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Drivers and Brakemen: Explaining
Cross-National Variation in Support
for European Foreign Policy
supranationalisation

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
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**Drivers and Brakemen: Explaining
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Abstract

A supranationalisation of European foreign policy would allow a departure from unanimous decision-making by relaxing required levels of internal cohesion – instituting the possibility of stronger European external action. Yet, since this would be a change of constitutional character, the consent of all member states is required. With this political reality in mind, this article seeks to analyse why some member states are drivers and others brakemen in moving towards a supranational mode of decision-making. It does so by analysing nationally aggregated public opinion data on supranationalisation as a proxy for member state behaviour in Treaty negotiations. On the basis of the findings, it is argued that national pride and degree of desired foreign policy autonomy from the United States are particularly powerful determinants of cross-national variation in support for European foreign policy supranationalisation. This has implications not only for the literature on European integration, but also provides lessons for practical politics about the possibility of European supranational integration in the sphere of foreign policy in the future.

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
Introduction

A central trade-off exists at the heart of European foreign policy decision-making: on the one hand, the stronger a proposed external position or action, the lower the likelihood that there will be strong internal cohesion among member states in favour of the position or action; on the other, the higher the level of internal cohesion for a proposed external position or action, the higher the likelihood that it is weak. Outside of concrete cases, the use of the adjectives ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ to describe foreign policy action appears abstract, but when applied to particular cases, ‘stronger’ and ‘weaker’ courses of action are frequently easily identifiable and often follow the hierarchy of military intervention, economic sanctions and finally declarations.¹ Taking into account that in its current intergovernmental guise, European foreign policy decisions are made in accordance with the unanimity voting rule, it is therefore unsurprising that European foreign policy tends to reflect the lowest common denominator (a weak position) to achieve consensus (internal cohesion) (Barbé 2013: 21; Bechev and Buras 2014) – even if socialisation and discursive practices can sometimes lead to cooperation above and beyond the rational interest of the most extreme preference outlier (Smith 2004: 122).

Figure 1 visualises this trade-off. The line upon which points A and B appear is a European foreign policy-making possibility frontier: it represents the possible strength of foreign policy options available for a given level of internal cohesion in decision-making. Point A best describes foreign policy-making under unanimity: the required level of internal cohesion must be high to satisfy the requirement of unanimity and this limits possible external positions and actions to weak ones. If the required level of internal cohesion is relaxed, point B may be reached by moving along the frontier, permitting the possibility of stronger external positions and actions. Under unanimity, however, required internal cohesion (in terms of voting) is absolute. Figure 1 therefore suggests that outcome of foreign policy-making under unanimity will be limited to weak external positions and actions.

¹ For example, the strongest course of action that the EU could have taken over Iraq in 2003 would have been military intervention, followed by economic sanctions and, at the other end of the spectrum, issued a declaration. A similar hierarchy could be argued to apply to the crisis in the Ukraine, with the EU choosing economic sanctions. It should be noted, however, that the military intervention-economic sanctions-declarations hierarchy is not rigid; what is considered ‘weak’ or ‘strong’ clearly varies from case-to-case. For example, EU military intervention in Ukraine to counter Russian aggression would be a far extreme example of strong action than EU military intervention in Mali. Moreover, in other policy areas, such as human rights, foreign policy action must be judged according to different criteria (e.g. legal standing, extensiveness).

Figure 1: The strength of position or action - internal cohesion trade-off



Empirically, this trade-off has a very tangible impact on contemporary European foreign policy. At the UN General Assembly, the unanimity threshold has often been reached only by agreeing upon weak external positions (Barbé 2013: 21). In other cases, a lack of internal cohesion has led to outright foreign policy inaction. For example, it took the EU almost an entire month to condemn violent acts of the Ben Ali regime against the Tunisian people, and only after France (the most extreme preference outlier) decided to withdraw its support for the regime (Viilup 2011). The unanimity rule ensured that French intransigence could not be circumvented. Moreover, fragmented internal decision-making based on unanimity has permitted Russia to constantly use its energy resources a geopolitical instrument to ‘divide and rule’ in Europe – and, in so doing, to undermine a common European foreign policy towards it (Barbé 2013: 20).

Of course, the unanimity rule, in itself, does not prevent the adoption of strong external positions and actions. Member states can, when they choose to do so, agree upon European strong external positions and actions. This is most obviously the case in the sphere of human rights, where the EU has developed a strong and cohesive position (Barbé 2013: 20). Instead, it creates extreme inflexibility in decision-making: only one member state must exercise its absolute sovereignty (veto right) in the foreign policy sphere to block a foreign policy action. And, at present, this stubborn intergovernmentalism generally inhibits the adoption of strong external positions and actions. Giegerig and Wallace (2010: 452), for

example, find that national differences remain a constant threat to solidarity in decision-making; and this despite the recent ‘Brusselisation’ of European foreign policy decision-making, making the process more intensively transgovernmental than hitherto.

The enduring importance of national positions is the defining characteristic of intergovernmentalism: member states cooperate voluntarily in the sense that no sovereignty is surrendered and member states remain independent at all times (EU-Oplysningen 2013). Supranationalisation, on the other hand, entails (at the least the partial) surrendering of sovereignty. This would be achieved if unanimity voting in the Foreign Affairs Council was replaced by a form of qualified majority voting. Under such a circumstance, member states would not remain independent at all times: voting by qualified majority would ensure that decisions could be adopted even in the face of (limited) opposition from member states. In other words, it would establish a mode of decision-making (not established at present) in which member states must accept the possibility that some actions will be taken and positions adopted at the European level of policy-making that are contrary to their wishes, without the possibility of utilising the ultimate blocking weapon of the veto. While shifting from unanimity to a form of qualified majority voting would not guarantee that strong European positions are adopted, it would ensure the easing of the central trade-off by relaxing the necessity of absolute internal cohesion.² Returning to Graph 1, it would suggest that reaching point B is possible. This is because the required level of internal cohesion is lower under qualified majority voting than unanimity, permitting movement along the foreign policy-making possibility frontier until stronger external positions and actions become feasible.

In light of this, the central question under study in this paper is as follows: Why are some member states drivers and others brakemen in moving towards a supranational mode of decision-making (i.e. qualified majority voting)? Given that such a change would require the consent of all member states, it is appropriate to study variation in support for supranationalisation at the national level. Understanding the factors that determine cross-national variation in support for such a shift will allow the pinpointing of factors that are driving and preventing supranational integration. Such knowledge is not only useful in

² The Lisbon rules for QMV, effective from October 2014, are as follows: if acting on a proposal of the Commission of the High Commissioner, a majority of 55% of countries comprised of at least 15 member states is required; if not, 72% of countries comprising at least 65% of the population of the European Union is sufficient (Article 16: TEU). Until 31 March 2017, the Nice rules on QMV can be invoked for any vote by a single member state. Under Nice rules, a majority must comprise of at least: 15 member states (or 18, if not proposed by the Commission); 313.6 million citizens of the European Union; 260 of all 352 voting weights (Article 3: Treaty of Nice).

speaking to the literature on European integration, but also in providing political lessons about the possibility of supranational European political integration in the sphere of foreign policy.


It should be noted, then, that this study is concerned with the study of support for a shift to a certain mode of decision-making (from intergovernmental to supranational), rather than support for European foreign policy in general. The rationale for this approach is that a supranationalisation of European foreign policy would allow it to depart from unanimity in decision-making by relaxing required levels of internal cohesion, instituting the possibility of stronger European external action. The theoretical trade-off – internal cohesion vs. strength of external position or action – would still exist, but the threshold for internal cohesion would not need to be as high, permitting the possibility of stronger European external action. The possibility of this breakthrough is worthy of study in its own right. While it is accepted that social interaction can increase cohesion between member states over time (Smith 2004: 122), more intensive intergovernmental cooperation is always made under the threat of the veto. As Giegerig and Wallace (2010: 452) note, this is still the case – even under the current phase of intensive transgovernmentalism cooperation.

Voting rules are enshrined in the Treaties and, as such, a supranationalisation of decision-making would be a change of constitutional character. In such cases, as Risse (2010: 178) notes, public opinion analysis is highly appropriate because it is public opinion that generally determines “who decides what at what level of policy-making” (Risse 2010: 178).³ The premise of this study is that public opinion performs such a function with regards to foreign policy competencies. This correspondence is, of course, imperfect: representatives of member states may not always reflect the views of those they represent at Treaty negotiations. Yet, even allowing for a degree of imperfection, democratically elected representatives of member states do not have a free hand; they must take heed of the wishes of their electorate or risk electoral punishment. As such, the current study focuses on the aggregation of public opinion at the national level; this is the most direct way that national representatives – responsible for agreeing to the constitutional basis of the European Union through Treaty negotiations – are held to account. In other words, this study sets out to explain cross-national variation in public support for European foreign policy supranationalisation as a proxy for the prediction of state behaviour in Treaty negotiations,

³ For the same reason, public opinion analysis is generally far less appropriate in analysing individual policy decisions (Risse 2010: 178).

which in turn shapes the constitutional basis of the Union. Figure two represents the variation to be explained across space.⁴

Figure 2: Cross-national variation in support for a supranationalisation of European foreign policy



Besides its suitability to this type of investigation, availability of data also makes public opinion analysis highly practical. An analysis that attempts to explain variation in member state support for European foreign policy supranationalisation (or, more broadly, European foreign policy) *directly* would run up against the challenge of identifying indicators – for which, to my knowledge, there are no obvious solutions. By making the dependent variable support for European foreign policy supranationalisation among European publics as a proxy for state behaviour in Treaty negotiations – rather than member state support directly – this research circumvents this issue.

This research paper is structured in four parts. Firstly, a literature review is conducted to demonstrate that European public opinion on foreign policy is worthy of scholarly attention. Moreover, it divides the literature on popular attitudes towards European foreign policy integration into three broad schools. Second, the methodology of the study is outlined. It sets out the variables to be tested (including data sources), specifies which of the three schools

⁴ The map is a visual representation of the dependent variable; detailed information on its construction and data sources is to be found in the methodology section.

each one belongs to and outlines a three-step research strategy to qualitatively and quantitatively test the importance each variable. Third, the results section details the outcomes of the three-step analysis. Finally, the conclusions and reflections section links results back to the three schools of explanations outlined in literature review and, in so doing, makes contributions to the literature on European integration in the sphere of foreign policy. Where relevant, the final section also reflects on political lessons about the possibility of European political integration.

I. Literature review

Prior to the early 2000s, the literature largely ignored European public opinion on foreign policy on the basis that European publics lacked information on foreign policy issues, and thus policy-makers failed to take their views into account in the policy-making process (Kentmen 2010: 285). This disregard of popular opinion was based on the assumed veracity of the so-called ‘Almond-Lippmann consensus’, which holds that public attitudes towards foreign policy are volatile, unstructured and thus – as ‘non-attitudes’ – unworthy of scholarly attention (Almond 1950). The high level of public attention generated by the Iraq war and the ensuing European fall-out ended this scholarly neglect of the link between public opinion and European foreign policy (Kentmen 2010: 285). Moreover, a marked shift in the literature away from the conceptualisation of European attitudes in general as providing a ‘permissive consensus’ for European integration (Lindberg and Scheingold 1970: 41) towards European public opinion acting as a ‘constraining dissensus’ (Down and Wilson 2008: 26) on the European project reflects a general increase in public attention towards EU affairs in recent years.⁵ In fact, as early as 2004, Van der Eijk and Franklin (37-38) found that not only do citizens respond in a non-random fashion when asked about European integration (i.e. they do not pluck their preferences from thin air), but their responses have become even more consistent with ‘real’ attitudes than their views regarding the left/right scale – and these are rarely questioned. Peters (2011: 11) finds strong evidence that this extends to European foreign policy integration: as far back as 1990, public attitudes towards European vis-à-vis national foreign policy-making have been structured and non-volatile. This breakdown of the

⁵ The triumph of anti-EU parties in the 2014 European elections in the wake of the eurocrisis and the subsequent calls from national leaders for reform of the EU provides recent empirical evidence of the increasing usefulness of the ‘constraining dissensus’ concept.

‘Almond-Lippmann consensus’ provides the rationale for public opinion analysis in this study.

An analysis of the literature that seeks to explain variation in popular attitudes towards European foreign policy integration – and those that can be logically extended from the literature on integration – yields explanations that can be divided into three broad schools. Explanations based on: (1) identity; (2) utilitarian perceptions of national performance and; (3) subjective perceptions of Europe’s foreign policy role vis-à-vis the US.

Identity (national and European)

Identity-based explanations can be most obviously divided into explanations based on European and national identities. A long-standing theoretical notion found in the literature is that a shared European identity is a necessary basis for political integration (Kielmansegg 1996: 58; Habermas 1974: 49). The contention is that the lack of a European public sphere – or *demos* – inhibits the construction of a legitimate political structure that can act on behalf of Europeans as a unified people (Kielmansegg, 1996: 58). The eurocrisis has arguably brought this lack of a genuine European “we-feeling” to the fore: redistributive measures taken as a consequence of the crisis have exposed this lack of cohesion, with conflict over redistribution cutting across national cleavages (Vilpišauskas 2013: 363). With respect to foreign policy specifically, research by Kentmen (2010: 296) reveals significant findings to suggest that feelings of attachment to Europe do increase levels of support for greater foreign policy cooperation, which supports the theoretical claims of the *demos* literature.

With respect to the literature on national identity, most recent research tends to reveal a negative correlation between national identity strength and support for European integration (Van Klingeren and Boomgaarden 2014). Yet this finding must be qualified: Van Klingeren and Boomgaarden (2014) distinguish between ‘exclusive national identity’ and ‘national pride’ and find that only the former is correlated with low levels of support for the European integration. In terms of the link between European and national identity, citizens’ general lack of knowledge about the EU vis-à-vis their own nation-state and the more direct impact of the nation-state on citizens have been cited as explanations for why national factors tend to trump European ones in determining support for European integration (Kritzinger 2003: 236).

Utilitarian perceptions of national performance

Continuing with a concern for national factors, another strand of the literature highlights the importance of utilitarian perceptions of national performance in determining support for European integration and European foreign policy. Testing a variety of variables designed to test utilitarian calculations based on national performance, Sánchez-Cuenca (2000: 151) argues for the relevance of the 'benefit' hypothesis: the more a public feels it benefits from EU membership, the more likely it is to support for integration.⁶ In support of this contention, he finds that poor public evaluations of nation-state performance correlate with support for European integration and on this basis argues that dissatisfied publics are more willing to transfer sovereignty to a potentially better performing supranational institution. Sánchez-Cuenca (2000: 168) uses this finding to challenge to identity-based explanations by making the strong claim that it is not identities themselves that determine levels of support for European integration, but rather the utilitarian political and economic calculations by citizens that underwrite identities. Rohrschneider (2002: 463), meanwhile, finds that perceptions of national institutional performance play an important (mediating) causal role in explaining the impact of public perceptions of underrepresentation in EU decision-making on support for European integration. Here, again, support for the integration is not based on identity, but rather on subjective national cost-benefit calculations. In a more recent study, Kentmen (2010) finds support for utilitarian calculations impacting upon levels of support for European foreign policy. A strong and positive correlation is revealed between the positive experiences of *individuals* with European economic integration and support for European foreign policy. The study, however, does not explore the link between perceptions of *national performance* and support for European foreign policy, presenting a research gap in the literature.

Subjective perceptions of Europe's foreign policy role vis-à-vis the US

A final strand deals with the role of subjective perceptions of Europe's foreign policy role vis-à-vis the US. The starting point of this strand is the increasing incidence of anti-Americanism and desire for autonomy from the US among Europeans (Hoffmann, 2001; Markovits, 2007). Why this trend has occurred is, however, less clear. One possible explanation is that these attitudes follow a balance of power logic; such explanations have so far been utilised to explain increasing levels of European cooperation in foreign policy since

⁶ For example, Sánchez-Cuenca (2000: 168) finds that poor public evaluations of nation-state performance correlate with support for European integration because dissatisfied publics are more willing to transfer sovereignty to a potentially better performing supranational institution.

the end of the Cold War. Howorth and Keeler (2003: 3), for example, claim that the post-Cold War unipolar concentration of power in the hands of the US may partly explain increased levels of European defense cooperation. Posen (2010: 151) refines this explanation by distinguishing between ‘balance of threat’ and ‘balance of power theory’. In lieu of a realistic security threat from the United States, Posen reasons, European member states’ increased defense cooperation can only be explained in terms of Europe balancing US power, not because of imminent security concerns. By making the structure of international power causally prior, these balance of power explanations suggest that an increasing desire for autonomy from the US among Europeans is likely to be a reflection of a geopolitical logic. Another line of reasoning links the desire for autonomy from the US among Europeans to a European cultural reaction to seemingly inexorable Americanisation of European culture (Markovits, 2007: 81). Yet, as Krotz (2009: 561) notes, whether recent European attitudes are indeed a reflection of a balance of power logic or driven by other social processes may not matter for ultimate historical outcomes; ultimately, there still remains a striking correlation between such attitudes and increased Europe foreign policy cooperation.

II. Methodology

The chosen methodological approach is to identify quantifiable variables that explain variation in support for European foreign policy supranationalisation (henceforth, EUFPS) among European publics. As such, this paper swims against the tide of the recent turn towards qualitative constructivist scholarship on EU foreign policy (Barbé 2012; Tonra and Christiansen 2004). The aim is not challenge such approaches, but to provide quantitative findings that could prove complementary. For example, the findings of this paper – which focuses on the internal decision-making – could be combined with research on external perceptions of the EU to provide a holistic analysis of the EU’s influence as a global actor (Barbé 2012: 21).

A central methodological assumption which guides this analysis is that a single independent variable cannot explain a phenomenon as complex as variation in support for EUFPS among European publics. It follows that analysis should ultimately focus on testing the significance of combinations of independent variables. After data sources and variables to be tested have been introduced, a three-step method to identify and test such combinations is outlined.

Data


Variables were operationalised using data from the period 2005-2007 exclusively using Eurobarometer and World Bank data. For variables using Eurobarometer data, data from the 2005.06, 2005.10, 2006.04, 2006.09 and 2007.05 Eurobarometer waves was used – and all calculated based on a minimum two-year average to increase reliability by mitigating against random measurement error.

The rationale for using older data (2005-2007) is to ensure that the crisis – as an omitted variable – does not skew the results. This is necessary because the crisis has undoubtedly increased negative attitudes towards the EU (see Figure 3) and this is likely to have impacted upon popular perceptions regarding the EU's ability to function as a supranational policy actor.

Two options were considered to mitigate this problem. Firstly, values for the variables could have been calculated based on data spanning over a longer time period (pre- and post-crisis). However, the most appropriate question to operationalise the dependent variable (see dependent variable explanation below) was discontinued from the Eurobarometer survey after 2007. No question after the 2007.10 wave adequately measures the concept of support for EUFPS without allowing enough ambiguity that it may more closely measure support for increased intergovernmental cooperation in the foreign policy domain – not supranational. Overcoming this by switching the question post-2007 would be highly problematic because it would entail an inconsistent operationalisation of the dependent variable, threatening the robustness of my findings. The second, preferred, option is to use older (pre-crisis) data. The advantage of this latter option is that the dependent variable can be operationalised accurately (using an appropriate question) and consistently (using the same question) throughout the 2005-2007 period. It is also advantageous because data for all independent variables and part of the dependent variable⁷ comes from just three waves (2005.10, 2006.09 and 2007.05), increasing the robustness of my findings by largely using data from the same samples of respondents answering questions at the same points in time.

⁷ A different combination of waves is used for the dependent variable, but out of the six data points used, two are based on the 2007.05 wave. The other four are from 2005 and 2006, but used different waves.

Figure 3: Post-crisis increases in negative attitudes towards the EU



Data source: Eurobarometer 2004-2013

Dependent variable

The dependent variable is the level of public support for EUFPS. The construction of such a variable is problematic for two fundamental reasons. Firstly, the Eurobarometer survey does not ask a question which explicitly mentions ‘supranationalisation’. Secondly, even if the question was posed, it is highly unlikely that a large proportion of respondents understand the term ‘supranationalisation’ sufficiently well to respond to such a question. Given these problems, the operationalisation strategy is to pick questions which measure the concept ‘support for supranationalisation’ by means of ‘cues’ which suggest the surrendering of sovereignty to the EU in the area of foreign policy. Two questions were selected for this purpose. Firstly, the following question: “The European Union should have its own Foreign Minister, who can be the spokesperson for a common European Union position.” The key cue word here is “Foreign Minister”. This term was omitted when the failed Constitutional Treaty was revised and reborn in slightly modified form as the Treaty of Lisbon because it was felt that the term ‘foreign minister’ was imbued with a constitutional character that suggested the EU should have nation-state-like competencies (BBC 2011). Since supranationalisation entails endowing the EU with nation-state-like competencies in a given area through the surrendering of sovereignty by nation-states, support for an EU foreign minister should act as

a valid proxy for support for EUFPS.⁸ Secondly, the following statement (agree/disagree): “A common defence and security/military policy among the European Union member states.” Degree of agreement with this statement was chosen because it touches upon security and defence – an area regarded as the most fundamental responsibility of the nation-state towards its people. Support for a Europeanisation of security and defence policy – even if interpreted as limited in scope – suggests support for a transferral of tasks fundamental to the existence of the sovereign nation-state from nation-states themselves to the European level. As such, it should act as another useful proxy for EUFPS.⁹ The value of the dependent variable for each unit of analysis – European publics – is an average calculated across six data points – three for each question – between 2005 and 2007.¹⁰

Independent variables

The independent variables to be tested in the analysis are listed below. Each one is explicitly linked to one of the three schools of explanations for variation in popular support for European foreign policy integration introduced in the literature review. These distinctions are used in the conclusions to substantively interpret the findings.

IVI: Member state size

School of explanation: utilitarian perceptions of national performance

Publics from smaller member states are hypothesised to demonstrate more support for EUFPS than those from non-small states because small states stand to gain more autonomy (albeit shared) from a supranationalisation of European foreign policy. This may, for example, help smaller states to meet security threats located beyond their borders (Ricki, 2008: 316). Publics from larger states, meanwhile, are hypothesised to demonstrate more support for EUFPS than those from non-large states because large states may be able to benefit from cost reduction by supranationalising the pursuit of their existing national foreign policy obligations, which tend to be quite extensive (e.g. UK, France, Italy, Germany, Spain). Size was measured in terms of GDP. World Bank data was used and an average for each member state calculated based on 2005, 2006 and 2007 figures. Both explanations belong to

⁸ Possible answers were: tend to agree; tend to disagree; don't know. Those who tended to agree were coded as supportive of EUFPS. Eurobarometer waves used: 2005.10; 2006.09; 2007.05.

⁹ Possible answers were: agree; disagree; don't know. Those who agreed were coded as supportive of EUFPS. Waves used: 2005.06; 2006.04; 2007.05

¹⁰ See footnote 9.

the utilitarian perceptions of national performance school because they both refer to the perception of a national benefit to supranationalisation.

H1: In a comparison of European publics, those from smaller member states should have a greater tendency to support EUFPS than those from non-small member states

H2: In a comparison of European publics, those from larger member states should have a greater tendency to support EUFPS than those from non-large member states

IV2: European identity

School of explanation: identity (European)

In democratic theory, it is argued that polities require the existence of a people – defined as group with a strong enough identity to regard themselves as “we” – as a basis for deliberation (Kielmansegg, 1996: 58). According to this logic, the existence of a European people is a prerequisite for deeper integration – towards the formation of a genuine polity. If this argument is correct, publics which report that they ‘feel European’ should also demonstrate high levels of support for EUFPS. The concept of European identity can be measured accurately by using the following Eurobarometer question: “Do you ever think of yourself as not only (nationality), but also European?” Possible answers were: often; sometimes; never. Those who answered ‘often’ are coded as having a European identity. The value of this variable for each member state is an average based on Eurobarometer data from 2005.10 and 2006.09.

H3: In a comparison of European publics, those that feel more European should have a greater tendency to support EUFPS than those which do not feel as European


IV3: National pride

School of explanation: identity (national)

Klingeren and Boomgaarden (2014) argue that strength of national identity has been the strongest predictor of (non-)support for European integration in previous decades. Importantly, they distinguish between exclusivity of national identity and national pride and find that only the former is associated with higher levels of Euroscepticism. Figure 4 demonstrates that exclusivity of national identity and national pride are far from coterminous. The British, for example, fear losing their national identity as a result of European integration

the most, but are only 21 out of 27 with respect to strength of national pride. This suggests that separate variables should be constructed to reflect this distinction between exclusivity of national identity and national pride. IV3 measures the concept national pride. The concept is measured using the following Eurobarometer question: “People may feel different degrees of attachment to their town or village, to their region, to their country or to Europe. Please tell me how attached you feel to (your country).” Possible answers: very attached; fairly attached; not very attached; not at all attached. Those who answered ‘very attached’ are coded as being proud of their nation. The value of this variable for each member state is an average based on Eurobarometer data from 2005.10 and 2006.09.

Figure 4: The disjuncture between national pride and exclusive national identities



Source: Eurobarometer (see data sources for IV3 and IV4)

H4: In a comparison of European publics, those that have higher levels of national pride should be less likely to support EUFPS than those which have lower levels of national pride.

IV4: Exclusivity of national identity

School of explanation: identity (national)

Following the distinction made above, IV4 measures the concept exclusivity of national identity. The concept is measured by using the following Eurobarometer question: “Regarding the building of Europe, the European Union, some people may have fears. Here is a list of things which some people say they are afraid of [The loss of our national identity and culture]. For each one, please tell me if you - personally - are current afraid of it, or not?” Possible answers: currently afraid of it; not currently afraid of it; don’t know. Those who answered ‘currently afraid of it’ are coded as having an exclusive national identity. The logic here is that fear of national identity loss is coterminous with exclusivity, since fear of loss to the EU implies that there is a concern with co-existing identities. The value of this variable for each member state is an average based on Eurobarometer data from 2005.10 and 2006.09.

H5: In a comparison of European publics, those that have a more exclusive national identity should be less likely to support EUFPS than those which have a less exclusive national identity.

IV5: Distrust of domestic political institutions

School of explanation: utilitarian perceptions of national performance

Previous studies reveal that low levels of trust with domestic political institutions are associated with higher levels of support for European integration (Sánchez-Cuenca 2000: 168). This contention is underwritten by Sánchez-Cuenca’s benefit hypothesis. If a European public is dissatisfied with the performance of national institutions, it is more likely to transfer sovereignty to a potentially better performing supranational institution (Sánchez-Cuenca 2000: 168). The concept ‘trust in domestic political institutions’ is measured using the following Eurobarometer question: “I would like to ask you a question about how much trust you have in certain institutions. For each of the following institutions, please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it? [(1) the national parliament (2) the national government” Possible answers: tend to trust; tend not to trust; don’t know. Those who answered ‘tend not

to trust' are coded as not trusting domestic political institutions. By measuring levels of distrust in both government and parliament, validity should be increased by ensuring that the popularity/unpopularity of a particular government does not skew the data unnecessarily, since a public may still trust the parliament. The value of this variable for each member state is an average of six data points (three for the parliament and three for the government), minimising random measurement error. The variable is based on Eurobarometer data from 2005.10, 2006.09 and 2007.05.

H6: In a comparison of European publics, those which demonstrate higher levels of distrust in domestic political institutions should have a greater tendency to support EUFPS than those which demonstrate higher levels of trust.

IV6: EU foreign policy independence

School of explanation: Subjective perceptions of Europe's foreign policy role vis-à-vis the US

This variable tests whether the desire among European publics for more foreign policy autonomy from the US translates into support for EUFPS. To the extent that EUFPS is regarded as a necessary condition for credible European foreign policy independence from the US, this variable also tests the rationality of European public opinion. The variable does not distinguish whether this desire for autonomy stems from cultural anti-Americanism or a balance of power logic, but it will test to confirm or disconfirm the noted correlation in the literature between a desire among European publics for greater autonomy from the US and greater European foreign policy cooperation – albeit measuring public support for greater cooperation through EUFPS, rather than directly measuring cooperation itself. 'Desired foreign policy independence from the US independence' is measured using the following Eurobarometer question: "Do you tend to agree or tend to disagree with each of the following statements? European Union foreign policy should be independent of United States foreign policy." Possible answers: tend to agree; tend to disagree; don't know. Those who answered 'tend to agree' are coded as wanting European foreign policy independence from the US. The value of this variable for each member state is an average based on Eurobarometer data from 2005.10, 2006.09 and 2007.05.

H7: In a comparison of European publics, those which are more supportive of a European foreign policy that is independent of the United States should have a greater tendency to

support EUFPS than those which are less supportive of a European foreign policy that is independent of the United States.

IV7: Benefits of EU membership

School of explanation: utilitarian perceptions of national performance

This variable is the most direct measurement of Sánchez-Cuenca's benefit hypothesis. The logic is simple: the more a public feels it has benefited from EU membership, the more likely it is to support further integration (e.g. EUFPS) (Sánchez-Cuenca, 2000: 151). The concept of 'benefiting from EU membership' is measured using the following Eurobarometer question: "Taking everything into consideration, would you say that (your country) has on balance benefited or not from being a member of the European Community (Common Market)?" Possible answers: benefited; not benefited; don't know. Those who answered 'benefited' are coded as subjectively believing that EU membership has been beneficial. The value of this variable for each member state is an average based on Eurobarometer data from 2005.10, 2006.09 and 2007.05.

H8: In a comparison of European publics, those which feel they have benefited from EU membership should have a greater tendency to support EUFPS than those which feel they have not benefited

IV8: Relative poverty

School of explanation: utilitarian perceptions of national performance

This variable tests the hypothesis that publics that experience relative poverty (in European comparison) are more likely to demonstrate support for EUFPS because they feel that they are able to benefit from cost reduction through the extensive pooling and sharing that is associated with supranationalisation. Publics with higher levels of poverty should be more motivated by the associated cost-savings. Relative poverty was measured using GDP/capita.¹¹ World Bank data was used and an average for each member state calculated based on 2005, 2006 and 2007 figures.

¹¹ GDP/capita is an imperfect measure of relative poverty because it may not accurately reflect the true income of citizens if, for example, there are large inequalities within a population. It is, however, the best available statistic that measures the average wealth per person in a given member state and is thus used here.

H9: In a comparison of European publics, those from member states that experience greater levels of relative poverty should have a greater tendency to support EUFPS than those from member states with lower level of relative poverty.

IV9: Founding member state

School of explanation: identity (national)

Peters (2011: 23) finds that support for European foreign policy is higher among publics from founding member states of the European Union, supporting the view that national identity as a founding member has an impact on support for EUFPS.

H10: In a comparison of European publics, those from founding member states should have a greater tendency to support EUFPS than those from non-founding member states.

Research strategy

To attempt to locate the most prominent factors that condition levels of support for EUFPS among European publics, analysis proceeds in three parts.

Firstly, the statistical significance of the relationship between each independent variable and the support for EUFPS is determined using chi-square tests. To perform this basic test, all independent variables and the dependent variable are dichotomised, with substantive theory and obvious jumps in the data being used to determine the dichotomisation of variables. Though substantially cruder than the tests undertaken later in the analysis, this procedure is sufficient in providing an initial overview of the significance each variable in isolation through the generation of p-values – though it is not expected that any variable in isolation will be very significant in explaining public support for EUFPS. P-values are generated for each independent variable in terms of both necessary and sufficient causality.

The second part is Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) using the independent variables that are most significantly related to the dependent variable from the first step. These variables are used subject to a test of bivariate correlation to determine whether the independent variables are truly independent of each other. Rather than testing individual variables, QCA searches for *combinations* of variables that may be able to explain variation in the dependent variable. The variables tested in the QCA analysis will be the most significant variables from part one. This cut-off is implemented because the aim of combinational analysis is to provide parsimonious solutions to explain variation in the

dependent variable. The more independent variables used, the lower the likelihood of parsimony. Unnecessary independent variables should thus be removed from the QCA analysis beforehand. Since it is not expected that any independent variable will be strongly casually related to the dependent variable in isolation but only in combination with other variables, standard measures of statistical significance ($p = <0.05$) are not used as a threshold for the carrying over of independent variables, but p-values must be at least promising. No threshold is assumed a priori; a significant 'gap' in p-values will instead be determinate. To help interpret the combinations generated by QCA, further chi-square tests are conducted to demonstrate the significance of the identified combinations, both in terms of necessary and causal sufficiency. Since a prerequisite of QCA is that all variables are dichotomous, the coding of variables remains the same as outlined in step 1.

The third and final component consists of a multivariate regression. Variables identified as of promising significance in the chi-square analysis are tested as part of an explanatory model; discarded variables from the chi-square analysis are also tested as part of the model in order to confirm/disconfirm their lack of significance. While the main output of the QCA is the qualitative identification of parsimonious solutions that explain variation in the dependent variable, the multivariate analysis produces statistical data on the explanatory power and significance of the independent variables as part of an explanatory model. It is also the only test based on disaggregated data. It therefore provides a basis to cross-check earlier findings as well as a complementary source of output for analysis.

III. Results

Step 1: Chi-square tests of independent variables

The results of the chi-square testing are presented in Table 1. As expected, when tested separately, the independent variables were unable to convincingly explain variation in public support EUFPS. The only statistically significant finding was found with respect to founding member states (H10): all founding member states (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands) demonstrate support for EUFPS and this correlation is significant at the .05 level. Though not related in a statistically significant way to support for public support EUFPS, four other possible determinants of levels of support for EUFPS stand out on the basis of their chi-square scores: smallness (H1); national pride (H4); distrust in domestic political institutions (H6); and desire for European foreign policy independence

from the United States (H7). These variables are selected to be carried over to the QCA combinational analysis (step 2) on the basis that their chi-square scores are notably higher than for most of the independent variables tested.

Conversely, the chi-square scores demonstrate little support for the European identity (H3), exclusive national identity (H5), benefit (H8) and relative poverty (H9) hypotheses. In particular, the relation between variables posited by the largeness hypothesis was so weak that it received a chi-square score of 0 in terms of both necessary and sufficient causality. Highly notable is the difference in chi-square scores between national pride and exclusive national identity: while the national pride variable reached significance at the 0.10 level for necessary causality, the exclusive national identity hypothesis produced relatively low chi-square scores (necessary: 0.33; sufficiency: 0.37). This justifies the earlier methodological decision to measure strength and exclusivity of national identity separately through the creation of distinct variables, but, contrary to theoretical expectations, it appears that national pride is a much more powerful predictor of levels of support for EUFPS than exclusivity of national identity. On the basis of their weak chi-square scores, the European identity, exclusivity of national identity, benefit and relative poverty variables are discarded prior to the QCA analysis.

Table 1: Chi-square tests of statistical significance for independent variables

Hypothesis	Consistency (necessary)	Coverage (sufficiency)	Chi-square score (necessary causality)	Chi-square score (sufficient causality)
H1: Smallness	0.50	0.8	1.83	1.16
H2: Largeness	0.19	0.6	0	0
H3: European identity	0.38	0.67	0.19	0.22
H4: National pride	0.82	0.6	2.98+	2.24
H5: Exclusive national identity	0.45	0.50	0.33	0.37
H6: Distrust in domestic political	0.69	0.73	1.05	1.27

institutions				
H7: EU foreign policy independence	0.81	0.76	2.29	2.15
H8: Benefits	0.63	0.67	0.36	0.37
H9: Relative poverty	0.50	0.67	0.23	0.29
H10: Founding member state	0.38	1	1.19	4.17*
<i>Notes: + = p <0.10, * = p <0.05, ** = p <0.01, *** = p <0.001</i>				

Step 2: Qualitative Comparative Analysis

Prior to conducting the QCA, bivariate correlations between the independent variables are tested to determine whether the independent variables are truly independent of each other. Table 2 presents the results of this test.

Table 2: Bivariate correlations between independent variables


		Correlations					
		Smallness	NI_strength	Trust_DPIs	EU_fp_ind	EU_feeling	FM
Smallness	Pearson Correlation	1	.163	.069	-.047	-.054	-.225
	Sig. (1-tailed)		.209	.367	.408	.394	.129
	N	27	27	27	27	27	27
NI_strength	Pearson Correlation	.163	1	-.043	-.082	.174	-.543**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	.209		.416	.342	.193	.002
	N	27	27	27	27	27	27
Trust_DPIs	Pearson Correlation	.069	-.043	1	-.069	-.316	-.060
	Sig. (1-tailed)	.367	.416		.367	.054	.384
	N	27	27	27	27	27	27
EU_fp_ind	Pearson Correlation	-.047	-.082	-.069	1	.054	.041
	Sig. (1-tailed)	.408	.342	.367		.394	.420
	N	27	27	27	27	27	27
EU_feeling	Pearson Correlation	-.054	.174	-.316	.054	1	.378*
	Sig. (1-tailed)	.394	.193	.054	.394		.026
	N	27	27	27	27	27	27
FM	Pearson Correlation	-.225	-.543**	-.060	.041	.378*	1
	Sig. (1-tailed)	.129	.002	.384	.420	.026	
	N	27	27	27	27	27	27

** . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed).

* . Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed).

Notably, the national pride and founding member state variables are significantly correlated with each other at the .01 level and almost at the .001 level. Based on this finding, the data for both variables is disaggregated so that a more detailed analysis of the relationship between the two variables can be conducted. Figure 5 below represents a founding member state-national pride nexus: founding member state status correlates with low levels of national pride: all five founding member states find themselves in the bottom 44% of member states in terms of national pride. This suggests a possible spurious relationship between the two variables and support for EUFPS. Given that there are too few cases to conduct a meaningful cross-tabs analysis, substantive theory is instead determinate. A plausible link between the two is that national pride is causally prior to founding member state status. The fact that all founding member states were deeply affected by the nationalistic tendencies that engulfed the European continent during WWII suggests that these countries learnt to reject strong national pride as dangerous through experience. Rejection of nationalism and the desire to avoid another European war is cited in the conventional story of how the Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community came into force in 1952 (Europa.eu). This suggests that low levels of national pride – at least in part – caused Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands to lay the foundations of the EU. If this interpretation is accepted, the relationship between founding member state status and support for EUFPS is spurious: the underlying cause of high support for EUFPS amongst these countries is low levels of national pride, not founding member state status. This interpretation dovetails with research findings on European integration in general, which finds that duration of membership has no impact on support for integration (Brettschneider et al. 2003: 12). The founding member state variable is thus discarded. This has the advantageous implication of reducing the number of independent variables for the QCA analysis, which will increase the likelihood of it generating parsimonious solutions. It also means that the less significant bivariate relationship between the founding member state and European identity variable does not require investigation.

Figure 5: The founding member state-national pride nexus



Source: See IV3 and IV9

Table 3 presents the findings of the QCA analysis in the form of a truth table.

Table 3: QCA truth table

Combination number	smallness	ind fp	distru st	nat_pri	num	raw consist.	Chi-square score (necessary/sufficient causality)
1	0	1	0	1	4	0	3.94*/5.76*
2	1	1	1	1	3	1	0.98/2.08
3	0	1	1	0	3	1	0.98/2.08
4	0	1	1	1	2	1	N/A
5	0	1	0	0	2	1	N/A
6	0	0	1	1	2	0	N/A
7	0	0	1	0	2	0.5	N/A
8	1	1	1	0	1	1	N/A
9	1	1	0	1	1	1	N/A
10	1	1	0	0	1	1	N/A

11	1	0	1	1	1	0	N/A
12	1	0	1	0	1	1	N/A
13	1	0	0	1	1	0	N/A
14	1	0	0	0	1	1	N/A
15	0	0	0	1	1	0	N/A
16	0	0	0	0	1	0	N/A
<i>Notes: + = $p < 0.10$, * = $p < 0.05$, ** = $p < 0.01$, *** = $p < 0.001$</i>							

The most common combination (row 1) of independent variables – which appears four times – suggests an important causal role for national pride. Despite all four countries (Austria, Denmark, Finland and Sweden) demonstrating support for European foreign policy independence from the United States, which should dispose them to support EUFPS, none of them support supranationalisation. Meanwhile, all four countries demonstrate high levels of national pride, which is associated with the absence of support for supranationalisation. Because the other two independent variables – smallness and distrust of domestic political institutions – are absent, it appears that high levels of national pride are decisive over a desire for foreign policy independence from the United States across all four cases in determining the outcome: the absence of support for supranationalisation. Importantly, this solution is significant as both a necessary and sufficient cause at the 0.05 level.

The combination of independent variables presented in row two, however, demonstrates that strong national pride is not determinate of the absence of support for EUFPS across all cases. The combination – which is present three times (countries: Hungary Latvia and Slovenia) – includes the presence of a strong national identity (associated with the absence of support for EUFPS); yet all three cases demonstrate an absence of support for supranationalisation. It is the presence of the other three independent variables – smallness, desired foreign policy independence from the United States and distrust of domestic political institutions – that appears to negate the causal effect of national pride. Despite covariation with a positive value of the dependent variable across all three cases, the low number of cases prevents this second combination being significantly related to support for EUFPS.

The combination in row three, which also appears three times, is more straightforward. All three countries (Czech Republic, France and Germany) want foreign policy independence from the United States and distrust domestic political institutions, which is associated with support for EUFPS. The strong national identity variable, which appeared decisive in determining the absence of support for EUFPS in the most common combination,

is absent. Though the smallness variable is absent, its absence is not associated with absence of support for EUFPS; rather, its presence is associated with the presence of support for EUFPS. It is therefore unsurprising – but supportive of the theoretical predictions of the model – that all the Czech Republic, France and Germany support EUFPS. As per combination two, the low number of cases prevents this relationship being significant, despite covariation with a positive value of the dependent variable across all three cases.

The remaining combinations of independent variables only appear twice or less and are therefore even less open to significance testing. Nevertheless, cases in which all independent variables make the same prediction about the value of the dependent variable can be used as crucial ‘test cases’, in the sense that they test the theoretical underpinnings of the entire model. Combination eight (Slovakia) presents such a case. The values for the variables smallness, independence from US foreign policy and distrust with domestic political institutions are all positive – and the presence of all three is associated with support for EUFPS. The national pride variable, meanwhile, the presence of which is associated with a lack of support for EU, is absent. The presence of the EUFPS variable for Slovakia provides validation for the model. Conversely, for combination 15 (Ireland), the values for the variables smallness, desired independence from US foreign policy and distrust of domestic political institutions are all negative. The national pride variable is present. For this case, validation for the model is provided by the fact that Ireland does not support EUFPS.

This analysis broadly supports theoretical predictions, but hardly provides a parsimonious explanation of variations in support for EUFPS among European publics. Combinations only cover a limited set of cases (countries), with generalisations only applicable to a maximum of four cases of the entire population. Exceptions could be added, but this would violate the principle of parsimony, which is the ultimate aim of QCA: to make meaningful statements about patterns in the data. The analysis is therefore re-run, but only using the two most significant independent variables from step 1: national pride and desired for foreign policy independence from the US. Table 4 presents the findings of the second QCA analysis in the form of a truth table.

Table 4: QCA truth table (reduced independent variables)

Combina tion number	strong_ ni	ind fp	number	raw consist	PRI cons ist.	SY M cons ist	Chi-square score (necessary causality)	Chi-square score (sufficient causality)
1	1	1	10	0.6	0.6	0.6	N/A	N/A
2	0	1	7	1	1	1	2.62	4.87*
3	1	0	5	0	0	0	5*	7.20**
4	0	0	5	0.6	0.6	0.6	N/A	N/A

*Notes: + = $p < 0.10$, * = $p < 0.05$, ** = $p < 0.01$, *** = $p < 0.001$*

By reducing the number of independent variables, the second truth table permits the generation of more parsimonious solutions. Two important generalisations about the entire population of cases can be made on this basis of the second truth table:

Solution 1 (based on combination number 2): Publics that want European foreign policy independence from the US and do not have a high degree of national pride support EUFPS;

Solution 2 (based on combination number 3): Publics that have a high degree of national pride and do not desire European foreign policy independence from the US support EUFPS.

The first solution is significant at the 0.05 as a sufficient cause, but not a significant necessary cause; the second is significant at the 0.01 level as a sufficient cause and at the 0.05 level as a necessary cause. More detailed qualitative description reveals the usefulness of these solutions as sufficient combinations of causes that are determinate of support for EUFPS. There are seven instances of the casual combination of independent variables that comprise the first solution: (1) a desire for EU foreign policy independence from the US and (2) a low level of national pride. The corresponding countries are Belgium, the Czech Republic, Estonia, France, Germany, the Netherlands and Slovakia. Given the combination of independent variables that corresponds to these countries, the theoretical expectation is that all countries should support EUFPS. The correlation is perfect: for all seven cases, the dependent variable is present. Meanwhile, there are five instances of the casual combination of independent variables that comprise the second solution: (1) a high degree of national pride and (2) the absence of a desire for EU foreign policy independence from the US. The corresponding countries are Bulgaria, Ireland, Malta, Portugal and Romania. According to the theory underpinning the combination of independent variables that corresponds to these

countries, all five countries should demonstrate a lack of support for EUFPS. Again, correlation is perfect: none of the five cases support EUFPS.

The two remaining causal combinations (combination numbers 1 and 4) make no obvious predictions about the value of the dependent variable. Combination number 1 from Table 4 is (1) a desire for EU foreign policy independence from the US and (2) the presence of a high degree of national pride. It is the most common causal combination – ten instances – and corresponds to the following countries: Austria; Cyprus; Denmark; Finland; Greece; Hungary; Latvia; Poland; Slovenia and; Sweden. No strong claim can be made about the value of the dependent variable for these ten countries because the independent variables make conflicting causal claims. In this scenario, no prediction can be made about the value of the dependent variable, apart from that it should not assume a constant value (positive or negative). The data supports this limited expectation: in 60% of the cases, the value of the dependent variable was positive (Cyprus, Greece, Hungary, Latvia, Poland and Slovenia); in the remaining 40%, its value was negative (Austria, Denmark, Finland and Sweden). Notably, this falsifies the notion that a high degree of national pride is always decisive over desired European foreign policy independence from the United States in determining a lack of support for EUFPS, as was suggested by the initial QCA: the dependent variable was only absent in 40% of cases. The same logic applies to combination number 4: (1) the absence of desired European foreign policy independence from the US and (2) a low degree of national pride. Again, the independent variables make conflicting causal claims. The five countries that correspond to this combination are Italy, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Spain and the United Kingdom. As expected, the value of the dependent variable varies almost evenly between these cases: in 60% of cases it was positive (Italy, Lithuania and Luxembourg); in 40% of cases, negative (Spain and the United Kingdom).

In sum, the more parsimonious QCA suggests that there are two combinations of independent variables that are causally sufficient in explaining variation in support for EUFPS among European publics: (1) a desire for European foreign policy autonomy from the US and a low degree of national pride (causes EUFPS support); (2) the absence of a desire for European foreign policy autonomy from the US and a high degree of national pride (causes a lack of EUFPS support). Where the model is unable to make clear predictions about the value of the dependent variable due to conflicting causal predictions made by the independent variables, the data is consistent to the extent that the value that the dependent variable assumes varies almost evenly.

Step 3: Multivariate regression

While the QCA analysis generated generalisations that are not able to be produced by a multivariate analysis, the multivariate analysis produces statistical data on the explanatory power and significance of the independent variables as part of an explanatory model. The aim of the analysis is to produce a model which is as significant and able to explain as much variation in support for EUFPS as possible.

As a first step, the support for EUFPS variable is regressed on the four most significant predictor variables from the chi-square analysis. Table 5 presents the results of this first regression under the column for Model 1. The initial model is able to explain just over 20% of variation in support for EUFPS (R square = .203) and is significant at the 0.10 level.

Table 5: Main findings of multivariate regression models

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Model coefficients				
Adjusted R Square	.203	.299	.309	.261
Model significance	.060+	.026*	.015*	.019
P-values of predictors				
EU FP ind	.032*	.046*	.035*	.031*
Nat_pride	.162	.086+	.121	N/A
Trust in DPis	.078+	.013*	.012*	0.14*
Smallness	.454	.415	N/A	N/A
Eur_identity	N/A	.058+	.057+	0.94+
<i>Notes: + = $p < 0.10$, * = $p < 0.05$, ** = $p < 0.01$, *** = $p < 0.001$</i>				

Second, the five independent variables that were omitted on the basis of the chi-square analysis are added to Model 1 on a one-by-one basis to test their significance as part of the model. The rationale here is that although an independent variable tested in isolation


may return insignificant findings, it may improve – through interaction with other independent variables – the explanatory power and significance of the model. Added to Model 1 on a one-by-one basis, four out of the five formerly excluded variables (largeness, exclusive national identity, benefits and relative poverty) support the conclusions based on the chi-square testing: they are found to be insignificantly correlated with the dependent variable¹² and do not increase the significance or explanatory power (R2) of the overall model. When, however, the formerly discarded European identity variable is added, its significance coefficient improves from 0.448, when treated as the only independent variable, to 0.058. More importantly, the increase of R2 from 20% to 30% demonstrates that the explanatory power of the model increase substantially when the European identity variable is added; and the change of p-value from 0.060 to 0.026 means that the model now becomes significant at the 0.05 level. This suggests strong interaction between the European identity variable and other independent variables. Table 5 presents the results of this regression with the addition of the European identity variable under the column for Model 2.

To determine which variables are principally interacting with the European identity variable, changes in significance levels of independent variables between Model 1 and Model 2 are analysed. This isolates the impact of the European identity variable on other variables to the greatest extent possible because the only difference between the two models is the addition of the European identity variable for Model 2. Notably, two independent variables change their significance threshold. Firstly, the national pride variable becomes more significant in Model 2 (p= .086; significant at .1 level) than it was in Model 1 (p= .162; not significant). Similarly, the significance of the distrust in domestic political institutions variable increases in significance when the European identity variable is added in Model 2 (p= .013; significant at .05 and almost at .01 level) compared to Model 1 (p= .078; significant at .1 level). This signifies that interaction is occurring between the national pride and level of trust in domestic political institutions variables, which helps explain why the addition of the European identity variable in Model 2 substantially increases the explanatory power and significance of the overall model.

¹² Relative poverty: .886; Benefits of EU membership: .229; Exclusive national identity: .973; Largeness: 454.


For analytical interest, Figures 6 and 7 present the nature of these relationships.¹³ Figure 6 reveals that the interaction between the European identity and distrust in domestic political institutions variables in the explanation of support for EUFPS is additive: for any given level of trust in domestic political institutions, the European identity markedly increases support for EUFPS. In other words, taken together, both help to explain variation in support EUFPS, without complex interaction. The interaction between the European identity and national pride variables in explaining support for EUFPS is more complex and presented in Figure 7. A strong European identity increases support for EUFPS when national pride is weak, but it has no effect on support for EUFPS when the national pride variable is strong. This suggests that strength of European identity is only useful in explaining variation in support for EUFPS when national pride is weak. This finding should, however, be treated with caution because it relies on the dichotomised data.

Figure 6: Trust in domestic political institutions, European identity and support for EUFPS



¹³ Figures derived from cross-tabs analyses based on the dichotomous variables used for the chi-square and QCA analyses.

Figure 7: National pride, European identity and support for EUFPS



Returning to the regression results from Model 1 and 2, a surprising outcome is that the smallness variable is insignificant, both as part of the four-variable ‘base’ model (.454) (Model 1) and after the addition of the European identity variable (.415) (Model 2). When treated as the only predictor variable, it is also highly insignificant (.793). This suggests that the dichotomisation of data for the chi-square may have unduly emphasised the explanatory importance of size (smallness) on support for EUFPS.

Model 3 tests the impact of removing the smallness variable from Model 2. After its removal, the model is able to explain 1% more variation of the dependent variable – the adjusted R2 of the model increases from 30% to 31%. The model also becomes more significant – for Model 2, $p= 0.26$; for Model 3, $p= 0.15$. The coefficients of the independent variables reveal that a desire for European foreign policy independence from the US and trust in domestic political institutions are statistically significant as part of the model (both at .05 level), while the European identity variable narrowly misses this threshold. The national pride variable is the least significant predictor variable in the model (0.121); yet, once removed from Model 3, there is a reduction in the adjusted R2 score from 31% (Model 3) to 26% (Model 4) and the significance of the model decreases – changing from a p-value of .15 (Model 3) to .19 (Model 4). It is therefore retained.

The full output of the model that is most significant and is able to explain the most variation in the dependent variable (Model 3) is presented below.

Model Summary

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	.644 ^a	.415	.309	.07339

a. Predictors: (Constant), EU_feeling, NI_strength, EU_fp_ind, Trust_DPIs

ANOVA^a

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	.084	4	.021	3.907	.015 ^b
	Residual	.118	22	.005		
	Total	.203	26			

a. Dependent Variable: Support_EUFPS

b. Predictors: (Constant), EU_feeling, NI_strength, EU_fp_ind, Trust_DPIs

Coefficients^a

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	.184	.203		.908	.374
	EU_fp_ind	.455	.203	.377	2.242	.035
	NI_strength	-.187	.116	-.267	-1.611	.121
	Trust_DPIs	.312	.114	.526	2.729	.012
	EU_feeling	.593	.295	.394	2.012	.057

a. Dependent Variable: Support_EUFPS

IV. Conclusions and reflections

This paper sought to identify why some member states are drivers and others brakemen in moving towards a supranational mode of decision-making (i.e. qualified majority voting). The undertaken analysis can now be linked back to the schools of explanations outlined in

literature review in order to contribute to the debate on European integration in the sphere of foreign policy. Moreover, where relevant, the results are interpreted to provide lessons about the possibility of supranational European foreign policy integration in the future.

Identity (national and European)

First of all, broad support was found for identity-based explanations – but with important nuances. On the one hand, the significance of national pride in the chi-square test, continuing importance through the QCA analysis and finally its importance in constructing a predictive model supports the general claim of Klingeren and Boomgaarden (2014) that national identity is one of the most important predictors of variation in support for EUFPS. Though national pride is a promising variable to explain variation in support for EUFPS in its own right (see chi-square test), the most striking (and significant) findings comes from the combinational (QCA) analysis. Firstly, all European publics that have a low degree of national pride and desire European foreign policy from the United States (Belgium, the Czech Republic, Estonia, France, Germany, the Netherlands and Slovakia) support a supranationalisation of European foreign policy. Conversely, all publics that have a high degree of national pride and do not desire European foreign policy from the United States (Bulgaria, Ireland, Malta, Portugal and Romania) do not demonstrate support for supranationalisation. The fact that the national pride variable can – in conjunction with another variable – accurately predict support for supranationalisation across all cases where the two variables do not make conflicting predictive claims about the outcome variable (support for EUFPS) supports the contention of Klingeren and Boomgaarden (2014) that national identity is of central importance in explaining variation in support for integration. However, the more specific claim of Klingeren and Boomgaarden (2014) that exclusivity of national identity is more important than national pride is not supported by the data. In fact, this analysis supports the reverse proposition: national pride appears to be a more important causal factor than exclusivity of national identity. A conclusion that can be drawn on the basis of this finding is that it may not be a fear of national identity loss (exclusivity) that drives some publics not to support a supranationalisation of European foreign policy, but their positive sense of attachment to their country (pride). Future research could further explore the distinction between exclusivity of national identity and national pride and its impact on support for European integration with the aim of validating/refuting this finding.

Meanwhile, support for the thesis that the existence of a European people is a prerequisite for deeper integration (Kielmansegg, 1996: 58) is mixed. While the European identity variable was not significant enough as part of the chi-square model to warrant inclusion in the QCA analysis, it did prove highly important in increasing the explanatory power and significance of the regression model. This suggests that European identity is a weak explanation of variation in support for EUFPS in its own right, but makes a significant contribution to understanding such variation through interaction with other variables – namely level of trust in domestic political institutions and national pride. Analysis of these interactions reveals that European identity may play a secondary role to national identity (more specifically, national pride): regardless of whether a public feels a strong sense of attachment to Europe or not, levels of support for European foreign policy supranationalisation remain low when levels of national pride are high. This nuanced understanding of the relationship between feelings of attachment to Europe and levels of support for European foreign policy integration problematise existing research, which finds a significant correlation between the two, but does not touch upon the possibility of interaction (Kentmen 2010: 296). It also provides an important lesson for practical politics: namely, that the cultivation of a European identity amongst European citizens as a means of laying the groundwork for further integration in the sphere of foreign policy can be fruitfully employed in countries with low levels of national pride, but appears to be ineffective in countries with high level of national pride. High levels of national pride, then, appear to block European identities and the potentially pro-integrationist views a European identity implies. This may signal an obdurate limit on supranational integration in the future.

Utilitarian perceptions of national performance

Secondly, this research demonstrates mixed support for explanations based on utilitarian perceptions of national performance. These findings are of particular importance to the literature, given that the link between perceptions of national performance and support for European foreign policy has not been explored until now – only the link between individual cost-benefit calculations and support for European foreign policy has been researched (Kentmen 2010). Three out of the four variables tested demonstrate little support for explanations based on utilitarian perceptions of national performance. Firstly, this research demonstrates no support for the proposition that European publics that feel their membership of the European Union membership is beneficial to them are more likely to support further integration in foreign policy in the form of supranationalisation. Secondly, there is no

evidence presented in this research paper that supports the idea that relatively poor European publics are more supportive of EUFPS than others because they perceive that national resource savings could be made through pooling and sharing which, once redirected, could improve their well-being. Finally, it was hypothesised that small member states stood to gain autonomy (albeit shared) through supranationalisation that would help them meet security threats beyond their borders (Ricki, 2008: 316) and should thus support supranationalisation; large states, meanwhile, were predicted to support supranationalisation because it would Europeanise their existing national foreign policy portfolios, leading to cost reductions. While largeness is not correlated with support for EUFPS at all, smallness demonstrates moderate correlation at the chi-square stage, but the correlation ‘washed out’ as part of the regression model. All three findings – especially the first, since it is a more direct test of his theory – call into question the validity of Sánchez-Cuenca’s theory that the more a public perceives a benefit to EU membership, the more likely it is to support further integration (e.g. EUFPS) (Sánchez-Cuenca, 2000: 151).

There is, however, strong evidence to suggest that European publics that are dissatisfied with domestic political institutions support EUFPS: low levels of trust in domestic political institutions correlated with high levels of support for EUFPS throughout all three stages of testing. This suggests that utilitarian perceptions of national performance are only important when the public perceives that national political institutions are underperforming and in need of replacement; not when European integration, on its own, is considered nationally beneficial. As such, this finding supports an existing consensus within the literature on European integration: because citizens have less European than national knowledge and are more directly affected by the nation-state, national factors tend trump European ones in determining support for European integration (Kritzinger 2003: 236). Exploring the gap in the literature, then, between perceptions of national performance and support for European foreign policy leads to expected conclusions.

For practical politics, this means that the performance of national political institutions will be important in determining the prospect of political integration in the future, with poor performance in a large number of member states potentially triggering the prospect of supranational integration. A political or economic crisis, for example, may be sufficient to trigger such a drop in trust. Yet, according to attitudinal data relating to the 2008 eurocrisis, European citizens tended to lose trust in the European Union (see Figure 4). The attribution

of responsibility for a future crisis must therefore shift from European to domestic political institutions for such a crisis to trigger the prospect supranational integration.

Subjective perceptions of Europe's foreign policy role vis-à-vis the UA

Finally, this research strongly corroborates the findings of previous research that European attitudes towards the US correlate with European foreign policy cooperation (Krotz 2009: 561): a desire for more autonomy from the US seems to be a key driver of support for EUFPS. Qualitatively, a striking finding from the QCA is that publics that want European foreign policy independence from the US and do not exhibit a high level of national pride always support EUFPS. Quantitatively, a desire for European foreign policy independence from the US was a significant predictor of support for EUFPS across all regression models and was only second in terms of significance to the national pride variable in the chi-square analysis. While this adds support to research linking European attitudes towards the US to increased levels of European foreign policy cooperation (Krotz 2009: 561), it is not able to disentangle whether the recent upsurge in anti-US trends in European public opinion is the product of European balancing or a cultural reaction to the Americanisation of European culture. It is important that future research seeks to disentangle causality here because doing so may help to understand how anti-US attitudes – and thus European foreign policy cooperation – may evolve in the future.

In addition to corroborating previous research on the correlation between European attitudes towards the US and European foreign policy cooperation, the correlation also supports the idea that European publics have rational views on European foreign policy: European citizens seem to be aware of the fact that to have a credible European foreign policy that is independent of the United States, the unanimity threshold must be relaxed (i.e. decision-making must be supranational) to institute the possibility of stronger external action. This serves to provide further evidence of the breakdown of the consensus Almond-Lippmann consensus – the notion that public attitudes towards foreign policy are non-meaningful ‘non-attitudes’ and thus not appropriate as the object of scholarly inquiry (Almond 1950).

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