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Migrants and the welfare state.

An examination of variation in migrants' access to social benefits

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Abstract

This paper explores welfare state generosity towards migrants, and conducts a quantitative and qualitative analysis, comparing cross-national differences across the International Labour Organization (ILO) members, European Union (EU) countries and Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) region. Migrants' access to social benefits varies greatly, this paper is aimed at answering – what determines welfare state generosity towards migrants. It explores mechanisms such as ethnic competition giving rise to perceived threat amongst native population and resulting in calls for limited access to benefits for foreign-born residents. It finds that higher ethnic diversity may indeed act as a catalyst for ethnic competition and calls for exclusionism but that this mechanism may be mitigated through contact and greater integration. Furthermore, it shows how variation in generosity differs across nations where migrants are considered a compliment or a substitute to native workers. With a wind of right-wing populism, and calls from powerful political leaders in Europe to cut migrants' access to social protection, this paper will help to map out the predictors of generosity, informing policy and theory as it fills a gap in literature that has largely attributed welfare state generosity to partisanship.

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Chapter 1: Introduction

Recent media reports have expressed decreased public support for welfare state generosity towards migrants, something which has been mirrored by the UKIP success in recent local councillors elections in the UK, and recent statements calling for cuts in benefits for migrants by leading politicians in Germany (BBC, 2014; Fariza & Doncel, 2014). The welfare state generosity arguably varies greatly across the International Labour Organization (ILO) nations, European Union (EU) member states as well as across the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) region. This variation becomes especially salient as the EU free movement zone allows for citizens of member states to migrate freely within the area, whether ‘welfare state shopping’ actually exists is a disputed factor but one which right wing parties have claimed in order to rally support.

With the aforementioned calls to restrict benefits, in particular unemployment benefits, there may be a move towards an Europeanization¹ of benefits, converging towards a uniform and more restrictive generosity (Fariza & Doncel, 2014). As this paper will help with understanding the determinants of welfare state generosity towards migrants, it may lay groundwork to inform policy; as it will enable a look at determinants for welfare state generosity it may inform the generosity policy a state should adopt, depending on how they fit into the framework. Furthermore it may stretch to having theory implications, as it will enrich the understanding of why partisanship, or party politics may not be a sufficient enough determinant of welfare state generosity when concerned with migrants as recipients.

This paper looks to determine the causes behind the variation in generosity amongst different welfare states. As such the research question for this paper is: What determines welfare state generosity towards migrants? In considering variations in welfare state generosity across the OECD and EU region, I hope to explain what are the underlying reasons for this variation – beyond explanations of partisanship.

¹ Europeanization: “domestic assimilation of EU policy and politics, hence the definition refers to the processes of institutionalization” (Radaelli, 2003: 30).

An important cluster of literature to consider is the impressive body of literature on determinants of welfare state generosity, which is focused on partisanship as an important predictor for generosity outcome (Huber & Stephens, 2001; Esping-Andersen, 1990). Little has been written, however, on variation in welfare state generosity towards migrants. And when one observes data and reports from the OECD statistics library, there appears to be variance within social democratic states – which Huber and Stephens (2001) classify as most generous – Denmark and Sweden present different levels of generosity, and of benefit uptake amongst migrants. Denmark is less generous than other Scandinavian states despite having the highest public spending as percentage of GDP – suggesting it is a highly generous welfare state, but this generosity is not extended to migrants (Liebig, 2007). What could be the possible explanation behind this variance? This paper will help fill a gap in literature that has focused on partisanship as an explanation for generosity, and examine why this explanation may not hold when extended to the migrant population.

This paper uses the widely recognised definition of the Welfare State developed by Gøsta Esping-Andersen; a paradigm for defining the welfare state not with an all encompassing stylus but by differentiating and clearly outlining three different models (Esping-Andersen, 1990). His definition, which looks at levels of de-commodification, allows us to move away from looking at levels of public and social expenditure as the only means to determine what defines a welfare state. Korpi and Palme (2003), are some of the scholars who have deepened the argument that expenditure alone is not sufficient to define the welfare state, one must look at state structure, institutions and how the social spending is made and on what (Esping-Andersen, 1990). Therefore Welfare State will mean; a state which through its state structure, social policy, and institutions allows its inhabitants a level of de-commodification; they can opt out of work and there still exists a safety net in the form of public social support.

The aim of this dissertation is to answer the overarching question: What causes welfare states to be generous towards migrants? In answering this question, the dissertation will consider 3 hypotheses that explore different possible determinants of national variation in generosity (please see section below). A range of literature, stretching from ethnic competition theory, contact theory, multiculturalism trade-off

theory etc., informs the hypotheses. Moreover, the ‘median voter’ is a powerful concept in political science, which together with pressure from interest groups, guides policymaking. It is therefore natural to examine how differences in attitudes towards migrants may be influenced. The section below will expand further on literature and theory that is relevant to this paper. In considering variations in welfare state generosity across the OECD and EU region, I hope to explain what are the underlying reasons for this variation – beyond explanations of partisanship.

I will begin this examination of variation in generosity by discussing existing literature and identify a gap, which this paper aims to fill. I will then proceed to outline my methodology; using a mixed approach with quantitative and qualitative research methods. I will finalise by presenting the results before concluding with implications for policy and theory and suggestions for further research.

Literature review

The scholarship on Welfare State generosity, retrenchment and restructuring has in large focused on partisanship (Huber & Stephens, 2001; Korpi & Palme, 2003). However as stated in the above paragraphs, partisanship does not appear sufficient enough to explain generosity in benefits available to migrants in some cases and deserve further examination.

With regards to the interplay between migrants and the welfare state there also exists a body of academic research, but little focused on welfare state generosity towards migrants. With an ageing population entitled to publicly funded pension schemes, states will have to maintain high levels of revenue from taxes to be able to fulfil its welfare commitments, where migrants will be crucial in sustaining fiscal revenues (Storsletten, 2003). There exists some limited scholarship on the effects of migration on the welfare state, which is still outranked by the body of literature on the effects of globalisation and the welfare state, and whether or not the two are in competition. There is also research being conducted on ‘welfare magnetism’ or ‘benefit shopping’² especially within the EU area and in the US (Allard & Danziger, 2000; Borjas, 1999; Hanson & Hartman, 1994; Peridy 2006a; 2006b). This scholarship feeds into the paper

² Welfare magnetism, benefit shopping: decision to migrate to a specific nation is primarily motivated by the possibility to receive social benefits in the host country (Peridy, 2006a; 2006b).

as welfare magnets may affect migration patterns, and the generosity a state adopts may have consequences for its 'attractiveness' as a host country. However, welfare magnetism has largely been disputed as a strong determining factor for migrants' decision of where to migrate. Instead networks, Diasporas and wage gaps are of greater importance.

As a dominant theoretical framework does not exist to guide this paper, a composition of numerous theoretical approaches and mechanisms will form the model of analysis.

(i) Ethnic Competition and Threat Theory

Oliver and Wong (2003: 582) find that increased diversity leads to more negative attitudes and animosity towards ethnic minorities; "with fewer immigrant members, blacks and whites probably feel greater competition and vulnerability from new immigrants". They argue that exposure to ethnic out-groups gives rise to aggression between groups. Early work by Blumer (1958) - which has been supported in later years by a number of scholars (Quillian, 1995; Bobo & Hutchings, 1996) – finds that the threat increases as the dominant group perceive their position threatened with regards to their access to jobs, economic interests and power.

Through 'Ethnic Competition Theory' Scheepers et al. (2002) explore ethnic exclusionism and the opposition amongst European citizens to grant civil rights to migrants residing legally within the country. Central to this theory "is the proposition that competition over scarce resources between social groups is the catalyst of antagonistic inter-group attitudes" (Scheepers et al., 2002: 18). The 'scarce resource' may be social benefits, and this competition may intensify as the financial crisis mean that many governments have had to cut their budgets and availability of welfare state benefits.

The competition is both actual competition of socio-economic-conditions, but also perceived competition where there may exist a "subjectively perceived socio-economic threat on the part of ethnic out-groups, which in turn may induce hostile, unfavourable stances toward these groups" (Scheepers et al., 2002: 18). Scheepers et

al. find that a large proportion of non-EU citizen migrants (actual competition) lead to higher support for ethnic exclusionism.

(ii) Contact Theory

Contrary to ethnic competition theory, contact theory suggests that increased diversity and growing number of ethnic minority groups will lead to increased contact and exposure, thus decreasing perceived threat and competition. This increased exposure and connection between groups leads to the majority groups not developing negative feelings and attitudes towards ethnic out-groups.

Allport (1954) presents how quality of bonds and contact between groups may vary, with different results ensuing. This depending on whether contact is 'voluntary' or 'forced', or whether the positioning and status of groups are in direct competition. Pettigrew (1998) building on previous work by Allport discusses how mixed groups, exposed to each other and having more 'contact' with one another may form friendships that limit prejudice and perceived threat, thus limiting ethnic competition. He stipulates that the 'potential' of forming friendship bonds is a necessary condition for contact to limit prejudice. However, "it has been proposed that when competition over resources is present, proximity and contact increase intergroup hostility, rather than decreasing it" (Esses et al., 1998: 701).

The strength of both ethnic competition and threat theory on the one hand, and contact theory on the other, have been widely discussed in recent years with results differing between scholars. The complexity of the theories further deepens as scholars argue that the quality of ties matter, and that exposure to out-groups have different affects on levels of neighbourhood and metropolitan groups (Oliver & Wong, 2003). Criticism has been laid on threat theories for focusing too narrowly on black-white relations (Morissens & Sainsbury, 2005). Blalock (1967) points to socio-economic conditions and access to political power as important factors when determining perceived threat. Contact theory may arguably be criticised for assuming that increased presence of ethnic out-groups would increase contact and exposure, whereas it may be that segregation and exclusion does not result in increased socialising or 'potential' to form friendships. Furthermore it has been criticised for not exploring the quality of

contact between migrants and natives, 'forced' or 'voluntary' as a binary measurement may not be sufficient enough to map the quality of interaction.

(iii) Constrict Theory and Ethnic Diversity Public Goods Provision Hypothesis

Putnam (2007) discusses how ethnic diversity, and increased immigration, may lead to a fall in social capital and trust. This decrease in social trust then extends to a decrease in support for redistributive capacities of the state, and support for the welfare state. Similar arguments are made by Alesina et al. (2001), as they discuss how the heterogeneity of the US population is one of the underlying factors of why there is less support for the welfare state in America than in Europe. In an earlier article Alesina et al. (1997) discuss how ethnic diversity exacerbate public goods provision, which Habyarimana et al. (2007) explore further by identifying the specific mechanisms that drive this linkage; 'preferences', 'technology' and 'strategy selection'. Although this hypothesis has been disputed by scholars such as Gisselquist (2013) and Gestuhuizen et al. (2009), it still remains powerful within political economy. It is therefore of importance to examine the interplay between migration, and increased ethnic diversity, and welfare states. These two theories are more concerned with the effects of migration on welfare state generosity for the whole population – natives and foreign-born – rather than welfare transfers towards migrants specifically, but if generosity as a whole is reduced than this will affect migrants as well.

(iv) Multiculturalism and Welfare State in Tension

Scholars have examined the claim that granting more rights to, and accommodating for migrants exacerbates the sustainability of a large welfare state (Banting et al., 2006). This ties in with the above mentioned theory that increased ethnic diversity undermines social trust; 'heterogeneity/redistribution trade-off' (Kymlicka & Banting, 2006a). A paper by Koopmans (2010) shows that there may exist a negative effect of multiculturalism policies coupled with a generous welfare state as, according to his results, it demotivates migrants' participation in the labour force and integration. Does multiculturalism policies necessarily erode the welfare state? According to Kymlicka and Banting (2006b) multiculturalism can help sustain the welfare state, but is generosity towards migrants tied in with these policies? Here there appears to be little

evidence, although Koopmans looks at the outcome of a combination of generous welfare state and multiculturalism policies, he does not look at whether generosity towards migrants necessarily is connected to support for multiculturalism. By conducting a quantitative study I explore this relationship in a wider sample of countries to gain better insight into the mechanisms at work.

Chapter 2: Methodology

Having explored existing literature and identified a gap, I have formed 3 hypotheses to answer the overarching research question of ‘what causes a welfare state to be generous to migrants? Building on ethnic competition theory I have formed the first hypotheses, looking at how competition may lead to calls for exclusionism and restricted access to benefits for migrant minorities. Secondly, I have explored the impact of contact between groups, and the relationship between multiculturalism policies and generosity towards migrants. Details of hypotheses and operationalization are outlined below.

Hypotheses

Hypothesis 1: In countries with high presence of ethnic competition, welfare state generosity will be low

How does competition between natives and migrants effect welfare state generosity towards migrants? This hypothesis builds on existing literature on Ethnic Competition Theory and Threat theory. Scheepers et al. (2002) explore the opposition amongst European citizens to grant civil right to legal migrants and the wave of support for ethnic exclusionism that is popularising in Europe. The perceived threat to dominant ethnic groups – native population – may be mitigated trough contact with the minority – immigrant population – through increased presence and decreased spatial segregation. The contact between the two may bridge the gap and decrease the perceived threat, leading to increased generosity and extension of civil rights and social protection (McLaren, 2003; Pettigrew, 1998). Furthermore, there are scholars who are concerned that diversity may complicate welfare state transfers as it may

create an environment of distrust and decreased solidarity (Alesina et al., 2001; Banting et al., 2006).

Borjas (1999) explores how welfare state generosity influences migration patterns and attraction, concluding that states with more generous welfare and more equal distribution of income result in the state being more attractive to low skilled migration. Furthermore, Peridy (2006a; 2006b) argues that low skilled migrants from MENA countries – Middle East and North Africa – are in greater numbers migrating to countries with generous welfare states. Turning to ethnic competition theory, an influx of competition from low skilled migrants competing for a scarce number of jobs and benefits, may give rise to perceived threat by the native population and a call for excluding migrants from accessing certain welfare programmes. Storlsetten (2003) argues that countries in Europe need to adopt a comprehensive social protection policy to attract high skilled migrants, needed to sustain the fiscal burden of an ageing population and changing demographics – which can be mirrored in many developed nations selective migration policies favouring skilled migrants.

As natives compete with migrants for a scarce number of jobs, rising unemployment rates may further increase perceived threat and competition between the groups (Scheepers et al., 2002). Examining the migrants' participation rates may also be an effective measure of actual competition amongst the groups – especially salient in sectors in which low skilled work is concentrated.

I will therefore explore this hypothesis using three main indicators that may lead to ethnic competition: (a) ethnic diversity, (b) presence of low skilled migrants, (c) unemployment rates.

*Hypothesis 2: Where immigrant integration is high,
welfare state generosity will be high*

Building on contact theory; where immigrant integration is high and their contact with the native population frequent, generosity towards migrants will be high. This because increased contact decreases perceived threat and support for ethnic exclusionism (Pettigrew, 1998; Scheepers et al. 2002). When migrants are incorporated into labour

markets, they are more likely to be granted access to social programs and participate in welfare programs – but there exists large variations in the rights available to migrants, especially migrants of colour (Morissens & Sainsbury, 2005). This paper will explore the connection between ethnic competition, ethnic diversity and contact theories and examine whether they are mutually exclusive or whether they can be interrelated.


Hypothesis 3: In countries with high level of multiculturalism policies, welfare state generosity will be high

The hypothesis above builds on work by Koopmans (2010) and Banting et al. (2006). What are the implications of a country having strong multiculturalism policies for welfare state generosity towards migrants?

This analysis will use the Multiculturalism Policy Index definition of Multiculturalism; Policies that “provide certain fundamental civil and political rights to all citizens on non-discriminatory basis. They differ, however, in the extent to which they go beyond the non-discriminatory protection of traditional individual rights of citizenship to also provide some additional form of public recognition, support or accommodation for ethnocultural minorities to maintain and express their distinct identities and practices” (Multiculturalism Policy Index Website, n.d.a). Examples of multiculturalism policies are opportunity to wear religiously associated headwear as part of a military uniform, access to funds for ethnic group organisations and education in languages that are not native to the country (Multiculturalism Policy Index Website, n.d.b).

The literature differs on the relationship between multiculturalism policies and its impact on welfare state generosity, with Banting et al. (2006) arguing that multiculturalism may in some cases strengthen the welfare state – but the studies are focused on generosity in general and its support by the native population.

Figure 1: Diagram of mechanisms



Source: compiled by the author.

Operationalization: data sets and case study selection

The dependent variable for all hypotheses is welfare state generosity towards migrants. I have conducted primary research using migrant uptake of a range of benefits according to the OECD (OECD migration outlook, 2013) – looking at migrants’ uptake of unemployment benefits, social assistance, family allowance, pensions and housing allowance, details can be found in appendix. Due to the limited availability of data, it is difficult to construct a statistically significant regression; available from the OECD are data on migrants’ uptake of social benefits from 27 countries, instead this data will be used to construct a cross tabulation of the data and to produce scatter plots presenting correlations and help inform case study selection.

As there are insufficient numbers of observations on migrant uptake of social benefits in comparison to natives, using general public spending as a percentage of GDP and public spending on health and education as proxies for generosity will allow for a regression analysis. The indicator “general public spending” as a measure of welfare state generosity, and by extension generosity to migrants, has been used by scholars in

previous studies (Peridy, 2006a; 2006b) following the assumption that states that are generous to their citizens are generous to migrants as well

Another measurement of generosity towards migrants is collected from ILO Migration Survey from 2003. The survey details legal access for migrants' access to health, family and unemployment benefits compared to natives of social protection for an extensive list of countries. This list of countries is used as a measurement of the dependent variable coding 0=equal rights, 1=difference in right to benefits. The data from the ILO survey will also be used to compile comprehensive cross-tabulations detailing support or opposition to the different hypotheses.

This regression may not capture the full picture, with regards to states that are more generous towards natives than migrants. This dissertation will therefore conclude with a qualitative analysis of two most puzzling cases.

As the dataset only provides us with a limited number of cases, choosing the cases at random is not a reliable option, as it is vulnerable to selection bias (Seawright & Gerring, 2008). In order to select the cases for qualitative research, two things should be central to the selection process; "(1) a representative sample and (2) useful variation on the dimensions of theoretical interest" (Seawright & Gerring, 2008: 296). At a glance, Ireland appears to show a good example of a representative case – appearing to be located near the median values for both migrant uptake of unemployment benefits and social assistance, and as social sciences prefer to select on the dependent variable, Ireland may present a good example for a 'typical case' (Seawright & Gerring, 2008). From inspection of the variables, Germany and Greece appear to be outstanding candidates to analyse hypothesis 5 using the case selection method of 'most similar'; the two countries have incredibly similar values amongst all independent variables apart from participation rates – however this difference is diminished once we control for GDP per capita. Sweden and Denmark also appear to present an opportunity for most similar case selection, as the variance in the two countries generosity is a puzzling outcome – analysing further these two cases offers an opportunity to gain thorough insight into the power of predicting generosity. The two cases have very similar number of migrants – but vary greatly in the application of multiculturalism policies.

The case study will focus on key texts; journal articles, newspaper articles and key reports from the OECD to explore all three hypotheses and map out the main differentials between the two nations. It will look at the recent history of the two nations and developments in migration policies and politics and how this might have influenced their different stands in generosity towards migrants. Table 1 below summarises the hypotheses and variables.

Table 1: Summary of hypotheses and variables.

DEPENDENT VARIABLE	INDEPENDENT VARIABLE	INDICATORS OF INDEPENDENT VARIABLE	SOURCES	THEORY	
H1: In countries with high presence of ethnic competition, welfare state generosity will be low.					
(a) Ethnic diversity: In countries with high presence of ethnic diversity, welfare state generosity will be low.					
Welfare state generosity	Ethnic Diversity	Migration Stock	World Bank data	Ethnic competition	
		Net migration as % of total population	World Bank data		
		Refugee Stock	World Bank data		
		Refugees as % of migrants	World Bank data		
(b) Presence of low skilled migrants: In countries with high level of low skilled labour migrants, welfare state generosity will be low.					
Welfare state generosity	Composition of labour migrants	Skill level of migrants	Eurostat		
			OECD statistical data		
(c) Unemployment rates: In countries with high level of competition for jobs, welfare state generosity will be low.					
Welfare state generosity	Unemployment rate	Unemployment rate	World Bank data		
	Migrant participation rate	Migrant participation rate	OECD statistical data		
H2: Where immigrant integration is high, welfare state generosity will be high.					
Welfare state generosity	Migrant integration level	MIPEX: Migration Integration Policy Index	MIPEX database	Contact theory	
H3: Countries with high level of multiculturalism policies, will have high level of generosity.					
Welfare state generosity	Multiculturalism policy level	MPI: Multiculturalism Policy Index	MPI website	Multiculturalism	

Source: compiled by the author.


Chapter 3: Results from quantitative study

Regression analysis

Despite the strenuous efforts to collect substantive data, the small number of observations available means that unfortunately not all hypotheses can be tested by regression analysis but they will instead be considered through cross tabulation and qualitative analysis in the following sections. The analysis uses public, health and education spending as percentage of GDP as proxies for generosity. A smaller analysis, with fewer observations, has also been conducted using the ILO migration survey coding for migrants' legal access to unemployment benefits, medical care and family benefits.

The results support hypotheses 1a and 1c – underpinned by ethnic competition theory. My findings also confirm hypothesis 3, which looks at the effects of multiculturalism policies. Moreover, evidence from the analysis supports the initial findings using the OECD data on uptake of social assistance (see figure 2) – countries with higher percentage of foreign-born population also have more restricted uptake of benefits by migrants. However, there are two distinct outliers; Sweden and Belgium. These are both countries with high MIPEx scores - indicating high integration – it may be that contact has mitigated the rise of ethnic competition in these two countries.

Figure 2: Migrant uptake of social assistance compared to natives and percentage of foreign born population of total population in OECD region.



Source: Compiled by the author, OECD data (2010).

There is substantial support for ethnic competition theory and hypothesis 1a, higher ethnic diversity leading to more restrictive generosity, by different proxies. Using Spending on Health as a proxy for generosity generates the most significant results with an adjusted $R^2=0.58$ the model explains 58% of variance in generosity. This analysis returns statistically significant results supporting hypothesis 1a leading us to reject the null hypothesis. There is also support for hypothesis 1c, where unemployment rates leads to higher competition and lesser generosity – the support is not as strong ($p=0.1$) but noteworthy. As the significance is not as high there is a need for further studies in order to confidently determine whether unemployment rates are a strong enough predictor for exclusionism.

Furthermore, there is support for hypothesis 3; countries that widely apply multiculturalism policies are also more generous to migrants. This analysis uses only a limited number of observations as the MPI only covers a limited number of nations' policies. The analysis returns statistical significance enough to reject the null hypothesis ($p=0,01$). Please see table 2 for further details.

Table 2: Generosity towards migrants, regression analysis results.

	Dependent Variable: Spending on ... as % of GDP	Education	Health	Public	ILO Unemployment benefits	ILO Medical care	ILO Family benefits
	Migration Stock (Absolute numbers)	0.3967 (1.032)	0.0000002 (0.00000004)***	-0.00000009 (0.0000001)		0.00000002 (0.00000001) *	-0.000000008 (0.00000001)
Hypothesis 1a	Migration Stock (%)	0.002 (0.03)	-0.06 (0.03) .	-0.0003 (0.078)	0.038 (0.018) .	0.003 (0.003)	0.007 (0.009) .
	Refugee Population	-0.9 (0.699)	-0.000002 (0.0000009) *	-0.000002 (0.000002)	0.000003 (0.000001) .	0.003 (0.004)	-0.0003 (0.004)
Hypothesis 1b	% of low skilled migrants				-0.007 (0.01)		
Hypothesis 1c	Unemployment rate	0.045 (0.035) .	0.06 (0.048)	-0.19 (0.11) .	0.037 (0.025)	0.015 (0.009)	-0.019 (0.012)
Hypothesis 2	MIPEX 2007 MIPEX 2010 MPI 2000						
Hypothesis 3	MPI 2010	0.023 (0.080)* <i>N=18, R2=0.48</i>					
Observations		62	62	59	16	57	49
R2		0.27	0.58	0.039	0.382	0.158	0.154
p-value		0.003	1.234e-10	0.214	0.362	0.108	0.192

Significant codes: p-value = 0 ‘****’ 0.001 ‘***’ 0.01 ‘**’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1

Source: Compiled by the author.

ILO Migration Survey Data

The ILO migration survey measured 93 member states' legislation, worker rights and migration policy. As the focus of this paper focuses is on migrants access to social benefits, it will only be concerned with this section of the survey responses – specifically variations in legal entitlement to social benefits between natives and migrants. The answers are supplied by officials of the nation and are concerned with the legal entitlement but not actual uptake or accessibility. This survey does therefore not provide answers as to informal discrimination. Furthermore, not all nations answered the questions regarding social benefits and some countries did not have a system in place, leaving 69 national observations in the categories: access to unemployment benefits, medical care and family benefits which are used as proxies. Details of data can be found in appendix.

(i) Ethnic competition theory

Hypothesis 1: In countries with high presence of ethnic competition, welfare state generosity will be low.

Countries with high presence of refugees appear to be more restrictive in allowing equal access to all three benefits measured – but the variation when considering general migration stock is too low to determine support for the hypothesis. It suggests that –based on this data set – although ethnic diversity may act as a causal mechanism, it may not be the most powerful predictor.

The data further suggests that countries where low skilled migrants make up more than 30% of all migrants are less generous than countries with smaller percentage of low skilled migrants when considering access to unemployment and medical care benefits. However the same results are not displayed for family benefits where the opposite is true but variation is more marginal.

With regards to unemployment rates and its connection to generosity, the data does not present a clear or convincing picture. Results differ greatly between the benefits

measured. In sum, this data set does not support the hypothesis 1c. The evidence found in the ILO survey supports hypothesis 1, especially with regards to ethnic diversity and presence of low skilled migrants.

(ii) Contact theory

*Hypothesis 2: Where immigrant integration is high,
welfare state generosity will be high.*

Access to all three types of benefits is greater in countries with higher immigrant integration index, supporting contact theory and hypothesis 2. This result suggests that competition and support for exclusionism may be mitigated through contact, and integration. There is therefor support for hypothesis 2 based on evidence found in ILO survey.

(iii) Multiculturalism and Welfare state in tension

*Hypothesis 3: Countries with high level of multiculturalism policies
will have high level of generosity.*

Looking only at unemployment benefits, one may see that countries with higher presence of multiculturalism policies are more generous than countries that do not widely adopt multiculturalism. However with regards to family benefits and medical care – there is not enough variation to support the claim that multiculturalism policies are a powerful predictor for generosity.

Chapter 4: Results from qualitative study

Case study: Generosity towards migrants in Sweden and Denmark

Sweden and Denmark present as distinctly contrasting cases for variation in migrants' access to benefits. As scholarship has grouped social democratic welfare states together as the most generous type of welfare states – it is noteworthy that they differ

in their generosity towards migrants (Liebig, 2007). This is why I believe that the two countries are excellent case studies to examine.

In the post-war period Sweden accepted large numbers of refugees and still continues this legacy. Receiving large numbers of migrants entering as family reunion or for humanitarian assistance (Schierup et al., 2006). Sweden was also early in announcing that Syrian refugees would be granted permanent residency (Migrationsverket, 2014). Sweden has also had a citizenship policy that enabled migrants to speedily, and relatively easily, obtain a Swedish nationality (Schierup et al., 2006). Despite this open policy towards refugees, the trade unions strength meant that labour migrants were only allowed in small numbers at times when there were severe labour shortages. Furthermore, many migrants found it difficult to gain recognition of their qualifications and thus ended up unemployed or overqualified (Schierup et al., 2006). Sweden has been one of the countries pioneering and sustaining strong multiculturalism policies, which came under critique in Koopmans (2010) article as creating a trade-off with participation. According to Schierup et al. (2006) Sweden maintains a generous welfare state to both its natives and migrants, in part through the accessible process to obtain Swedish citizenship.

Denmark has one of the world's most generous welfare states, with an impressively high public spending succeeding half of GDP expenditure. However, according to the OECD (Liebig, 2007), this generosity does not extend to migrants who have a harder time gaining access to benefits in Denmark, compared to its brethren social democratic welfare state – Sweden.

Unlike migrants in Sweden, new arrivals to Denmark struggled to obtain employment at the same level as natives and employment rates remains lower for migrants than natives. In the early 1980s there was an overarching change in the immigration framework (Liebig, 2007). This gained migrants greater legal standing and allowed family reunification to stretch to parents, previously it had only included partners and children. Before the 1980s “immigration to Denmark was a very marginal phenomenon” but the country is now “among the few OECD countries which has a separate Ministry for Refugee, Immigration and Integration Affairs, in which immigration and integration policies are considered together” (Liebig, 2007: 5).

Unions in Denmark had similarly to Sweden opposed labour migration and with the migrant framework reform, humanitarian migration became a large proportion of immigration to both countries (Liebig, 2007).

Migration policy has become a much more salient issue in Denmark than in Sweden, it has become a central issue to gain votes – whereas in Sweden the topic is seldom quoted as the top 10 issues for the electorate (Green-Pedersen & Krogstrup, 2008). This because “focusing on the immigration issue easily leads to a conflict with the centre-right, especially social liberal parties. In Sweden, such a conflict would undermine mainstream right-wing attempts at winning government power” (Green-Pedersen & Krogstrup, 2008: 610). Thus it is party competition that drives this difference, not mass media, according to Green-Pedersen and Krogstrup (2008). The public opinion in Sweden is slightly more favourable, but in both nations there are negative fractions – but it is in Denmark that they have become mainstream and their concerns promoted to the top of the political agenda, in Sweden they remain marginalised for the time being.

Considering evidence from secondary sources from reputable journals, together with statistics from the OECD and World Bank, this section provides evidence relating to the different hypotheses and outlines the background to welfare state generosity towards migrants in the two nations.

(i) Ethnic competition theory

Hypothesis 1: In countries with high presence of ethnic competition, welfare state generosity will be low.

Sweden has a higher foreign-born population, compared to Denmark – and a higher percentage of migrants from outside the OECD (Green-Pedersen & Krogstrup, 2008). According to ethnic competition theory this may lead to increased support for ethnic exclusionism, however the numbers for these two nations does not seem to support this. However if we consider the diagram (figure 1, above), one can note that this

support may be mitigated through contact between natives and migrants –hypothesis 2.

According to Facchini and Mayda (2008), the skill level of Danish migrants are more level to those of the natives, whereas in Sweden migrants often gain employment in the segmented labour market working in jobs that may be considered ‘unfavourable’ by native Swedes. Danish migrants may act as a substitute to the low skilled natives, whereas Swedish migrants compliment a growingly more high skilled native population. This is central to the flourishing of ethnic exclusionism and competition. Studying figures from the OECD database, one can also see that low skilled workers that are migrants have higher participation rates compared to natives.

This competition between low skilled natives and migrants in Denmark lay at the core of welfare state restrictiveness towards migrants. Unemployment rates have not differed greatly in the two nations, it has been slightly lower in Denmark throughout the 2000s. Participation rates amongst low skilled Danish natives are more than 10% less than foreign-born low skilled workers. Which may be giving rise to ethnic competition.

(ii) Contact theory

*Hypothesis 2: Where immigrant integration is high,
welfare state generosity will be high.*

As described in above paragraphs, ethnic competition and support for exclusionism can be mitigated through contact. Sweden is top of the Migration Integration Policy Index (MIPEX), with highly integrated migrants in all aspects of society; politics, education, labour market mobility etc. Denmark is found lower down the table (17th of 36 countries) with a less favourable access to politics, more difficult to obtain citizenship and many labour market policies are separate to natives according to MIPEX.

For both Sweden and Denmark, migrants are hugely important to maintaining a large working age population to sustain the state’s fiscal capacities (Storsletten, 2003). The

two nations have similar levels of participation rates amongst migrants – but the gap between natives and migrants are slightly larger in Denmark than in Sweden.

(iii) Multiculturalism and Welfare state in tension

Hypothesis 3: Countries with high level of multiculturalism policies will have high level of generosity.

Sweden and Denmark stand at two ends of the Multiculturalism Policy spectrum – Sweden is a strong supporter, whereas Denmark does not apply any (MPI). This is one point that starkly contrasts the two nations (Green-Pedersen & Krogstrup, 2008).

In summary, the findings from the case studies supports in part hypothesis 1, with regards to (b) skill level and (c) unemployment rate. There is also support for hypothesis 2, as migrants in Sweden are more highly integrated than in Denmark. There is also strong support for hypothesis 3, with the two countries at opposite ends of the spectrum of their application of multiculturalism policies. The role of migrants in Swedish labour market has meant that they have not been in straight competition with natives, which appears to be an important factor in Sweden's generosity towards its migrants.

Chapter 5: Conclusion

Implications and conclusions

This dissertation has analysed the explanations as to 'What causes welfare states to be generous towards migrants?' Using a mixed approach of both quantitative and qualitative data this dissertation has examined the mechanisms that shapes this variation in generosity. Firstly, through running a regression analysis with data primarily from the OECD and World Bank. Secondly, by using information from the ILO migration survey conducted in 2003 – mapping out migrants legal entitlements to social benefits compared to natives – and finally through an in-depth quantitative study of Sweden and Denmark. This final analysis has enriched the understanding as

to why two highly generous welfare states would differ in extending their generosity towards migrants.

Table 3: Support for hypotheses.

Hypothesis	Regression		ILO survey		Case of Sweden and Denmark		Score
	Support	Reject	Support	Reject	Support	Reject	
<i>1a: In countries with high presence of ethnic diversity, welfare state generosity will be low</i>	x		x			o	2
<i>1b: In countries with high level of low skilled labour migrants, welfare state generosity will be low.</i>	-	-	x		x		2
<i>1c: In countries with high level of competition for jobs, welfare state generosity will be low.</i>	x			o		o	1
<i>2: Where immigrant integration is high, welfare state generosity will be high.</i>	-	-	x		x		2
<i>3: Countries with high level of multiculturalism policies will have high level of generosity.</i>	x			o	x		2

Source: Compiled by the author.


As one can note from table 3 above, the results from the three different analyses support ethnic competition theory – with ethnic competition leading to exclusionism unless mitigated by contact across groups.

A key difference between Sweden and Denmark appears to be the presence of ethnic competition, the skill level of Danish migrants compared to natives gives rise to fierce rivalry over low skilled jobs and in turn springs native support for ethnic exclusionism. Competition exists in Sweden, but migrants appear to act more as a complement than a substitute, and competition is also mitigated through contact between the groups. Even though the application of multiculturalism policies varies greatly and we find support for hypothesis (3); this does not seem to act as a powerful

enough predictor – at the heart of the issue is skill level and competition, which appears to be at the core of this policy formation.

The analysis suggests that through contact ethnic competition and perceived threat may decrease – hence limiting support for ethnic exclusionism. These findings would therefore support discussions that ethnic competition and contact theory are not mutually exclusive, but rather intertwined and connected. Under specific conditions ethnic contact may balance the negative impact of competition. According to the research presented here, such conditions may be skill level of migrants and ethnic/cultural distance of migrants. Figure 3 presents the framework showing how countries with higher percentage of migrants are the least generous when migrants are not highly integrated. Countries such as Sweden and the Netherlands have high numbers of migrants – but are also generous as contact is high with high integration levels.

Figure 3: Countries by percentage of migrants and integration index.



Source: compiled by the author, data from the World Bank and MIPEX database.

The results may have policy implications as Europe currently seeks to find ways in which to halt the rise of the right. Interestingly, higher unemployment rates does only seem to gather the same levels of support from the analysis – suggesting that this is not a powerful predictor for competition, nor a common denominator for countries with low generosity.

Limitations and suggestions for further research

The research conducted was restricted in parts by availability of data and universality of data available. Using World Bank data allowed for a more general quantitative analysis – but using proxies for generosity rather than a more specific measurement. Where there were data available from the OECD on uptake of social assistance it was only available for a limited number of nations at one point in time. The ILO survey proved comprehensive in mapping out migrants’ legal entitlements to social protection, but did not show migrants’ actual access. There may be instances where, despite being legally entitled, access is restricted through difficult and arduous bureaucratic process which acts as an exclusionary method.

This dissertation has opened a path for further research and highlighted the gaps that exist when considering migrants’ access to welfare state benefits. With the current debate across the European Union and the OECD, the topic has never before been more poignant. There is therefore need for further research, which takes into account greater data sets and time series.

Furthermore, the role of transnational ties and networks in limiting prejudice and improving quality of contact between groups should be further explored. There are also additional explanatory angles to explore – such as public opinion, the role of the media and attitudes towards migrants. The sway of public opinion and the median voter are powerful when influencing political decision making and policy formation. This dissertation has focused its analysis on the migrants – but an alternative view is to focus on the natives – their attitudes, skills and education. Furthermore, researching the role of media at points in time where policy regarding generosity towards migrants has changed and how migrants are portrayed. Looking also at changes in EU enlargement and changes in how media represents workers and labour migrants from

other EU nations in times of economic fluidness and hardship. Perhaps focusing on how media changed its approach to portraying migrants from Poland when the enlargement reached Romania and Bulgaria.

Ethnic competition theory has proved powerful mechanism throughout this analysis, to further strengthen the theoretical framework underpinning it conducting studies stretching over longer periods in time – and looking to the ethnic composition of natives and migrants – could help to further validate the results presented here. Due to space constraints an analysis stretching across more points in time was not possible here but is suggested for future research.

The future will undoubtedly hold increased migration and ethnic diversity, as transnationalism is the way of the century. Hopefully this will not bring with it increased perceived threat, but rather increased quality of contact between groups.

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Appendix

The following section of the appendix contains detail cross tabulation of uptake of social benefits and foreign born population from the OECD statistical database. This formed the core of my primary research and helped inform case study selection.

Table A.1: uptake of social benefits and foreign-born population (%)

Foreign-born population	Uptake ratio migrants:natives
Social Assistance, N=23	
0-10%	2,07
10,01-20%	2,36
21%+	1,84
Unemployment Benefits, N=26	
0-10%	1,25
10,01-20%	1,37
21%+	1,18
Pensions, N=27	
0-10%	0,78
10,01-20%	0,84
21%+	0,8
Family Allowance, N=27	
0-10%	1,05
10,01-20%	1,15
21%+	1,1
Housing Allowance, N=23	
0-10%	1,47
10,01-20%	1,45
21+%	2,1
<i>mean = 13.89%</i>	<i>median = 13%</i>
<i>N=27</i>	<i>sd = 9.617026</i>

Source: compiled by the author.

The following section of the appendix contains detail cross tabulation of migrants access to benefits, where access to benefits are coded as 0=equal to natives, 1=not equal to natives.

Table A.2: Access to unemployment benefits.

H1a: In countries with high presence of ethnic diversity, welfare state generosity will be low				Source
Migration stock absolute numbers (2005)	Access to unemployment benefits:	Migration stock (2005) (%)	Access to unemployment benefits:	World Bank Data Set (2004, 2005)
<200.000	0,47	<=2%	0,52	
>200.000 <1.000.000	0,43	>2%<10%	0,35	
>1.000.000	0,4	>=10%	0,41	
Refugee population (2004)	Access to unemployment benefits:	Refugee population(%) (2004)	Access to unemployment benefits:	
<2000	0,35	<1%	0,42	
>2000 <100.000	0,35	>1% <= 5%	0,3	
>100.000	0,6	> 6%	0,43	
H1b: In countries with high level of low skilled labour migrants, welfare state generosity will be low				Source
Low skilled migrant as percentage of total foreign born (2005/06)		Access to unemployment benefits:		OECD Statistical Database (2012)
<30%		0		
>30%		0,33		
H1c: In countries with high level of competition for jobs, welfare state generosity will be low.				Source
Unemployment rate (2004)		Access to unemployment benefits:		World Bank Data Set (2004)
<= 5%		0,53		
>6% <10%		0,36		
>= 10%		0,39		
H2: Where immigrant integration is high, welfare state generosity will be high				Source
MIPEX 2007		Access to unemployment benefits:		MIPEX website (2014) ³
<60		0,4		
>= 60		0,13		
H3: Countries with high level of multiculturalism policies will have high level of generosity				Source
MPI (2000)		Access to unemployment benefits:		MPI website (2000) ⁴
<=2		0,22		
>2		0,13		

Source: compiled by the author.

³ <http://www.mipex.eu/download>

⁴ http://www.queensu.ca/mcp/immigrant/table/Immigrant_Minorities_Table1.pdf

Table A.3: Access to medical care.

H1a: In countries with high presence of ethnic diversity, welfare state generosity will be low				Source
Migration stock absolute numbers (2005)	Access to medical care:	Migration stock (2005) (%)	Access to medical care:	World Bank Data Set (2004, 2005)
<200.000	0,07	<=2%	0,11	
>200.000 <1.000.000	0,29	>2%<10%	0,15	
>1.000.000	0,2	>=10%	0,29	
Refugee population (2004)	Access to medical care:	Refugee population(%) (2004)	Access to medical care:	
<2000	0,14	<1%	0,16	
>2000 <100.000	0,1	>1% <= 5%	0,09	
>100.000	0,27	> 6%	0,23	
H1b: In countries with high level of low skilled labour migrants, welfare state generosity will be low				Source
Low skilled migrant as percentage of total foreign born (2005/06)	Access to medical care:			OECD Statistical Database (2012)
<30%	0			
>30%	0,18			
H1c: In countries with high level of competition for jobs, welfare state generosity will be low.				Source
Unemployment rate (2004)	Access to medical care:			World Bank Data Set (2004)
<= 5%	0,11			
>6% <10%	0,17			
>= 10%	0,23			
H6: Where immigrant integration is high, welfare state generosity will be high				Source
MIPEX 2007	Access to medical care:			MIPEX website (2014) ⁵
<60	0,1			
>= 60	0			
H3: Countries with high level of multiculturalism policies will have high level of generosity				Source
MPI (2000)	Access to medical care:			MPI website (2000) ⁶
<=2	0,14			
>2	0,17			

Source: compiled by the author.

⁵ <http://www.mipex.eu/download>

⁶ http://www.queensu.ca/mcp/immigrant/table/Immigrant_Minorities_Table1.pdf

A.4: Access to family benefits.

H1a: In countries with high presence of ethnic diversity, welfare state generosity will be low				Source
Migration stock absolute numbers (2005)	Access to family benefits:	Migration stock (2005) (%)	Access to family benefits:	World Bank Data Set (2004, 2005)
<200.000	0,23	<=2%	0,25	
>200.000 <1.000.000	0,33	>2% <10%	0,24	
>1.000.000	0,28	>=10%	0,31	
Refugee population (2004)	Access to family benefits:	Refugee population(%) (2004)	Access to family benefits:	
<2000	0,28	<1%	0,29	
>2000 <100.000	0,21	>1% <= 5%	0,13	
>100.000	0,31	> 6%	0,29	
H1b: In countries with high level of low skilled labour migrants, welfare state generosity will be low				Source
Low skilled migrant as percentage of total foreign born (2005/06)		Access to family benefits:		OECD Statistical Database (2012)
<30%		0,14		
>30%		0,09		
H1c: In countries with high level of competition for jobs, welfare state generosity will be low.				Source
Unemployment rate (2004)		Access to family benefits:		World Bank Data Set (2004)
<= 5%		0,41		
>6% <10%		0,18		
>= 10%		0,21		
H2: Where immigrant integration is high, welfare state generosity will be high				Source
MIPEX 2007		Access to family benefits:		MIPEX website (2014) ⁷
<60		0,11		
>= 60		0		
H3: Countries with high level of multiculturalism policies will have high level of generosity				Source
MPI (2000)		Access to family benefits:		MPI website (2000) ⁸
<=2		0,14		
>2		0,13		

Source: compiled by the author.

⁷ <http://www.mipex.eu/download>

⁸ http://www.queensu.ca/mcp/immigrant/table/Immigrant_Minorities_Table1.pdf