut provinces. Nevertheless, its violent activity is mainly perpetrated in Chubut through ambush, firefights and incendiary actions against multinational companies (especially Benetton). The Mapuche conflict concerns also the Chilean and Argentinian governments for the CAM and the RAM, conceiving these states as symbols of the usurpation of their territory and the oppression of their peoples, have waged war against them once it was patent they favoured neoliberal policies and private companies’ business over indigenous rights. Such propensity fomented Mapuche evictions from many contested territories and vicious cycles of violence between police agents and Mapuche activists (Amnesty International 2017).

At this point, some conceptual clarifications are in order: “ethnic violence” is defined in collective terms and relates to the violence perpetrated by an ethnic group against the state (Varshney 2007) and multinational companies. Subsequently, an “ethnic group”, defined in terms of ethnic identity, is intended as a social group whose member eligibility is determined by descent-based characteristics

Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Censos (2010) “Censo Nacional de Población, Hogares y Vivienda 2010”. In Argentina, according to 2010 data, the Mapuche accounted for 21.5% of the total indigenous communities, about 0.52% of the total national population.
rather than political ideology, socioeconomic class or gender (Chandra 2006; Fearon 2006 quoted in Rørbæk 2017: 1) and, lastly, an “ethnic organization” is a representative of an entire community, which recruits members from the ethnic group and mobilizes on its behalf (Bormann et al. 2015: 757; Rørbæk 2017: 8). In other words, such organizations embrace and mobilize around their indigenous identity and act following collective demands as: territorial autonomy, new forms of political representation and bicultural education (Yashar 1998: 23). To meet these goals, ethnic organizations may operate by creating or adhering to political parties (Van Cott 2005), participating in peaceful demonstrations (Ibidem) or acting as a rebel movement challenging the government (Cederman et al. 2010: 94) and the neoliberal model embodied by private companies (Van Cott 2005: 37; Yashar 1998). Additionally, when mobilizing violently the organizations should count on sufficient organizational resources, *inter alia*, a substantive number of recruits (Cederman et al. 2010; Bormann et al. 2015) or supporters who legitimize their actions (Tejerina 2001: 40). Consequently, it could be inferred that very small (demographically) indigenous communities and those that lack sufficient members’ support are unlikely to constitute violent ethnic organizations.

Finally, the structure of the paper is the following: the introduction concludes highlighting the policy relevance of the research; later, a theory section presents the theoretical relevance of the study with particular attention to why the existing literature on ethnic conflict does not apply to the variation of interest, therefore, introducing the literature on social movements; next, the methodological section presents the dependent and independent variables; then, follows the comparison of the selected cases; and, finally, some concluding remarks.

1.1 Relevance Of The Topic:

The relevance of this research is illustrated by many reasons. To begin, its importance originates from the focus on Latin America; indeed, the nationalism and ethnic conflict literatures have overlooked this region biasing other areas of the world, particularly Africa and India. Furthermore, these scholarships, when probing the causes of ethnic violence, focus on ethnic communities as a whole (e.g. Hutu vs. Tutsi or Hindu vs. Muslims) rather than on specific ethnic organizations as done hereby. Consequently, the inclusion of a study from Latin America and an organization-level focus would add new comparative cases to the scholarship and might suggest an alternative or complementary explanation of the possible causes of ethnic organizations’ violence.

The topic is also relevant because: indigenous movements are a kind of activism that has been overlooked by the literature (Warren 2013: 236); it contributes to shed light on the Mapuche conflict, which is struggling to reach scholarly attention, especially outside the region and, since there are few studies comparing the situation of the Mapuche across the Andes.
As a result, the findings of this study might add an alternative insight to the existing literature and contribute to spread knowledge on ongoing and increasingly debated issues, such as indigenous rights and the Mapuche conflict.

Besides, Argentina and Chile are interesting countries to analyse and compare because they have experienced similar historical developments during the XX century and they are, respectively, upper-middle and high-income countries, which contrasts the common belief that ethnic violence stems from poor countries (Fearon and Laitin 2003).³

Moreover, the decade of the 1990s has been characterized by a strong mobilization of Latin American indigenous communities throughout the whole region; within such context, also the Mapuche started to mobilize via political and social protests (Kropff 2005: 108; UNPO 2014: 3).⁴

Last but not least, the increase in ethnic organizations’ violence after the transition to democracy in Argentina and Chile is puzzling since a democratic regime is expected to promote a tolerant and inclusive environment for minority groups instead of violence. For these last two reasons, the research focuses on the period following the restoration of democracy in both countries, specifically on the 1990-2017 timeframe.⁵

Finally, the writing matters in human and minority rights terms since, despite the national rhetoric and international legislation, indigenous rights in Latin America are often breached (CEPAL 2014: 58; UNPO 2014) or not even recognized (e.g. Chilean Constitution) (Ameghino 2013; Warren 2013: 242).

In sum, this paper features real-world significance; it is policy relevant considering that it could contribute to the understanding of ethnic organizations’ behaviour and introduce useful policy recommendations to democratic states on which policies to implement to foster dialogue and cooperation with ethnic organizations and which ones to refute to avoid an increase of either side’s violence.

---

³ David Lake, and Donald Rothchild, “Containing Fear: The Origins and Management of Ethnic Conflict.” *International Security* Vol. 21, No. 2 (1996): 44-45. When resources are scarce conflict is more likely to outburst. If these resources are unequally distributed along ethnic lines the likeliest outcome is a boost in the competition between the affected communities, which may result in ethnic conflict.

Nevertheless, the selected countries contradict this theory; the reader deduces that in high-income countries, where by definition resources abound, governments should be capable of redistributing them evenly among its citizens (thereby avoiding clashes). However, these cases prove the opposite.

⁴ José Aylwin, “Políticas públicas y pueblos indígenas: el caso de las tierras mapuche en Neuquén (Argentina) y la Araucanía (Chile)” CLASPO (2004): 11. Such mobilizations led Argentina’s government to sign, in 1992, the ILO Convention n° 169 (C/169) on “Indigenous and Tribal Peoples” and to reform its national constitution in 1994 (followed by provincial ones) recognizing the ethnic and cultural pre-existence of indigenous communities on its soil as well as the legal rights on the lands they traditionally occupied (Art. 75, sentence 17).


⁵ The democratic regime in Argentina was re-established in 1983 under Raúl Alfonsín, while in Chile it was restored in 1990 following the election of Patricio Aylwin’s Concertación party.
Furthermore, as explained in the following section, the topic is also theoretically relevant for it links to existing literature and scholarly debates.

2. THEORY

2.1 Nationalism And Ethnic Conflict Literature, The Scholarly Debate:

The topic of the paper relates mainly to the nationalism and ethnic conflict scholarships. The latter can be divided in three schools of thought: primordialism, instrumentalism and constructivism. Some authors add a fourth tradition: institutionalism, according to which ethnic violence stems from the design of one state's political institutions (Varshney 2007). Hence, when considering the national level, the variables deemed to cause ethnic conflict are: state weakness (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Lake and Rothchild 1996) and state structure, i.e. unitary vs. federal (Bakke and Wibbels 2006).

Nevertheless, such explanations do not fit the case of interest because even if Argentina is considered weaker, in state-capacity terms, than Chile (Fairfield 2010: 38), if we examine historical records, Argentina is also portrayed as a successful case of state building (Soifer 2015). Accordingly, neither country can be defined as a weak state; conversely, they are both labelled as stable (Fund for Peace 2017). Similarly, the structure of the state does not matter since in both countries ethnic organizations resort to violence. Besides, state-level variables are not helpful to explain variations at the organizational level.

Otherwise, in agreement with primordialism, ethnic conflict sparks from ancient hatreds between ethnic groups and from their human nature (Petersen 2002 quoted in Varshney 2007: 281); i.e. from irrational factors. Yet, this irrationality, together with the lack of mentioning the role of institutions, is the main reason for discrediting primordialism in the debate (Varshney 2007: 280).

Here, the deep-rooted hostilities between ethnic groups and their human nature cannot explain the behavioural variation of members belonging to the same community; if past conflict (Cederman et al. 2010) or old antagonisms caused ethnic communities to mobilize violently, why are not all the Mapuche confrontational? Besides, primordialism is not fit to explain the variation of ethnic groups’ behaviour within a country. As highlighted by Varshney (2007) in his study on the conflict between Hindu and Muslims in India, ethnic violence does not outbreak ubiquitously in the country; conversely, it takes place only in some regions. Similarly, the Mapuche are not acting aggressively all around Chile or Argentina. Lastly, this theory does not explain the temporal dimension; Mapuche organizations changed tactics over time switching from peaceful to confrontational approaches once democracy was restored. Ergo, it is possible to discard the primordialist approach.
Furthermore, instrumentalists perceive ethnicity as the strategic basis for coalitions seeking a larger share of economic or political power. This theory argues that it is rational for parties to organise along ethnic lines to ensure for themselves the highest share of the resources provided by the state (Varshney 2007).

Various authors follow this line of thinking: Lake and Rothchild (1996) and Wimmer (1997) suggest that ethnic conflict derives from the competition for limited resources, whereas Collier and Hoefller (2004) stress the fundamental role of economic opportunities asserting that greed overtakes grievances as a cause of civil war.

However, if groups resorted to violence to generate profit, why is there behavioural variance within the Mapuche provided that, as indigenous peoples belonging to the same community, they are poorer than other sectors of the society? (Gobierno de Chile 2015; UNPO 2011: 4; UNPO 2014: 2).

Accordingly, whereas Collier and Hoefller (2004) and Fearon and Laitin (2003) assert that income inequality does not cause socio-political instability, Bakke and Wibbels (2006) state the opposite. Besides the lack of consensus, these explanations do not suit this study, first, because they cannot explain organization-level variance, second, because, in comparing Neuquén and Chubut, we notice that in the 2003-2014 period the Gross Provincial Product (GPP) has annually decreased in the former and increased in the latter (MECON n.d.). Furthermore, data for the second semester of 2016 show a higher poverty percentage in Neuquén than in Chubut (INDEC 2017). Accepting the previous explanations one would expect Neuquén to host violent organizations and not the contrary. Finally, the last reason why the abovementioned explanations cannot be used regards the analysis of both provinces’ economy, which shows that their revenue derives mainly from mines and hydrocarbons exploitation (MECON n.d.).6 Accordingly, acknowledging that economic elites are likely to oppose indigenous land claims in provinces that host a relatively large extractive sector (Higuera and vom Hau 2017: 30) and bearing in mind that Neuquén’s mining industry accounts for a higher GPP share than Chubut, one would expect Neuquén’s organizations, rather than Chubut’s, to use violence. However, this paper proves the opposite. For all of the above, the instrumentalist approach is here refuted.

Lastly, constructivism introduces the idea of a “master cleavage” as the cause of conflict between ethnic minorities (i.e. blacks vs. withes in the USA or Protestants vs. Catholics in Northern Ireland). Nonetheless, this cleavage exemplifies violence at the national level not at the local or regional one where violence is more likely to outburst (Varshney 2007: 287). Indeed, as aforementioned, a number of cities covering approximately 6% of the Indian population accounted for little less than half of all deaths in Hindu-Muslim riots between 1950-1995 (Varshney 2002 quoted in Varshney 2007: 287). Consequently, a nation-level constant does neither explain the variation at the local level, which is fundamental to

---

6 MECON (n.d.) In 2011 the exploitation of mines and quarries represented 41.1% of the GPP in Neuquén and the 31.6% of the GPP in Chubut.
understand the variance in the Mapuche organizations’ behaviour, nor it serves to illustrate the behavioural variance within the same region or province.

Besides, Lieberman and Sing (2012) assert that the level of institutionalization of ethnic categories by the state is the cause of ethnic conflict. Anyhow, such approach cannot be used here since, first, the Chilean state does not recognize indigenous groups constitutionally and, second, if we accept that exclusion and competition along ethnic lines are strongly associated with internal conflict, we are obliged to focus on the behavior of ethnic communities as a whole and not on specific organizations. Therefore, also this school of thought can be neglected.

Additionally, some authors argue that large groups (demographically) are more likely to fight than small ones since they have a larger pool of potential recruits and supporters if recruitment occurs along ethnic lines (Bormann et al. 2015: 757). Likewise, Cederman, Wimmer and Min (2010) and Fearon and Latin (2003) propose the demographic-size variable as a plausible cause of ethnic conflict. Nevertheless, since the focus is here pointed at the organizational level, the demographic size of an ethnic community does not matter to explain the variation of interest.

Finally, other authors introduce further variables to explain the causes of ethnic conflict (or civil war): the conditions that favour insurgency (Fearon and Laitin 2003) and the exclusion from state power (Cederman et al. 2010). Nonetheless, these do not apply to ethnic organizations either.

All the aforementioned approaches relate to ethnic groups and state variables (macro-level) and study the reasons behind the outburst of inter-ethnic violence rather than intra-ethnic phenomena; thus, such focus does not suit the unit of analysis of interest. Likewise, micro-level explanations, which concentrate on psychological (Della Porta 2006: 10) and personal (Birnir 2007) factors, are not useful to explain the behavioural variation of ethnic organizations either.7 8

Summing up, this paper fits in the scholarly debate since neither group (macro) nor individual (micro) level explanations are apt to understand the behavioural variation of ethnic organizations (meso-level). Besides, since the nationalism and ethnic conflict literatures do not provide helpful variables to explain the

---

7 Stathis Kalyvas, “New And Old Civil Wars: A Valid Distinction?” World Politics, Vol. 54 No.1 (2001): 102. Kalyvas presents the difference between “old” and “new” civil wars and asserts that the violence of the latter originates from the behaviour of individuals that are moved by personal gain rather than communal ideology.

8 Jóhanna Birnir, “Book Reviews: Kalyvas, S. N. (2006). The Logic of Violence in Civil War. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.” Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 40 No. 11 (2007): 1396. Kalyvas suggests that, when incumbent and insurgent organizations are competing for public loyalty, political actors gather information through the collaboration between armed groups and civilian informants. Accordingly, he reaffirms his argument on “new” wars introducing the concept of “selective violence” implying that political actors, after collecting information, stop indiscriminate targeting and decide to aim exclusively at the denounced targets. Furthermore, he hypothesises that when political actors have incomplete control over a territory, they have the incentive to use selective violence to deter potential defectors and consolidate their control over the area. Nonetheless, he recognizes that the collected information can be malicious either because individuals wish to revenge past grievances or because they aim at material benefits. Consequently, he highlights the fundamental role individuals are playing and the relevance of personal reasons leading to biased information that can result in selective violence.
phenomenon, I will draw on social movements literature, particularly on the political opportunity structure theory and on ethnic terrorism precepts, to identify alternative interpretations for the outburst of organizational violence.

2.2 Social Movements Literature:

The attention is now posed on social movements literature and focuses on the following independent variables to explain organizations’ choice to either use or abstain from violence. In agreement with Van Cott (2005), an important element to consider when analysing the conduct of an ethnic organization is to determine whether it has created or adhered to an ethnic indigenous party. Indeed, she asserts that when indigenous organizations create such parties they enter the electoral arena voicing their demands in a legal and peaceful manner. Furthermore, Della Porta suggests that the decision to “radicalize” or not, depends on the availability of resources to each particular organization (2006: 85). She divides such resources in a) organizational, i.e. those already available within a movement resulting from previous phases of mobilization and capable of influencing its current strategy and b) environmental, i.e. those available outside the movement like the mobilization potential intended as the capability of mobilizing other actors in support of the movement’s claims (2006: 108). To clarify the concept of organizational resources, assuming that social mobilizations feature various phases, Della Porta asserts that the organizations emerging in an earlier phase of activism produce resources (e.g. number of members, financial and structural assets) for the following stages, which can be used, at a later time, to create and support new organizations. Thus, presenting the example of the Italian and German student movements of the 1960s, she argues that the resources they had and their centralized structure were the legacy of previously founded student parties and small Marxist groups (2006: 104-105).

Moreover, in terms of environmental resources, the author refers to when an organization collaborates with or is backed by actors such as political parties or other influential organizations (independent from the organization). For instance she presents the case of the Italian student movement that managed to survive and radicalize outside the university environment due to the support of working class organizations (2006: 108-109). Even if Della Porta focuses on terrorist groups, her propositions explain meso-level units of analysis; therefore, her findings are useful in this context. Additionally, Sidney Tarrow asserts that terrorist organizations can be closely related to other cycles of political mobilization and that, similarly to ordinary movements, terrorist groups focus on psychological processes of collective identification (de la Corte 2007). Acknowledging this, I will test the variables proposed by Della Porta on my study-cases.
Finally, at least for some administrations, comparing terrorist groups to ethnic organizations is not overstated; both the Chilean and Chubut governments have been defining Mapuche activists as terrorists or criminals (Clarín 2017; Molina 2014).

Furthermore, Koopmans introduces the concept of “opportunity” conceived as “constraints, possibilities, and threats that originate outside the mobilizing group, but affect its chances of mobilizing and/or realizing its collective interests” (1999: 96). Coherently, it now appears appropriate to introduce the concept of political opportunities and analyse how it affects ethnic organizations’ behaviour.

Within social movement studies, the repertoires of protests have been perceived as influenced by a political opportunity structure (POS). Accordingly, scholars experienced a breakthrough in realizing that social movements develop and succeed because “something” in the larger political context allows existing grievances to be heard (Della Porta 2008: 223); such theory suggests that social movements depend on the range of political opportunities, or constraints, inherent to a country’s context (McAdam et al. 1999: 23-24).

Having said so, Della Porta believes that a social movement will opt for either radicalism (violence) or moderation (non-violence) depending on three factors: 1) the response it meets in its environment, e.g. if it is backed by civil society; 2) the reaction of the authorities, i.e. whether law enforcement agents respond to the movement’s protests using force or with a tolerant stance and 3) the strength and postures of its potential allies and opponents, such as, the Catholic Church, NGOs or political parties (2006: 8). Consistently, drawing on these factors, I expect that when an organization benefits from the support of civil society, endures policing violence and does not have strong and peaceful allies, it will likely radicalize and use violence.

Accordingly, POS theory shows a correlation between state and movement strategies: “the more confrontational the state strategy, the more radical the movement strategy; and vice versa: the more assimilative the state strategy, the more moderate the movement strategy” (Della Porta 2006: 11). Comparing social movements in Italy and Germany, Della Porta finds that peaceful protests are more likely to take place in contexts of policing tolerance and that “hard police tactics coincide with hard protest tactics” (2006: 79-80); consequently, ethnic organizations will more likely radicalize and use violence in repressive environments.

Now, it might be interesting to analyse the role and tactics of the potential allies of the selected organizations. Indeed, in the comparative-case section while learning about the different stance of the

---

9 Donatella Della Porta, “Research on Social Movements and Political Violence.” Qualitative Sociology, Vol. 31 No. 3 (2008): 222. The “repertoires of protest” derive from Tilly’s definition of repertoires of action as “a limited set of forms of protest that are commonly used in a particular time and place.”
Argentinian and Chilean governments vis-à-vis social movements, the reader will also determine the availability, or lack of it, of influential allies to the chosen organizations.

Besides, Wilkinson proposes that “ethnic riots far from being relatively spontaneous eruptions of anger, are often planned by politicians for a clear electoral purpose”, specifically to build a winning political coalition (2004: 1). Accordingly, he proves that town-level electoral incentives account for where ethnic violence will break out (in the Hindu-Muslim conflict).

To conclude, in a study comparing Basque and Catalan regional nationalisms and their capital industrialization, Díez Medrano affirms that nationalist movements use violence to achieve their goals when they follow a left-leaning, anti-capitalist and separatist ideology. Such position is embodied by the Basques who, opposite to the Catalans, refuted modernization and the economic ties with Madrid following the industrialization process (Colomer 1996: 1722-1723; Esenwein 1997: 173). Consistently, Diego Muro stresses ETA’s adhesion to Marxist, nationalist ideas (Muro 2008: 148).

3. METHODOLOGY

3.1 Dependent Variable (DV) And Independent Variables (IVs):

To begin, this research develops its argument drawing on primary and secondary sources, testing existing variables extrapolated from the social movements literature and from ethnic terrorism precepts. Subsequently, the dependent variable of interest is: use of violence by ethnic organizations and the IVs to analyse are: 1) the creation/adherence to an ethnic indigenous party (Van Cott 2005), 2) the adoption of an extremist (de la Corte 2007), nationalist, anti-capitalist and separatist ideology (Díez Medrano quoted in Colomer 1996 and in Esenwein 1997; Muro 2008), 3) the availability of organizational as well as 4) environmental resources (Della Porta 2006) and the constituency relevance of the ethnic organization (Wilkinson 2004); finally, 5) the outbidding variable deduced from ethnic terrorism postulates (Boylan 2012; 2016).

Thus, in agreement with Van Cott (2005), the first hypothesis suggests:

\[ H_1: \text{Those ethnic organizations that create or adhere to an ethnic political party are likely to abstain from the use of violence (ceteris paribus).} \]

The following couple of hypotheses relate to the organizational level. On the one hand, focusing on the ideology of the movement and accepting Díez Medrano and Muro’s postulates, the second hypothesis advocates:

---

**H$_3$:** Ethnic organizations that adopt an extremist, nationalist, anti-capitalist and separatist ideology will likely resort to violence (ceteris paribus).

On the other, consistent with the abovementioned definition of organizational resources (Della Porta 2006):

**H$_3$:** Those ethnic organizations that lack organizational resources, such as material (e.g., weapons) and financial assets as well as sufficient members, will likely abstain from the use of violence (ceteris paribus).

Besides, acknowledging the context in which an organization operates:

a) Accepting the precepts of POS theory, particularly on the correlation between state and movement strategies, acknowledging that state authorities might target specific groups and not the indigenous community as a whole:

**H$_{4a}$:** Those ethnic organizations that operate in a context of tolerant policing will less likely resort to violence (ceteris paribus).

b) Depending on the availability of environmental resources (Della Porta 2006), such as the organization’s mobilization capability resulting from the support of either the civil society (as in the case of indigenous peasants’ support to the Maoist Shining Path in Peru) (Palmer 1986: 142) or influential allies (e.g. political parties, NGOs, Human Rights organizations and the Catholic Church), the following hypothesis proposes:

**H$_{4b}$:** Ethnic organizations that benefit from the support of influential and peaceful allies (e.g. the civil society, political parties, NGOs, Catholic Church, etc.) will likely abstain from the use of violence (ceteris paribus).

c) Lastly, similarly to the previous and in line with Wilkinson’s precepts:

**H$_{4c}$:** Ethnic organizations will more likely resort to violence in provinces/regions where political parties do not deem their ethnic group as an important constituent to win elections and, therefore, do not have an electoral incentive to prevent the outburst of violence (ceteris paribus).

To conclude, it is interesting to recall again the comparative case of the Basque ETA (successful terrorist group) vs. the Catalan terrorist groups (unsuccessful). Drawing on ethnic terrorism, Boylan suggests that terrorist organizations in Catalonia were unable to succeed because, since their creation, they faced strong competition from other nationalist actors who outbid them. Accordingly, the possibility to choose between various organizations led Catalans to privilege legitimate actors over violent groups (Boylan 2012: 29-31). Similarly, the Spanish transition to democracy led to the institutionalization of Basque parties creating an unfavourable climate, competition and a lack of civilian support to ETA’s violence (Shabad and Llera 1995 quoted in Boylan 2012: 29) and eventually resulting in its ceasefire.
Summing up, Boylan argues that when elites compete over the control of an ethnic community, terrorism is likely to arise (2016: 251). I aim to probe whether such finding holds at the ethnic organization level estimating that when there are various organizations claiming to represent the same ethnic community some may decide to use violence to avoid outbidding. Thus, drawing on ethnic terrorism postulates:

\[ H_5: \text{Ethnic organizations that fear of being outbid in representing the ethnic community they belong to are likely to resort to violence (ceteris paribus)}. \]

This last hypothesis arises in clear opposition to \( H_{4b} \): ethnic organizations can be either backed by or compete against other local organizations to represent an ethnic community. Indeed, they will either resort to or abstain from violence depending on which of these cases prevails.

Summarizing, if these hypotheses were true I would expect those ethnic organizations that create/adhere to ethnic political parties as well as those that benefit from the support of influential and peaceful allies to abstain from the use of violence since their demands would be likely voiced, heard and met, or at least discussed, within inclusive arenas. On the contrary, I presume that those ethnic organizations that are marginalized, lacking the support of civil society or other influential allies, especially in a context in which there are many organizations willing to represent the same community, will likely opt to use violence resorting to extreme tactics, provided they have sufficient organizational resources to do so.

In conclusion, I also expect ethnic organizations to use violence when relevant political parties do not deem them as an important constituency and when the interested governmental authorities criminalize them.

3.2 Operationalization:

To test or falsify the proposed hypotheses it is necessary to clarify more elements. First, to determine the ideology of an organization I will draw on its funding statute and its public statements. Furthermore, to analyse if an organization benefits from organizational resources I will verify whether it stems from a previous movement/organization, in order to ascertain its expertise, as well as its financial and material resources (e.g. weapons). Additionally, by tolerant policing I refer to the episodes when police agents refrain from the use of violence (firing their weapons and evicting indigenous peoples) and imprisoning activists.

With the term “influential allies” I consider those political parties, NGOs, Human Rights associations and other actors that are recognized and respected by the local and national civil society (e.g. Movimiento Popular Neuquino, the Catholic Church, Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch,

---

etc.). Besides, such actors are deemed influential when they incorporate the demands of an ethnic community and support it in pursuing and reaching them. In sum, such actors should be capable of influencing decision-makers to consider indigenous peoples’ requests and lobby them to do so.

To understand whether an ethnic organization is deemed important as an electoral constituent, I will analyse whether it does participate in traditional Western-like politics or it operates outside such model, refuting it (in which case the organization should not be considered by political parties as a constituent).

To conclude, to probe whether there is a risk of outbidding among ethnic organizations, especially if such organizations lack support from influential allies, I will consider the organizations operating in each selected province/region and verify whether they should be deemed as possible competitors or not (because they do not have many members, are not supported by the society or influential allies, have different aims, are not interested in representing exclusively the community, etc.).

3.3 Control Variables:

As mentioned, the comparison between Chile and Argentina as well as the focus on the organizational unit of analysis allow me to control for the independent variables proposed by the literature on the macro (country) and the micro (individual) levels of inquiry.

In particular, many variables are held constant due to similarity: the studied countries are neither weak nor politically precarious being both consolidated democracies labelled as upper-middle and high-income countries (World Bank Data 2016). Besides, in both states the Mapuche represent the poorest sector of the society; hence, the difference in income between ethnic organizations should not be relevant. Additionally, past conflict experiences do not seem important to consider because they do not explain the intra-ethnic variation. Finally, neither greed nor grievances are helpful to explain such variation within the same community.

At this point, through a within case analysis first and a comparison of the selected cases later, I will either test or falsify my hypotheses. Accordingly, to solve the puzzle I will probe and compare three cases: 1) the Coordinadora Arauco-Malleco (CAM), a radicalized organization of the Chilean Mapuche, which uses violence and operates in the Araucanía region; 2) the Confederación Mapuche de Neuquén (CMN) in the Argentinian province of Neuquén, which adopted a peaceful stance and 3) the Resistencia Ancestral Mapuche (RAM), the armed wing of the Movimiento Mapuche Autónomo acting violently between Chubut, Río Negro and Neuquén (Argentina).
4. COMPARATIVE CASE STUDIES

4.1 The Context:

A background on social activism and state response in the selected countries follows.

Owing to the federal structure of Argentina and to the relevance of its provinces (especially in decision-making), Mapuche organizations have developed within rather than across provincial lines and, depending on their provincial context, have followed various trajectories, which led them to emphasize different demands (Warren 2013: 245). Accordingly, the country experienced a long tradition of social movements; relevant episodes are: the 1993 “santiagazo” in the province of Santiago del Estero, the 1996 “pueblada” in Cutral Có and Plaza Huincul (Neuquén province), the 1999 “correntinazo” in the Corrientes province (Auyero 2002), the piquetero (picket) movement of the piqueteros (unemployed workers) and the 2001 protests which caused the presidential resignation of de la Rúa and Duhalde (Mayekar 2006: 10). Since the state did not succeed in curbing the mobilizations, the government favoured a tolerant approach characterized by hearings, negotiations, concessions (Wolff 2007: 6) and, sometimes, co-optation of activists (e.g. the Peronist tendencies to absorb new social actors to strengthen the party or Kirchner’s assimilation of some piqueteros’ branches) (Mayekar 2006: 7, 10; Wolff 2007: 8). In this context, many ethnic organizations’ members participated in oil or mining trade unions, starting to mobilize through demonstrations, roadblocks and establishing alliances with social movements and political parties (Ameghino 2013: 186).

Conversely, the Chilean stance towards social protests has been less tolerant. Regarding indigenous organizations, the government has had a double discourse: on the one hand, it supported those groups that shared its vision of the nation, on the other, it criminalized those that did not, resorting to the anti-terrorist law while privileging the partnership with private companies (Ameghino 2013: 182; Rojas Pedemonte and Miranda 2015: 34, 44; Warren 2013: 243).

Another interesting example to recall regards the student mobilization against the private educational system. In fact, such demonstrations have been usually repressed violently by the Chilean carabineros (Tomaselli 2016: 417-418).

However, the Argentinian tolerance towards social movements is not a unilateral policy; conversely, it varies between provinces. Notably, Neuquén and Chubut have responded in opposite ways to indigenous mobilizations; whereas in Neuquén indigenous activism has been backed by the Catholic Church and human rights organizations first and the Movimiento Popular Neuquina later (Ameghino 2013: 186; Kropff 2005: 109-110; Tricot 2011: 159), in Chubut the anti-mining movement, active since the early 2000s and including many indigenous members, has been harshly repressed by the provincial government (Cisneros and Christel 2014: 178). Similarly, the local government has been
repressing indigenous mobilizations (Amnesty International 2017).

Nonetheless, lately, the provincial government of Neuquén has also started to use harsh police strategies against social activism, as in the case of the 2013 violent repression of activists protesting against the agreement between the YPF and Chevron oil companies (Canosa 2013).

I have chosen to analyse Neuquén and Chubut because those are, together with Río Negro, the provinces that account for the largest number of Mapuche in the country and include the territories where indigenous activism has been manifested more strongly (Kropff 2005: 106). Moreover, I have decided to omit the analysis of Río Negro because the majority of violent attacks perpetrated by the RAM happened in Chubut (Observatorio de Terrorismo en Chile 2017) and its background on indigenous policies and development of peaceful indigenous organizations (e.g. Coordinadora del Parlamento Mapuche de Río Negro) is similar to the case of Neuquén (Kropff 2005).

Finally, analysing the main Argentinian Mapuche organizations listed in Higuera and vom Hau’s (2017) database, I have come to the conclusion that the RAM is the sole using violence to voice its claims. Similarly, despite the impossibility of finding a detailed database of Chilean indigenous organizations, an accurate research seems to lead to the belief that the most relevant violent ethnic organization in the country is, indeed, the CAM (Observatorio de Terrorismo en Chile 2016).

4.2 Analysis:

I will proceed by doing an in-depth analysis of each case and then compare the three to discern the variables explaining the variation in ethnic organizations’ behaviour.

4.2.a) Coordinadora Arauco Malleco – CAM:

The CAM was established in 1998 by the merging of three organizations: Coordinadora Territorial Lafkenche, Meli Wixan Mapu and Coordinadora Mapuche de Santiago, aiming at representing the Mapuche communities in conflict (Klein 2008; Pairicán and Álvarez 2011: 71). Consistently, it was created with a clear-cut ethnic identity (Pineda 2014: 114) and featuring an ethnonationalist, anti-capitalist and anti-imperialist ideology (Weftun 2013a). It encompasses radical members from 30 to 50

---

13 Gobierno de Chile (n.d.) “Registro de Comunidades y Asociaciones Indígenas”, Ministerio del Desarrollo Social, CONADI. CONADI’s register of indigenous communities and associations lists 1,948 communities and 620 associations enrolled in the Temuco National Sub-direction (Araucanía). Nevertheless, there are no further details.
Mapuche communities, which waged war against the capitalist structure and the Chilean state (Gaitan Barrera 2014) (testing H2).

Furthermore, defining itself as an autonomous movement, it mobilizes outside the Chilean institutional framework and acts independently from the winka (usurper) model of political parties, both traditional (Western-like) and ethnic, NGOs (Weftun 2013b) and other influential organizations, including those indigenous, e.g. Consejo de Todas las Tierras, Ad-Mapu and Identidad Territorial Lafquenche (Klein 2008). As a result, the CAM is not considered a constituent of any political party and does not have any influential and peaceful allies (refuting H1, H4b and H4c).

One of the main goals of the CAM is the liberation and reconstruction of the Mapuche nation, which can only be achieved by controlling its ancestral territory (Pineda 2014: 116, 120). This necessity legitimizes the use of violence as a form of resistance of the oppressed (Weftun 2013d). Such confrontational stance entailed a harsh response by the central government and a number of violent clashes between the militants and police forces (refuting H4d) (Observatorio de Terrorismo en Chile 2016). To understand its activity, it should be highlighted that it has a decentralized structure and it operates through clandestine groups named Órganos de Resistencia Territorial (ORT) (Ibidem), the armed wing of the organization, whose main aim is to sabotage forestry and hydroelectric companies (Pineda 2014: 115; TVN 2016). Coherently, CAM’s actions are intended as the defence of the Mapuche nation and its strategy encompasses three tactics (Observatorio de Terrorismo en Chile 2016; Rojas Pedemonte and Miranda 2015: 55; TVN 2016; Weftun 2013a):

- Recovery actions: e.g. the occupation of private property or the theft of wood;
- Self-defence actions: e.g. clashes (usually firefights) with police agents;
- Resistance actions: e.g. roadblocks and sabotage actions against machinery, infrastructure and transportation (operated by the ORT).

This last tactic resulted in the criminalization of the organization and its labelling by the central government as “terrorist” (Rojas Pedemonte and Miranda 2015: 34). Consequently, in 2009 the leaders of the CAM were incarcerated under the anti-terrorist law, and, to retaliate, responded with hunger strikes (Pairicán and Álvarez 2011: 81-82; Pineda 2014: 112-113).

Considering the register of indigenous communities and associations provided by the CONADI we learn that there are grossomodo 2,000 indigenous communities in the area of jurisdiction of Temuco;

---


Fernando Klein, “Los movimientos de resistencia indígena. El caso mapuche.” Gazeta de Antropología Vol. 24 No. 1 (2008). In 2000 the Coordinadora Mapuche de Santiago withdrew from the CAM, followed in 2001 by the Meli Wixan Mapu (which a few months later asked to be reinserted in the organization).
nevertheless, the information on Mapuche violence leads only to the CAM and, more recently, to the *Weichan Auka Mapu* (not analysed because operates similarly to the CAM).

Finally, in the 2016 TVN report, in line with CAM’s public statements, representatives of one ORT stated they were neither terrorist nor criminals; conversely, they defined themselves as *weichafe* (warriors) and asserted that their actions were not directed against people but only at damaging the machinery of the multinationals occupying their lands. As a concluding remark, the video shows militants armed with rifles and guns (TVN 2016).

4.2. b) Resistencia Ancestral Mapuche – RAM

The RAM is the armed wing of the autonomist movement *Movimiento Mapuche Autónomo del Puelmapu* (MAP) operating between Neuquén, Río Negro and Chubut (the paper focuses on the last).

To begin, the Argentinian state did not create an institutional arena of dialogue with indigenous communities in Chubut; such choice resulted in a late public emergence of urban Mapuche organizations in the province (Kropff 2005: 112). Besides, in this province, there are various organizations protesting against the provincial government; among them, the *Mapuche-Tehuelche 11 de Octubre* group has been demonstrating against the mining exploitation and land evictions (Ibidem: 113, 115). Furthermore, other indigenous organizations have been participating in actions for land restitution, e.g. the *Pillán Mahuíza* community (Delrio and Ramos n.d. quoted in Kropff 2005: 113) and the *Frente de Lucha Mapuche Campesino*. In spite of this, or maybe because of it (outbidding reasons), the RAM is the only one resorting to a confrontational and violent stance against the state and multinational companies (*Observatorio de Terrorismo en Chile* 2017).

The RAM started its activities in 2010 but it was not renowned until 2014 when it published a statement presenting its political motivations while claiming the responsibility for various violent actions perpetrated to free the Mapuche nation. Among those: arson attacks against the Neumeyer mountain hut (Río Negro), forestry plantations of the Benetton company and the burning of *La Trochita* train station in Chubut, firearm attacks (Chubut) and actions against the Chilean consulate and the Catholic Cathedral (Río Negro) (Ibidem).

Taking responsibility for these actions the organization brought into light its revolutionary, anti-capitalist and autonomist ideology (*Mapuexpress* 2014).

Furthermore, the RAM operates independently from the state, NGOs and private companies (refuting...
H₁₀) (Ibidem). Conversely, the abovementioned Observatory on Terrorism deems that the RAM cooperates with the CAM. Whether this is true or not, it is clear that, in structural terms, the RAM uses the neighbouring organization as a model; indeed, it acts through cells known as *Unidades Ancestrales de Liberación Territorial* (UAL), which resort to violence to achieve autonomy and self-government. Consequently, the provincial government condemned RAM’s activities and responded defining the group as “terrorist” and sending the police to evict the natives from the occupied territories. Such behaviour resulted in violent clashes between the parties (refuting H₄a) and led Amnesty International to condemn the behaviour of the local government (Amnesty International 2017).

Besides, RAM’s main enemy is capitalism thus the organization announced the intention of expelling from the Mapuche territory every connection to it; e.g. transnational, mining, oil and hydroelectric companies (*Observatorio de Terrorismo en Chile* 2017).

To conclude, refuting the Western model, neither the RAM nor the MAP created nor adhered to an indigenous political party and, consequently, are not deemed as a constituent for any of them (traditional or indigenous) (refuting H₄e and H₄c); yet, as part of a wider movement encompassing other organizations, communities and militants, the RAM benefits from organizational resources and the support of MAP’s members.¹⁸

### 4.2.c) Confederación Mapuche de Neuquén – CMN

The emergence of indigenous organizations in Neuquén has been characterized by a strong connection with the Catholic Church, human rights agencies and the *Movimiento Popular Neuquino* (MPN) party (Ameghino 2013: 186; Kropff 2005: 109). Since its institution in 1961, the MPN has used inclusive policies promoting land adjudications and the development of social as well as support services for the indigenous communities (Aylwin 2004: 8). One of the main achievements of MPN’s support has been the establishment, at the beginning of the 70s, of the CIN (*Confederación Indígena Neuquina*), precursor of the CMN (Aiziczon 2014). Thereafter, the aims of the *Confederación* have been: a) land restitution, b) defence of common interests and of cultural identity, c) socio-economic development and d) social welfare for its members (Carrasco 2002 quoted in Aylwin 2004: 9). However, it should be stressed that MPN’s relationship with the CIN/CMN has been characterized by paternalism and subordination, with the specific aim of generating an electoral base for the party, hampering the autonomy of the indigenous organization (Aiziczon 2014; Kropff 2005: 110). Nevertheless, during the ‘90s the new leaders of the *Confederación* started to distance themselves from the MPN and marginalize the _winka_ presence from indigenous matters (Tricot 2011: 256). After 1995, the CMN rearranged its structure merging with the *Nehuen Mapu* and the Mapuche Education Centre and creating the *Coordinadora de Organizaciones Mapuche* (COM). The COM was established with a

decentralized structure and the CMN was put in charge of 6 area-councils: Xawynko, Lafkence, Pikunce, Pewence, Wijice and Ragince Kimvn (Ameghino 2013: 187; Kropff 2005: 112).\(^{19}\)

Moreover, it has refuted the integrationist stance of the Argentinian government and of the MPN, claiming Mapuche autonomy and self-determination (Díaz et al. 2011; Tricot 2011: 198) and has adopted a confrontational discourse against the extractive industry at the local and national level (Ameghino 2013: 186). Such stance led the COM to cooperate with other organizations that shared its view (also outside the province); indeed, in 2010 it allied with the Parlamento Mapuche de Río Negro to collaborate on topics as land restitution and the role of multinational companies (Meli Wixa Mapu 2010).

To conclude, the CMN should not fear outbidding for it encompasses and represents many groups. Besides, it did not form nor adhere to an ethnic political party (refuting H\(_1\) and H\(_3\)); in fact, despite being linked to the MPN for many years; it eventually distanced itself from it. As a result, in the analysed timeframe, it cannot be considered as a constituent of any political party (against H\(_{4c}\)).

\(^{19}\) CMN’s Facebook page: [https://www.facebook.com/pg/XAWVNKO/about/?ref=page_internal](https://www.facebook.com/pg/XAWVNKO/about/?ref=page_internal)
Table 1: Comparative Table: CAM-CMN-RAM

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>CAM</th>
<th>CMN</th>
<th>RAM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>IDEOLOGY</strong></td>
<td>• Emancipation of the Mapuche nation</td>
<td>• Emancipation of the Mapuche nation</td>
<td>• Emancipation of the Mapuche nation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Restitution of ancestral territory</td>
<td>• Restitution of ancestral territory</td>
<td>• Restitution of ancestral territory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Illegitimacy of Chilean State and neoliberal model</td>
<td>• Emancipation of the Mapuche nation</td>
<td>• Revolutionary, anti-capitalist.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Anti-capitalist, anti-imperialist</td>
<td>• Emancipation of the Mapuche nation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>OBJECTIVES</strong></td>
<td>• Recovery of ancestral land</td>
<td>• Recovery of ancestral land</td>
<td>• Recovery of ancestral land</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Territorial control</td>
<td>• Autonomy</td>
<td>• Reconstruction of the Mapuche nation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Autonomy; total independence from the</td>
<td>• Political representation of indigenous</td>
<td>• Autonomy (from the State, capitalist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>state, political parties NGOs, etc.</td>
<td>communities</td>
<td>companies, NGOs, etc.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>STRUCTURE</strong></td>
<td>Autonomous.</td>
<td>Decentralized structure.</td>
<td>Armed branch of the MAP.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>30-50 Mapuche communities.</td>
<td>Each area-council has a:</td>
<td>Operates through territorial resistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Includes:</td>
<td>• Political</td>
<td>cells (UAL).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Directive branch</td>
<td>coordinator</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Executive branch (ORT)</td>
<td>• Spokesman</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Support networks</td>
<td>• Representative for the *Consejo de</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Participación indígena.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>REPRESENTING</strong></td>
<td>Mapuche communities in conflict.</td>
<td>Mapuche communities in conflict in both</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><em>Gulumapu</em> and <em>Puelmapu</em>.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TARGETS</strong></td>
<td>• Multinational and national companies</td>
<td>Non-violent actions vs. the central and</td>
<td>• Multinationals’ property,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(property and infrastructure)</td>
<td>provincial governments and multinational and national companies</td>
<td>infrastructure, machinery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• State</td>
<td></td>
<td>• State</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---


### TACTICS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CAM</th>
<th>CMN</th>
<th>RAM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Use and promotion of terrorist tactics. Collective action divided in:</td>
<td>• Collective action through peaceful demonstrations participation of communities in the Neuquén province (and Río Negro) • Formal complaints, public statements and appeal to international organizations • Use of social networks</td>
<td>Collective action (UAL) divided in: • Sabotage actions • Resistance actions • Ambush</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Recovery actions • Self-defence actions • Resistance actions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Following the analysis it emerges that neither case had created nor adhered to an ethnic political party (refuting H₁). Accordingly, neither traditional nor indigenous party, institution of a state the selected groups do not recognize, can consider such organizations as constituents; conversely, these organizations maintain an outright antagonistic stance to the *winka* model (refuting H₄c). Indeed, they seek autonomy and emancipation from the states that took over their ancestral territories. However, despite having similar objectives, the CMN differs from the other organizations as for a non-extremist ideology (testing H₂).

Besides, the availability of organizational resources does not seem to matter in terms of deciding whether to use violence or not; in fact, the three organizations are part, or originate from, earlier organizations from which they have plausibly inherited expertise, members and material assets (refuting H₃). Conversely, the existence of environmental resources, particularly influential and peaceful allies, seems to matter on the behavioural variation of the ethnic organizations (testing H₄b); indeed, the CMN, refuting violent means, benefitted and still does from influential allies: first the Catholic Church, human rights associations and the MPN, later, the *Parlamento Mapuche de Río Negro*.

Finally, the 2013 police repressions in Neuquén show that, all in all, the governmental response to indigenous activism is not tolerant in any selected province (refuting H₄a).

In conclusion, the variables that influence ethnic organizations’ behaviour are: an extremist/anti-capitalist ideology, the presence of influential and peaceful allies and, the risk of outbidding.
5. CONCLUSIONS

Despite having a similar ideology and the same historical background, especially in terms of land dispossession, Mapuche organizations act differently facing the activity of multinational companies in the Patagonian areas of Argentina and Chile where many territories are claimed by indigenous peoples. Accordingly, the Mapuche do not recognize the borders established by the “oppressor” states (Weftun 2013d) and, consequently, refute the integration within a nation they do not recognize as their own. Furthermore, the rejection of winka governments and institutions originates from the fact that Argentina and Chile have privileged doing business with the private companies instead of fulfilling the rights, internationally granted, of the indigenous communities living within their borders.

As the paper illustrates, ethnic organizations operating in upper-middle and high-income democracies are likely to resort to violence when they follow an extremist and anti-capitalist ideology, lack the support of influential and peaceful allies and fear of being outbid by other representatives of their community.

I expect these findings to be useful to understand other instances in which activism has turned violent. For example, they could suit the case of Peru’s anti-mining protests in the Amazon (in 2009) and in the department of Cajamarca (in 2012) that resulted in violent clashes between activists and the police, repressions and casualties on both sides (Bebbington 2009; Taylor and Bonner 2017). Furthermore, these findings could be also applied outside Latin America, specifically to the cases of ETA and the Tamil Tigers. Indeed, ETA was inspired by a Marxist revolutionary ideology and reached the peak of violence after the restoration of democracy when its action was no longer backed by civil society and various legitimate Basque organizations/parties were legalized (Boylan 2012).

Similarly, the Tamil Tigers were a nationalist, revolutionary and separatist militant group in Sri Lanka, which operated alongside other Tamil groups, did not have influential/peaceful allies and was supported only by the Tamil community (including the diaspora overseas) (CISAC 2015).

Accordingly, provided that further research is needed, some policy recommendations are to: 1) enforce national and international laws on behalf of indigenous communities in terms of legitimate land restitution; 2) avoid violent policing responses to social mobilizations, which foster a vicious cycle of retaliation and violence; 3) create spaces for dialogue both between indigenous groups and with the government. Inclusive policies and indigenous participation in decision-making might favour peaceful confrontation and, as shown by the Catalan terrorist groups case, when there are many organizations claiming to represent the same community, it is likely for civil society to support legitimate instead of violent ones, thus, hampering and reducing violent organizations’ momentum.

Besides, it could be useful to monitor those organizations that appear to have extremist stances; accordingly, it is urgent to build an all-encompassing database of Chilean indigenous organizations.
The lack of detailed information about ethnic organizations shows either a serious and naïve shortcoming or a dangerous indifference by the Chilean government vis-à-vis indigenous organizations. Paraphrasing Sun Zu’s teachings in the “Art of War”: to solve a conflict it is fundamental to know your “enemy”, thus, it seems appropriate to collect as much information as possible and quickly.

To conclude, concerning the limitations of the research, the little and incoherent information available on the Internet regarding Mapuche organizations, especially on the RAM and the CMN should be stressed. As recommendations for further research, I suggest that future scholars conduct field investigation and interviews in loco to collect relevant and reliable information to share. Another advice is to focus on other organizations, e.g. Weichan Auka Mapu, and include in the analysis the province of Río Negro to verify if the findings of this paper are tested or falsified. Indeed, since the RAM does not operate exclusively in Chubut additional investigation could contribute to unravel more information about the ethnic organization’s behaviour.
REFERENCES


Inter American Court of Human Rights (IACHR). (2014). “Case of Norín Catrimán et al. (leaders, members and activists of the Mapuche indigenous peoples) vs. Chile.”  


