Lethal Repression of Peaceful Protest in Africa. Why Do (non-) Accountable and Military Regimes Shoot

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Abstract

Repression and protest are interdependent, autoregressive phenomena that depend on a wide range of third variables. Being aware of the complexity of the subject matter, this study uses a subtle research design, focusing on the onset of lethal repression of peaceful protesters in Africa. The author seeks to depict why governments start to kill protesters. Therefore, countries that have a record of state terror, i.e. routinely murder and torture their citizens, are excluded from the analysis. An actor-centered framework predicts repression of peaceful protest events at a certain point in time, using multivariate logistic regression of discrete event data. This estimation technique allows to control for standard errors that are correlated over time. It grasps the correct sequencing of repression and protest, easing the chicken-and-egg dilemma (endogeneity). Most importantly, it accounts for repression of previous protest events in *t-1* that has an influence on repression in *t*. Two findings stick out. Regimes that equip military officials with prominent positions in the government are prone to initiate lethal repression (Hypothesis 2). Secondly, vertical accountability (akin to democratic responsiveness), lowers the likelihood of repression. "The people" can hold their leaders accountable via elections or via more indirect means, such as the free articulation of interests and the political competition of ideas. Surprisingly, only well-developed mass participation and representation of diverse interests in the political sphere lower the likelihood of repression (Hypothesis 5). Neither elections nor institutionalized veto players (vertical accountability) seem to have a consistent impact on repression.

246 words

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I   Introduction

No one expected hundreds of thousands of citizens taking to the streets against authoritarian regimes during the Arab Spring. The Middle East and North Africa were characterized by little social mobilization. Furthermore, many states maintained a strong security apparatus (oil rents) and possessed international support (Bellin 2012, 129). It was not surprising that many authoritarian regimes were willing to use lethal repression against protesters. In Tunisia the police shot on protesters, Mubarak's regime in Egypt killed close to 1,000, Gaddafi's security forces killed protesters in Benghazi, as did the regimes in Yemen, Syria and Bahrain.[1]

Extraordinary may be the fact that bullets were not able to stop protesters in many countries, as "hope and euphoria outweighed rational calculation of risk, cost, and benefit" (Bellin 2012, 141). In some cases, repression and the taking up of arms of opposition groups led to full-scale civil wars, e.g. in Libya and Syria. The relationship between repression and non-violent or violent protest can be manifold, as the unfolding events in the Arab Spring/autumn show. Violent repression may quell the opposition and lead to less protest. It could also trigger a radicalization of opposition groups and increase the level of protest. Certainly, the level of peaceful and or violent protest influences the degree of state repression, and vice versa.

I start to analyze how African states meet protest. The Social Conflict in Africa Database (SCAD) provides daily data on 9,354 distinct social conflict events in 48 African states from 1990 to 2012 (Hendrix and Salehyan 2012). Seven thousand events were not repressed, while 1,630 were met with non-lethal and 717 events with lethal repression. Out of 4,494 peaceful protest events (organized demonstration, spontaneous demonstration, general strike, limited strike), 3,261 were met with no, 938 with non-lethal and 295 with lethal repression. A T-test reveals that the average number of deaths is significantly higher for social conflict events that observe lethal repression than for those that do not (24 versus nine).

This study seeks to reveal the underpinnings of a government's decision to kill peaceful protesters. Analyzing the onset of lethal repression is highly relevant, as it often radicalizes factions and initiates a spiral of violence. The specification of the explanandum is also a way to circumvent the complex feedback cycles between repression and dissent, especially at a later

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[1] BBC News. 2013. December 16. Arab uprising: Country by country. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-12482311

stage of repression. Governments also use repression without the presence of a violent threat, as the SCAD statistics above indicate.

The literature review will be followed by a theoretical part focusing on the actors of repression. At first, I examine the extent to which a government is restricted by other political institutions (horizontal accountability) and by its people (vertical accountability). Secondly, the role played by formal and informal security forces is scrutinized. Five hypotheses are deducted that predict the likelihood of the use of lethal repression against peaceful protesters. The methods section introduces multivariate logistic regression and justifies its usage for discrete event data analysis. In the operationalization part, the dependent variable *lethalrepress* will be defined and different indicators for the empirical examination of the five hypotheses introduced, drawing on a wide range of data sources. The findings in the last section suggest that military officials should be excluded from influential positions in the government, as this is found to increase the likelihood of lethal repression against peaceful protesters, ceteris paribus. Furthermore, regimes that allow the free articulation of alternative political ideas make repression less likely. Strikingly, majoritarian political systems with winner-takes-it-all elections are more likely to use lethal repression than other political systems that rely on proportional representation. Plurality vote in Africa seems to induce a marginalization of oppositional groups, up to the lethal repression of peaceful protesters.

II   Lethal Repression of Peaceful Protest in Africa

II.1   Research Question

Davenport (2007b, 35) argues that repression can be perceived as "a mechanism of force wielded by the government [..] that restricts the freedom and/or inflicts bodily pain/injury on citizens up to and including the destruction of human life itself (Wrong 1988, 24)". It is an integral part of statehood, in order for a government to exert control over a people inside a territory. As the legitimation, reasons, aims, context and attainments of repressive events vary, only a procedural definition can serve as a common denominator for a wide field (p.37). This definition also directly links to two different strands in repression studies. One camp focuses on the restriction of civil liberties and the other on the violation of personal/physical integrity rights (Davenport 2007c, 487).

In this study, I am concerned with governmental repression as "the violation of the human right to physical integrity" (Carey 2009, 14). Revoking the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) (1966; into force 1976), violations of physical integrity rights at the very minimum include extrajudicial killing (Article 6), torture or similarly cruel treatment (Article 7), and arbitrary imprisonment (Article 9, 11). Article 6, 7 and 11 are non-derogatory under the provisions of Article 4.2 of the ICCPR. This study tries to explain the murder of peaceful protesters understood in terms of Article 6 ICCPR and prohibited by it.

Earl's (2003) understanding of the repression of social movements is very applicable. The author lays out a repression typology that includes three dimensions, distinguishing between repressive agents, character of repression and the intended observability of repression. I will restrict my analysis to open forms of repression (leaving covert action by intelligence agencies etc. aside) carried out by state agents (tightly or loosely connected to national power elite) using coercion (not channeling). More specifically, I will focus on overt lethal repression of public protest.

A very prominent measure assessing the respect for physical integrity rights around the globe is the Political Terror Scale (PTS) (Gibney et al. 2013). It focuses on the infringements of rights authored by the state. The PTS provides a categorical score *pts* ranging from 1 to 5, 1 standing for very low and 5 standing for very high repression. African states are frequently amongst the states with the worst human rights records. From 1990 to 1999, Sudan, Liberia, Rwanda and Burundi were in the top 11 most repressive states. From 2000 to 2009, Sudan, DR Congo, Burundi and Somalia were in the top 12. Lately, Sudan, DR Congo, Central African Republic, Somalia and Nigeria were in the top 11 most repressive states from 2010 to 2012, each having a mean *pts* of 4.3 per year or more. The average African state showed a mean *pts* of 2.92 per year from 1990 to 2012, which is significantly higher than the mean *pts* of 2.33 in the rest of the world. A *pts* of almost 3 in Africa stands for a considerable degree of repression, including executions, political murders, extensive political imprisonment and unlimited detention (Wood and Gibney 2010, 373).

The overall level of repression is related to various factors (Carey, Gibney, and Poe 2010). Poor countries show high *pts* values. So do countries with a high population. Regime type has an important impact, in that full democracies observe a lower level of repression than fully-fledged autocracies, but in-between-type regimes show the worst values. Also, previous repression

impacts the current level of the *pts* and, obviously, the level of state terror is directly related to the degree of violent dissent. Africa is very prone to a high level of repression because its countries show unfavorable values across many of those indicators. These initial considerations demonstrate that repression is a complex study object. The choice of my research design speaks to that.

Pts will only be used as an independent variable in this study. One of the index's major weaknesses is the lack of disaggregation into different types of state repression. Also, country year observations hide subregional patterns and dynamics over time (Carey, Gibney, and Poe 2010). Many violent events trigger quick responses on a regional base. Only accurate event data allows to grasp the dynamics of repression and protest. Focusing on the onset of repression is one way to minimize the impact of previous repression. I also exclude highly institutionalized repressive regimes. The number of actual repressive events, i.e. violations of physical integrity rights, observed in such states might be relatively low. That in itself is not an indicator for peaceful state-society relations. The government's repression might simply be very effective or the protesters very cautious as result of previous repression and widespread fear. Focusing on peaceful protest, I also exclude repression that is merely an answer to violence of non-state groups.

With a subtle research design, I manage to circumvent many caveats to the formulation of a cogent argument. Despite the narrowly tailored research question, new insight can be expected, especially with the introduction of Carey et al.'s (2013) pro-government militias dataset into a multivariate logistic time series predicting repressive events in Africa. This study finds an answer to the following question:

Excluding governments that are highly repressive (pts ≤ 3), how do horizontal and vertical constraints influence the likelihood of lethal repression against peaceful protesters?

II.2   State of the Art: Dissemination of Dissent, Repression and Democracy

Davenport (2007b, 39pp.) points out two of the most stable findings in the repression literature, namely that "dissent provokes" repression and that "repression persists" (Carey, Gibney, and Poe 2010, chap. 5; Carey 2009, chap. 2; Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999).

Dissent predicts repression and repression predicts dissent. "Political dissent" stands for anything from peaceful demonstrations to civil war (Davenport 2007b, 39). But the relationship between (non-)violent dissent and repression is complex (Carey 2006; Pierskalla 2010; Ritter 2014). Francisco (1996, 1181–1182) describes the causal chain in terms of feedback loops that follow no systematic trend, an inverted-U trend (repression depresses protest and protest triggers repression), are adaptive (protesters adopt and elude repression) or backlash (repression triggers protest). The backlash hypothesis suggests that repression leads to the radicalization of protesters. In a comparative study, della Porta (2014) links escalating policing to a rise of clandestine political violence, e.g. in the Basque Country in the 1970s. Repression pushes protesters in the underground and makes them use other means to make their concerns heard. Hard repression closes opportunities for moderates, which will probably show solidarity to more radical factions. Also, violence creates emotional fix points. Pictures of outrageous police violence will be remembered for a long time. Trust in the state shrinks as it is perceived as utterly unfair. Violence builds on some sorts of grievances, but once it is initiated it also "acquires a logic of its own, producing the very same polarization that then fuels it" (Della Porta 2014, 167). A radicalization of both sides might result. Carey (2006) agrees that hostile actions by one actor are usually not answered with accommodation by the other, instead finding support for a tit-for-tat logic in her study of nine states in Latin America and Africa from 1974 to 1992. Similarly, Francisco (1996) finds tentative support for backlash in the cases of Germany and Northern Ireland. However, both studies concede that the relationship between repression and protest is complex and may vary across different contexts.

Pierskalla (2010) drafts a game theoretical model that makes clear that protest and repression cannot be modeled by a simple "one-shot" game. In a repeated game, the moves of the government (repress/accommodate) and the opposition (escalate/acquiescence) at each decision knot not only depend on potential costs and benefits, but also on the availability of information and the influence of third parties, e.g. the military. In short, it is not easy to decipher if repression triggers violent dissent, if it is the other way around, if both are only parallel trends or the expression of a third factor. Scholars do not agree on how repression and protest are interrelated (Carey 2006, 1; Pierskalla 2010). As the causal chain is not unidirectional, endogeneity problems arise. Therefore, the dependent and independent variables need to be operationalized carefully. In

addition, the inclusion of a time dimension is necessary in order to depict the correct sequencing between trigger and response of an action.

There is broad agreement that repression tends to persist (Davenport 2007b, pp.39). Repression at a certain point in time is not only an answer to a perceived threat but also autoregressive, i.e. the scope and severity of past repression influences future repression (Carey 2006; Conrad and De Meritt 2013; Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999). Widespread lethal repression is often not the government's initial intend, but rather a "Plan C". "Some of the planners radicalize further" (Mann 2005, 7), when former repression tactics do not yield the expected results or merely as an escalation spiral goes on. The repetitive use of repression makes this policy option less insecure and costly (Davenport 2007b, pp.39). Policy inertia sets in, as leaders get used to apply repression. Carey et al. (2010, 144) show that *pts* scores highly correlate from one year to the other. For all *pts* levels, the majority (min. 55%) of the countries scoring a particular *pts* value in one year also show the same value in the next year. Once the first shot has fallen in a country in *t-1* (*pts*=3) it is likely (almost 75% of the cases) that *pts* remains at 3 or higher in *t*.

In fact, not only repression is autoregressive (Carey 2006, 4). Protest in *t-1* predicts protest at *t*, as well. Once a threshold of a certain number of participants is crossed, the mobilization of further protesters becomes less costly. Bandwagon effects set in. This does not mean that repression and dissent escalate ad infinitum. "Repression and dissent are increasingly costly as they increase in severity[..]" (Ritter 2014, 149). The autoregressive nature of both repression and protest, as well as feedback loops between the two, make it difficult to elucidate the reasons behind repression at an advanced stage.

"Democracy pacifies" (Davenport 2007b, 40pp.). The third most agreed-upon variable explaining repression, besides dissent and former repression, is regime type. Often highlighted is the pacific role played by democracies (Carey 2006, 2009; Conrad and De Meritt 2013; Davenport 2007b; Poe 2004; Rummel 1995). In "State Repression and the Domestic Democratic Peace", Davenport (2007b) presents a state-of-the-art overview of the relationship between regime type and different forms of repression in 137 countries from 1976 to 1996. Democracies repress less and show more respect for human rights than non-democracies. Accountability of political leaders, towards the people and towards other veto players inside the political system (checks and balances), is the single most important factor (p.50; chap. 4). It limits political power and punishes misuse. The

benign impact of democratic rule (especially electoral participation and political competition) is even greater on personal integrity rights than on civil liberties.

To be sure, findings vary for different types of repression and many positive effects only set in at a very high level of democracy (Bueno De Mesquita et al. 2005; Davenport 2007b). Bueno De Mesquita et al. (2005) entwine different stages of democratic development and include aggregated as well as disaggregated measures of democracy. The effects of democracy and its subcomponents vary from one stage to the other. In the process of democratization, multiparty competition is the single most important factor for the respect for human rights. At a high stage of democracy, (horizontal) accountability becomes crucial. Big changes in favor of the respect for integrity rights are only possible if "executives are constrained and party competition is entrenched" (2005, 450).

Poe et al. (1999, 309) underline that democracy has a significant negative impact on the violation of physical integrity rights but also acknowledge that the substantive effect is relatively small. The latter finding may be explained by a non-linear relationship between democracy and repression. Democratization processes often come along with repression (Davenport 2007a, 11). This observation makes Fein (1995) formulate the "More Murder in the Middle" (MMM) hypothesis. Democratization might involve class and group conflict, with challenged elites resorting to repression (p.173). The author finds that a relatively high percentage of semi-democracies were under the worst human rights violators in 1987. Pierskalla (2009, 135) speculates that semi-democracies and transitional regimes suffer a "higher uncertainty about the rules of the game, behavioral norms, and the capabilities of actors." Not fully institutionalized regimes might perceive repression as a viable strategy to counter mass population movements. These findings are also mirrored in the study of civil wars. Both democratic and autocratic regime changes are violence-prone, "but particularly dangerous are transitions to intermediate regime types" (Hegre et al. 2001). Important to note, Davenport (2007) suggests that the negative influence of democracy on repression does not always hold. If a political conflict is ongoing, democracies pacify less. Vertical accountability, towards the people, remains significant but has a weaker impact. Horizontal accountability ceases to be an important factor (chap. 5). When faced with dissent, democracies also use repression (Carey 2006). According to Rummel (1995, 24), they partly lose their democratic character in war times, particularly due to increased competencies and power for the military. Civil and interstate war are incorporated as control

variables in most multivariate repression models (Bueno De Mesquita et al. 2005; Carey 2009; Conrad and De Meritt 2013; Davenport 2007b; Hibbs 1973; Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999). Coups, as a clear indicator of political instability, also increase the probability of repression (Hibbs 1973).

II.3   Importance of the Research Question

Besides the fact that it is methodologically easier to grasp the onset, the first shooting of protesters is a turning point. Repression tends to persist. Having used lethal repression once, a government is also likely to kill people in the future. Lethal repression of single protest events often radicalize factions and lays the ground for further violence to come. This study focuses on the actors of repression, particularly on the accountability dimension of governance and the role of coercive agents such as the military and pro-government militias. State-sponsored murder of peaceful protesters is a heinous combination that is worth to be reexamined in the light of protest events in many parts of the world. The decision to shoot (e.g. in Ukraine 2014) or not to shoot (e.g. German Revolution 1989) shapes the path of history.

The literature review above clarifies that the empirical findings concerning the "domestic democratic peace" are not straightforward. Democracy must be disaggregated in order to understand how it or its subcomponents influence the onset of repression (Bueno De Mesquita et al. 2005; Davenport 2007a). Repression literature can hardly be useful for practitioners when it only relates, "how system type (broadly conceived) influences repressive behavior (also broadly conceived)" (Davenport 2007a, 13). This study will break with this tradition, tracing the key causal mechanisms that restrain coercive agents, rather than relying on prominent composite indices. Following Earl's (2003) typology, not only the government and its security apparatus but also state agents connected to political power qualify as actors of repression. The latter include pro-government militias (Carey, Mitchell, and Lowe 2013).

Repression literature is divided between studies focusing on onset and others focusing on the severity of repression. The latter often use *pts* as a dependent variable (Bueno De Mesquita et al. 2005; Conrad and De Meritt 2013; Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999). The decision to focus on the onset, leaving severity or the scope of violent state repression aside, is motivated by the

following reasons. Relying on numerical figures for the intensity of repression is problematic. First of all, fatality counts are many times inaccurate. Secondly, once state violence becomes more widespread, it is likely that factions of protesters radicalize and take up arms. Then, it becomes difficult to distinguish those killed by state repression from casualties resulting from violent encounters between protesters and security forces. Thirdly, effective totalitarian repression probably goes hand in hand with a limited number of actual repressive events (Wood and Gibney 2010). Kalyvas' (2008, 407) concept of "territorial control" in civil wars points out that there is no need to use violence in areas under the full control of one conflict actor. The same logic applies here. Only because after a certain moment there are no more clashes, that does not mean that repression is ebbing up. Examining the severity of repression, it would seem perverse if a statistical evaluation were to count a relatively low number of repressive events in North Korea. Focusing on the onset, I am able to avoid all these traps. The next paragraph concentrates on horizontal and vertical accountability, important subcomponents of regime types, and links them to the setup of security forces. I construct a theory of coercive action that looks beyond the democracy-(semi)-democracy-autocracy divide.

III   The Argument: Bring the Military in and Hold Political Elites Accountable

Being reminiscent of the fact that the key element behind the notion of a "domestic democratic peace" is not quite clear (Davenport 2007a, pp.12, 2007b), an in-depth literature review nevertheless allows an educated guess. Executive constraints (horizontal accountability) as well as political competition and participation (vertical accountability) stand out (Bueno De Mesquita et al. 2005; Davenport 2007b).

"Power kills, and absolute power kills absolutely" (Rummel 1995, 25). Between 1900 and 1987, governments have killed almost 170 Mio. of their people in democide, referring to genocide, massacres, extrajudicial executions etc. Rummel (1995) unifies a democratic-authoritarian and a totalitarian regime power scale into a single democratic-authoritarian-totalitarian power dimension. The scholar's main hypothesis stipulates that "the less democratic a regime, the more unchecked and unbalanced power at the center, the more it should commit democide" (p.5). In a multivariate regression analysis, he finds a strong positive impact of the squared political power variable (*TotalPower²*) on domestic democide (p.22). The *TotalPower* measure largely

outperforms other regime type conceptualizations: "That power kills is the primary and, for domestic democide, singular general explanation of democide" (p.5). It becomes evident that the most totalitarian regimes, i.e. centralized power without institutional or democratic constraints, are the ones most likely to kill their people.

Power needs to be controlled for not being misused (Schedler 1999). Accountability is crucial in preventing human rights violations. Generally, "A is accountable to B when A is obliged to inform B about A's (past or future) actions and decisions, to justify them, and to suffer punishment in the case of eventual misconduct". Both horizontal and vertical accountability build on the three dimensions information, justification and punishment (Schedler 1999, 17). Ideally, accountability questions, controls and limits the unlawful or misuse of political power, as it would be the case with the killing of peaceful protesters. The extent to which political power is constrained varies considerably between different regime types, but also within democracies, semi-democracies and autocracies. Political competition and participation are prerequisites for vertical accountability, which implies the presence of a democracy (O'Donnell 1998, 112). Many countries would easily qualify for such a minimal definition of democracy but lack horizontal accountability. An introduction of the concepts of horizontal and vertical accountability is helpful in order to explain both the within- and between-regime-type variation.

Horizontal accountability stands for the control of executive organs from within a set of political institutions and is often referred to as checks and balances or executive constraints. It requires institutions that are authorized, capable and willing "to upholding the rule of law " (O'Donnell 1998, 119). Effective legislatures, courts, or human rights monitoring bodies compel a leader to reconsider the use of lethal repression, obliging the leader to inform and to justify his actions to these institutions. Other "political elites know exactly with whom they are dealing and who is responsible for what type of action" (Davenport 2007b, 60). They might even veto or punish the leader for misconduct.

Hypothesis 1:

The more horizontal constraints, the less likely is the lethal repression of peaceful protest.

Important to note, Davenport (2007b) expresses doubts over the power of veto, problematizing collusion of political elites across different institutions. It can hardly be ruled out, even though one institution would be de jure and practically capable of restraining the other. Collusion makes

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horizontal accountability a paper tiger, especially if it coincides with weak vertical accountability. Generally, uncertainty about the rules of the game makes repression more likely (Pierskalla 2010). This is manifest by the absence of institutional controls.

Not only the extent to which political leaders face constraints varies but also the setup of enforcement agencies and their accountability, both towards the people and other political institutions. There is a clear need to bring the military/police into the regime discussion. An actor-centered approach cannot spare a close look at those agents that implement repression. Ex ante, it is neither clear if a capable state security apparatus stands for more protection or repression (Colaresi and Carey 2008; Hibbs 1973), nor how strength and repression are related. Empirically, security forces often commit human rights abuses. Shaw (2003) points out that in thirteen of fourteen genocides official troops were perpetrators. For Colaresi and Carey (2008), the key intervening variable are institutional constraints. Ceteris paribus, the authors find that a strong state security apparatus makes genocide more likely (n=32 genocides between 1955 and 2003). Yet, the effect is reversed under a constrained government. Then, a strong state security apparatus makes the onset of genocide less likely. Unrestricted leaders cannot credibly commit to bargaining solutions with the oppositions. Therefore, a stronger state security apparatus under unconstrained (horizontally and vertically) political institutions should make lethal repression more likely. It is not possible to examine this hypothesis due to a lack of data on the strength of state security forces for domestic use.[2]

The strength of security forces is not the only way to assess the military's role. Colaresi and Carey's (2008) analysis rests on the simplifying assumption that the government directly controls the military. This is not necessarily the case. Sometimes, the chain of command is reversed and the military is in charge of the executive or it controls a civilian leader from "behind the scenes" (Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999, 296). In a multivariate analysis of 105 countries between 1976 and 1993, the authors find that military regimes have a bad human rights record. Their "direct control

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[2] The National Material Capabilities (Correlates of War Project) only includes the number of soldiers "intended for use against foreign adversaries" (p.8). Similarly, the dataset only examines military expenditure "related to a country's war fighting capacity". The World Development Indicators (The World Bank) present another measure for military expenditure (percentage of GDP), which is based on figures of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). Albeit their definition does not draw a clear line, external military capacity remains the. A dataset on police or paramilitary forces in Africa is not available.

of the instruments of coercion" could account for that (1999, 293). To be sure, the positive effect of military regimes on human rights violations is of a moderate size (cf. also Poe 2004).

Hypothesis 2:

The bigger the say of the military in the executive, the more likely is the use of lethal repression against peaceful protesters.

In yet another scenario, the security apparatus is a relatively independent institution. Distance to the regime could stand for professionalism. Hence, the military would take on an institutionalized veto player position, in turn enhancing accountability. Bellin takes this stance in her examination of state repression in case of the Arab Spring protests. The more independent the military from political pressures and the more professional it is, the less likely will it kill unarmed civilians. Such a behavior would endanger the integrity of the military as an institution, undermining prestige, moral and discipline. On the contrary, the closer the military to the regime, in terms of "blood ties or ethnic ties", and the more it is linked to the survival of the regime, the more likely will soldiers shoot on protesters (Bellin 2012).

Moreover, non-official coercive agents are common in many countries. If security forces are outsourced, formal checks and balances are weakened. Carey et al. (2013) count 332 pro-government militias in 88 different countries between 1981 and 2007 (at least one year occurrence). In fact, 213 informal and 114 semi-official pro-government militias frequently target civilians. The database includes 128 pro-government militias in 24 African countries. With the use of militias as coercive agents, governments can evade accountability mechanisms (Mitchell, Carey, and Butler n.d.). Militias enable a government to use repression opportunistically, without taking over full responsibility or bearing the reputational costs, neither in the next elections nor internationally (p.9). Most pro-government militias are poorly trained and hardly monitored. Also, the government's coercive agents tend to become self-employed, bolstering private financial or ideological matters. Mitchell et al. (n.d.) find that the presence of informal pro-government militias significantly increases the violations physical integrity rights in a given country year, whilst controlling for armed conflict, democracy, economic development, population size and lagged repression. Yet, the impact of semi-official militias is not significant. To my best knowledge, Mitchell et al. (n.d.) is the only quantitative study that relates the presence pro-government militias to the violation of physical integrity rights.

Hypothesis 3:

The presence of pro-government militias makes lethal repression of peaceful protest more likely.

Pro-government militias are common in Africa and enable governments to use lethal repression whilst minimizing the public outcry. Unlike professional armies, informal armed groups most likely lack a code of ethics that might prohibit them from killing civilians (Mitchell, Carey, and Butler n.d., 8). Due to their clandestine nature, militias are neither responsive to other political institutions nor to the people. This subverts horizontal and vertical accountability and all the three major elements information, justification and punishment.

Vertical accountability refers to the control of a government by the people. It is akin to the concept of democratic responsiveness (Powell 2004). "Political competition and participation are crucial conditions for vertical accountability" (Diamond and Morlino 2004, 25). Independent from regime type, leaders always want to remain in office (Bueno De Mesquita et al. 2003; Davenport 2007b). Political power brings certain benefits to the incumbent leader, such as an important say over policies, private gain, and "the honor attached to the office" (Manin, Przeworski, and Stokes 1999, 31). In highly accountable political systems, leaders have to inform the public, justify controversial decisions and may be punished for unpopular policies. It is reasonable to assume that citizens prefer not to be repressed and would pressure their government to refrain from doing so.

There are different means for the people to hold their leaders accountable. The most obvious control mechanism are competitive elections (Bueno De Mesquita et al. 2005; Davenport 2007b; Manin, Przeworski, and Stokes 1999). To begin with, citizens are unlikely to elect a leader with a repressive agenda. Of course, it is possible that a leader steps over the political mandate and uses repression against (parts of) the population, e.g. because the government feels threatened by an unforeseeable incident. Then, voters would probably punish the government in the next elections and vote for someone else, both in abjection of repressive policies and for exceeding the mandate. Manin et al. (1999, fig. 44) counter that voters might evaluate parties more at the hand of their future agenda than for their past behavior. Another problematic case would occur if an incumbent leader were not to seek reelection, e.g. because of limited terms. Then, the "victorious candidates will not act in the representative manner" (p.34). However, the following sentence should be generally true.

Hypothesis 4:

The more free, fair, regular and competitive elections, the less likely is the use of lethal repression against peaceful protesters.

Another accountability mechanism is political representation. Politicians usually represent constituents. The more diverse the interests represented in the political system, the more difficult would it be to exclude constituents from those that suffer repression. On the contrary, the more particular the interests represented by politicians, the less likely is it that the political leaders would victimize their own constituents (Davenport 2007b, 52/53). Hence, a more representative political system (e.g. proportional representation) should be less repressive than a system that only serves certain interest groups.

Hypothesis 5:

The more accountable towards the people, i.e. the more developed mass participation and representation of diverse interest (Davenport 2007b, 53; Hibbs 1973), the less likely does a government use lethal repression.

Davenport (2007b, chap. 4) concludes that vertical accountability ("*Voice*") is the most important factor in reducing the violations of physical integrity rights, outperforming horizontal accountability ("*Veto*"). However, Manin et al. (1999, 46) formulate certain caveats for the functioning of vertical accountability. Due to the complex nature of many representative systems, most voters lack the necessary insight to evaluate a government's performance. Coalition governments, differing majorities in executive and legislature, amongst others, make an evaluation of public policies difficult. A majoritarian system with one strong political figure, on the other hand, makes it easier to hold someone accountable. I notice that democratic elections alone are not a sufficient warranty for accountability.

Accountability mechanisms between government and people are complex and have multiple facets. In "Constrained by the Bank and the Ballot", Conrad and De Meritt (2013, chap. 106) observe that a leader's decision to repress "is a function of the extent to which he is dependent on his citizenry to stay in power". Governments are not only elected but also financed by their people. Via the payment of taxes, citizens exert an indirect influence. Taxes will only flow in a smooth manner if a leader does not infringe the citizen's human rights. Not paying taxes as an

answer to the leader's misconduct stands for the punishment element of vertical accountability. The authors find that a high level of non-taxed base income, especially fuel rents, is related to high level of repression. Meanwhile, democracy mitigates the repressive reverberations of the resource course. Other important variables for the link between voter and government are the strive for political survival (Bueno De Mesquita et al. 2003; Carey 2006; Ritter 2014), the role of international "name and shame" and the media.

IV.   Research Design and Measurement

Consequently, I will conduct a multivariate logistic regression of discrete event data, seeking empirical support for the claims made in the previous section. I construct a dataset relying on several highly recognized sources, namely the Social Conflict in Africa Database (SCAD), Political Terror Scale (PTS), Database of Political Institutions (DPI), Polity IV Project (Polity IV), Pro-Government Militias Database (PGMD) and the World Development Indicators (The World Bank).

IV.1   Logistic Regression of Discrete Event Data

The model of choice addresses the binary nature of the dependent variable *lethalrepress*, i.e. lethal repression of peaceful protest excluding highly repressive regime (*pts* $\leq$ 3). In order to introduce a time-dimension into regular logistic regression analysis, I rely on a program written by Tucker (1999) that can be integrated into STATA 12. Beck et al. (1998) explain the rationale behind it and Carey et al. (2013) underline its utility for logistic regression models, applying it in a study predicting the incidence of civil war.

A logistic model predicts the probability that the dependent variable assumes the value 1 ($\hat{p}(Y_i = 1)$). It uses a cumulative logit distribution $\wedge$ to link a linear equation to the probability that $Y_i = 1$. This can be expressed as $P_i = P(Y_i = 1) = \alpha + \beta_1 x_{1i} + \beta_2 x_{2i} + \beta_3 x_{3i} + \ldots + u_i$

, whereas P_i is the probability for a specific i=1,..,N, $\alpha \in$ N is the baseline, $\beta_1, \beta_2, \beta_3 \in$ N are regression coefficients of the independent variables x_1, x_2, x_3 and u_i is a randomly distributed error term.

A logistic model does not assume a linear relationship between independent variables and the dependent variable. Instead, the link function resembles the form of an S-Curve (rotated 90 degrees clockwise). It follows that the marginal effect for x_i on y varies for different values of x. The dependent variable is expressed in the log (odds) units. Holding all other predictors constant, a regression coefficient β indicates the impact of a one unit change in x on a log (odds) change in Y. Working with log (odds) appears cumbersome at first but they can easily be transformed into odd ratios or predicted probabilities. Mc Fadden's R^2 stands for the percentage of cases the regression model correctly predicts to be either 0 or 1. The higher it is, the better is the model specification.

I am aware of the fact that the use of a logistic regression for event data, i.e. time-series analysis, raises certain questions. Generally, residuals are correlated over time, i.e. the variance of an independent variable in *t-1* predicts the variance of the independent variable in *t* and in the following years. Time trends may accidentally overlap and lead to spurious results. Therefore, it is of chief importance to address the autocorrelation of error terms over time. Neglecting this would not only violate the underlying assumption of the regression model but also lead to biased standard errors (usually smaller). This would inflate t-/z-values and erroneously indicate significant results.

Beck et al. (1998) argue that it is possible to control for dependence over time within logistic models. According to the authors, cross-sectional time series data with a dummy dependent variable (discrete) are similar to grouped continuous duration data. Therefore, the concept of baseline hazard ratios can be borrowed from pure event data analysis, e.g. Cox regression. "These baseline hazards give the probability of failure in each time interval when all the independent variables are zero" (p.1270). In order to grasp correlations over time, "temporal dummies" count the number of periods until the failure event. Natural cubic *splines*, which will be used here, are nothing but a smooth function for the jagged distribution of temporal dummies/baseline hazards (cf. Carey, Mitchell, and Lowe 2013, pp.255). In order to grasp the effect of previous on current repression, I include a count variable *nonrepress*, again relying on the *btscs* command written by Tucker (1999). It counts the number of protest events that have not been repressed until the failure event, i.e. lethal repression, sets in. It always starts to count anew after every incidence of

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lethal repression. In order to account for country specific effects, I use robust standard errors clustered on countries. In addition, several regression diagnostics are conducted.[3]

IV.2 Dependent variable

The output of the regression shall describe a government's inherent propensity to violent repression, and not be merely a function of an imminent threat or attack on its power. To avoid the latter, disaggregated event data are necessary. The SCAD provides data on 9,354 distinct social conflict events in 48 African states from 1990 to 2012 (Hendrix and Salehyan 2012), including all incidents of social/political violence except from those related to civil war (Salehyan and Hendrix 2012). Providing daily event data, it is the best regional dataset of its kind. It has been compiled using Associated Press and Agence France Press newswires via LexisNexis online news service. Nine different sorts of events are included, under them different types of demonstrations, riots and strikes. I use the categorical variable repress (0 for no repression, 1 for non-lethal repression (tear gas, arrests etc.) and 2 for lethal repression) to construct a dummy variable *lethalrepress* [0;1], whereby 1 stands for lethal repression. The SCAD also reports the number of deaths per protest event but this only plays a secondary role, here. Furthermore, it is possible to compute a dummy variable *govtarget* that shows if either the central, the regional government, or both, were a target of the protest (0 no target; 1 target). 1,135 organized demonstrations, 2,094 spontaneous demonstrations, 149 general strikes and 1,116 limited strikes sum up to 4,494 events of peaceful protest. Of those, 3,261 were met with no, 938 with non-lethal repression and in 295 incidents peaceful protesters were killed by the government.

Focusing on the decision to initiate lethal repression or not, I exclude governments with a bad human rights record as this stands for repression campaigns that have already been initiated in the past. The PTS provides a good measure for governmental repression (Gibney et al. 2013). State terror stands for "violations of physical or personal integrity rights carried out by a state (or its agents)" (Wood and Gibney 2010, 369). This definition encompasses the actions of pro-government paramilitary organizations or militias (p.388).[4] The PTS includes data on 129 countries from 1976 to 2012 and ranges from 1 to 5. In order to be able to focus on the onset of repression, I restrict my analysis to protest events in a country year with a *pts* $\leq$ 3. A *pts* of 4

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[3] Every model presented was tested for model specification, multicollinearity and heteroskedasticity. Also, the percentage of correctly classified cases was examined.
[4] The PTS does not include violations of a physical integrity right that follow a due process, e.g. capital punishment.

would already stand for "murders, disappearances, and torture are part of life", although only targeting parts of the population. At a *pts* of 5 those methods are expanded and target the population as a whole (p.373).

The *pts* used here relies on US Department of State (DOS) Country Reports on Human Rights Practices.[5] PTS experts examine the human rights violations reported in these country reports regarding to scope (type of violence), intensity (frequency) and range (portion of population targeted). Important to note, the PTS rather measures actual violations of physical integrity violations authored by the state than the general human rights situation.[6] An alternative measure would be the CIRI Human Rights Dataset, which is available for 195 countries from 1981 to 2011 (Cingranelli and Richards 2010). CIRI scores for physical integrity rights build upon the same country reports as the PTS. Consequently, CIRI and *pts* scores are highly correlated. However, CIRI disaggregates for fifteen different types of human rights practices and only later extrapolates a final eight point score. For Wood and Gibney (2010), CIRI pretends to show exact figures on each indicator that cannot be derived from the annual reports. Also problematic is the accumulation of these specific scores to the build-up the overall country score. A further comparative advantage of the PTS is that the distribution of *pts* scores closely resembles a normal distribution while the distribution of CIRI scores is skewed (Wood and Gibney 2010).[7]

IV.3   Independent Variables

Several indicators for accountability are drawn from Polity IV and DPI. Both understand and conceptualize key concepts very differently, although at times variables seem complementary.

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[5] There are three different *pts* scores. One is relying on Amnesty International (AI) Annual Reports, one on DOS and a third *pts* score represents a combination of DOS/AI (Carey, Gibney, and Poe 2010, ch.4). I rely on the DOS reports whenever it is available. They have been described as more systematic. For the African countries in my dataset, AI reports are missing in 280 cases while DOS reports are only missing in eight case. For those eight missing observations, I rely on AI.
[6] Cingranelli and Richards (2010, 412) doubt that the PTS is able to distinguish human rights violations by governments from general human rights conditions. The statement builds on the fact that the PTS provides very bad scores for collapsed warfare states without a functioning central government, e.g. Somalia from 1996 to 2008.
[7] The PTS coders are asked to code countries in relation to one another. Scope, intensity and range of state-authored human rights violations for two countries A, B with the same *pts* value should be comparable, and be different from the human rights record of countries with a better/worse *pts* (Wood and Gibney 2010, 373pp.). In fact, Cingranelli and Richards (2010) acknowledge that "CIRI rates countries to an absolute standard of behavior and does not rank them relative to one another" (p.408). On the positive side, there are exact scores for open regimes that allow the free flow of information. On the negative side, it is not possibly to compare these countries with others that undoubtedly have a far worse human rights record but for whom information scarce.

Therefore, I will not put both in the same model. The POLITY IV variables are capitalized to distinguish them from dpi measures. Values of dummy variables [0;1] that affirm the variable label will be given a 1.

In order to evaluate the first hypothesis on horizontal accountability, I rely on a variable *XCONST* taken from the Polity IV Project (Marshall, Gurr, and Jaggers 2014, pp.24). It refers to institutionalized constraints of decision makers by accountability groups, whereas accountability groups are not strictly defined but typically refer to legislature, judiciary, powerful advisors etc. *XCONST* ranges from 1 to 7, whereby 1 stands for unrestricted power of the executive, 3 for limited constraints, 5 for substantial constraints and 7 for "executive parity or subordination" to accountability groups. *POLITY2* is used as a control variable for regime type. It varies from -10 to +10, whereas -10 stands for a strong autocracy and +10 for a strong democracy. Both variables are widely used (e.g. Bueno De Mesquita et al. 2005; Colaresi and Carey 2008; Davenport 2007b, chap. 4).

One way to assess the military's role in repression in Africa is to focus on its proximity to political power and the decision making process. Hypothesis 2 states that the bigger the military's influence on politics, the likelier is repression. The DPI provides two straightforward dummies *military* ("Is Chief Executive a military officer?") and *defmin* ("Is defense minister a military officer?") that can be readily incorporated into my model (T. Beck et al. 2001; Keefer 2012).

Hypothesis 3 will be evaluated with the help of the PGMD (Carey, Mitchell, and Lowe 2013), introduced above. A pro-government militia is an armed organized group that is not part of the regular security forces but sponsored by or with close ties to the government (p.250). A dummy *militias* shall describe the presence of semi-official and or informal pro-government militias. Semi-official militias, e.g. Gaddafi's Revolutionary Committees in Libya, have closer links to the government than informal militias, e.g. Sierra Leone's RUF. I will not further consider this distinction as it is often based on a fine line. Pro-government militias, almost by definition unaccountable coercive actors, should enhance the likelihood of lethal repression.

Elections are key to vertical accountability (Hypothesis 4). The DPI includes month and year of legislative and executive elections (Keefer and Stasavage 2003). I create a dummy variable *emonth* (*eyear*) that indicates months (years) that observe repression and either legislative or executive elections. In addition, the binary variable *fraud* [0;1] takes on the value 1 in case of

vote fraud or the intimidation of oppositional candidates in the most recent election. I also consider the indices of electoral competitiveness *leg_comp* (legislative elections) and *ex_comp* (executive elections). Both share the same scale and vary from 1 standing for no legislature/no (undisputed) executive, over 2 for unelected legislature/executive, up to 7 for fully competitive elections. Hypothesis 4 stipulates that the more fair and competitive elections, the less likely is repression. Furthermore, I expect that protest taking place during election time is not prone to lethal repression. Even leaders in weakly responsive systems were to be questioned over the incidence on election day.

Another aspect of vertical accountability is political representation (Hypothesis 5). The DPI's *system* variable takes on the values 0 for a presidential system, 1 for an assembly-elected president and 2 for a parliamentary system. In polities that both have a prime minister and a president, the power of the main figure is decisive to classify *system*. A regime in which the strong figure can either veto legislation or has the competency to both appoint ministers and to dissolve the parliament is a presidential system. Parliamentary systems are expected to represent more diverse interest and to be less confrontational than presidential systems. Electoral rules are another influential indicator for the diversity of political representation. *Pr* stands for proportional representation and is expected to induce a more diverse representation than *plurality*, i.e. winner-takes-it-all majoritarian elections.

Checks_acc is a composite measure including dimensions of both horizontal and vertical accountability (Keefer 2012). It builds on the indices of electoral competitiveness *leg_comp* and *ex_comp* (above). If a country takes on the values 4 or worse for *leg_comp* or *ex_comp* , i.e. at best the choice between different candidates from the same party, *checks_acc* takes on the value 1. Yet, the variable can be incremented by several points if there is political competition and government and opposition depend on each other to some extent. If the opposition is not a veto player, *checks_acc* [1;6] remains at its initial value 1.

Polity IV provides alternative measures for vertical accountability. *XRCOMP* stands for "Competitiveness of Executive Recruitment", or for fair chances to gain power. The variable takes on three values, 1 for the selection of the political leadership by elites or by birth, 2 for mixed regimes where some power-holders are elected or transitional phases and 3 for competitive elections. *PARCOMP* [0;5] indicates competitiveness of participation, whereby 0 stands for not

applicable (unregulated), 1 for repressed, and 5 for competitive. High values of *PARCOMP* stand for regimes in which alternatives policy preferences to the status quo can be freely articulated, where a political opposition is permitted and political change in form of a peaceful power transfer is possible. The more competitive participation, the more diverse the voices raised in the political sphere, the higher is vertical accountability (Hypothesis 5).

WDI is an important source for the control variables *ln_gdp_pc* (GDP per capita in current US$), *pop_dense* (population density; people per sq. km of land area) and oil rents. *Govtarget*, *duration* (duration of protest event in days) and *npart* (number of participants) are control variables that are key characteristics of each single protest event. Lastly, I created a dummy for the presence of *civil war* (Salehyan and Hendrix 2012, pp.6).[8]

V   Findings

The findings are summarized in Table 1. I run various models to support my claims. I begin the empirical examination with an "empty" Model 0. First of all, it is composed of variables that describe key characteristics of protest events. Having in mind the autoregressive nature of repression, it is indispensable to include the count variable of non-repressive protest events *nonrepress*. In addition, it is controlled for the general level of repression via a one-year-lagged *pts* as well as for *civil war* periods. Furthermore, I include control variables for population density and economic development. The empty model already shows a good performance. Mc Fadden's R² stands at 0.15. Most variables are highly significant and the coefficients show in the right direction. A high number of participants, a long duration, and addressing either the regional or national government with the peaceful protest event all make lethal repression more likely. It is also evident that the use of repression in singular protest events depends on the general level of repression and most importantly on the absence of previous protest (*nonrepress*). Ceteris Paribus, each additional protest event that is not repressed lowers the likelihood of lethal repression by 0.37 log (odds). Surprisingly, the likelihood of a protest event to be repressed during the times of civil war is not significantly different from non-civil war times. Regression coefficients of

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[8] Civil war periods are already included in the SCAD, relying on the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflicts Database. The latter count an internal conflict as a civil war if there are at least "25 battle-related deaths per calendar year in one of the conflict's dyads" (http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/definitions/).

Table1

	Model 0	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
govtarget	0.920* (0.015)	0.898* (0.020)	0.975 (0.070)	1.156* (0.016)	1.018* (0.029)	0.762 (0.063)
npart	0.333*** (0.000)	0.348*** (0.000)	0.269* (0.010)	0.411*** (0.000)	0.217* (0.023)	0.380*** (0.000)
duration	0.00995*** (0.000)	0.00960*** (0.000)	0.0157*** (0.000)	0.0107*** (0.000)	0.0111*** (0.001)	0.0107*** (0.000)
ln_gdp_p~t	-0.289** (0.006)	-0.304** (0.008)	-0.508* (0.012)	-0.288* (0.010)	-0.412** (0.002)	-0.318* (0.011)
pop_dens	0.00362* (0.028)	0.00389* (0.020)	0.00548** (0.002)	0.00338 (0.081)	0.00228 (0.357)	0.00259 (0.089)
pts_lag1	0.409*** (0.001)	0.412*** (0.001)	0.391* (0.016)	0.310* (0.036)	0.216 (0.124)	0.549*** (0.000)
civilwar	-0.636 (0.200)	-0.522 (0.320)	-1.388* (0.034)	-0.383 (0.444)	-0.278 (0.615)	-0.734 (0.280)
nonrepress	-0.368** (0.004)	-0.359** (0.005)	-0.296 (0.071)	-0.321* (0.028)	-0.321* (0.043)	-0.306* (0.026)
_spline1	-0.00445 (0.186)	-0.00450 (0.186)	-0.00240 (0.590)	-0.00407 (0.296)	-0.00328 (0.462)	-0.00418 (0.244)
_spline2	0.000963 (0.473)	0.00104 (0.436)	0.000105 (0.954)	0.000928 (0.545)	0.000454 (0.805)	0.00109 (0.435)
_spline3	0.000185 (0.317)	0.000153 (0.388)	0.000297 (0.302)	0.000148 (0.456)	0.000265 (0.346)	0.0000815 (0.639)
military		0.493* (0.032)				
militias			0.0847 (0.786)			
leg_comp				-0.0692 (0.546)		
ex_comp				-0.0920 (0.242)		
fraud				0.472 (0.094)		
PARCOMP					-0.338*** (0.000)	
POLITY2					0.0436 (0.456)	
XCONST					-0.122 (0.595)	
plurality						1.134** (0.007)
system						0.318 (0.135)
_cons	-3.172*** (0.001)	-3.397*** (0.000)	-1.927 (0.190)	-2.953* (0.024)	-0.286 (0.802)	-4.742*** (0.000)
N adj. R-sq	1547	1526	905	1421	1272	1393

p-values in parentheses
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

pop_dens and *ln_gdp_pc* show in the expected direction and are highly significant. A one unit change in *ln_gdp_pc* goes hand in hand with a drop of 0.329 in the log (odds) of *lethalrepress*, holding the effects of the remaining independent variables constant. Governments of richer

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countries are less likely to repress. The impacts of most of the independent variables of the empty model are stable across most of the models.

Stepwise, the following Models 1 to 5 introduce the respective variables for each hypothesized relationship. Model 1 introduces *XCONST* in order to examine Hypothesis 1. The sign of the coefficient shows in the expected direction but is insignificant. Introducing *XCONST* lowers R^2 in comparison with the empty model. The picture does not change with the introduction of *POLITY2*, nor with *POLITY2_squared* (not portrayed); to address the argument that middle-type-regimes are prone to violence. Both variables remain insignificant. Modell 2 relates to the influence of the military's say in politics on lethal repression (Hypothesis 2). A post of the military in the government, no matter if it is the head of the executive or the defense minister, makes lethal repression more likely in that it induces a 0.49 change in the log (odds) of *lethalrepress*, all else given. Both *military* and *defmin* remain significant even when controlling for DPI regime type variables *system*, *finittrm* (finit term of executive) and *checks_acc*. Model 3 analyzes the presence of pro-government militias (Hypothesis 3). *Militias* show a positive coefficient but it is not significant. Important to not, the number of observations shrinks considerably (642 observations less). Data of the PGMD are only available until 2007. Next, the DPI election variables are introduced (Hypothesis 4). Model 4 shows that none of the variables is significant although all coefficients but the one for *eyear* show in the predicted direction. The variable *fraud* is closest to be significant. *Eyear* and *emonth* are not portrayed in Table 1. Model 5 and 6 analyze vertical accountability (Hypothesis 5), whereby Model 5 is based on Polity IV variables and Model 6 on the DPI. Model 5 shows that a one unit change in *PARCOMP* leads to a -0.39 decrease in the log (odss) of *lethalrepress*. *XRCOMP*, on the other hand, stays insignificant. To be sure, Mc Fadden's R^2 of Model 5 stands still at 0.15 and does, thus, not predict more cases correctly than the empty Model 0. Model 6 suggests that *plurality* is a highly significant and very strong predictor of lethal repressions. It induces a 1.14 raise in the log (odds) of *lethalrepress*.

The size of the coefficients and significance levels over all models naturally vary, so do the underlying conceptualizations of the independent variables. Also, the number of observations is not the same due to missing data for many variables. Still, several trends are obvious especially looking at Model 1, Model 4 and Model 5.

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VI   Conclusion

Two of five hypotheses are found empirical support in this study. The military seems to play an important role in repression, as suggested by the finding that regimes with military heads of state or defense ministers are more likely to use lethal repression, ceteris paribus. It seems, thus, to be a fruitful endeavor for future research to scrutinize the relationship between the strength of the military and repression. This was not possible in this study due to a lack of data availability (p.12). Vertical accountability seems to play a crucial role, too. A high degree of vertical accountability reduces the likelihood to observe lethal repression against peaceful protesters. Mass participation and representation of diverse interest stick out as the most important accountability mechanisms (Hypothesis 5). To be sure, the classical accountability mechanism -free, fair and competitive elections (Hypothesis 4)- has no significant impact on repression. The malfunctioning might be related to the poor state of democracy on the African continent and the fact that only a few elections are really democratic. Not supported are the role of militias in repression of peaceful protest (Hypothesis 3) and the benign impact of horizontal accountability (Hypothesis 1). In fact, the overall findings support both Davenport (2007b), who argues that the "*Voice*" is more important than "*Veto*" in order to reduce repression, and Bueno De Mesquita et al. (2005) who find that in the early stages of democratization vertical accountability is the most important factor and only later horizontal constraints play a role.

All in all, the model fits the data. This is evident by the well performance of Model 0. Clearly, it shows why including time variables is important. The idea of an autoregressive nature of repression outlined in the literature review is strongly supported. Logistic regression models for discrete event data proof to be a very fruitful analytical tool in the study of repression.

Lastly, it has to be mentioned that statistics on repression outside a war context alone say little about the human rights situation in Africa. During the observation period 86 civil war episodes in 28 countries with a mean duration of 1491 days were counted by the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflicts Database. Notwithstanding, repression deserves all the attention as it often sows the seeds for further violence to come.

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