Women Voting Patterns and Religio-Cultural Determinism in Pakistan

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ABSTRACT

Women are deliberately kept out of the electoral sphere in Pakistan because of notions of respectability and gendered norms which dictate women stay out of the public domain. This regressive culture is perpetuated by what Gramsci calls ‘organic intellectuals’ such as the religious clergy who mold caricatures of what a woman should and should not do. This academic piece brings together two theoretical frameworks, Critical Junctures by Collier and Collier (1991) and Gramsci’s commonsense argument (1985). This novel framework allows for an in-depth exploration of how critical moments in Pakistan’s history have allowed progressive forces such as the civil society to carve a space for themselves and forward the feminist agenda of including more women in politics, both as politicians and voters. The research contribution of this work is to showcase how culture and religion come together to disenfranchise women and highlight the uphill task of eradicating obstacles that stand in the way of women voters.

Key words: politics, critical junctures, hegemony, gender, voting, electoral rights
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1. INTRODUCTION

Electoral politics globally have a propensity to be marred with inconsistencies, inequalities, and inefficiencies (Khan, 2018). Pakistan is no different and the political sphere in the country is even more intriguing due to the consistent change in the political landscape. In the seventy-four years since Pakistan gained independence, the country has had military dictatorships three times, from 1958 – 1971, 1977 – 1988 and 1999 – 2008 (Khan, 2018). The multiple military trysts, thirty-three years in total, have made policy formulation and implementation in all spheres of life inconsistent. The internecine conflict has hindered the development of governance institutions and impaired movement towards gender-friendly policy implementation, especially in the electoral sphere. Specifically, women voters go unnoticed which results in their limited participation in the electoral sphere, a smear on the country which masquerades as an inclusive and equal democracy.

Pakistan is particularly interesting because of its distinctive breakup of power between the federal and provincial level. The country is divided into five provinces, each of which have autonomy to introduce, accept and reject bills in their region. There is also a federal government which has control over certain legislative issues. All citizens are eligible to vote every five years and elect politicians at both the provincial level and the federal level. As has been the case in the forty-one years of democracy in Pakistan, different political parties with differing ideologies have governed each of the provinces. All parties in Pakistan are colored with religious undertones and the degree of how conservative laws are, and in turn societal norms, fluctuates from province to province. This results in schizophrenic policies at the national and provincial level which impacts women voters disproportionately. Since Pakistan is an Islamic Republic, religion is an inherent part of daily activities and determines the roles that women must conform to; these roles typically exclude them from the political arena.

Excellent literature exists on obstacles women voters face and plausible ways forward, but there are critical research gaps around how and what tools are used to keep women out of election activities. This needs to be rectified by studying how agential factors determine material outcomes as these observations can be used in policy interventions. Therefore, this thesis will investigate how religion and culture work together to disenfranchise women and increase the gender gap between male and female voters. This academic work is divided into five sections. The first section will be a thematic literature review on electoral voting and gendered discrimination within it. The second section will introduce two theoretical frameworks, Critical Junctures (CJ) by Collier and Collier (1991) and the Commonsense narrative by Gramsci (qtd. in Cox, 1987) which will help to understand the deterministic elements of culture and religion in shaping the role of women in the political sphere. The third section of methodology will combine the two theories to create an innovative new framework to understand
dialectic and non-dialectic understandings of society and show how norms and state structures interact for a more nuanced understanding of the electoral sphere. Moreover, this section introduces the research methods which includes archival research and semi-structured interviews to understand the case study which will pave the way to the fourth section of historical background and analysis of Pakistan’s electoral sphere to show how religious and societal notions construct what the ‘ideal voter’ looks like.

2. LITERATURE REVIEW

The use of religion and cultural norms as tools to marginalize women voters is not novel to Pakistan. With increased globalization, fundamentalist convictions are gaining ground and this section will focus on academic work that has been done within this theme. It will try to conceptualize how overarching notions of religiosity relegates women to a lower status in society and can lead to women being excluded from a very important aspect of democracy and civic duty. Claudia Derichs and Andrea Fleschenberg (2010) posit an interesting argument about the ways in which religion and understandings around religion have undergone challenges and deconstruction over the years in different geographies. In more western contexts religiosity is juxtaposed to secularism which is in turn conflated with being progressive. However, in Muslim contexts this is not the case since religiosity is an inherent part of even more open-minded and left-leaning ideologies (Derichs and Fleschenberg, 2010, pp. 8). This is further explained by Sharify-Funk who claims that “religiosity is a ‘transcendent view’, tradition a ‘past orientation’, modernity a ‘future orientation’ and secularity a ‘worldly view’…Most Muslims do not simply live ‘in tradition’ or ‘in modernity’; rather, they dwell ‘in between’ these two poles, as well as ‘in between’ their secular and religious ideas” (pp. 61-8). For this discussion, Women Living Under Muslim Law Network’s definition of religiosity will be used which “consists of an ideology that does not give attention to principles of universal human rights, is often anti-women, and is dogmatic about acceptance of ‘the Other’” (Rouhana, 2005, pp. 181). Thus, the application of how conservative or secular a part of the country is depends very little on the religion itself but concentrates more on the ideological underpinnings of those who wield power and accounts for religion’s historical contingency.

When reviewing literature, Jordan proved to be an interesting example and gave insight into gendered electoral barriers. Islam is strongly intertwined in society and there exists a common perception that women need to be protected through men’s guardianship (OECD, 2018, p. 71). This often translates into “restrictions on their freedom of movement, social engagement and civic participation, particularly in rural areas. Women, as such, often remain on the side-lines, disinclined to engage in politics” (OECD, 2018, p. 70). This puts women in a disadvantaged position as voters and was reflected in the 2016 elections statistics where only 32% of all eligible females voted (Al Sharif, 2016). These facts feed into the narrative that there is an increasing pressure on women to devote time to ‘womanly’ responsibilities which include taking care of the family and doing household chores (OECD, 2018; Naz, 2010). This is
compounded by the fact that voting is considered the domain of male family members and women are seen as inappropriate if they engage in it.

Discussions around religion are important because there is ample evidence which suggests that the entrenchment of religious fundamentalist groups and parties within society has led to an increase in exclusion of women from the electoral sphere. According to Derichs and Fleschenberg (2010), the increased invigilation of women has an impact on “(i) public discourses and (ii) forms, embodied practices and opportunities with regard to political participation and interaction, and on (iii) the agenda-setting and value-framing of the policy-making and legislative initiatives of male and female politicians and civil society actors alike. Fundamentalist forces affect women disproportionately and frequently in a manner that prevents them from standing up for their rights and autonomy” (pp. 10). This is most clearly shown in the example of the Philippines where research suggests that religious fundamentalism is tied very closely to culture because it poses a threat to women's rights, their well-being and their physical integrity (Claudio, 2010, p. 11). This compartmentalizes ‘good’ and ‘bad’ behavior and anyone belonging to the latter is considered the ‘Other’. The damage caused by these dichotomies is illustrated by Sahgal and Yuval (2002) who claim that “the ‘proper’ behaviour of women is used to signify the difference between those who belong and those who do not; women are also seen as ‘cultural carriers’ of the grouping, who transmit group culture to the future generation; the proper control in terms of marriage and divorce ensures that children who are born to those women are within the boundaries of the collectivity, not only biologically but also symbolically” (pp. 14-15). These identity markers help to cogitate good and bad behaviors that position the agency of women in society. Interestingly these markers do not remain static but are constantly changing depending on the interaction between the structures and agents in society.

With the absence of state intervention to dissipate the religious contours in society, other non-state entities come to the fore to fill this gap. Most frequently this is done by non-government organizations and international organizations who implement programmes to educate communities, political parties and the wider public. However, with religiosity on the rise, these entities are looked at with suspicious and a perceived threat of spreading “punitive alien values, aimed at the establishment of a different set of socio-cultural values and socio-political systems” (Derichs and Fleschenberg, 2010, p. 10). Demands for greater political emancipation is confused as the spread of these ‘alien’ values that are misconstrued as being Western and thus anti-Islamic which damage the pillars upon which the society and family system stand. Furthermore, in many cases women demanding more political rights is confused with women asking for other freedoms such as bodily agency which is deemed as 'vulgar'. In the end, both are seen as un-Islamic, and thus both rights are denied.
When looking at how society is structured, we need to determine the core of how decisions are made and institutions function. When citizens enter the social contract, the state becomes the primary ‘caretaker’ that ensures their well-being. The material basis of this care is enshrined in the constitution of the state. In Pakistan article 25 (2) of the constitution claims “there shall be no discrimination on the basis of sex” (The Constitution of Pakistan, 1973). However, Cox (1983) claims that “when the administrative, executive, and coercive apparatus of government was in effect constrained by the hegemony of the leading class of a whole social formation, it became meaningless to limit the definition of the state to those elements of government. To be meaningful, the notion of the state would also have to include the underpinnings of the political structure in civil society” (p. 51). Following from this, it is important to determine who exactly is determining how norms are established. In Pakistan, the ulema, or the religious clergy, dominate most institutions. This is exemplified by the fact that laws introduced in the provincial and national assemblies need to be accepted by the Islamic Council, which usually results in progressive laws not being accepted. When notions like this determine how legislation functions, the freehand that religion gets to play in day-to-day life can be damaging. The space religion is given contributes to form behaviors and expectations of how women should behave. When women activists ask for freedom and emancipation, it threatens the state firstly because it means that hegemonic men will lose their standings and secondly because they will be held accountable for gendered exclusion. As a result, ideational realities continuously interact co-constitutively with state institutions and the state acts as an “outer ditch, behind which there stands a powerful system of [religious] fortresses and earthworks” (Cox, 1983, pp. 53).

Typically, and even more specifically in Pakistan, election literature revolves around political participation of women as both voters and party candidates. Cheema et al.’s (2019) work has done randomized control tests in the urban city of Lahore, Pakistan to debunk the assumption that there is a rural-urban divide in women voters. Fact-finding missions have been sent to the far-flung Northern conservative areas of Pakistan to show the obstacles that stand in the way of women casting their votes (Aware Girls, 2013). There is also abundant research devoted to acclaiming the pivotal role women activists have played to carve political space for women through protests, petitions and legal recourse (Naz, 2010; Khan, 2018; Brohi and Khattak, 2013). While important and necessary writing has been volumized about Pakistani voters, the discussion is limited because academics and policy makers either concentrate on just one election cycle (Mahmood, 2018; Cheema et al., 2019), or have vague discussions about patriarchy, the state, and the unequal status of women in society. However, almost no work has been done theoretically and thematically in Pakistan that maps out different points in the country’s history and systematically studies how state structures have transformed over the years. While these

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1 It is merely apathy and disinterest in urban centers that accounts for low women voter turnout, not institutional or cultural obstacles.
academic and policy contributions have helped shape political discourse, there is an urgent need to bridge the gap between academia and on-ground realities. One cannot holistically understand the political landscape by merely listing down problems. There needs to be a critical evaluation of why and how policies are segmented in legislation, what elements of the status quo bar women from participating in the political sphere, and what historical events and legacies contribute to the backward thinking of societies and the upholding of patriarchy. Thus, without a historical and nuanced tracing of events and the study of the overlap between history, religion and culture, a country’s electoral sphere cannot be understood correctly.

3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Following from the research gaps which exist in current anthologies, it is essential to use a theoretical framework which aims to rectify ahistorical narratives and allows for a systemic study of the past to understand the present. A temporal analysis is appropriate because it helps to cogitate institutional development and causality (Mahoney, 2016) and critical moments that have allowed for change to take place in Pakistan (Collier and Collier, 1990). To achieve this, this thesis will introduce Collier and Collier (1990)’s Critical Juncture (CJ) framework to show how antecedent historical conditions in the country led to breaking points, or cleavages, which result in critical junctures that are defined as short periods of time where change can take place (Bruff, 2008). When the critical juncture ends, a new legacy is built. Once historicity is established, there is a need to introduce a more dialectical element to help compliment CJ’s non-dialectical structuring. For this reason, Gramsci’s common-sense analysis is fitting because it identifies who power belongs to and what mechanisms are used to establish a hegemonic commonsense in society. This is even more important when discussing change because commonsense is established by organic intellectuals who “articulate, through the language of culture, the feelings and experiences which the masses could not express for themselves” (Singh and Devine, 2013, p. 26). Through these two frameworks, the aim of the thesis is to show how legacies are produced and reproduced after critical moments. This will also buttress the argument that while the state masquerades as a neutral structure, this is not the case. The state is not just democratic institutions but consists of other structures; more specifically the Islamic clergy and civil society exist as entities within the confines of the state and each tries to propagate their versions of commonsense. The tussle then becomes between hegemonic and non-hegemonic commonsense narratives, and the one who wins, gains legitimacy in society since “the source of consensus is not the institutional environment; it is culture” (Bruff, 2008, p. 12).

These theoretical frameworks are suitable for this case study because firstly they manage to map out the history of electoral politics in Pakistan extremely well, a taxing exercise given the oscillation between democracy and dictatorship in the country. Secondly, since there are such dramatic and swift
changes from one regime type to another, the critical juncture framework is appropriate because these ‘shift’ moments result in “relatively short periods of time during which there is a substantially heightened probability that agents’ choices will affect the outcome of interest” (Capoccia and Kelemen, 2007, p. 348). This allows actors to gain more agency and meaningful choice as critical junctures are “moments of relative structural indeterminism when willful actors shape outcomes in a more voluntarist fashion than normal circumstances permit” (Mahoney, 2002, p. 7) as “the decisions and choices of key actors are freer and more influential in steering institutional development than during ‘settled’ times” (Swidler, 1986, p. 275). This paves the path perfectly for the commonsense narrative because when these ‘moments of relative structural indeterminism’ happen, non-hegemonic organic intellectuals, such as the civil society, came to the fore. Furthermore, this also lends to the argument that the State cannot just be seen as a “specialized bureaucracy, hierarchical organization of settlements around a center, and unique symbols of power” (Joffe, 2018, p. 4). The state’s definition is expansive and incorporates multiple stakeholders that hold varying degrees of power, but ultimately all these entities converge to wield power within and through the official state apparatus. These non-state actors uphold the status quo which discriminates, marginalizes, and ostracizes women in the political realm.

3.1. Critical Junctures Framework

The discussion is now going to focus on studying electoral politics through a historical lens. Stuart Hall (1996) stresses that the “material conditions are the necessary but not sufficient condition of all historical practice” (p. 147). This concept becomes particularly important to cogitate when looking at critical junctures and historical institutionalism (HI), because material realities are not the whole picture. They interact discursively with agents and ideas to help explain human activity, and within this try to understand how change takes place - from the erosion of a previous commonsense narrative to the establishment and embedding of a new commonsense. To look at reality through determinist conceptions, such as historical materialism, is an incomplete and insufficient reading of reality.

The Critical Juncture (CJ) framework being used for this thesis was conceived by Collier and Collier (1991) who study path dependency and legacy formation. This conceptualization is better than other formulations of path dependency theories since it is more multilayered than vague notions of how ‘history matters’ and how ‘the past influences the future’ put forth by linear causal analysis scholars such as Herbert Simon and Simon-Blalock (North, 1990; Mahoney, 2000) who tend to “trace outcomes back to temporally remote causes” (Mahoney, 2000, p. 507). CJ goes a step ahead and allows path-dependent processes of change to be studied. Mahoney’s work on critical junctures is the starting point of this work because it sees critical junctures as “choice point[s] when a particular option is adopted among two or more alternatives defined by antecedent historical conditions” (Mahoney, 2000, p. 507). Following from this, path dependency is defined as “historical sequences in which contingent events
set into motion institutional patterns or event chains that have deterministic properties” (Mahoney, 2000, p. 507). These junctures become important because they demonstrate how important moments of the critical juncture are as they lead to multiple plausible choices, and once the critical juncture closes these options are no longer feasible and difficult to alter (Pierson, 2004, p. 114). The CJ approach is also appropriate because it allows to study multiple points of history and try to structure them coherently to establish distal causation or “decisions and development in the distant past can have long-lasting effect on institutional arrangements” (Capoccia, 2015, p. 5). The CJ framework can be seen below.

**Figure 3.1 The building blocks of the critical juncture framework**

![Diagram of Critical Juncture Framework](source: Collier and Collier, 1991)

1) **Antecedent conditions**: They provide a historical background and allow for the study of multiple variables. Antecedents can be confused with cleavages, but they act as the run up to the cleavages. When some causes are more important than others, they can be seen as critical antecedents.

2) **Cleavages**: These are described as tensions which exist before the start of the critical juncture. For this thesis, the cleavages are going to be seen as ‘generative’ because they raise “political issues so compelling as to trigger some kind of larger reorganization of political relationships” (Collier and Collier, 1991, p. 33). It is a common mistake to conflate cleavages and critical junctures, but the difference is that cleavages are not periods where institutional innovation takes place (Collier and Munck, 2017).

3) **Critical Junctures**: These are periods after cleavages where a particular institutional arrangement is chosen from two or more alternatives (Mahoney, 2002, p. 513). Critical junctures are shorter than the period in which legacy is produced and reproduced.

4) **Historical Legacy**: You cannot study CJ without studying historical legacy because a “critical juncture cannot be established in general, but only with reference to a specific historical legacy” (Collier and Collier, 1991, p. 33). For this thesis, legacy will be studied in contrast to the
antecedent conditions because it is possible that there is some continuity which is re-established at the mechanisms of (re)production of legacy. Thus, there are two parts of legacy making, the production which happens after a set of reactions and counter reactions, and the reproduction which helps to stabilize the legacy.

Given this, the thesis will discuss how legacies are not formed immediately but are segmented because certain events take place in a specific order. This ordering is what Mahoney (2000) calls reactive sequencing. Reactive sequencing can be seen to “set in motion a chain of tightly linked reactions and counterreactions….and historical narrative offers an especially useful method for making sense of the multiple steps in a reactive sequence” (Mahoney, 2000, p. 530). Thus, heightened contingency can be seen as the core attribute of CJ. All in all, the CJ framework is appropriate because “a focus on critical junctures and their legacies shows that what might be at play in shaping important institutional arrangements is not co-relational causation but distal causation: decisions and events happening much earlier in time give rise to path-dependent institutions that shape their social underlay and thereby persist over time” (Capoccia, 2015, p. 11).

The ontological positioning of critical junctures helps to understand change because while being a structuralist theory, CJ explains how during critical junctures there is an ideational causal gap between structural conditions and institutional outcomes, which results in many more outcomes being possible from the CJ period (Capoccia, 2015). This allows CJ to be more nuanced because it tends to move past fixed structuralist connotations. It also becomes important because it shows how CJ moments have a destabilizing effect temporarily and need to be studied empirically, and not just assumed a priori, something if not done properly might lead to the problem of infinite regress (Capoccia, 2015).

3.2. Gramsci’s Commonsense vis-à-vis Organic Intellectuals

Gramsci’s commonsense narrative is fitting because for him hegemony is “connected to a union between philosophy and politics” (Joseph, 2002, pp. 26-7) and philosophies “are tied up with the leading role of intellectuals in shaping organic blocs and normative action” (Joseph, 2002, p. 27). This becomes important for this thesis because while the CJ theory is being used, the predominant focus of the work is to look at legacies and how they are built. Following from this vein, Gramsci speaks about how important organic intellectuals are in keeping and fighting for control over their hegemony (qtd in Bernardi, 2018 about Mordenti, 1996, p. 52). It is also crucial to see how organic intellectuals gain power and when looked through a Gramscian lens they need “certain conditions to become dominant such as objective location related to capital, access to structures among others” (Joseph, 2002, p. 160).
The use of both these theories together dissipates criticism that philosophies which denounce any material basis for social scientific explanations can be titled as one-dimensional and incomplete (Sayer, 1997). Dogmatic notions that center their analysis entirely around the ideational conceptions negate the existence of material realities, such as food, drink and other universal human characteristics (Nussbaum, 1992). Negotiating and evaluating positionality on the cultural terrain is an exercise every theoretical perspective should practice. When looking at how change takes place, it is crucial to study all contradictory ‘common sense’ perspectives because it helps to see how subjectivities are articulated no matter how incoherently in society. This becomes even more pivotal to understand when studying how change takes place, because change is not merely a change of material realities, but also ideational transitions. Gramsci (1985) aptly states “common sense is not something rigid and stationary, but is in continuous transformation, becoming enriched with scientific ideas and with philosophical opinions which have entered into common circulation” (p. 421). Thus, it is malleable in the sense that common sense is ‘relatively’ rigid, having shape but the content is not determined. This malleability can be understood further through the CJ framework, thus the complementarity of the two theories is established.

One of the obvious criticisms leveled against dialectical analyses such as the commonsense narrative is by Critical Realism (CR). One understanding of this is by Bhaskar who argues that “Gramsci sees knowledge as dependent on history, it shows that the object of science needs to be separated from knowledge” (qtd. in Bernardi, 2018, p. 378) and that Gramsci’s conceptions “reduces science to an expression of the historical process” (Joseph, 2002, p. 20). However, while CR and Gramsci seem antagonistic, they are ontologically similar because firstly they both believe that reality must be structured and objective, and hegemony needs institutions to exist and be maintained (Bernardi, 2018, p. 379; Joseph, 2002, p. 31). Secondly, Gramsci’s conceptions about hegemony are very well connected to structure and superstructure and “these are not seen as separate, but united in their formation of a ‘historical bloc’” (Bernardi, 2018, p. 278; Gouldner, 1971, pp. 366). Thus, while critique is merited, when looked through a more critical ontological lens, there are overlaps, especially because Gramsci takes objectivity as generalized subjectivity that is conditioned by dominant ideology, and thus “transitive and intransitive domains of hegemony are collapsed into each other” (Joseph, 2002, p. 159). This adds more theoretical rigor to the Gramscian logic because while it does have a dialectical approach between structure and agency with more material understandings, it allows space for ideas and norms to contextualize the setting. It also allows us to study change, since hegemony is not a static state, and the non-dominant classes are constantly organizing themselves counter-hegemonically.
4. METHODOLOGY

For the purposes of this academic piece and following from the previous section, it is important to understand how historical legacies are formed, how they permeate into society and how they become embedded and instituted in the long-term. To holistically understand norms in the country, it is first critical to determine who exactly forms hegemonic ideologies, cogitate who holds power and the tools they use to exercise it and piece together how the combination of these factors determine commonsense in society. Current work done by Pakistani academics misses theoretical rigor because of the dualistic approach to either conceptualize the electoral sphere through material realities or ideational constructs; no work has been done to see the interaction between material and ideational and how they can be mutually exclusive.

In this discussion, culture will be seen as a web of ideas, or the ideational. This will demonstrate how agency interacts with structures and institutions to give meaning to the material world. In tandem with this, it is important to deconstruct how history impacts the present and the process through which production and reproduction of legacies take place. This academic work will take an ideational-material position and assume that structure and agency are co-constitutive (Bruff, 2008) and ideas are causally relational (Knio, 2021), thus there is reflexivity of agents and recursivity of structures.

There needs to be a critical understanding of how “fragmentary, amorphous, uncritical everyday conceptions” (Bruff, 2008, p. 49) of how a woman should act become embedded and embodied in national institutions. It is important to emphasize that materialism will be seen historically and not purely theoretically. To deny materiality is limited, but to center discourse around it is incomplete. Robert Cox (1987) asserts “production creates the material basis for all forms of social existence, and the ways in which human efforts are combined in productive processes affect all other aspects of social life” (p. 1). Taking this into account, this paper will look at how changes through critical junctures take place because structure and agency interact in constitutively causal way (Knio, 2021). Additionally, commonsense narratives are embedded in the system because structure and agency are co-constitutive, where ideas are causally relational (Knio, 2021). By seeing the interaction of the state with religion and culture in Pakistan through these theoretical frameworks, the outcome of this academic exercise is to show how marginalization is embedded in society, and the excruciating efforts that have taken place, and need to take place, to make the country inclusive and equal for women.

To understand hegemonic and non-hegemonic common-sense narratives, we need to define what hegemony means. According to Joseph (2015), hegemony is “the way leadership or dominance is exercised through the attainment of consent” (p. 164). When cultural norms of how women and men should act are repeated in different social settings, they become the dominant schema of people and
leads to consent resulting in it becoming hegemonic knowledge. This fits in well with the commonsense narrative because it is the establishment and reproduction of a particular set of ideas that relationally interact with structures to form a commonsense narrative. This dialectical understanding can be complimented by the non-dialectical CJ theory because as Joseph (2002) claims, “it is important not only to challenge the ideas that are dominant, but also the structures that make them possible” (p. 11). CJ helps to understand how structures are produced and understand that change can be achieved by transforming both mindsets and the structures that allow this thinking to disseminate.

It is here that the compatibility of the Critical Juncture Framework to Gramsci can be discussed because Gramsci implies that there is “a strategy of ‘war of position’, which implies constructing a different historical bloc, detaching the intellectuals from the other bloc. Gramsci’s strategy implies the development of new ideas, while waiting for a crisis” (Bernardi, 2018, p. 378). Keeping this in mind, the two theoretical frameworks work well together because they provide an explanation of how change comes about in Pakistan and how legacies are reproduced. However, for theoretical integrity, it is crucial to add that while in the case of Pakistan transformation will be studied, it is not a requirement that after a critical juncture change will take place. This understanding of the theory is only applied in this thesis.

To undertake the exercise of embedding history in a theory like CJ it is important to establish the longevity of the critical junctures. These can range from “relatively quick transitions for example, moments of significant structural change to an extended period that might correspond to one or more presidential administrations, a long policy period, or a prolonged regime period” (Collier and Collier, 1991, p. 32). This thesis will look at two critical junctures in the history of Pakistan, both of which took place during the two dictatorships. Both are important to study because the decisions made in the first CJ had a legacy which lasted from 1988 to 1999 when the second critical juncture took place. Kelemen and Capoccia (2007) have claimed that critical junctures are important because “choices made during this time trigger a path depend on processes that constrains future choices” (p. 348) and Pakistan’s case study will demonstrate this.

Critical junctures can be defined as “relatively brief episodes during which the range of possible outcomes that might take place in the future briefly but dramatically expands and events occur that quickly close off future possibilities and set into motion processes that track specific future outcomes” (Mahoney at al., 2016, p. 77). It is important to remember that the duration of a critical juncture is shorter than the causal processes that lead to the final outcome (Capoccia and Keleman, 2007). This becomes important in the discussion since HI gives space for actors to influence structure. Soifer (2012) aptly claims: “a critical juncture is an episode in time characterized by a brief loosening in the constraints of structure...allowing for agency or contingency to shape divergence from the past, or divergence across cases” (p. 1583) Thus, when a critical juncture ends, the constraint on agency
increases, and therefore critical junctures are so important because they allow for change to take place. To embed this further in the discussion about Gramscian common sense narrative, we see that non-hegemonic organic intellectuals use these critical junctures as a means to achieve their aims of promoting their hegemonic view. Thus, it is interesting to see the way agent and structure interact, and how this interaction is significantly changed during critical junctures, demonstrating its temporal characteristic.

When the critical juncture ends, the specific outcome starts to be tracked “through causal processes set into motion by the critical juncture” (Mahoney et al., 2016, pp. 78). Thus, agency and contingency become associated with critical junctures, and the resultant legacy needs to be studied holistically to understand historical puzzles. It is difficult to determine whether a “critical juncture is a clean break from the past versus entangled in a jumble of significant antecedent factors” (Slater and Simmons, 2010 qtd. in Mahoney et al., 2016, p.79). Thus, this thesis will see critical junctures as “important necessary conditions that come close to also being sufficient for an outcome…passing through the critical juncture is not only essential for the outcome, but also comes relatively close to ensuring the outcome, including the intervening causal processes that link the critical juncture to the outcome” (Mahoney at al., 2016, p. 79; Ragin, 2008; Goertz, 2006). However, it is important to remember that causality is one thing, but the ordering of causal conditions is important. For example, if a regime was set up earlier and later, the outcome we see today would be very different. Thus, along with causes, the ordering of the causes become important in studying historical cases.

Following from this, the proposition put forth in this thesis is to showcase how the commonsense narrative and the critical juncture theory can go hand in hand in explaining the status quo, change and subsequent legacies. This novel theorization combines a dialectic and non-dialectic theory to give more methodological grounding to explain legacy building and how certain norms and values remain in society. This conceptualization is presented below.
In the above diagram, we see an augmented visualization of the critical junctures framework to explain how critical moments can lead to the breakup of hegemonic ideology and the existence of both non-hegemonic and hegemonic commonsense in society. Here, dialectic and non-dialectic interaction between structure and agency takes place at the same time, which makes figure 2 innovative because it gives space for two ontological positions to exist at the same time because material reality is complex and needs to be understood through a more nuanced ontological lens. The important contribution through this diagram is that there always exist organic intellectuals who are constantly determining what the culture and norms of society are, no matter what part of history you are in; this could be during the antecedent condition, cleavage, critical juncture or legacy. At any moment in time there exists a hegemonic commonsense which both determines and is determined by political will, culture and norms. Additionally, this hegemonic commonsense exists alongside counter-hegemonic commonsense which in most cases is an opposing ideology. Regardless of what is happening in society, most often the legitimization and space for hegemonic commonsense to be disseminated is when hegemonic organic intellectuals have state backing (Khan, 2018). This also helps to understand how the definition of the role of the state is expansive and not just limited to democratic institutions and state structures. This diagram proves what Gramsci (1985) claims, which is that there is always a commonsense which exists in society, but the people who determine it are in flux and constantly changing. It is important to also point out that the diagram includes political will and climate because there is ample research which points towards the fact that when there is a disposition of implementing more inclusive laws in a society, for example gender-friendly measures, the commonsense (norms and culture) via the state determines whether this will be accepted (Khan and Naqvi, 2018).
The explanation for the rest of the diagram is consistent with the original model, except that in mechanisms of production only reactive sequencing is considered and omits self-reinforcing sequences; this was in the original model (Collier and Collier, 1991) but does not fit in the argument being made in this framework. In the end, after mechanisms of reproduction are established, this framework suggests that there can be a reality in which counter-hegemonic commonsense can exist in tandem with hegemonic commonsense in a much greater capacity. The critical juncture proves to be the point at which this reality is possible. However, in most cases the new legacy produced is merely non-hegemonic organic intellectuals being given the space to reverse the previous legacy. Thus, residues of the past provide structure to the present. However, while this model is interesting, it is not generalizable to every case study because the pivotal point that is made by Collier and Collier (1991) is that critical junctures do not necessarily lead to change. The environment after the CJ ends may look the same. Thus, the end point of legacy thus can look very different or the same, or mostly the same with some reconfiguration.

This new framework corrects criticisms that are levelled against both theories separately. By using a more material theorization (Gramsci) with the more ideational framework of CJ, this model acknowledges and accepts the flaws which exist in each of the theories in isolation. First and foremost, Bhaskar’s (2008) argument that “tendencies may be possessed unexercised, exercised unrealized, and realized unperceived (or undetected)” (p. 7) can be actualized in this model, because when critical junctures open, there is a propensity for agents to come forward and actualize their tendencies. Thus, though critical junctures rely on structures first, the combination with Gramsci allows for more agency with reflexivity of agents and recursivity of structures. Additionally, more Spinozian arguments critique historical institutionalism for being too deterministic, but if we look at the doctrine of parallelism, it “permits a more thoroughgoing understanding of the role of ideas in ‘prescribing, shaping, constraining and guiding’ the policy preferences of decision makers” (Knio, 2018, p. 405). Thus, while separately there are merited flaws, figure 2 aims to rectify these inconsistencies and propose a more refined understanding of history and a thorough comprehension of the present.

4.1. Research Methods

The purpose of using Historical Institutionalism and the commonsense narrative is that it provides a critical understanding of the past to understand the present. There is a plethora of literature that speaks volumes about election cycles, the obstacles that women face both before, on the day of and after elections, and what are the ways forward. Using secondary data as a starting point, this thesis uses deductive reasoning to answer the research question. The purpose of this work is not to merely embed a case study within a framework, rather use the two interchangeably to help to understand how certain
forces within society gain more legitimacy than others and how this contributes to overall backwardness when it comes to women’s rights.

While deciding the research methods, it was critical to not to choose tools which do a disservice to the theory. For this reason, a comparative case study was not chosen even though the original theory by Collier and Collier (1991) was one. While comparative-historical analysis in the original model is interesting it does not include differences in repercussions within one case country. The case study of Pakistan requires individual attention because the religiosity within the country differs, and so a systematic understanding of why this is can only be achieved through a single case study analysis. Additionally, quantitative methods such as regression and predictive analysis were not used because the starting point of the research is more heavily reliant on structural underpinning, and so quantitative research-based material realities would not meet the requirements of this historical analysis.

To augment the already existing data, this thesis has used ontological frameworks to add more nuance to the discussion by showing how positivist understandings and prescriptive solutions are ontologically flat, and that a well-researched, intersectional, and historically rich narrative is the only way to explain the theme. Most of the analysis was done through archival research using NVIVO to keep track of academic texts and establish linkages between common themes. The archival research also included substantiating the Pakistani case study by tracking media developments, academic work done and media appearances of politicians in talk shows and in the national and provincial assembly. To complement the secondary data, some primary data was also collected in the form of semi-structured and open-ended interviews. The interview questions touched broad themes such as the role of culture and society in contributing to low voter turnout, the part played by the civil society in empowering women voters and possible solutions to the problem. As a result of COVID-19, conducting fieldwork was extremely difficult, but six interviews are included in the research data from the following people:

1) Saadia Agha (Vice President, Central Women Wing of PTI2)
2) Zonia Yusuf (Researcher)
3) Sarah Khan (Researcher, Yale lecturer)
4) Jaleela Raffay (Women’s Digital League3)
5) Zohra Sohail (Gender Specialist at USAID)
6) Nuzhat Sidiq (Former Senate Member, PML-N4)

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2 Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf is the incumbent party in Pakistan.
3 Leading social enterprise in Pakistan which trains young women in digital literacy.
4 Pakistan Muslim League is the opposition party in Pakistan.
5. **ANALYSIS**

5.1. **Historical Background**

In Pakistan’s electoral landscape, the legitimacy and support to win elections comes from the will of people (Khan, 2018). As mentioned before, Pakistan has different political parties in each province. This in turn has an impact on gender and electoral politics because firstly women are not accorded equal rights to men, and secondly all women of the country are not enfranchised in a homogenous way. Since Islam is such a strong part of national identity, political parties need to play into regressive understanding of religion and gender to win. This means that conceptions such as women should not vote and focus on more ‘womanly’ duties is the norm, conflating notions of respectability in electoral considerations (Weiss, 1985). Women are thus not seen as valuable stakeholders in the electoral process and not included in political campaigns that aim to convince citizens to vote for them, are not assisted on the day of voting and are ostracized and marginalized when they stand as candidates (Cheema et al., 2019). Current research and statistics point towards how excluded women are in the electoral terrain. In the last election cycle in 2018, there were 112.39 million registered voters, from which 62.5 million were male voters and only 49.8 million were female voters (Khan et al., 2020). This indicates that the gender gap between male and female voters is a staggering 12.7 million; thus, a lot of Pakistan’s 48 per cent female population is left out of the election exercise.

In Pakistan, the attitude towards the role of women in the public sphere puts limits on their agency, and the expectation is that women should be circumscribed to the *chaar diwari* (four walls) of the house in many parts of the country. Considering the limited role of women in public affairs in general, it comes as no surprise that voting is not a high priority for women. However, it is important to involve them because only when women, which make up 48 per cent of Pakistan’s population (Khan, 2018) are included will there be conditions conducive to achieve economic, social and political self-reliance. Till then Pakistani politics and democracy remains imperfect. Voting is important because currently there need to be better laws for women; they need to have access to justice systems, be accorded property rights and have bodily autonomy, amongst others. In order for this to happen, there needs to be more women in power because research highlights that when women are present in positions of power, they push for more laws that make space for women (Khan, 2018). This holds true for women in politics, because female leaders on average spend more time recruiting women to go out and vote and support ideas that others support (Cheema et al., 2018; Pepera, 2018).

Women’s lived reality is drastically different from men’s and so it is important to get their perspectives in decision making processes. Thus, any discussion about women and voting is incomplete without female politicians being introduced as their entry into politics is determined largely by culture, which
does not look upon such acts favorably. The logic behind why it is important that women be involved in the political sphere might seem trite, but needs to be repeated constantly world over. The most pressing research shows how one of the solutions to bridge the gender gap is to have more women in politics (Pepera, 2018). While some progress is made, as demonstrated by the fact that over the past twenty years, the rate of women’s representation in national parliaments have exponentially increased from 11.8 per cent in 1998 to 23.5 per cent in 2018 (Pepera, 2018), there is still a lot of work that needs to be done. The lack of inclusion of women as voters is seen in Cheema et al.’s (2018) work where male politicians go house to house only to speak and share their political agenda with men. Jaleela Ali in an interview corroborates this fact by stating that “women are not allowed to go to political gatherings and hear what the political parties are campaigning for. While they are aware of the needs and wants of their area as it affects them (water, electricity, schools, roads) they are unaware of which political parties are promising to deliver what they need the most” (Ali, 2021).

Additionally, National Democratic Institute, an NGO working in the United States, has studied women politicians in 100 countries and concluded that women politicians encourage citizen confidence in democracy through their own participation (NDI, 2019). This becomes especially important when speaking about voter turn out because political participation is conflated with the freedom to speak out, assemble and associate, and for women to partake in public affairs. A lot of time men do not want to give this right to women because it can mean that women are ‘getting out of hand’ or ‘doing more than they are meant to’ (Khan, 2018; Khan and Naqvi, 2019; Naz, 2010). When this becomes the norm, Gramsci’s common sense narrative can be tangibly seen because when there is no enabling social environment, how do women make space?

Constitutionally women are entitled to vote, however supporting laws and societal norms do not create an enabling environment. When it comes to ‘private matters’ of the house which involve women, the state takes a step back. In the absence of the state, other forces take its place and in Pakistan this is occupied by the religious clerics and regressive patriarchal entities. Jaleela Ali observes that “a reason that contributes to low female voter turnout is lack of awareness amongst women themselves. This is because politics is rarely discussed with women in a household. It is discussed within male family members and if the women are present for the discussion, they are not allowed to contribute. They do not understand the power of their vote and the importance of every single vote in an election. They do not think ‘their one vote’ can make a difference in the elections” (Ali, 2021).

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5 Interview conducted on 4th July 2021. Online via Skype.
5.2. Critical Analysis

To further conceptualize the role of religion and how the clergy dictate societal norms, there is a need to dissect the tools through which ‘commonsense’ is established by these hegemonic organic intellectuals and then further disseminated. Derichs and Fleschenberg (2010) claim that there are “a number of common features can be discerned about religious fundamentalisms and gender:

1) The authority to interpret sacred religious texts in order to construct an ideology is often monopolised by and enforced to sustain patriarchal structures, and therefore it is a question of authority and power.

2) Women are often the first target of fundamentalist forces in an effort to demonise all differences and to prescribe codes of behaviour, thus either restricting or exaggerating the role of women.” (p. 5)

This observation is particularly applicable when it comes to Pakistan because ordinarily the Quran is used as a basis to legitimize why women should not go out and vote. This can be highlighted by the fact that before the 2013 elections in Pakistan, leaflets were circulated in KP stating that it was un-Islamic for women to partake in democracy (McVeigh, 2013). This was followed by violent acts during the 2008 elections where many polling stations were burnt down, and women were told that it was vulgar for them to cast their vote (McVeigh, 2013). Saadia Agha (2021) in an interview substantiates the claim that misconstrued renditions of Islam are used incorrectly and how “our religion does not stop women from voting. It gives women a lot of rights and privileges. There is nowhere that the right to vote is taken away from women. The Quran is just used by these religious clerics to further their own aims. God knows why those are to exclude women from society”. What further aggravates the problem is that civil society groups in conservatives such as KP that are working towards educating people of the importance of civic duty and voting are constantly threatened because what they are doing is seen as un-Islamic. Saba Ismail, Founder and Director of Aware Girls, a group which is led by and for young women to learn leadership skills has stated that their group had to change offices twice because of the death threats that they were receiving (McVeigh, 2013).

By using causal-temporal concepts, the aim of the next section is to see how “causes as conditions that are necessary for specific outcomes and/or conditions that combine together with other conditions to create packages of causes that are sufficient for specific outcomes” (Mahoney et al., 2016, p. 72). In the case of Pakistan, it is important to not look at cross-sectional explanations, but rather look at causal conditions in different points of time, making it process-oriented and mechanism-oriented.
a) The First Critical Juncture

The first critical moment in Pakistan can be traced back to July 1977, when military General Zia-ul-Haq came to power after a coup d’état. This era was heralded after the regime of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto (1971-77) which was termed the period of progress for women because women politicians mobilized resources to empower female citizens to take up important positions (Mumtaz and Shaheed, 1987, p. 16). This period also coincided with the 1975 International Women’s Year where key politicians signed the Mexico Declaration. When Zia came to power, laws and rules were put in place that negatively impacted women in the whole country. These measures included introducing regressive laws such as the Hudood Ordinances in 1979 and Law of Evidence in 1984. While these laws did not directly impact the electoral sphere in Pakistan, it did put pressure on women to have a limited presence in the public sphere and shaped norms around their roles in society. Zia introduced his Islamization program in February 1979, which was legitimized through the government because its supporters belonged mostly to the ultra-conservative Jamaat-i-Islami (JI) party and claimed that Zia was correct in "having all laws conform to Islamic tenets" (Weiss, 1985, p. 864). This support legitimized Zia’s garrison state which was further segmented in society by the writing of esteemed and popular religious clerics such as Fazlur Rehman, who wrote a popular article titled Implementation of the Islamic Concept of State in the Pakistani Milieu which was circulated in economic, political and social circles of Pakistan (Weiss, 1985). In theoretical terms, the religious right had the backing of the state; since this ideology was accepted widely, JI became what Gramsci calls organic intellectuals and they became the mediums through which commonsense around Zia’s Islamization program was spread. State sanctioned platforms such as media and printing presses were used as resources to propagate the ‘proper’ version of Islam, which kept women out of the public sphere for the most part (Kurin, 1985).

At the same time, when international attention came to the lack of rights accorded to women in Pakistan, Zia tried to quickly rectify his negative image by establishing the Women’s Division as part of the Cabinet Secretariat (Weiss, 1985). The role of the international community becomes even more interesting because while internal politics are important, the legitimacy gained by showing to the world that women are given rights portrays an element of progressiveness which is important. This cosmetic solution in front of the world was enough for Zia to continue his Islamization within the country in covert ways vis-a-vi his organic intellectual allies. Weiss (1985) claims that “we see the same type of conflict in Pakistan that has emerged throughout the Muslim world: the push of modernity (i.e.,

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6 The result of this declaration was to facilitate women’s social, legal and economic position in society and resulted in the set-up of a 13 member Women’s Rights Committee to ensure this (Mumtaz and Shaheed, 1987)
7 The Hudood Ordinances This was part of Zia’s shariazation or Islamization programme. It criminalized adultery and fornication with punishments such as stoning, whipping and amputation.
8 The Law of Evidence was the law introduced under Zia’s military regime that witness should state facts in his/her knowledge in court, which included having four male witnesses to prove rape.
industrialization and the contemporary emphasis on realization of human potential) versus the pull of redefined tradition (i.e., Islamization)” (p. 864).

These tensions galvanized women from all over the country belonging to different classes, ethnicities, and religions to come together and work to reverse directives which curtailed women’s public participation (Mumtaz and Shaheed, 1987, p. 17). In September 1981, the Women’s group Shirkat Gah, which worked on women’s issues from Pakistan’s independence, formed the Khawateen Mahaz-e-Amal, or the Women’s Action Forum (WAF), which became the most active women’s rights lobby and pressure group against Zia’s regime. They actively pushed against norms that were disseminated, which included fatwas9 given out by religious clerics that women who go out and engage in public activities, including voting, are impure (Khan, 2018; Shaheed and Mumtaz; 1987, Aware Girls, 2018). Thus, within the same society, an Islamic hegemonic commonsense was established alongside a counter-hegemonic activist-backed commonsense which constantly put pressure on Zia’s government.

In 1988, Zia was assassinated when the plane he was in exploded, apparently because of explosive seeds in the crate of mangoes that were on his flight. Here, the reason why the CJ model fits better than other HI theories is because it allows for us to track a certain period and see how causally relational events are. The assassination of Zia-ul-Haq in 1988 can be classified as a ‘cleavage’, which acts as a crisis of the antecedent condition (which in this case is the regressive society under his rule) and led to a critical juncture moment where multiple options were available for the state, clergy, and civil society to make to carve space for themselves. This moment meant that the same legacy could be retained or a new hegemonic commonsense could be established. The critical juncture gave agency to women politicians and civil society to push to reverse the laws introduced by Zia, and when this space was made and the critical juncture period ended, a new legacy was formed. The diagram below shows how this critical moment in history can be explained by the CJ and commonsense framework.

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9A ruling on a point of Islamic law given by a recognized Islamic authority.
It is important to remember that the legacy formation part is the most important aspect of figure 3 because it shows how the hegemonic Islamic viewpoint was broken. When Zia was killed, the counter-hegemony that already existed in the country through WAF came to the fore and “because of the resiliency of civil society” (Cox, 1983, p. 53) women were given a say when subsequent democratic elections took place in 1988. Thus, Gramsci’s organic intellectual explanation is fitting because as Cox shows us that “to build up the basis of an alternative state and society upon [alternative] leadership means creating alternative intuitions and alternative intellectual resources within existing society” (p. 53). These alternative institutions allowed for more space of women in society such as the introduction of doubling of the reserved seats for women in the National Assembly, the establishment of the Ministry for Popular Welfare and a welfare of women development chapter in the 5-year plan of the country (Khan and Naqvi, 2018, p. 28). The concept of reactive sequencing is important here because the mechanisms of production are achieved only when actions in day-to-day life were pushed against by democratic entities such as political parties and civil society that tried to overturn Zia’s degressive laws. However, Zia’s legacy did live on which can be exemplified by the fact that some of Zia’s legislation was reversed much later, mostly in 2006. Additionally, the most insidious part of Zia’s rule remained as the ‘core attributes’ of his legacy: the Islamization. The religiosity that he empowered during his rule lived on, and through reactive sequencing, which was achieved through community fatwas, the media,
religious sermons and prayers, the view that women should be kept out of the public sphere remained and became more and more embedded in society.

b) The Second Critical Juncture

In the case of Pakistan, while activism and the push by the civil society was important and critical, it is not sufficient to achieve the outcome. In a country where religion and culture are so heavily embedded, with right-wing religious groups and clerics morphing into the state apparatus, only a critical moment or a shock helped bring change. Khan (2018) has made an interesting observation that while progressive people in the government are important, it is the environment that also makes a significant impact. Looking at doctrinal and non-doctrinal changes in Pakistan, Khan and Naqvi (2018) observed that “a confluence of factors i.e., government type, political will, international context, women’s political voice, civil society advocacy/activism” (p. 27) led to progressive policy outcomes for women. A policy which is overarchingly related to religion is doctrinal and affirmative action measures separate from customary practices or scripture are non-doctrinal (Htun and Weldon, 2010). This leads us to the second critical juncture in Pakistan which was the inception of the third military dictatorship in 1999 by Pervez Musharraf.

Musharraf’s dictatorship came eleven years after Pakistan’s experience with authoritarian rule. However, in these eleven years steps had been made to achieve women’s empowerment. As will be seen later in this section, when Musharraf came to power the antecedent conditions already looked very different from Zia’s dictatorship. More progressive laws had been passed which was predominantly achieved because of Benazir Bhutto\(^\text{10}\) who pushed for more laws to include women in policy making, as politicians and as voters. Women were included more through the reserved seats system and as discussed before, women’s entry into politics paved the way to empower women voters, which statistics point was the case (Khan and Naqvi, 2018). Table 1 showcases how when there is political commitment and women’s political representation, more just laws are proposed that safeguard women. Thus, when studying Musharraf’s regime, we need to remember that the end Zia’s dictatorship led to the establishment of a very strong counter-hegemony through WAF and the civil society, forwarding the rights of women in the country. Table 1 shows policy changes after Zia and before Musharraf came to power.

\(^{10}\) Benazir Bhutto was the first woman Prime Minister of Pakistan and of any Islamic country.
Table 5.1 Governance, social and policy context associated with policy outcomes for women

Source: Khan and Naqvi, 2018, pp. 27-28

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Type of government</th>
<th>Political commitment</th>
<th>Intl policy context</th>
<th>Women’s political rep*</th>
<th>Women’s activism**</th>
<th>Policy change</th>
<th>Doc</th>
<th>Nondoc</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1971–1977</td>
<td>Civilian democracy</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High: WCW ‘75 UN Decade for Women</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Constitutional equality Reserved seats provision (10 in NA, 5% PAs) First Women’s Rights Committee est. Government services opened to women Dowery &amp; Bridal Gifts (Restriction) Act</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977–1985</td>
<td>Military</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Intl support high WCW ‘80</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Women’s Division and Prov Cells established Inquiry Commission on the Status of Women Second Women’s Rights Commission set up</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990–1993</td>
<td></td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1 + 2 Increased quota for women in local government</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993–1996</td>
<td></td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High: WCCHR ‘93 [CPD ‘94 WOW ‘95]</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1 + 2 + 3</td>
<td>Inquiry Commission on Status of Women set up Women’s Police Stations Centres for burn victims and crisis established High profile govt part in 3 UN Conferences CEDAW signed Women appointed to superior judiciary Punjab govt 1/3 reserved seats in loc govt to women Women Devt Cells upgraded to Depts in provinces Beijing Follow-Up launched</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997–1999</td>
<td></td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Intl sanctions Some donor support high</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1 + 2 + 3</td>
<td>Death penalty for gang-rape Inquiry Commission Report released Cabinet asks provinces to double local govt seats</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013–2018</td>
<td></td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Western aid reduces</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1 + 2</td>
<td>Anti-rape law Anti-honour killings law Provincial Women’s Caucuses set up Provincial Commissions on the Status of Women est Provinces review marriage laws Domestic violence laws Electoral law reforms</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: * 1 = Influential individual women in government/politics; 2 = 1 (above)+ few elected legislators; 3 = 2 (above) + reserved seats for women in elected bodies/assemblies. ** 1 = WAF mobilisation; 2 = Vocal women’s advocacy organisations; 3 = Grassroots mobilisation. Sources: key informant interviews, Khan (1998), and Hun and Weldon (2010).

The entry of Musharraf into the political arena can be classified as a cleavage. The critical juncture came when Musharraf wanted to establish his legitimacy abroad and at home and achieved this by utilizing the international wave of feminism by giving more space for women to enter the public sphere. Khan (2018) claims “Musharraf benefitted from creating an expanded cadre of supporters in elected bodies. He was at pains to demonstrate to hostile international critics that he was not an anti-women
dictator, like Zia...his openness on the issue is in part due to the essential modernist inner culture of the military, as far as women are concerned. It is therefore not opposed to women’s representation in the political arena, within its own patriarchal understanding of how they can best serve the national interest” (p. 251). Gramsci’s claim that “concessions to the subordinate classes in return for acquiescence in bourgeois’ leadership” (Cox, 1983, pp. 51) is appropriate here because small concessions were given to appease women at home and led to international applause for his so-called progressiveness. In figure 4 below, we see how the author’s new framework explains Musharraf’s military dictatorship.

Figure 5.2 Critical junctures and commonsense framework to explain the second critical juncture in Pakistan

Author: Sana Naqvi

The CJ framework speaks to the idea that in normal times women would not be given space to inhabit the public realm, but a dictator desperate for legitimacy came to power acted as a period where a lot of options are available to counter-hegemonic intellectuals in society to go up against patriarchal and hegemonic organic intellectuals, i.e., the religious clergy. This time also provided women activists to legally try to reverse after-effects of Zia’s Islamic regime, and we see the importance of antecedent conditions as the “effect of decisions made much earlier in time become entrenched in institutional arrangements” (Pierson, 2004) and the fight to rectify old laws is a long-drawn-out process. It is important to mention here that since there is a long gap between the two critical junctures being studied there is temporal leverage which is a “measure of the duration of the impact of the critical juncture relative to the duration of the juncture itself. The higher the value of this measure, the more critical the
juncture” (Capoccia and Kelemen, 2007, p. 361). Furthermore, it is important to remember that critical juncture studies ‘historical causes’, such that certain events can be historically sequenced back (Collier and Collier, 1991, p. 35).

For the CJ, historical causes are necessary to explain legacy building and will be the focus of the next section. The diagram above shows how this critical juncture might have been under a similar variable, i.e., a dictator coming to power, but the antecedent conditions in figure 4 look very different from those in figure 3. The legacy that was formed after Zia’s rule (figure 3) was already more gender friendly. Thus, while in figure 3 it was Zia’s death that was the critical juncture, in figure 4 it is Musharraf coming to power that helped to improve the conditions for women. In the legacy building of this critical juncture, we see that more laws were introduced regarding women. While these laws are heartening to see, it is interesting that counter-hegemonic forces such as Islamic clerics continued to propagate that woman should be kept out of the public, which included casting their vote. This is seen when election watchdog PILDAT released statistics that there was an overall 39 per cent reduction in women voters from 2002 to 2007 (Khan, 2018, p. 273). While Sindh women voters reduced by 20 per cent, the more conservative areas such as Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) saw a 45 per cent decrease (Khan, 2018, p. 273), which reflects the notion that more conservative areas are victim to more gendered regressive norms. The next section will discuss further the latter part of figure 4 which includes legacy production and reproduction.

c) The Legacy of the Dictatorships

Figure 4 shows how legacy formation takes place. In the aftermath of Musharraf’s rule there were mechanisms of production which included introduction of more laws for women, highlighted in table 1. During Musharraf’s era there was high political commitment because he was trying to legitimize his rule. This production of space for women can be understood through the concept of self-reinforcing sequences, or a group of sequenced events. Women took their issues to court and since there were already gender-friendly laws in place, slowly it became the norm that women were protected; thus, the support of state institutions helped reproduce a positive legacy for women. However, as mentioned before there are core attributes of the past legacy that continued to exist; Zia’s Islamization had seeped into society and was extremely hard to control. However, since there was continuous rival commonsense in society formed by the civil society, there was constant pushback on these unfriendly actions. When studying this case study and tracing how women voters are empowered more, we need to see that in the years following Musharraf there was an increase in political consciousness which led to more awareness about women’s role in politics, more fact-finding missions sent when there were inconsistencies in election results and more media presence around women voters (Aware Girls, 2013).
Institutional obstacles shrink the little will that women have to vote to begin with. The political legacy in Pakistan and the general mistrust of the judicial system because of inconsistencies within it meant that other mediums of justice are present which becoming means through which norms around how women should act are disseminated. In the more conservative areas of KP, the jirga11 system still exists. These institutions and decision-making bodies are dominated by influential men and their policies and practices discriminate against women, as this has been the status of women for decades. In these areas the infringement of women in the public sphere constitutes a crime worthy enough to be judged by these conservative elders whose opinions are to a large extent related to notions of shame (Saigol, 2016). This is where the power resides, and this is how knowledge is produced at the end of the day because by constant repetition of the same sort of mindset, these dangerous norms take over society and color the perception of how women are meant to act, and the autonomy they should be accorded in the public sphere. Judith Butler’s (1990) has aptly claimed that to understand power, we need to study in depth how we are socialized to believe in particular hierarchies and gender norms are determined as a result of this socialization. Power does not exist horizontally when certain people have more of a say in how society will function. This vertical power play thus infiltrates both the public and private sphere. In an interview with Zonia Yousuf12 about these informal institutions, she states “I remember my diver who belonged to a small village in KP told me that the 2018 elections were the first time that the elders of his village asked everyone to vote, including women, and to vote for PTI13. So essentially the head of the household, the cleric you follow and/or the leader of the village decides who will vote and for whom” (Yousuf, 2021). This buttresses the argument that while there is a great push being made by activists and civil society, as highlighted above, these regressive justice systems and conservative mindsets still exist. The reason the CJ framework is suitable here is because while space is made for alternative commonsense narratives, which propagate women’s inclusion, the legacies of Zia’s era continue to live on. Thus, the civil society and more left-leaning democratic forces have two tasks: one is to gender mainstream policies and push for rights of women and second is to continually reverse the actions from the past. An example of this is that even though Zia’s Hudood laws were put in place in 1979, it was only in 2006 that they were reversed with the Protection of Women Bill, thirty-three years later (Mehdi, 2010). Thus, it is interesting because legacy is not produced right after the critical juncture, instead there are steps that take place in between that shape the legacy (Collier and Munk, 2017, p. 6). It is these steps that then allow for mechanisms of reproduction to take place and ‘account for the stability’ of the legacy (Collier and Munk, 2017, p. 6).

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11 Jirgas are tribal councils, local institutions of conflict settlement that incorporate “prevalent local customary law and rituals. The jirga is an all male institution where designated ‘honorable men’ – mostly family headmen, village elders, tribal chieftains and landholders arbitrate conflicts and give solutions that focus on restoring societal equilibrium rather than justice and human rights of individuals. The collective decision is socially binding on the parties involved” (Brohi, 2017, p. 6)

12 Interview conducted on June 28th 2021, Online via Skype

13 PTI is the incumbent government in Pakistan (2018-2022). The Prime Minister of Pakistan is from this party, and it has a center-right political ideology.
It is because of the coexistence of dominant and counter-hegemonic commonsense after the second critical juncture that the Election Act 2017 was introduced, a fundamental step that helped to increase women voter turnout. On May 7, 2015, the by-election in a constituency in KP took place. From the 53,817 women registered as voters, not even one came out to vote (Ghauri, 2015). Independent election observer reports were published, and media proclaimed that women were deliberately kept from voting when the local jirga struck a deal with contested candidates that women would not come out to vote (Aware Girls, 2013; Ghauri, 2015). This ad-hoc informal deal is presented in the image below and the Islamic clerics, or the hegemonic organic intellectuals of the area, ensured this by making announcements through the local mosques that if women came out to vote they marriages would be annulled and clerics would not carry out funeral prayers on their families (Dawn, 2015). Reports claim that “announcements were made through load-speakers in mosques, asking women to remain indoors during the polling” (Sirajuddin, 2015).

**Image 5.1 The informal agreement between the jirga and political parties to keep women from voting**

Source: Sirajuddin, 2015
A petition was filed by women politicians and activists in the court and the Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP) was told to cancel the election results and call for fresh elections. The theorization mentioned in figure 4 becomes important because if women had not fought to have a say in the workings of the public sphere, this event would have gone unnoticed and the ECP would have made promises to improve in the next election cycle. However, because women activists and politicians used the courts to push for the disenfranchised women, ECP called for new elections to take place. As a result, discussions took place in the national and provincial assembly and eventually the Election Law 2017 was passed which mandated that “firstly the returns from any constituency where women’s turnout was less than or equal to 10 percent be nullified. Second, it criminalized the practice of preventing a woman from voting in or contesting an election” (Mahmood, 2018).

Change is being seen in Pakistan, but it has been the result of shocks to the system. As the two critical junctures analyzed above show that changing norms might be a long process, but it is only possible if critical moments appear and give space to women. Musharraf’s rule proved to pave for women to fight for their rights and now it is the responsibility of organic intellectuals to disseminate good values. Interestingly both hegemonic and counterhegemonic organic intellectuals continue to exist today, political parties especially, and it is their responsibility to propagate more integration of women voters in the electoral landscape. Sadia Agha14, a PTI politician on reserved seat in Sindh claims: “PTI takes it very seriously as far as women’s polling rights are concerned because the support we have is from the youth and women. Women even in small towns are being educated and now know about the importance of voting, and other aspects such as inheritance and loans. As far as my part is concerned, our leadership is doing a great job in motivating, encouraging, and playing an active part in the development of the country and in politics” (Agha, 2021). When these forward-looking initiatives are taken, a brighter future in the electoral sphere can be envisioned.

6. CONCLUSION

Androcentric viewpoints have been the center of discourse around the structuring of the electoral terrain in Pakistan. This thesis attempted to understand more succulently what endogenous and exogenous factors contributed to the abysmal women voter turnout in Pakistan. While current literature paints an excellent picture of hindrances women voters need to overcome, and quantitative and qualitative research narrow down possible solutions to the problem, there is a huge research gap on historical contingency, notions of religiosity and the mechanisms in which regressive norms, that sideline women, are formed and disseminated. This dissertation bridged those gaps by studying both ontologically and epistemologically obstacles in the way of women voters. The combination of Critical Junctures and

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14 Interview conducted 2 June 2021. Online via Skype
Commonsense narrative is an innovative approach as it provides an holistic understanding of how dictatorships in the country Islamized the society and the remnants of this rule condemned women to fight an uphill, unwinnable battle to legitimize themselves in the electoral sphere. Tracing two periods under authoritarian rule was deliberate to showcase how stringent certain historical legacies are and how even when regimes fall, their fallout have devastating impacts even years later. While the thesis continually paints a negative image of electoral terrain, it concludes that change is possible, by showcasing how progressive agents such as civil society can transform society, and how the political terrain is starting to include and empower women voters. This exercise helped to answer the research question and showed how religion and culture work together to disenfranchise women voters and increase the gender gap between male and female voters. Going ahead, it is important to remain cognizant and learn from the past; positive gains can easily be lost unless intrusions to reverse them are thwarted. The base for women’s inclusion has been built in Pakistan and now is the time to march forward and keep augmenting the electoral sphere, one politician and one voter at a time.
7. REFERENCES


Ali, J. Interview conducted by Sana Naqvi. Interview date: 4 July 2021. Skype.


