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**What is the effect of terrorist attacks on the securitization of migration?** Case studies from the UK and Spain

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## **ABSTRACT**

Migration and terrorism have become a central part of the international agenda. However, scholars have not been able to achieve an agreement on whether or not these two issues are connected, and so whether migration has been involved in a securitization process or not. This paper claims that the lack of consensus is a result of the poor methodological tools that have been applied when studying the issue. This is why, when trying to answer how terrorist attacks affect the securitization of migration, this paper applies a new quantitative methodology, which grants the field with a new perspective.

By measuring the frequency with which certain words are mentioned in a legislative arena, this paper tries to analyse the existence or non-existence of speech acts in the Spanish and British parliaments; more precisely before, in between, and after the Madrid (2004) and London (2005) attacks. As well, and trying to address one of the shortcomings mentioned by the authors who designed the quantitative methodology applied in this paper, it carries out a qualitative analysis of resulting legislation and law-making as a way to measure the audience's response. The aim is to find whether these attacks developed a securitization of migration process in the case studies analysed.

The unexpected values of the results contribute not only to the acknowledgement that international security studies require a more robust and transparent methodology, which understands the complexity of the securitization process; but also to clarify the debate that has been taking place around the securitization of migration. In other words, it solidifies the theory by which migration has been securitized, while it distinguishes the levels at which this process has taken place, and tries to provide a hypothesis that explains differences in securitization levels among different countries.

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## 1. INTRODUCTION

The securitization of migration<sup>1</sup> has become a trending topic amongst International Relations academics, especially in relation to terrorism. However, these two are not new phenomena. Terrorist attacks started taking place almost as soon as States themselves were formed, but it became a salient international issue notably after 9/11. As for migration, many academics have argued that its securitization process started long before it became linked to terrorism.<sup>2</sup> It was in fact Weiner<sup>3</sup> who –for the first time in the academic sphere– raised the question of how migration could affect states’ security.<sup>4</sup> Nonetheless, this issue moved to the top of the list of the international security agenda after nineteen hijackers were able to travel overseas, legally enter the United States and plan the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon.<sup>5</sup> It has been argued that the international reaction to this event created a formal link between migration and counterterrorism<sup>6</sup>. After 9/11, many states developed new institutions with the aim of controlling migration flows and used them as counterterrorism methods. Even in Europe –where the idea of open borders was thriving– several institutions took advantage of this momentum to promote controversial migration laws. Some authors state that this process expanded after the Madrid (2004) and London (2005) attacks, since they posed a threat in European soil.

However, we can still wonder: has migration actually been securitized? If so, did all countries securitize it with the same intensity? And mainly, how do terrorist attacks affect the securitization of migration? On the one side, Fiona B. Adamson (2006), Jef Huysmans (2000 - 2006), Gallya Lahav (2010), and Georgios Karyotis (2007), amongst others, have concluded that migration has been securitized, and even more when it became related to terrorism. Huysmans<sup>7</sup> claimed that states fear migration since they consider it a destabilizing factor, which can destroy internal cohesion. This is to say that immigrants do not only affect the normal life of a reduced number of individuals, they endanger “a collective way of life that defines a community of people.”<sup>8</sup> In the beginning, this issue was mainly related to economic factors. Immigrants were considered ungrateful people, who were taking advantage of the welfare state.<sup>9</sup> As Huysmans phrases it, scarcity led to a competition between immigrants and national citizens for the distribution of

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<sup>1</sup> I will use the concept ‘migrant’ as a general category including immigrants, asylum-seekers, and refugees.

<sup>2</sup> Huysmans, Jef. "The European Union and the securitization of migration." *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies* 38.5 (2000): 751-777.

<sup>3</sup> Weiner, Myron. "International migration and security." (1993).

<sup>4</sup> Fauser, Margit. "Transnational Migration–A National Security Risk? Securitization of Migration Policies in Germany, Spain and the United Kingdom." Center for International Relations (2006).

<sup>5</sup> Adamson, Fiona B. "Crossing borders: international migration and national security." *International security* 31.1 (2006): pp.165.

<sup>6</sup> Crenshaw, Martha (ed) *The Consequences of Counterterrorism*. Russell Sage Foundation, pp. 131.

<sup>7</sup> Huysmans, Jef. "The European Union and the securitization of migration." *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies* 38.5 (2000): 751-777.

<sup>8</sup> Huysmans, Jef. *The politics of insecurity: fear, migration and asylum in the EU*. Routledge, 2006: 45-62.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*

social goods.<sup>10</sup> In more chauvinistic terms, immigrants were not only competitors, but also “illegitimate”<sup>11</sup> claimants and beneficiaries of social economic rights.<sup>12</sup>

Karyotis<sup>13</sup> reinforces this view by arguing that 9/11 was not the originator of the securitization of migration, but instead, it accelerated “dynamics that were already deeply rooted in the emerging European internal security regime.”<sup>14</sup> Huysmans also maintains that the consolidation of the European Union has directly securitized migration, and indirectly perpetuated it.<sup>15</sup> Lahav<sup>16</sup> clearly noted as well that the securitization of migration is not a new phenomenon, but when migration became linked to “law-and-order concerns”<sup>17</sup>, the nexus between migration and terrorism was formalized. Hence, the European Union’s foreign policy became more involved with counterterrorism.<sup>18</sup> Alessandra Buonfino<sup>19</sup> states that migration, as a security issue, has emerged as one of the most relevant topics nowadays. It has a central role in the political discourse and policy making.

On the other side, scholars like Christina Boswell<sup>20</sup> have argued that migration has not been securitized. She claims that instead of securitizing migration, countries have harnessed existing migration policies as a form of counterterrorism.<sup>21</sup> However, she does not deny that some securitizing attempts have been made, but concludes that “political discourse and practice in Europe have remained surprisingly unaffected by the terrorism threat.”<sup>22</sup> When faced upon these discrepancies, most scholars agree that there is no consensus on the topic. Nonetheless, this thesis, by assuming that the problem which prevents scholars from achieving a consensual answer is related to methodological issues, will attempt to clarify the controversy, and provide a clearer answer to the issue of how terrorist attacks affect the securitization of migration. In doing so, a new approach will be applied, proposed by Stéphane J. Baele and Olivier C.

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<sup>10</sup> Huysmans, Jef. "The European Union and the securitization of migration." *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies* 38.5 (2000): 751-777.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.* pp. 767.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>13</sup> Karyotis, Georgios. "European migration policy in the aftermath of September 11: The security–migration nexus." *Innovation* 20.1 (2007): 1-17.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.* pp. 1.

<sup>15</sup> Huysmans, Jef. "The European Union and the securitization of migration." *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies* 38.5 (2000): pp. 770.

<sup>16</sup> Lahav, Gallya. "Immigration Policy as Counterterrorism: The Effects of Security on Migration and Border Control in the European Union." *The Consequences of Counterterrorism*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation (2010): 130-176.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.* pp.165.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>19</sup> Buonfino, Alessandra. "Between unity and plurality: the politicization and securitization of the discourse of immigration in Europe." *New Political Science* 26.1 (2004): 23-49.

<sup>20</sup> Boswell, Christina. "Migration control in Europe after 9/11: Explaining the absence of securitization." *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies* 45.3 (2007): 589-610.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.* pp.590.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.* pp. 589.

Sterck<sup>23</sup> who tried to create a “less biased” method.

The paper will be divided into four sections. The first section will encompass a thorough review of the Securitization Theory, as well as a short analysis of how security, migration and terrorism are linked. The second section will briefly introduce the methods that had been applied until now to measure securitization, and will compare them to the method proposed by Baele and Sterck. In doing so, it will demonstrate in detail how this new methodology works. Furthermore, it will introduce the relevance of the two case studies that will be taken into account when carrying out the analysis. Finally, this section will present the hypotheses that this paper will try to test. The third section will present the quantitative results, achieved by using Baele and Sterck’s method, and will try to compare them with a more qualitative study of the resulting policies and extraordinary measures that both the UK and Spain have implemented in the evaluated time lapse. Lastly, the fourth section will discuss the results obtained and will evaluate the shortcomings of the methodology applied. It will also provide suggestions for further research.

## **2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND: SECURITIZATION THEORY**

The securitization theory has become a fundamental part of IR studies, and has produced a whole new field of research. Securitization refers to the quality of “existential threat” that an issue might acquire<sup>24</sup>, even beyond the actual threat that it represents. This could justify the use of extraordinary measures or the implementation of new policies and institutions with the aim of protecting the object that has been threatened<sup>25</sup> or perceives a threat. In other words, the securitization of an issue implies the transfer of the issue from low to high politics in order to protect a fundamental piece of the state (territory, population and government). The securitization process, according to the Copenhagen School, takes place through a speech act, which frames the issue in security terms. For a speech act to be successful, not only the actor involved in carrying out the securitizing move has to have the legitimacy to do so, but also, the speech should include a security language.<sup>26</sup> However, the existence of the speech act is not enough for an issue to become securitized. The audience must also accept and embrace the speech.

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<sup>23</sup> Baele, Stéphane J., and Olivier C. Sterck. "Diagnosing the Securitisation of Immigration at the EU Level: A New Method for Stronger Empirical Claims." *Political Studies* 63.5 (2015): 1120-1139.

<sup>24</sup> Buzan, Barry, Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde (1998) “Security Analysis: Conceptual Apparatus,” in idem, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, 21-47. London: Lynne Rienner.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid. pp. 23

<sup>26</sup> Ibid.

## 2.1 Terrorism, Migration And Security

Terrorism has –by definition– always been part of the security agenda, since it attempts to destroy, partially or completely, some element or elements of the state. Borrowing Hoffman’s<sup>27</sup> definition of terrorism, I define the concept as the threat or use of violence with the end of achieving a political aim. Based on this, a terrorist attack would be a “planned, calculated, and (...) systematic act”<sup>28</sup> of violence, carried out with a political objective. In other words, it is a “specific, dramatic and sharply”<sup>29</sup> focused act of aggression that intends to have political consequences. I would add to this definition that this act is directed towards an audience (which can be the population or the government) with the aim of creating terror and getting this audience to succumb to requests.

As it has been argued previously, migration has not always been part of the security agenda. This notion emerged around the 1980s, when mass immigrant settlements were considered a disruption to public order, cultural identity, societal security and the labour market (even though they actually posed almost no threat to internal cohesion at the time).<sup>30</sup> However, not long before, European countries had highly appreciated working migrants. During the 1950s and 1960s, immigrants constituted an extra workforce, which satisfied the need for cheap and flexible manpower, since this type of workers did not exist in the domestic market.<sup>31</sup> In this context, many countries promoted migration through their policies, and even though they tried to regulate it, the legal status of immigrants was not a principal concern.<sup>32</sup>

Nonetheless, by the end of the 1960s and during the 1970s there was a shift in terms of migration control.<sup>33</sup> The topic generated public anxiety, even though it did not change the understanding of migration itself. The changes were mainly based on economical factors, related to the heavy transformations that the market had suffered. In this scenario, states were driven to protect their domestic workforce<sup>34</sup>, which meant that some restrictions were established so fewer foreign workers could enter the country.

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<sup>27</sup> Hoffman, Bruce. *Inside Terrorism*, 2nd ed. New York: Columbia University Press, Chapter 1: Defining Terrorism, (2006). pp. 1-41.

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.* pp. 3

<sup>29</sup> Mueller, John E. *Policy and opinion in the Gulf War*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994.

<sup>30</sup> Lahav, Gallya. "Immigration Policy as Counterterrorism: The Effects of Security on Migration and Border Control in the European Union." *The Consequences of Counterterrorism*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation (2010): 130-176.

<sup>31</sup> Huysmans, Jef. "The European Union and the securitization of migration." *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies* 38.5 (2000): pp.753

<sup>32</sup> Marié, Michel, and Jean Viard. *La campagne inventée*. Actes Sud, 1988.

<sup>33</sup> Fielding, Anthony. "Migrations, institutions and politics: the evolution of European migration policies." *Mass Migrations in Europe: The Legacy and the Future*, London, Belhaven Press,(40-62) (1993).

<sup>34</sup> Blotvogel, Hans Heinrich, Ursula Müller-ter Jung, and Gerald Wood. "From itinerant worker to immigrant? The geography of guestworkers in Germany." King R.(ed.) (1993): pp. 88



However, despite the creation of these restrictive migration norms<sup>35</sup>, the immigrant population still increased, and guest workers became more permanent with the passing of time. This situation led to the generation of the rhetoric that created a nexus between migration and internal conflict.

Some years later, one of the biggest terrorist attacks in history took place. Terrorism was not a new concept, but for the first time it represented a great risk for the West. The securitization theory argues that the immediate reaction to 9/11 of most Western countries was linking the (in)security posed by terrorism to migration. Migration was not conceived as the threat per se. Nonetheless, the opportunities that it granted to terrorism were conceived as a big risk. However, and as it was mentioned before, there is no consensus on how these two phenomena are linked, and how they relate to each other. This paper will propose a possible explanation for the lack of consensus (which according to my understanding is based on methodological problems), and will attempt to solve it.

### **3. METHODOLOGY**

Given the provided definition, it seems like operationalizing securitization may be far from easy. In fact, even despite notable effort to explain how migration, security and terrorism are linked, an actual consensus amongst scholars still seems far from reach. This paper assumes the methodology applied in addressing this issue so far has been at least partly responsible for the present lack of accordance. Thus, it embraces Baele and Sterck's critique.

Firstly, the authors argue that the question of whether an issue has or has not been securitized has a fundamental problem that does not allow scholars to obtain a consensual and universal answer, as it fails to understand the complexity of the securitization process. Instead it strives to provide a binary "yes" or "no" answer.<sup>36</sup>

Furthermore, the authors criticise the lack of transparency that International Security scholars have applied when choosing certain documents or events to conduct their analysis. In other words, they blame the biased selection of data for the different answers provided by different researchers when studying the same issue.<sup>37</sup>

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<sup>35</sup> King, Russell. "European international migration 1945-90: A statistical and geographical overview." *Mass migration in Europe: the legacy and the future*, London, Belhaven (1993): 19-39.

<sup>36</sup> Baele, Stéphane J., and Olivier C. Sterck. "Diagnosing the Securitisation of Immigration at the EU Level: A New Method for Stronger Empirical Claims." *Political Studies* 63.5 (2015): pp.1123.

<sup>37</sup> Ibid.

Given that Baele and Sterck propose a different approach to the study of securitization (and specifically, securitization of migration), this paper seeks to answer whether or not (and to what extent) migration, security and terrorism are linked, and how terrorism might affect migration. I will apply Baele and Sterck's method, which tries to support qualitative analyses with statistical instruments.

Thus, in this section of the paper I will firstly introduce this new methodology and its application to my work in greater detail, before presenting my case studies as well as my hypotheses.

### **3.1 Baele and Sterck's method**

The methodology approach chosen by Baele and Sterck as a solution for the dilemmas posed by previous methods for measuring securitization, is based on the idea that an issue may go through different levels of securitization, given that the authors understand this process as "the result of practices and framing narratives whose securitizing intensity may be more or less strong."<sup>38</sup> Accordingly, they consider "the speech act", established by the Securitization Theory, not to be constructed by a single isolated move, but by a "semantic regularity"<sup>39</sup> of discourses. Grounded on Felix Ciuta's warning<sup>40</sup> that securitization almost never happens as a clear and direct act, Baele and Sterck thus interpret the "speech act" as a continuum of securitizing moves.<sup>41</sup>

Compendiously, their method consists on a statistical study of the results provided by LIWC, a computer-operated, fully automated language analysis program. Their aim is to study to what extent the discourse of a given field is affected by "semantic regularities."<sup>42</sup> In other words, their method explores the quantitative presence of certain words, related to security and securitization, in suitable and relevant written and spoken documents.<sup>43</sup> By including a large scale of pertinent political texts, they try to eliminate the line between discourse on the one hand, and practice on the other.

The LIWC fits this methodology since it is designed to calculate the frequency of specific words in any given text. The authors also proposed a carefully tailored dictionary with which this computer program functions. That is another fundamental factor for the LIWC to fit this study, since it allows its users to modify or create a set of words, which can be grouped according to the subject they relate to (terrorism,

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<sup>38</sup> Baele, Stéphane J., and Olivier C. Sterck. "Diagnosing the Securitisation of Immigration at the EU Level: A New Method for Stronger Empirical Claims." *Political Studies* 63.5 (2015): pp.1124

<sup>39</sup> Ibid.

<sup>40</sup> Felix, Ciută. "Security and the Problem of context: a Hermeneutical Critique of Securitisation Theory." *Review of International Studies* 35, no. 2 (2009): 301-326.

<sup>41</sup> Baele, Stéphane J., and Olivier C. Sterck. "Diagnosing the Securitisation of Immigration at the EU Level: A New Method for Stronger Empirical Claims." *Political Studies* 63.5 (2015): pp 1125

<sup>42</sup> Ibid.

<sup>43</sup> Ibid.

migration, security, etc.). It then calculates the proportion of these words over the total sum of words in each text. Thereby, an average share of appearances of the determined words per document over a certain period can be calculated. On the other hand, a possible and powerful argument against this program could be its incapacity to distinguish between words that have been mentioned with an “in favour” and an “against” connotation. However, this paper considers the sole appearance of one of these words to be linked to a security move already taking place (no matter the connotation), since their mere presence in such a high political arena makes a stance by itself.

After analysing the documents with LIWC, a precise security ratio is provided (security lexicon/total amount of words) for each sample. While the ratio cannot be interpreted on its own, it acquires relevance when compared to other scores as then reflecting an increase or decrease in the level of securitization according to the securitizing move. This comparison, however, has to be adjusted for possible different sample sizes and variances, which can be achieved by the application of the one-tailed Welch’s t-test to  $\frac{\bar{x}_1 - \bar{x}_2}{\sqrt{\frac{s_1^2}{n_1} + \frac{s_2^2}{n_2}}}$ , with  $n_1 = 12$ ,  $n_2 = 22$ ,  $\bar{x}_1 = 0.12$ ,  $\bar{x}_2 = 0.15$ ,  $s_1^2 = 0.001$ , and  $s_2^2 = 0.002$  degrees of freedom, where  $\bar{x}_1$ ,  $\bar{x}_2$ ,  $s_1^2$ , and  $s_2^2$  are the means, variances and sizes of sample  $i$  respectively.

Using the Welch’s t-test thus enables us to detect significant differences between the security ratios and hence conclude whether securitization has taken place or not. The use of LIWC’s results and the application of this statistical analysis provides an automated and unbiased analysis of documents as the outcome is unaffected by any partial reading or interpretation. Moreover, it provides the opportunity for other scholars to apply the same methodology when carrying out different studies.

In this paper, by adapting this methodology, we will be able to conclude that in cases where political actors (with the legitimate capacity to provoke this kind of move) have used the customized set of words with a high frequency, there has been a high intent to produce a securitizing move. Nonetheless, to be able to interpret that migration has been securitized, both the “security” and the “migration” related words should be used more frequently simultaneously. The study, however, should not be interpreted as a discourse analysis, but rather as a content one.

### 3.2 Case studies: Spain and UK

Two cases were selected in order to carry out this study: Spain and United Kingdom. Despite their discrepancies, they fit the research because they share many aspects that allow for controls to be carried

out. They have a history of internal terrorism (which took place during the same period of time); they are both Western European countries; they were both members of the EU at the time; the attacks they suffered were separated by a reduced amount of time; they both happened after 9/11; the attacks took place as a response to their participation in the Iraq war; and nationals were involved in the attacks, though they were –in both cases- related to Al Qaeda. Moreover, the attacks suffered in both cases fit the definition of “terrorist attack” provided above.

Furthermore, for the purpose of this paper, all parliamentary debates that took place between 11-03-2003 and 07-07-2006 have been included in the analysis, and have been processed by applying the methodology explained above, as a way to operationalise the “speech act” or “securitizing move”. Considering all debates helps this study avoid mistakes done during data selection, and confirms the existence of an unbiased methodology. Moreover, the period of time has thus been chosen because considering a year before and after the attacks allows for a clear interpretation of the reality, and admits control over outliers. Taking into account a shorter time might have expressed exceptional patterns, and would have not permitted a “semantic regularities” study to be carried out. Also, considering a longer period of time would have affected the clarity of the securitization move, which could have been lost among the huge amount of debates considered.

What is more, this period has been divided into three phases: before the Madrid attacks (11/03/2003 – 10/03/2004), in between the Madrid and the London attacks (11/03/2004 – 06/07/2005) and after the London attack (07/07/2005 – 07/07/2006). The purpose of this has been to study the effects of a terrorist attack in the country that suffers it, and in neighbouring countries. Furthermore, it was not possible to study the UK only considering “before” and “after” the London attack, since the time before this attack is not equivalent to the time before the Madrid attack (given that the Madrid attack was the first of its kind to take place in Europe, and could have started a process in the UK which needs to be analysed and controlled for a proper comparison between cases).

Next, only the parliamentary debates of the lower cameras have been considered. This is so because this camera is the one designing the legislative agenda and the resulting legislations. Furthermore, given the democratic form that both countries possess, the executive power is compelled to reflect the thoughts of its party sitting in the parliament (and vice versa). The proposed methodology was not applied for the analysis of the produced legislation, since these documents would be better interpreted by the legal changes they produce, for which a qualitative approach is better suited. Also, given the size of this study, other sources could not be included (like the media, or public speeches). The limitations of only using parliamentary debates as a way to operationalize the speech act have been acknowledged, but it gives us a

general understanding of the positioning of the agenda setting political elites, or in other words, of the actors with the capacity to carry out securitizing moves.

As for the tailored lexicon, I have used Baele and Sterck's dictionary. However, it had to be adapted for this study. Many words related to migration were added, since as Baele and Sterck specify in their paper, they decided to delete migration-related words given that they did not suit the purpose of their analysis. In this case, however, those words are necessary, since we are trying to analyse whether migration suffered higher or lower levels of securitization after the Madrid (2004) and the London (2005) attacks. As well, an adaptation and translation had to be made to be able to study Spain's case. The final version of the dictionary can be found in *Appendix I*, both in English and in Spanish.

### **3.3 Hypotheses**

The central question of this paper could be divided into two parts: the "how" and the "why". The first part focuses on how terrorist attacks affect the securitization of migration. Taking into account the two cases that have been selected, the hypothesis proposed to answer this first question is that the UK has securitized migration (around terrorism) more than Spain. Furthermore, a second part of this hypothesis implies that both cases have securitized migration more after the attack took place in their own territory than when it took place in a neighbouring country. As a result to the proposed analysis, we expect a high level of securitization in Spain after the Madrid attack, which would be shown by a high and positive variance between the time before the Madrid attack, and the time after it. Some level of securitization is also expected after the London attack for the case study of Spain, but with lower degrees of variance (although still positive).

On the other hand, the hypothesis explained above supposes that the UK will experience a positive but lower degree of variance than Spain after the Madrid attack, and a higher (and again positive) degree of variance after the London attack. However, the overall levels of securitization are expected to be greater in the UK than in Spain throughout the time lapse considered.

Moving on to the second part of the question, there is no way to predict what the actual results are going to be. This is why we can only generate a hypothesis for the "why" question after the quantitative and qualitative results have been analysed. However, this paper will focus on the first part of the question. Even though it will generate a hypothesis to try to answer this second part, it will not try to prove its validity.


## 4. ANALISIS OF RESULTS

Now is when an attempt can be made to answer the question of how the securitization of migration is affected after a terrorist attack takes place. The method proposed by Baele and Sterck discloses some unexpected results. Yet, when combined with a qualitative analysis of the resulting legislations and law-making (which is the operationalized result of the audience's reaction to the speech act or securitization move), they can support some hypotheses that were previously proposed by authors like Huysmans<sup>44</sup>. However, the different tendencies shown by the two cases generate an irregular picture. The qualitative analysis tends to support the hypothesis proposed by this paper; however if we only rely on the quantitative one (for methodological reasons) then this is not so clear.

### 4.1 Quantitative Results


Figure 1 and Figure 2 describe the quantitative analysis' results obtained by the application of LIWC. They reflect the average percentage of words in the considered documents that are related to the respective categories terrorism/security/migration as defined in the tailored lexicon in Appendix I. The three samples are determined as described above and divided into "before the Madrid attack" (PREMAD), "between the Madrid and the London attacks" (POSTMAD) and "after the London attack" (POSTLON).

What stands out most prominently when comparing Figure 1 and Figure 2 is that the use of "security" related words (even without relation to migration and terrorism) in legislative debates clearly had a higher frequency in Spain than in the UK.



**Percentage of Total Words related to Security/Migration/Terrorism, Average per Debate**

**Figure 2: Spain - Percentage of Total Words related to Security/Migration/Terrorism, Average per Debate**



Thus, relying on a simple graphical comparison, the quantitative results seem to prove the main hypothesis false. Moreover, the graphs suggest that the frequency of words related to “terrorism” and “migration” in both cases is very similar. Accordingly, this simple analysis could imply that even though policy-makers in Spain tended to use higher levels of securitization language, this was not necessarily linked to either migration or terrorism. Hence, although it is too early to make general conclusions at this point of the analysis, the quantitative assessment appears to open up new perspectives on issues considered obvious before.

In any case, it points out one of the advantages of the applied methodology against solely carrying out a binary analysis of an issue related to securitization. While the results still lead us to recognize that a certain level of securitization has taken place in both cases, the new approach can take us one step further: beyond a simple “yes” or “no”, what remains to be seen is whether the terrorist attacks influenced migration’s securitization process and to what extent. In other words, at this point of the analysis I am forced to observe that migration has not been fully treated as a security issue in either case; but on the other hand, it is also not possible to argue that migration has not been securitized at all.

It is certainly important to note, however, that from sole eyeballing we cannot make any statistical inference and thus draw any conclusion with respect to the extent in which the securitization of migration has taken place. The difference in sample sizes and variances hinders our ability to simply carry out a “before” and “after” comparison. Therefore, the Welch’s t-test is applied to the raw results obtained by the use of LIWC.

**Table 1: p-value of Welch’s t-test**

<i><b>TERRORISM</b></i>				
	<b>POSTMAD VS. PREMAD</b>		<b>POSTLON VS. POSTMAD</b>	
MEAN ABSOLUT	0,21 vs. 0,33	0,36 vs. 0,41	0,31 vs. 0,21	0,36 vs. 0,36
MEAN DIFFERENCE	- 0,12	- 0,05	+ 0,10	0
TEST STATISTIC	- 6,88	- 1,77	7,13	0,134
P-VALUE	0,000	0,039	0,000	0,447
SIGNIFICANCE LEVEL	1%	5%	1%	-



	Spain	UK	Spain	UK
<b>SECURITY</b>				
	<b>POSTMAD VS. PREMAD</b>		<b>POSTLON VS. POSTMAD</b>	
MEAN ABSOLUT	1,20 vs. 1,59	0,26 vs. 0,29	1,56 vs. 1,20	0,26 vs. 0,27
MEAN DIFFERENCE	- 0,39	- 0,03	+ 0,36	- 0.01
TEST STATISTIC	- 9,86	-1,22	10,69	0,41
P-VALUE	0,000	0,112	0,000	0,34
SIGNIFICANCE LEVEL	1%	-	1%	-
	Spain	UK	Spain	UK

	Spain	UK	Spain	UK
<b>MIGRATION</b>				
	<b>POSTMAD VS. PREMAD</b>		<b>POSTLON VS. POSTMAD</b>	
MEAN ABSOLUT	0,39 vs. 0,24	0,18 vs. 0,20	0,26 vs. 0,39	0,19 vs. 0,18
MEAN DIFFERENCE	+ 0,15	- 0,02	- 0,13	0,01
TEST STATISTIC	11,61	-1,49	-10,31	1,07
P-VALUE	0,000	0,069	0,000	0,143
SIGNIFICANCE LEVEL	1%	10%	1%	-
	Spain	UK	Spain	UK

\*These results are as well presented under a different arrangement in *Appendix II*

Table 1 shows the p-values as implied by the test statistic computed according to the formula presented before. The decision rule is given by rejecting the null hypothesis of the two sample means being equal

whenever the p-value remains lower than the significance level. I.e. when the null hypothesis is rejected, a significant variance in the frequency of use has taken place from one time lapse to the other.

Noticeably, in the UK, words related to terrorism and migration were used less frequently after the Madrid attack, albeit only at the 5% and 10% significance level respectively. Moreover, there is no statistical significant variance at all in the frequency of words related to any of the categories (security/migration/terrorism) after the London attack –result that tends to contradict the postulated hypothesis at the beginning.

In sum, what these numbers represent is that after the Madrid attack, the House of Commons made less references to migration and terrorism, which would suggest that the UK does not respond to a terrorist attack suffered by a neighbouring country by securitizing migration. Furthermore, the lack of significant variance after the London attack might imply that there was no intent from high political decision-makers to create higher levels of securitization, and/or link terrorism to migration. Without further analysis, the statistical output thus suggests that the UK did not create a link between migration, security, and terrorism.

On the other hand, Spain did not only show higher levels of usage of security language than the UK, it also showed significant variance at the highest common significance level (1%, p-value: 0,000) in all the time lapses and lexicon categories studied. Nonetheless, the tendencies exposed by this case are unexpected since in fact the mean percentage of words related to terrorism and security decreases after the Madrid attack, while on average words assigned to migration were used more frequently in debates. In contrast, the effect that the London attack had on Spain was completely the opposite (although at the same level of significance). After 7/7, legislative members started to make more references to “terrorism” and “security” issues in their discourse. However, fewer references were made to migration issues.

All in all, and making an attempt to provide a preliminary conclusion, what these results show is that on the one hand, the UK did not create a link between migration, security, and terrorism. In other words, this means that migration did not get securitized at a discourse level in any point of the time lapse studied. Furthermore, and keeping in mind that this only refers to a discourse level, the UK did not get involved in any kind of securitization process, not even in relation to terrorism.

On the other hand, the analysis of parliamentary debates reflects that Spain showed some kind of concern in relation to migration after the Madrid attack, even though it was not linked to terrorism and (in)security. This interpretation is retrieved from the fact that when “migration” suffers a positive significant variance, “security” and “terrorism” suffer a negative one. What is more, this preliminary conclusion could suggest that the significant changes shown by Spain’s case after the London attack determine the involvement of

Spain in a securitization process (again, at least at a discourse level), which was however not related to migration, since the frequency with which migration related words were used decreased at the time.

We should bear in mind that this paper celebrates a non-binary kind of answer. Nonetheless, this kind of answer cannot be provided due to the results obtained. In other words, different levels of securitization of migration could have been evaluated if both cases (or at least one) had shown an increase or decrease of both “security” and “migration” language synchronously, in any of the time lapses studied. However, this kind of variance was not found, and the statistical results obtained give no space for a non-binary kind of answer.

Finally, we should not neglect the fact that “security”, “migration” and “terrorism” related words were used with some frequency in the parliamentary debates of both cases, which reflects that at least to some point, these three concepts were connected and migration was partly securitized, even if it did not happen as a result of the terrorist attacks considered in this paper, and if it was at a very low ratio.

#### **4.2 Qualitative Analysis**

Even though the quantitative method applied above presents itself as very solid and robust, the question arises on whether we can measure securitization only by considering the frequency with which certain words are mentioned in influential political spheres. I argue that we cannot disregard the merits of a clear and straightforward quantitative method; however, an analysis of parliamentary debates is not enough to conclude whether migration has or has not and/or to what level been securitized. To do so, we should include an analysis of the resulting legislations, and how these affected the pre-established legal system in relation to migration issues. We can clearly see the necessity of including this second part of the analysis in the definition of “securitization” provided in the introduction. As it was mentioned before, for an issue to become part of the security agenda, two actions are needed. First the speech act, or securitizing move, which in this case is operationalized by the use and analysis of parliamentary debates. Secondly, the audience needs to accept and embrace the speech, since only this action allows for the issue to actually become securitized. Baele and Sterck’s method does not fit the criteria for it to be applied when analysing laws and legislation, and even the authors recognise that in their paper the audience has been neglected; and for that reason a qualitative analysis of law-making is included.

This does not imply that the previous acknowledgements of how scholars have hand picked qualitative methodologies when studying securitization issues are forgotten, or that the quantitative results are less relevant. On the contrary, taking into account what Baele and Sterck have signalised as weak spots of this

type of method, my aim is to provide this study with a deeper analysis, which helps support and clearly explain the results shown above.

#### *4.2.1 Spain*

Spain has always been categorized as one of the most liberal state members of the EU in migration matters<sup>45</sup>, given that the new Organic Law on Rights and Freedoms of Foreigners in Spain and their Social Integration (which is the only legal document which regulates migration in Spain) grants expanded rights to both legal and illegal incomers. Moreover, two were the effects that the Madrid attack had over the Spanish case. However, none of them possessed a legal stance or was directly connected to migration.

The first one was a clear rejection of the speech put forward by the government. People refused to believe that ETA was responsible for the attack, and created a clear link between Spain's participation in the Iraq war and what happened in Spain's capital city. This could be seen not only in the protests against terrorism, but also in the final results of the national elections that took place only days after the attack.

Until February of 2004, the Popular Party (PP) held a majority of public support.<sup>46</sup> We should bear in mind that this party had been in office since the year 2000, and constitutes until this date the most powerful political movement in Spain. PP managed to contain inflation and enjoyed low levels of unemployment during its time in office.<sup>47</sup> It also had a very strong and successful anti-terrorist policy, which was implemented to counteract attacks from the Basque terrorist group ETA.<sup>48</sup> Nonetheless, by the beginning of March the situation seemed to change as people's minds shifted.

Zapatero, the head of the Socialist Workers' Party had promised to withdraw troops from Iraq, which did not seem important to the common citizen before the attacks took place. However, after the 11<sup>th</sup> of March, and with a government full of officials reluctant to accept that Al Qaeda had been involved in the attacks, this issue gained massive importance. Thus, after the elections, the Socialist Party won 164 seats in the Parliament, allowing it to form a minority government, which was historic.<sup>49</sup> Furthermore, this also made the PP loose 35 of the 183 seats obtained in 2000.<sup>50</sup>

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<sup>45</sup> Gonzalez, Lydia Esteve, and Richard Mac Bride. "Fortress Europe: Fear of Immigration-Present and Future of Immigration Law and Policy in Spain." *UC Davis J. Int'l L. & Pol'y* 6 (2000): 155-160.

<sup>46</sup> Chari, Raj. "The 2004 Spanish election: Terrorism as a catalyst for change?." *West European Politics* 27, no. 5 (2004): pp. 955.

<sup>47</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>48</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>49</sup> *Ibid.* pp. 956

<sup>50</sup> *Ibid.*

As for the second effect, even though it was not related to law-making, it was indeed policy-making. Spain committed to the strengthening of police forces and intelligence capabilities.<sup>51</sup> This was shown by the Terrorism Prevention and Protection Plan, which was developed by the Executive Committee for the Unified Command in March 2005. In a way, this Plan only reinforced some measures that had been previously taken by the Secretary of State for Security. These measures could be activated in different levels, according to a calculation of possible threats. The highest possible level (level three) was activated shortly after the London attack in 2005.<sup>52</sup> Furthermore, higher regulations were established to control the transport and storage of possible terrorist weapons.<sup>53</sup>

The most extreme measure related to identity that was applied in Spain had to do with the isolation of prisoners who had shown Jihadist tendencies while in prison. However, the Organic Law on Rights and Freedoms of Foreigners in Spain and their Social Integration suffered no modifications until the year 2009, which indicates that Spain did not link the terrorist threat to migration at a legal level.

#### *4.2.2 United Kingdom*

The United Kingdom is one of the countries in the world with the longest tradition for the protection of civil liberties, all the way back since the Magna Carta in 1215.<sup>54</sup> In other words, the United Kingdom has had a strong commitment towards human rights and democracy, both domestically and abroad. However, when dealing with terrorism it has established one of the stricter limits to individual rights.

There is a more tangible contradiction in relation to this case. In 1998 the Labour government “brought the rights home”<sup>55</sup> with the Human Rights Act, which was later enforced in the year 2000. But by 2001, after the attacks of 9/11, the Labour government was quick to introduce new legislation that enhanced the powers already conceived by the 2000 Terrorism Act. The 2001 Terrorism, Crime and Security Act renounced Britain’s obligation under the ECHR to protect the “right of life and liberty” at time of war or other crises that may endanger the nation, creating a precedent in Britain’s tradition for the protection of individual liberties.<sup>56</sup> The United Kingdom allowed itself to carry out indefinite detentions of foreign nationals who could not be deported due to risk of being tortured or executed in the recipient country.<sup>57</sup>

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<sup>51</sup> Reinales, Fernando. "After the Madrid bombings: Internal security reforms and prevention of global terrorism in Spain." *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 32, no. 5 (2009): 367-388.

<sup>52</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>53</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>54</sup> *Ibid.* pp. 76

<sup>55</sup> *Ibid.* pp. 82

<sup>56</sup> *Ibid.* pp. 83

<sup>57</sup> *Ibid.*

This legislation went even further after the London attacks in July 2005. The Prime Minister, Tony Blair, pledged for the introduction of a new law. A month after the attacks had taken place, he revealed his 12-point anti-terrorism plan. Eight of the twelve points were related to immigration and the Muslim community.<sup>58</sup> The Prime Minister's desire for the introduction of a harsher law related to the subject was later on reflected by the Terrorism Bill and the Immigration, Nationality and Asylum Bill.<sup>59</sup> This was accompanied by some new administrative measures and some executive intervention in court cases.<sup>60</sup>

The Terrorism Bill aimed at reaching further back in the causal chain of the commission of acts of violence<sup>61</sup>; in other words, to prevent terrorist acts from the moment they are first conceived. This meant an increase in surveillance, a limitation of freedom of speech, and longer periods of imprisonment, even for those individuals who were only suspected –in other words, pre-charged– of being involved in terrorism.<sup>62</sup> Since the creation of these laws, individuals are assessed based the risk they pose; based on an evaluation of their likely future conduct.<sup>63</sup> The Bill also authorised a wide range of restrictions that did not need judicial involvement or approval, on matter of suspects' movements, association, and expression.<sup>64</sup> However, this legislation was very careful in not drawing a direct connection between migration and terrorism.

As for the Immigration, Nationality and Asylum Bill, it discusses arrangements for asylum-seekers and created greater powers for the detention or removal of foreigners.<sup>65</sup> It also established further complications for asylum seekers to actually obtain asylum. Even though the connection with terrorism was not explicitly drawn, the fact that this legislation was enforced right after the London attacks, and so closely after the Terrorism Bill 2005 was sanctioned, created a link by itself. What is more, it should not be forgotten that this legislation intended –up to a point– to reflect Tony Blair's 12-point anti-terrorist plan.

However, it is relevant to highlight that the Labour party could only push the argument of necessity so far

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<sup>58</sup> New grounds for deportation and exclusion; to create offence of condoning or glorifying terrorism, here and abroad; to refuse asylum automatically to anyone who has participated in terrorism anywhere; a legal framework which makes it easier to strip the citizenship from some individuals; maximum time limit introduced for future extradition cases; extension of control orders against those who cannot be deported; set new threshold for the obtainment of British citizenship; new powers to close mosques; bringing forward proposed border security measures; and designate some countries specifically for biometric visas. See *The Guardian* (5 August 2005), *The Prime Minister's 12-Point Plan*, *The Guardian*, and Brysk, Alison, and Gershon Shafir, eds. *National Insecurity and Human Rights: Democracies Debate Counterterrorism*. Vol. 5. Univ of California Press, 2007.

<sup>59</sup> *Ibid.* pp. 85

<sup>60</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>61</sup> See Crenshaw, Martha (ed) *The Consequences of Counterterrorism*. Russell Sage Foundation, pp.5

<sup>62</sup> Brysk, Alison; Shafir, Gershon (ed.). *National Insecurity and Human Rights: Democracies Debate Counterterrorism*. Univ of California Press, 2007. pp. 86.

<sup>63</sup> Fenwick, Helen; Phillipson, Gavin. *Covert derogations and judicial deference: redefining liberty and due process rights in counterterrorism law and beyond*. *McGill LJ*, 2010, vol. 56, p. 863.

<sup>64</sup> Hiebert, Janet L. "Parliamentary Review of Terrorism Measures." *The Modern Law Review* 68.4 (2005): 676-680.

<sup>65</sup> *The Guardian* (19 January 2009), *A-Z of Legislation: Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2006*, *The Guardian*.

during their attempt to introduce broader counterterrorist measures. Concerns about civilian liberties, and the mechanisms designed for their protection, set a limit to the government's capacity. One example is the vote on the ninety-days detention for pre-charged individuals thought to be related to terrorism. Instead of the government's proposal, only a twenty-eight days detention was approved. Another proof of this is the discussion that took place among academics on how many of the points mentioned in the 12-point counter-terrorism plan had Tony Blair been able to enforce. Nonetheless, many academics argued that the Parliament had little opportunity to amend the texts related to terrorism and migration, and so they concluded that this case showed insufficient democratic opposition and unwillingness to condition the new counterterrorist legislative packages to the historic compromise to the rule of law and civilian liberties.<sup>66</sup> All in all, this case clearly shows how the connection between security, migration and terrorism has been drawn and legally established, refusing Boswell's, and other scholar's argument that migration has not been securitized.

### **4.3 Answering "Why"**

Understanding Spain's behaviour is clear and straightforward. In a nutshell, Spain maintained its "open borders" tradition, and even if it got involved in a securitization process, it did not securitize migration. Quantitative and qualitative results go hand in hand in this case, since the evaluation of parliamentary debates show high levels of "security" language, but not so high (and actually we could call them low) levels of "terrorism" and "migration" language. This was undoubtedly reflected on the political and legal measures that followed. Spain did not modify its migration laws until the year 2009, for which we can understand that neither the Madrid or the London attacks were responsible for these legal modifications. However, it did adjust its security measures. As it was mentioned before, this was mostly a policy move, but it explains the high levels of security language used in parliamentary debates.

Nonetheless, it still seems odd that a significant reduction of the use of "security" and "terrorism" language followed the Madrid attack. This does not represent a contradiction with the security measures that were applied in the year 2004 since they were generated in political arenas that were not necessarily related to the parliament (like the Secretary of State for Security). However, it makes us doubt of the relevance of the speech act; doubt that is intensified when analysing the UK's case.

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<sup>66</sup> Finn, John E. "COUNTERTERRORISM REGIMES AND THE RULE OF LAW: THE EFFECTS OF EMERGENCY LEGISLATION ON SEPARATION OF POWERS, CIVIL LIBERTIES." *The Consequences of Counterterrorism* (2010): 74. See as well Haubrich, Dirk. "September 11, Anti-Terror Laws and Civil Liberties: Britain, France and Germany Compared1." *Government and Opposition* 38.1 (2003): 3-28. and Phillipson, Gavin, and H. M. Fenwick. "Legislative over-breadth, democratic failure and the judicial response: fundamental rights and the UK's anti-terrorist legal policy." (2005): 455-490.

Furthermore, an increase of “migration” related language with no political or legal result to reflect it could be showing the importance of the audience, for the securitizing move not only to be developed, but also to be embraced.

The London attack produced an increase in “terrorism” and “security” language, but a reduction of “migration” language. The policies applied after this attack clearly represent the debate that was taking place in the Parliament, since security measures (related to terrorism prevention) were applied at its highest level. Nonetheless, an understanding of the involvement of national citizens in the attack together with Spain’s “open borders” tradition could explain the reduction in “migration” related language.

All in all, we could say that Spain got involved at a policy-making level in a securitization process, both after the Madrid and the London attacks. We cannot conclude that a securitization process did not take place at a discourse level after the Madrid attack, since this paper only considers parliamentary debates, and given that anyhow “security” related words were still used with a high frequency<sup>67</sup>; but it is possible to argue that a securitizing move was present at a discourse level after the London attack. However, (in)security was not linked to migration at any level (discourse/policy making/legally) and at any point of the time lapse considered. We can conclude that given the contradicting tendencies acquired by “terrorism” and “security” language on the one hand, and “migration” language on the other.<sup>68</sup>

Furthermore, the results presented by the analysis of the UK’s case turned out to be less intuitive. As Huysmans and Buonfino<sup>69</sup> have pointed out “there is a considerable reluctance within the political elite to insert and especially sustain the connection between migration and terrorism too intensely in public debate.”<sup>70</sup> This does not imply that migration has not been securitized<sup>71</sup>, but that instead this process was embedded in a multifaceted framing.

In a nutshell, the securitization process did not rely on the idea of “existential threats”, but instead was inserted in a discussion of policing technologies.<sup>72</sup> After carrying out a qualitative analysis (based on discourse interpretation) of parliamentary debates in the UK, Huysmans and Buonfino conclude that even though after 9/11 parliamentary debates reflected the existence of a link between migration, terrorism and

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<sup>67</sup> It is also important to bear in mind that this paper is not looking for a “yes” or “no” answer, so it is possible to conclude that there was in fact a securitization process in parliamentary discourse/debates, though with higher levels after the London attack than after the Madrid attack.

<sup>68</sup> While “terrorism” and “security” language decreased, “migration” language increased; and the other way around.

<sup>69</sup> Huysmans, Jef, and Alessandra Buonfino. "Politics of exception and unease: Immigration, asylum and terrorism in parliamentary debates in the UK." *Political studies* 56.4 (2008): 766-788.

<sup>70</sup> *Ibid.* pp. 2.

<sup>71</sup> *Ibid.* pp. 4.

<sup>72</sup> *Ibid.*



(in)security, there was a conscious de-link of the issues after the year 2002.<sup>73</sup> The authors signalise that the results of their study (which resemble the results of this study) turned out to be unexpected, since public statements and the media followed a completely different pattern at the time, and especially after the London attack.

Furthermore, the de-link seems contradicting, given that, as it was explained above, important legal changes were made in relation to migration and terrorism controls in the time lapse studied. This can be explained by understanding the de-link as a political move, or by being sceptical about the idea of a “speech act”. Again, it is important to bear in mind the limitations of a study based only on legislative debates; however, the UK’s case could demonstrate that the presence of a speech act is not necessary for an issue to become securitized. Nonetheless, we can not forget that at some point this speech act existed (even if it was in the year 2001), which could have set certain processes into action, which did not require for a second securitizing move to be re-activated.

Another way to understand UK’s results would be by taking a closer look at the definition of “securitization” proposed by Buzan, Waever and De Wilde.<sup>74</sup> They argue that an issue becomes securitized when it is presented as “urgent and existential”<sup>75</sup> in such a way that “it should not be exposed to the normal haggling of politics but should be dealt with decisively by top leaders prior to other issues.”<sup>76</sup> In other words, what this could mean is that an analysis of parliamentary debates can make it look as if a securitization process or a securitizing move are not taking place, given that the issue is actually being managed by the head of the state, and not by the parliament.

Finally, there are some possible alternative explanations for the differences in the results obtained for each case, and so for Spain not creating a link between (in)security and migration while the UK did (although only at a legal level and not at a discursive one). Firstly, it should be noticed that, unlike the UK, Spain relies on international agreements for the management of its migration policies. In other words, being part of these agreements (for example, the Schengen agreement), could mean that Spain reduces its internal law-making on migration issues, since it already adopts another framework that manages this issue. On the other hand, the UK might be forced to have a deeper involvement in the management of migration policies and laws since it does not rely on international agreements to take care of it. Nonetheless, this does not explain by itself the entire picture, since it does not clarify why did the UK did not connect migration to security at a discourse level.

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<sup>73</sup> Ibid. pp. 16.

<sup>74</sup> Buzan, Barry, Ole Wæver, and Jaap De Wilde. *Security: a new framework for analysis*. Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998.

<sup>75</sup> Ibid. pp. 29.

<sup>76</sup> Ibid.

This, however, could be explained by the contradicting traditions (“open frontiers” and integration incentives in Spain’s case, and a historical animosity towards immigrants in the UK), which could or could not have been developed due to historical migration flows and geographical circumstances, and could have led to different historical processes (or previous securitizing moves that did not need to be reproduced to get the securitizing process going) for the securitization of migration that in the end affected the final results of this paper. However, an evaluation of these hypotheses will not be provided in this paper.

## **5. CONCLUSION**

This paper proposed a new way of analysing a controversial topic for which a unified and universal agreement had not been achieved due to methodological problems. The paper asked how do terrorist attacks affect the securitization of migration. To be able to answer this question, it presented two case studies. Its main hypothesis, which argued that the UK had gotten involved in a deeper process of securitization of migration than Spain, was confirmed. Still, it also opened new doors for a more profound understanding of how and at what level this happened.

First of all, we should highlight that a concise answer for “how do terrorist attacks affect the securitization of migration?” could not be provided, since both cases showed completely different results. However, we can say that in some cases, terrorist attacks can result in the development of a deep securitization of migration process, even if it does not happen at a discourse level; and in other cases, the same attack can restrain its effects to a simple securitization process which is not linked to migration. As it was argued at the end of this paper, these differences could be due to different traditions and previous “securitizing moves” that had taken place in relation to migration; however, this paper does not aim to prove this hypothesis.

As for the main hypothesis raised by this paper, we can observe that in fact the UK did securitize migration more than Spain. However, this did not happen at a discourse level, but at a legal one. Understanding this can lead to a new interpretation of the Securitization Theory and the significance of the speech act and the audience. Achieving this kind of conclusion proves the importance of applying a solid and transparent method, which does not look for binary “yes” or “no” answers when dealing with securitization. Essentially, the application of the methodology proposed by Baele and Sterck, together with a qualitative analysis to support it, which includes the role of the audience (which was mentioned by Baele and Sterck as one of the weak points of their paper), showed a clearer view of how do politicians carry securitize an issue in practice.

Nonetheless, this paper recognises the shortcoming of the analysis presented, starting with the limitations of a study that only considers parliamentary debates as the operationalization of speech acts. It would be interesting to include, in future studies on the topic, public discourses and media files, since they also form part of what the Securitization Theory names as the speech act. Furthermore, even with the effort put in creating an unbiased and complete tailored dictionary, it may have had tendentious trends which may have affected the quantitative results. Moreover, even if it was not a problem in this paper due to the results obtained, Baele and Sterck mention that “a high ration of SL/total words (...) orientates the scholar (...) towards an overall diagnosis of securitization, whereas a low ratio reflects a low saliency of security words and therefore a lower probability of facing a securitizing move.”<sup>77</sup> Yet they never propose a clear parameter of what should be considered as “high” and “low” ratios. Finally, taking into account the qualitative analysis, it would also be interesting to try to find a more precise and transparent method to carry out this kind of study. It is true that we cannot apply Baele and Sterck’s method to analyse the changes produced in a legal framework, but still, scholars should try to propose a new method that can be universally applied when carrying out this kind of analysis.

All in all, we can refuse the argument that migration has not been securitized at any level. This is so for two main reasons. The first one, which also serves as a clarification, is that even though the variance showed by the two case studies in the quantitative analysis reflected that migration had not been securitized at a discourse level after the Madrid and London attacks, it did show that “migration”, “security”, and “terrorism” related words were used with some frequency in parliamentary debates. This frequency per se proves that at least at some level, migration was securitized within discourse, all though it was not as a reaction to the terrorist attacks. Furthermore, both cases showed that the terrorist attacks had a securitizing effect (although it was not always reflected at a discourse level); and more precisely, the UK’s case showed that this process was related to migration. In other words, this paper’s objective to clarify the debate that was taking place around the securitization of migration is considered to have been achieved.

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<sup>77</sup> Baele, Stéphane J., and Olivier C. Sterck. "Diagnosing the Securitisation of Immigration at the EU Level: A New Method for Stronger Empirical Claims." *Political Studies* 63.5 (2015): pp. 1128.

## APPENDIX I

English Security/Migration/Terrorism Lexicon:

Abatement	Battle	Concession
ABMT	Bin	Conciliat*
Afghanistan	Biological	Conflict*
Aggression	Bipolar*	Contain*
Airland	Blitzkrieg	Control*
Airpower	Block*	Cooperat*
Alliance	Bomb*	Counteract*
Alqaeda	Bullet	Counterinsurgen*
Ammunition	Capabilit*	Counterterrorism
Amphibious	Capitulat*	Countervail*
Anarchy	Casualt*	Coup
Antipersonnel	Catastroph*	Crim*
APT	Ceasefire	Crisis
Arab	Chechnya	Critical
Arm*	Chemical	Cybersphere
Assassi*	Clos*	Cyberwar
Assault	Cluster	Damag*
Atomic	Coerc*	Danger*
Attack*	Collaps*	Decisive
Authority	Colonial	Defen*
Baader	Combat*	Demilitaris*
Balance	Compel*	Hamas
Ballistic	Compromise	Demobilis*

Hard	Infiltrat*	Iraq*
Destab*	Domin*	Fear
Hazard*	Inhuman	Israel*
Destruct*	Drugs	Fight*
Hegemon*	Insecur*	Kill*
Détente	Embargo	Firearms
Hezbollah	Insurgen*	Kurd*
Deter*	Emergency	FLN
Hiroshima	Intelligence	Landmine
Dictator	Enemy	Forbid*
Homeland	Interdependen*	Law*
Dilemma	Escalation	Force*
Hostage	Interdiction	Lebanon
Disarm*	Evil	Freedom
Hussein	Interpol	Liberat*
Disaster	Existential	Friction
Identity	Intervention	Libya
Disease	Expeditionary	Fundamentalis*
Illegal*	Invade*	Malacca
Disintegrat*	Explos*	Gang
Illicit	Invasion	Militar*
Disobedience	Extraordinary	Gas
Imminen*	IRA	Ghraib
Dispute	Faction	Missile
Incumbent	Iran*	Genocide
Division	Failed	Munition*

Globalization	Overwhelm*	Radical*
Muslims	Safe	Stabilis*
Guerrilla	Pakistan*	Rescue
Nagasaki	SALT	State
Guevara	Palestine	Strateg*
Narcotics	SALW	Strike
Gulf	Partisan	Suicide
Nationalis*	Sanction*	Superpower
NATO	Police	Surge
Resist*	Sarin	Surveillance
Nazi	Poverty	Syria
Resolution	Scarc*	Tactic*
Netwar	Power	Target
Resources	Seapower	Terror*
Non-proliferation	Preempt*	Threat
Response	Secur*	Traffic*
Korea	Prevent*	Transnational
Retaliation	Separatis*	Uprising
Nuclear	Proliferat*	Values
Revenge	Shock	Vietnam*
Offensive	Protect*	Violen*
Revolution	Shortage*	War*
Oil	Puniti*	Water
Rival*	Somalia	Weapon*
OSCE	Racis*	WMD
Rogue	Sovereign*	Wound*

Counterattack	Newcomer	Nationality
Immigrant	Exile	Extradition
Refugee	Incomer	Visa
Foreign*	Displaced	Citizen*
Asylum	Deport*	Database
Secur*	Outsider	Passport
Migration	Culture	9/11
Suffer	Consul*	Detention
Violence	Settlement	Imprisonment
Border	Disruption	Extremis*
Frontier	Nation	Intimidat
Migrant	National	ETA

Spanish Security/Migration/Terrorism Lexicon:

Abatimiento	Árabe*	Biológica
ABMT	Arma*	Bipolar
Afganistán	Asesino	Blitzkrieg
Agresión	Asalto*	Bloque*
Aéreo*	Atómico*	Bomba*
Alianza*	Ataque*	Bala*
AlQaeda	Autoridad*	Capacidad*
Municion*	Baader	Victima*
Anfibio	Balance	Catástrofe*
Anarquía	Balístico*	Químico*
Mina*	Batalla*	Coerc*
APT	Bin	Colaps*

Colonia*	Desestabiliza*	Inhuman*
Combate*	Peligro*	Droga*
Compromet*	Destru*	Insegur*
Concesi*	Hegemón*	Embargo
Concilia*	Détente	Insurgen*
Conflict*	Hezbollah	Emergencia*
Conten*	Disua*	Inteligencia
Control*	Hiroshima	Enemigo
Coopera*	Dictador	Interdependen*
Contrarresta*	Patria	Escalada
Insurgen*	Patriot*	Interdicción
Terror*	Dilema*	Mal*
Golpe	Rehen*	Interpol
Criminal*	Desarma*	Existencial
Crimen*	Hussein	Intervención
Crisis	Desastre*	Expedicionaria
Crítica	Identidad*	Invad*
Ciberesfera	Enfermedad*	Explos*
Ciberguerra	Ilegal*	Invasión
Daño*	Disintegra*	Extraordinari*
Peligro*	Ilícit*	IRA
Decisiv*	Desobed*	Facción
Defenza*	Imminente*	Irán*
Demilitariza*	Disputa	Fallido*
Hamás	División	Iraq*
Demobiliz*	Infiltra*	Miedo



Israel*	Guerrill*	Policia*
Lucha*	Nagasaki	Sarín
Matar	Guevara	Pobreza
Asesin*	Narcóticos	Escasez
Arma*	Nacion*	Poder
Curdo*	OTAN	Preven*
FLN	Resistencia	Segur*
Minas	Nazi	Separatista*
Prohibi*	Recursos	Prolifera*
Ley*	Proliferación	Shock
Fuerza	Corea	Protege*
Líbano	Represalia	Déficit*
Libertad*	Nuclear	Punitiv*
Fricción	Venganza	Somalia
Libia	Ofensivo	Racis*
Fundamentalis*	Petróleo	Soberan*
Malaca	Rival*	Radical*
Pandilla	OSCE	Estabil*
Militar*	Rogue	Rescate
Gas	Abruma*	Estado
Ghraib	Pakistán	Estrategia*
Misil*	SALT	Ataque
Genocid*	Palestina	Suicidio
Municion*	SALW	Superpotencia
Globalización	Partidista	Agita*
Musulman*	Sancion*	Vigilancia

Siria	Contraataque*	Asentamiento*
Tactic*	Inmigrante*	Ruptura
Objetivo*	Refugiad*	Transtorno
Terror*	Extranjer*	Nación
Amenaza*	Asilo	Nacional*
Tráfico*	Migración	Extradición
Transnacional	Sufri*	Visa*
Alzamiento	Violencia	Ciudadan*
Valores	Frontera	Pasaporte
Vietnam*	Migrante	9/11
Violen*	Exilio	Detención
Guerra*	Desplazado*	Prision*
Agua	Deporta*	Extremis*
Arma*	Foraster*	Intimida*
ADM	Cultura	ETA
Herida*	Consul*	Identidad

## APPENDIX II

Spain			
	<b>Terrorism</b>	<b>Security</b>	<b>Migration</b>
AVG/ Debate			
PREMAD	0,33	1,59	0,24
POSTMAD	0,21	1,20	0,39
POSTLON	0,31	1,56	0,26
WELCH T-STAT			
PREMAD→POSTMAD	-6,876	-9,863	11,618
POSTMAD→POSTLON	7,132	10,688	-10,310
P-VALUE			
PREMAD→POSTMAD	0,000***	0,000***	0,000***
POSTMAD→POSTLON	0,000***	0,000***	0,000***

UK			
	<b>Terrorism</b>	<b>Security</b>	<b>Migration</b>
AVG/ Debate			
PREMAD	0,41	0,29	0,20
POSTMAD	0,36	0,26	0,18

POSTLON	0,36	0,27	0,19
WELCH T-STAT			
PREMAD→POSTMAD	-1,768	-1,218	-1,488
POSTMAD→POSTLON	0,134	0,413	1,071
P-VALUE			
PREMAD→POSTMAD	0,039**	0,112	0,069*
POSTMAD→POSTLON	0,447	0,340	0,143

Levels of Significance: \*10 per cent, \*\*5 per cent, \*\*\*1 per cent.

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