

ARE DICTATORS IMMUNE TO HUMAN RIGHTS SHAMING?

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Abstract: This paper examines whether human rights naming and shaming destabilizes the rule of authoritarian leaders. We argue that human rights shaming can destabilize autocratic leaders by signaling international disapproval to elites in the targeted country, increasing their capacity to replace the incumbent. In personalist regimes, shaming increases the risk of irregular exit because regime elite do not have a means to peacefully replace the incumbent. Shaming campaigns also decrease foreign aid and international trade in personalist regimes, denying the leader access to resources to pay his coalition – further destabilizing his rule. In non-personalist regimes where parties or the military allow elites to peacefully replace incumbents, human rights shaming increases the risk of regular turnover of power, but has little effect on the risk of irregular exit or international flows of aid and trade. These findings have implications for understanding when and where shaming campaigns are likely to reduce or deter repression.

Key words: Dictatorship, Human Rights, Shaming Campaigns, Survival, Regular and Irregular Exit

1. Introduction

In early March 2009, the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued an arrest warrant for President Omar Hassan al-Bashir of Sudan for war crimes and crimes against humanity. While this marked the first time the ICC indicted a sitting head of state, international institutions and organizations have long issued indictments of sitting leaders in the form of naming and shaming. The United Nations Commission on Human Rights (UNHCR), born in the wake of World War II (1946), issued its first reprimand in 1967, while international non-governmental organization (INGOs) have also long targeted repressive leaders with missives highlighting human rights abuses. Amnesty International began its letter-writing campaigns in 1965, three years after it released its first annual report on prisoners of conscience. Human Rights Watch (HRW) began monitoring human rights violations in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe in 1978, shortly after the signing of the Helsinki Accords (1975). In the 1980s, HRW quickly expanded its coverage to most other regions of the world. Perhaps since the advent of mass produced print newspapers, the media have served to name and shame human rights abusers. Indeed, amidst the debate over the slave trade in early 19th century Great Britain, an anti-abolition M.P., General Gascoyne, once complained, "The attempts to make a popular clamour against the trade were never so conspicuous as during the last election, when the public newspapers had teemed with abuse of this trade..." (Drescher 1994, p. 148).¹

The ICC indictment of al-Bashir raises a number of questions concerning the effect of naming and shaming on both the level of repression in Sudan and the political fortunes of al-Bashir himself: Will this indictment reduce repression in Sudan or will al-Bashir increase repression in response to international pressure? Will rival elites view the indictment as an excuse to replace al-Bashir? Finally, will the ICC ruling deter repression by other authoritarian leaders in the future? The analysis of well-informed commentators does not give us a clear answer. For example, some who supported the indictment argued that making al-Bashir an international fugitive would deter political repression in other countries. The director of Human Rights Watch suggested that "[H]e [al-Bashir] will be a fugitive, a man on a wanted poster held to be most responsible for the atrocities of Darfur."² Others, such as the United Nations undersecretary general for peacekeeping operations, pointed out that the indictment may lead to an increase in repression, particularly in the near-term.³ Still others, such as the deputy president of the International Crisis Group, argued that, "although Mr. Bashir and his security apparatus are still entrenched in power, the indictment is likely to weaken their hold. It may even cause the army and intelligence agencies, the ultimate wielders of power, to contemplate a future without Bashir."⁴ Indeed, whether al-Bashir increases repression in the aftermath of the indictment may well be linked to how the indictment shapes his political fortunes. If the indictment increases the risk of a coup, some fear, this may prod al-Bashir to increase repression in the short-term.

1. Furneaux (1994), p.251. Quoted in Drescher (1994).

2. Richard Dicker was quoted in Simons (2009). "Court Issues Warrant for Arrest of Sudan President." *New York Times* (March 5 2009).

3. Alain Le Roy was quoted in Simons (2009). "Court Issues Warrant for Arrest of Sudan President." *New York Times* (March 5 2009).

4. Nick Grono was quoted in Simons (2009). "Court Issues Warrant for Arrest of Sudan President." *New York Times* (March 5 2009).

The debate over the indictment of al-Bashir suggests that understanding whether rulings of this nature in any sense “work” – with respect to both the level of repression in the target country and the potential deterrent effect in other countries – may be linked to the political fortunes of the targeted leader. Understanding how naming and shaming affects these political fortunes, in turn, may depend on the political pressures the targeted leader faces at home. In this paper, we take up this question by examining how shaming campaigns affect the survival of authoritarian leaders.

This paper asks when and where human rights naming and shaming affects the political fortunes of authoritarian leaders targeted by such efforts. In particular, we examine how shaming affects the risk of *irregular* and *regular* exits from power (Goemans & Chiozza 2009). While other scholars have looked at whether shaming affects subsequent levels of repression, our approach to this question takes a step back and puts the question of repression in the context of overall political instability. Following the logic Marinov (2005) highlights with respect to the effectiveness of economic sanctions, we argue that to better understand whether shaming can reduce or deter repression, we need to first understand whether human rights shaming can impose domestic political costs on the target leader.

Scholars have recently begun to examine how naming and shaming affects outcomes such as repression and foreign aid across a broad swath of countries. Hafner-Burton (2008) is the first study (to our knowledge) to examine the effect of shaming on repression in a global sample. Her findings generally suggest that on *average* shaming makes little difference for repression outcomes in targeted countries.⁵ One explanation she highlights for this largely null result is the possibility that targeted countries may vary substantially in their capacity to effect change in repression outcomes once targeted. While we find this argument quite compelling, we offer another possible explanation: the effect of shaming on repression may vary by regime type because shaming campaigns shape the political fortunes of targeted leaders in different ways. We explore this latter question in this paper.

The search for how human rights naming and shaming can “work” took a step forward with Lebovic & Voeten’s (2009) study of UNCHR resolutions and foreign aid. They provide some of the first systematic evidence that shaming campaigns can be costly to targeted countries by showing that UNCHR resolutions reduce foreign aid receipts in countries shamed by the UNCHR. Multilateral donors – especially the World Bank – reduce aid to targeted countries, but bilateral donors, they find, do not. Governments may not always have the domestic political incentives to sanction human rights infractions bilaterally, they argue, but do have an incentive to delegate these tasks to multilateral organizations. While this research explores donor politics to understand how shaming affects aid distribution, we concentrate on the politics of the recipient countries to understand how UNCHR shaming affects the political

5. In some specifications she finds that shaming in certain regions, such as the Americas and Asia, is correlated with increased repression, but subsequently more political freedoms.

fortunes of targeted leaders, arguing that the aid conduit is one mechanism through which shaming can shape the political fortunes of targeted leaders. We build directly on this work by expanding Lebovic & Voeten's (2009) analysis of UNCHR resolutions and foreign aid to test whether the effect of these resolutions vary by recipient country regime type.

Preceding these pioneering cross-national empirical studies, many observers and scholars have for decades examined how international approbation affects the emergence of human rights norms and regimes, and whether the enforcement of human rights law can reduce and deter repression (Cleary 1997; Sikkink 1993; Lutz & Sikkink 2000).⁶ As Hafner-Burton & Ron (2009) argue, though, the method researchers use often leads to very different conclusions about the effectiveness of human rights campaigns. Many of the qualitative case studies conclude that human rights pressure leads to positive changes in human rights laws and that enforcement can help to reduce repression. The conclusion of much of the cross-national empirical work, however, offers a more pessimistic view because these studies have been unable to uncover a systematic pattern showing that human rights campaigns have helped to reduce repression in targeted countries. Our study contributes to this latter literature by looking more closely at the politics inside authoritarian countries targeted by human rights campaigns. By examining how shaming affects the political fortunes of targeted leaders and looking at how this effect varies by regime type, we may be able to progress towards bridging the gap between the optimistic view of many of the qualitative findings and the pessimistic conclusions of the initial pioneering cross-national empirical work.

We argue that the effect of shaming on the political fortunes of incumbent authoritarian leaders should vary by authoritarian regime type because elites in different regimes face varying domestic political constraints and have very distinct mechanisms for replacing incumbents who fall into disfavor. Rival elites in personalist regimes, we posit, have no peaceful mechanism for rotating elites – forcing rivals to pursue violent means to remove incumbents. Thus if shaming proves destabilizing for personalist leaders, international approbation should increase the risk of *irregular* removal from power. In military and dominant party regimes, however, elites have access to institutional mechanisms to rotate elite peacefully. The removal of incumbents who fall into disfavor, therefore, can take place without violence. If shaming were to destabilize rulers in these regimes, it should increase the risk of *regular* exit. Further, we show that the incentive for elites in personalist regimes to remove the incumbent leader when targeted by shaming campaigns is stronger than in other types of regimes because shaming decreases the flow of foreign aid and trade in personalist regimes. Thus shaming campaigns strike at the very mechanism by which personalist leaders maintain the loyalty of regime elite.

6. See Hafner-Burton & Ron (2009) for an excellent review.

We first discuss how the domestic politics of leaders in different types of authoritarian regimes is likely to affect how shaming campaigns shape the political fortunes of targeted leaders. To underscore why the elite in personalist regimes have such a strong incentive to remove the incumbent when targeted by shaming campaigns, we show empirically that naming and shaming campaigns have the strongest effect on aid and trade in personalist regimes. The next section discusses the data and methods used to test the main hypotheses for how shaming affect authoritarian leader survival. The following section reports the results. We conclude with a discussion of the findings, emphasizing the implications of the main results for the prospects of shaming campaigns.

2. The Domestic Political Costs of Shame

To understand how shaming campaigns affect the survival of authoritarian leaders, we discuss two mechanisms through which shaming can shape the domestic political fortunes of the targeted leader. First, shaming can be costly for the incumbent if he loses valuable sources of external revenue such as foreign aid and trade (*external revenue loss*). This should be especially costly for leaders in regimes that are most dependent on patronage to stay in power and in countries where shaming leads to the sharpest decreases in foreign aid and trade. Second, shaming can provide a signal to domestic political rivals that the incumbent is weak, reducing the collective action costs for rival elites to coordinate and remove the incumbent (*signal to rival elites*). This signalling mechanism should be most effective in removing the incumbent in regimes where elite have the institutional capacity to coordinate their action against the incumbent leader. These same institutions that provide elites with organizing capacity to act collectively against the incumbent may also provide the elite with a mechanism to peacefully remove the leader, allowing another member of the elite to take power. The next three subsections discuss these two mechanisms by answering the following questions.

- Which leaders are the most sensitive to external revenue loss? (*external revenue loss*)
- Which leaders actually lose aid and trade when shamed? (*external revenue loss*)
- Which leaders depend upon support from elite who have institutions that aid collective action? (*signal to rival elites*)

It is quite difficult to directly observe the potential political costs of shaming in authoritarian polities, so we use the risk of removal from power to measure these domestic political costs, under the assumption that a greater risk of removal imposes a larger political cost on the incumbent leader (Marinov 2005). Simply measuring the risk of exiting power, however, may not fully capture the *types* of political costs or domestic pressures that a leader may face when targeted by a shaming campaign. That is, all exits from power may not incur the same costs. Goemans (2008) shows that different *types* of removal from power entail very different consequences for the incumbent leader. Irregular exit – for example via a coup by the military – frequently

entails jail, exile or even death for the deposed leader. An increased risk of irregular exit may therefore provide leaders with an incentive to increase repression in an effort to remain in power and forestall a particularly nasty post-exit fate. Regular exit from power – for example the transfer of power via a democratic election – may leave the deposed authoritarian incumbent in peaceful retirement or even well placed to compete again in (possibly democratic) elections in the future. The risk of regular removal of power may therefore entail very different incentives for the incumbent with respect to using repression. Rather than increasing repression in a desperate attempt to hold onto power, an increased risk of regular exit may prod the incumbent to loosen the repressive apparatus of the regime in an effort to win popular support for regime elite.

2.1 Which Leaders Are the Most Sensitive to External Revenue Loss?

While most scholars of authoritarian politics acknowledge that patronage is an important, if not the most important, tool in the box of strategies available for dictators to maintain the loyalty of their supporters (Wintrobe 1990; Wintrobe 1998; Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003), personalist leaders are singled out for their total reliance on patronage spending (Jackson & Rosberg 1984, Bratton & Van de Walle 1994, Linz & Chehabi 1992). Some of the first researchers to circumscribe the method of rule in personalist regimes argue that “the system favors the ruler and his allies and clients: its essential activity involves gaining access to a personal regime’s patronage or displacing the ruler and perhaps his regime and installing another” (Jackson and Rosberg 1984, 424). While patronage keeps the loyalty of rival elites, personalist leaders also frequently concentrate power in their own hands by gaining control over other institutions in society – in particular the military and political parties. Geddes argues that “although personalist regimes have parties and militaries, these organizations have not become sufficiently developed or autonomous to prevent the leader from taking personal control of policy decisions and selection of regime personnel” (2003, 53). Personalist leaders are more likely to create parties after they come to power and these parties are more often urban political organizing tools with little loyalty to the leader save the patronage he can dispense in return for support (Geddes 2008).

While personalist leaders may be more likely to (initially) have less control over the military, when they do succeed in gaining authority over the soldiers, these leaders are often left with a relatively weak defense force. Personalist leaders typically attempt to gain control of the military by seizing the authority to make personnel decisions. This allows the leaders to place supporters in high ranking positions within the military – often resulting in a weaker military. In practice, this may mean filling the upper ranks of the military with blood relatives or members of the leader’s ethnic group. For example, by the mid-1990s Mobutu had swelled the ranks of colonel and general in the Forces Armées Zairoises (FAZ) to over 50 generals and some 600 colonels, with more than half of the generals from Mobutu’s Ngbandi tribe and many of the rest from his home state

of Equateur Province (Lemarchand 2009, Prunier 2009, p. 128).⁷ In the end, Mobutu's military put up little fight against Kabila's AFDL – as many of the FAZ regulars in the East switched sides when they realized Kabila would be the new boss in town. Mobutu was indeed successful in controlling the military and faced few coup threats from the military itself, but this control came at the expense of a military incapable of defending Kinshasa from even the most rag-tag group of rebels.

Personalist leaders are not the only ones to employ patronage spending to stay in power. Quite the contrary. Dominant party regimes maintain the support of relatively large coalitions of supporters through their dominant parties by distributing patronage – particularly local public goods (Magaloni 2006, Brownlee 2007, Blaydes 2008, Greene 2009). Even militaries can be quite adept at buying the support of key elite or the mass public with patronage. For example, Hunter argues the Brazilian military's attempt to ensure electoral victory after 1974 meant “transforming ARENA into a ‘gigantic patronage machine’.” (1997, p.103)

While almost all authoritarian leaders use some form of patronage to buy support, personalist leaders set themselves apart because they lack strong institutions to help them rule: they typically have weak militaries and either weak or non-existent parties and legislative institutions (Wright 2008). Even with a weakened military, they may be reluctant to activate (and adequately supply) the military for fear the soldiers will organize against the leader. Thus pursuing widespread repression when external resources available for patronage spending fall short can be a risky strategy for surviving in power (Escribà-Folch & Wright 2009).

Further, because personalist leaders lack strong political institutions, they cannot make credible inter-temporal promises to their supporters. Dominant party regimes can and do make good on promises to distribute patronage in the future – particularly around election time (Magaloni 2006, Blaydes 2008, Pepinsky 2007). This may be one reason dominant party regimes are relatively resistant to economic shocks (Haggard & Kaufman 1995, Chapter 7; Geddes 1999), and typically only lose power once the state (and hence the party) reduces its control over large portions of the economy (Greene 2009). Because of the long history state patronage and large margin of electoral victories for dominant parties, supporters expect the party to remain in power at least in the near- to mid-term, if not indefinitely, and thus believe party promises of future support.⁸

While much of the literature on personalism emphasizes the ruler's dependence on patronage resources to maintain loyalty, we take this claim one step further and suggest that personalist leaders are generally more sensitive to the loss of external revenue sources

7. The strongest units and those tasked with internal security, the Division Spéciale Présidentielle (DSP) and the Service d'Action et de Renseignement Militaire (SNIP), were filled mostly with Ngbandi and headed by Mobutu's nephew and brother-in-law respectively (Prunier 2009, 128).

8. Magaloni (2006) shows that older voters who experienced decades of PRI rule under a growing economy were much more likely than younger voters to support the PRI in the wake of the 1994 peso crisis, in part, because the older voters expected PRI rule to continue and had been long-time recipients of PRI patronage.

than leaders in other types of regimes because: (1) they do not have strong militaries that can effectively repress mobilization against their rule and mobilizing the military is a risky strategy; and (2) these leaders typically have weak parties and hence cannot make credible inter-temporal promises to their supporters. Therefore, when personalist leaders lose valuable external sources of revenue, they have little else left in their toolkit of authoritarian strategies to retain the support of their coalition.

2.2. Which Leaders Lose Aid and Trade when Shamed?

Shaming campaigns are political tools and thus reflect the political calculations of the shaming organization (Lebovic & Voeten 2006). Being targeted by a shaming campaign is therefore not simply a function of the level of repression in a country (though this matters), but reflects larger political interactions. A quick look at some of the well-known human rights abusers represented on the UNCHR illustrates the point that there are political explanations for being the target (or not) of a shaming campaign.⁹ The candidates for the UNCHR submitted by various regional bodies, for example, are frequently the winners of a (regional) political game and are not chosen based on their capacity to ferret out and stand up to human rights abuses. Some countries, such as Libya or Zimbabwe, have a stronger incentive to gain a seat on the UNCHR to shape its action and deflect criticism of its own human rights abuses, than a country such as Tanzania which has little to gain from being on the UNCHR precisely because its level of repression is so low that is unlikely to be targeted in the first place. Because human rights shaming is itself the outcome of a political process, repression does not automatically result in being targeted by a shaming campaign.

Extending this logic one step further, being targeted by a shaming campaign also may not always result in damaging action against the targeted leader. As Lebovic & Voeten (2009) show, bilateral aid donors cannot easily sanction human rights abusers because these donors cannot credibly withdraw aid from strategically important recipients. Alternatively, multilateral donors use UNCHR resolutions condemning human rights abuses as a signal that it is politically acceptable in the larger international community to cut aid to the targeted countries. These findings suggest that whether a shaming campaign results in less aid for the targeted country depends on the type of donor. The larger point, though, is that shaming may not always lead to costly foreign aid sanctions for the targeted leader.

We build on this intuition by examining how the effect of shaming campaigns on foreign aid varies by the regime type of the target country. While Lebovic & Voeten (2009) show that the shaming effect varies by donor, we investigate whether it also

9. Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International protested the nomination of Libya to the U.N. Commission on Human Rights in 2003. Amnesty argued that "it expected the chair of the Commission to lead by example, but that it was apparent from various reports it had written on Libya that human rights were not respected there." (*BBC News* 2003).

varies by type of recipient. Different types of regimes have more and less capacity to lobby donors and potentially block a shaming campaign from turning into a more costly loss of valuable international sources of revenue. The logic of Lebovice & Voeten (2009) suggests that UNCHR resolutions should matter because they signal to donors that the international community has given international organizations license to sanction the targeted countries. In other words, the UNCHR-targeted countries are not only guilty of repression, but they have lost the political battle and are now eligible for punishment meted out by international organizations.

Personalist regimes again stand apart from other types of regimes because they lack strong domestic institutions, which in turn can affect their ability to lobby international organizations in two ways. First, just as personalist leaders cannot make credible inter-temporal promises to domestic audiences, their lack of strong institutions may also reduce their ability to be taken seriously in the international realm. While some personalist leaders secure domestic power and may be long-lived, this does not necessarily mean they can make credible promises, now or in the future, because they still face few domestic constraints and thus bear little in the way of domestic audience costs should they rescind or back down (Weeks 2008, Ezrow & Frantz forthcoming). Second, because personalist rulers prefer weaker domestic institutions, they may not have the capacity to collect income taxes to fund an effective civil service that can provide the basic functions of the state including providing public goods. Thus leaders in these regimes may simply lack the state capacity to effectively lobby internationally. Finally, personalist leaders may simply have less international legitimacy than leaders in other types of authoritarian regimes. Winning relatively free elections by large margins may give leaders in dominant party regimes more international legitimacy, while military leaders during the Cold War may have been viewed as more legitimate precisely because their military capacity was an asset in defending Western interests against the the advance of communism – at least in the eyes of many Western international leaders. Thus personalist leaders may face the most difficulty in blocking international targeting of their country and its leaders.

This discussion yields two testable implications. First, if GDP per capita is a good proxy for state capacity, wealthier countries should be better placed to lobby donors to keep the aid flowing despite a bad round at the UNHCR. We should therefore expect the effect of UNCHR resolutions to vary by income.¹⁰ A second implication suggests that if personalist rulers have weaker domestic institutions that hinder their capacity to lobby internationally, the effect of UNCHR resolutions in reducing aid should be strongest in these regimes.

10. In testing this implication, it is important to control for oil wealth because donors may be reluctant to cut aid to oil producers for fear that oil-rich countries would cut the supply of a good with highly inelastic demand; and oil and wealth are highly correlated in the sample of authoritarian countries.

2.3. Does Shame Hurt Personalist Leaders where It Counts?

In this section, we test these expectations about how the effect of UNCHR resolutions on foreign aid flows and international trade may vary by recipient. In the context of our larger argument, authoritarian leaders in personalist regimes may be the most sensitive to human rights shaming. This sensitivity may be exacerbated if shaming leads to a substantial decrease in foreign aid and/or trade in personalist regimes than in other types of regimes. Here we test the plausibility of this latter conjecture by extending an important finding by Lebovic & Voeten (2009). Their analysis shows that UNCHR resolutions decrease multilateral aid disbursements, but have no effect on bilateral aid. They suggest that bilateral donors cannot credibly withdraw aid from repressive recipient countries for strategic reasons. Alternatively, multilateral lenders use UNCHR resolutions to determine which recipient countries can be sanctioned by withdrawing aid. The important strategic component for multilateral lenders, they suggest, is that UNCHR resolutions provide valuable information about which recipient countries they can sanction without losing support from governments that provide funding to the multilateral institutions themselves. The multilateral lenders, they suggest, use UNCHR resolutions as cover.

In this section, we use UNCHR resolutions to measure international naming and shaming. Below, we expand the measure shaming to include NGO shaming (Amnesty International) and media shaming (the *Economist* and *Newsweek*). We use UNCHR resolutions in this section for three reasons. First, this allows us to directly replicate and expand upon earlier research by using the same research design. Second, UNCHR resolutions are the culmination of a larger process of naming and shaming. These resolutions, as Lebovic & Voeten (2006) argue, are the last stage and the most severe punishment that the U.N. can dispense for human rights violators. The other forms of shaming (INGO and media) that we consider when testing the main hypothesis may signal international disapproval to domestic rivals in the targeted country, but they do not have mechanisms for directly punishing the targeted country. The U.N. does and it takes the form of these UNCHR resolutions. Third, and perhaps most importantly, these resolutions capture the strategic component of aid distribution wherein multilateral institutions use resolutions to determine which repressive countries the international community has approved for targeting with sanctions. After controlling for the level of repression, we can determine *de facto* which types of regimes actually suffer aid (and trade) losses when targeted by the UNCHR.

2.4. UNCHR Resolutions and Foreign Aid

We begin by extending Lebovic & Voeten's (2009) findings. They test whether UNCHR resolutions affect foreign aid to recipient countries using three different dependent variables: bilateral aid, multilateral aid, and World Bank aid. All aid measures are divided by population and then logged. They test both random- and (country) fixed-effects models for each dependent variable: six models in total. Their model specification includes a lagged dependent variable to control for auto-correlation and the following control variables. *PTS* is a measure of repression (human rights abuses); *CivilLiberties*

is the Freedom House score for civil liberties; *USAgree* is a measure of how often the recipient country votes with the U.S. in the U.N. General Assembly; *War* is a binary indicator measuring internal or external conflict as coded by Gleditsch et al. (2002); and *Capabilities* is the Correlates of War's Composite Indicator of National Capability, an index of military expenditure and personnel, energy consumption, iron and steel production, urban population, and total population. The time trends measure calendar years. We take this same specification and add dummy variables for different types of authoritarian regimes: (*Personalist*, *Party*, *Military*, *Monarchy*, and *Military-Personalist*).¹¹ The excluded category is *Democracy*. We then interact each of the authoritarian regime type dummies with the binary UNCHR resolution variable.

$$Aid = Aid_{t-1} + RegimeType_r + UNCHR_{t-1} + RegimeType_r * UNCHR_{t-1} + \Delta PTS + PTS_{t-1} + \Delta CivilLiberties + CivilLiberties_{t-1} + GDPpc_{t-1} + Log(Pop)_{t-1} + USAgree_{t-1} + War + Capabilities + time + time^2$$

Table 1. UNCHR Resolution and Foreign Aid (Replication & Extension of Lebovic & Voeten 2009): Coefficients for HR Resolution only

Models	Bilateral		Multilateral		World Bank	
	RE	FE	RE	FE	RE	FE
Coefficients for Human Rights Resolution						
Personalist	-0.29*	-0.36*	-0.62**	-0.56*	-1.20**	-0.87**
	(0.12)	(0.15)	(0.16)	(0.24)	(0.36)	(0.32)
Single-party	-0.08	-0.05	-0.33	-0.32	-0.19	-0.04
	(0.13)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.18)	(0.41)	(0.19)
Military	-0.11	-0.18	-0.13	-0.23	-0.37	-0.28
	(0.15)	(0.13)	(0.21)	(0.27)	(0.34)	(0.34)
Monarch	0.12	-0.08	0.38	0.25	-0.13	-0.06
	(0.20)	(0.11)	(0.26)	(0.23)	(0.37)	(0.08)
Military-Personalist	-0.21	-0.18	-0.91**	-0.87**	-0.59*	-0.49
	(0.14)	(0.10)	(0.20)	(0.24)	(0.29)	(0.29)
Democracy	0.25*	0.20*	-0.13	-0.05	-0.31	-0.27
	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.13)	(0.15)	(0.23)	(0.23)
Average effect from Lebovic & Voeten	-0.03	-0.06	-0.30**	-0.28**	-0.42**	-0.28*
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.14)	(0.13)
% Change in Aid:						
Personalist	-25*	-30*	-46**	-43*	-70**	-58**
Single-party	-8	-5	-28	-27	-17	-3
Military	-11	-16	-12	-21	-31	-24
Monarch	12	-8	45	28	-12	-5
Military-Personalist	-19	-16	-60**	-58**	-44*	-38
Democracy	28*	23*	-12	-4	-27	-24
Average effect from Lebovic & Voeten	-3	-6	-26**	-24**	-34**	-24*
Log likelihood	-1774	-1542	-2456	-2264	-2182	-2062
Observations	2324	2324	2308	2308	1548	1548

Note: Dependent variable is logged Aid per capita. Standard errors in parentheses. % change in Aid calculated using: $100 * (e^{\beta} - 1)$ where β is the coefficient for UNHCR Resolution. * p<0.05; ** p<0.01.

In Table 1, we report the coefficients for the *UNCHR* and the linear combination of the coefficients for *UNCHR* and its interaction with each regime type dummy. For example, in

11. The coding for these regimes is from Geddes (2003) and Wright (2008). Single-party hybrid regimes are grouped with *Party* regimes.

Table 1, the coefficients for Personalist are actually: . The coefficient for *Democracy* in Table 1 is simply the coefficient for , which represents the marginal effect of these resolutions on aid for the excluded category, which is Democracies. The coefficients reported in the top panel of Table 1 can therefore be interpreted as the marginal effect of a UNCHR resolution in each regime type. The full results of the regression are reported in the Appendix. We also provide the results from Lebovic & Voeten (2009) for the *average* effect of UNCHR resolutions across all regime types. The bottom panel of Table 1 transforms the coefficients into percentages to gauge the substantive effect of UNCHR resolutions.

In all six models, UNCHR resolutions decrease foreign aid to countries with personalist leaders.¹² However, the substantive effect varies across donor: bilateral donors decrease aid in personalist regimes by 25-30%, while multilateral donors cut aid by over 40% – including reductions of World Bank aid by as much as 58-70%. The only other regime type in which UNCHR resolutions are associated with statistically significant cuts in aid are military-personalist regimes, where multilateral donors cut aid by close to 60% when the recipient is targeted by a UNCHR resolution. Our extension of Lebovic & Voeten’s (2009) model is still consistent with their general claims: even in the regime type (personalist) that consistently faces aid cuts when targeted by UNCHR resolution, the effect is much larger for multilateral lenders than for bilateral lenders – a pattern, though not statistically significant, that emerges across other regime types. But our analysis does suggest that only looking at the average effect obscures substantial variation across the type of recipient. All donors, even bilateral ones, may view UNCHR resolutions as sufficient evidence that the international community backs aid reductions to repressive countries with personalist leaders.

Models	Bilateral		Multilateral		World Bank	
	RE	FE	RE	FE	RE	FE
Coefficients for Human Rights Resolution						
Wealthy (@ 75 th %tile of Log(GDPpc))	.14+	.08	-.19+	-.15	-.46*	-.41**
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.21)	(0.14)
Poor (@ 25 th %tile of Log(GDPpc))	-.13+	-.15+	-.37**	-.35**	-.41*	-.22
	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.12)	(0.16)	(0.18)
Average effect from Lebovic & Voeten	-0.03	-0.06	-0.30**	-0.28**	-0.42**	-0.28*
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.14)	(0.13)

Dependent variable logged Aid per capita. Standard errors in parentheses. + p<0.10; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01.

We also tested whether the effect of UNCHR resolution on foreign aid was conditional on the wealth of the targeted country by interacting *UNCHR* with *Log(GDPpc)*. Instead of include regime type dummies and their interaction with *UNCHR*, we simply add the interaction between *UNCHR* and *Log(GDPpc)*. Table 2

12. The results remain the same if we include interactions between regime type and the *PTS* and *CivilLiberties* variables.

reports the coefficients for *UNCHR* in all six models in wealthy countries (75th %tile of the distribution of $\text{Log}(GDPpc)$ in the sample) and poor countries (25th %tile).¹³ The results indicate that relatively wealthy targets of UNCHR resolutions can avoid aid sanctions from bilateral donors and to some extent multilateral donors, while relatively poor targets are hit hardest when targeted. The results for the World Bank, on the other hand, suggest that the wealth of the target country does not condition the effect of UNCHR resolutions on World Bank aid. If $\text{Log}(GDPpc)$ is a good proxy for state capacity to lobby in an effort to block aid sanctions when targeted by the UNCHR, then these results suggest that bilateral donors and to some extent multilateral donors (but not the World Bank) are susceptible to these types of lobbying efforts. The evidence for bilateral and multilateral aid lend some credence to the conjecture that state capacity conditions the effect of UNCHR resolutions on foreign aid.

Overall, the evidence in this section cannot conclusively pinpoint the causal mechanism that links personalist rule to the loss of aid revenue when targeted by the UNCHR. However, we suggest that ineffective international lobbying may be one reason for this finding. That said, the results suggest that UNCHR resolutions are the most painful for personalist leaders, which is consistent with the conjecture that personalist leaders lose more international financial support than other types of authoritarian leaders when targeted by international shaming campaigns.

2.5. UNCHR Resolutions and International Trade

Next, we examine how UNCHR resolutions affect international trade. Trade can be an important source of revenue for governments – particularly in countries with insufficient state capacity to collect income taxes (Brautigam 2009; Lieberman 2002). Combined with aid, international trade, and especially the taxes on that trade, may be essential for a authoritarian leaders to maintain the support of elite in their coalition and survive in power. Here we test two models of trade using the Lebovic & Voeten (2009) data. We exclude democracies in this analysis and add a control variable for oil and gas rents (*Rents*) from Ross (2008). We control for *Rents* because world demand for natural resource exports is more inelastic than other types of exports and trading partners may be less willing to curb fuel imports than other types of imports. We only examine models with country fixed effects to control for the geographic determinants of trade that do not vary across time. In the first model, we exclude most of the control variables from the *Aid* equations, except the following:

$$\text{Trade} = \text{Trade}_{t-1} + \delta_t + \text{UNCHR}_{t-1} + \text{UNCHR} * \text{Regime Type}_t + \text{Regime Type}_t + \text{Rents}_{t-1} + \text{time} + \text{time}^2 + \text{time}^3$$

13. The full models are available from the authors. The coefficients for poor countries are obtained from the linear combination of . The coefficients for wealthy countries are obtained from the linear combination of . The results do not change if we include dummy variables for regime type.

where δ_i are country fixed effects, indexes each of four authoritarian regime types (*Personalist*, *Party*, *Military*, *Military-Personalist*), with *Monarchy* as the excluded category. In the second *Trade* model, we add back in all of the controls from *Aid* models. Again, we only report coefficients for UNCHR resolution (capturing the marginal effect in *Monarchies*) and the linear combination of the coefficients for UNCHR resolution and its interaction with each regime type dummy. The full model is reported in the Appendix.

In both models, UNCHR resolutions are associated with large and statistically significant decreases in trade in *Personalist* regimes. The decreases in *Military-personalist* regimes is much larger than in other regime type (save *Personalist*), and statistically different from zero in the second model. In the other regime types, the decreases in trade resulting from UNCHR resolutions are much smaller and not statistically significant. While the evidence for trade is not as strong, it does nonetheless point in the same direction as the finding for aid, suggesting that another mechanism through which UNCHR resolutions hurt personalist leaders is via trade.

In short, the evidence for aid and trade is consistent with the contention that authoritarian leaders in personalist regimes suffer more losses in external revenue from international shaming than leaders in other regimes. Testing this possibility with UNCHR resolutions is important because this measure of shaming accounts for the fact that international actors are more likely to sanction repressive leaders when given the green light by international consensus. Precisely because UNCHR actions are *political* in nature, they signal the full disapproval of the international community and make it politically feasible for other international actors to curb aid and trade in response to human rights violations. The larger point, though, is that one avenue through which shaming hurts repressive leaders may be the loss of foreign aid and revenue from trade. If personalist leaders are the most sensitive to the loss of foreign aid and trade, and as the results of this section indicate, they are also the most likely to face sharp reductions in aid and trade when targeted by the UNCHR, then shaming may be most effective in destabilizing personalist rulers.

Models	1	2
Coefficients for UNCHR Resolution		
Personalist	-6.12+	-6.46*
	(3.49)	(3.06)
Single-party	-2.98	-2.60
	(2.89)	(2.72)
Military	-0.55	-0.73
	(3.62)	(2.74)
Monarchy	-1.44	0.64
	(2.51)	(2.10)
Military-personalist	-5.93	-6.30+
	(3.81)	(3.34)
R ²	0.594	0.598
Observations	1340	1340

Dependent variable is Trade%GDP. Robust standard errors in parentheses.

3. Which Leaders Face the Most Institutionalized Collective Action?

As noted above, leaders in personalist regimes typically have control over other political institutions such as the military and political parties. Their method of rule frequently uses divide-and-rule tactics to keep both potential rivals and supporters (who may in fact be the same) in line by offering large, private goods to a relatively small coalition (Wintrobe 1990, Wintrobe 1998, Acemoglu & Robinson 2004). Weeks (2008) uses this insight to argue that in these regimes, “there is no domestic audience that can effectively coordinate to sanction the leader.” (2008, p. 46) The leader can punish internal rivals, she explains, and elites often cannot survive in positions of power without the leader. Rather than the elite within the party or the military choosing a method to rotate the chief executive position, leaders in personalist regimes rotate elite in and out of positions of power so potential rivals cannot gain a power base. For example, Rafael Trujillo used the legislature to routinely sanction and resuscitate potential rivals. Any cabinet member he suspected of becoming too powerful or too contrarian was sent to Congress to demonstrate his loyalty to Trujillo. This strategy quickly escalated into a pattern of increasingly rapid turnover. Wiarda (1968) notes that during Trujillo’s first term, only two of 12 Senators and 19 of 33 Deputies “resigned.” In his second term, the Senate saw 12 resignations for 13 seats and 46 resignations for 35 lower house seats. In his third term, 32 Senators (19 seats) and 122 Deputies (42 seats) “resigned.”

In contrast, both single party regimes and military regimes frequently have institutionalized mechanisms for the turnover of leadership. Its more extreme form, observed in some dominant party regimes, is simply regular terms limits. Beginning in 1985, the Tanzania’s dominant party, the Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM), observed regular five-year terms for each president. Similarly, the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) in Mexico had regular elections every six years in which the incumbent could not be re-elected. Party insiders chose the successor to lead the party in each new Presidential election, which the PRI won every time until 2000. Even military juntas can have mechanisms for predetermined, regular leadership turnover. Remmer (1991) points out that even before the coup that ousted the Peronist in 1953, the military junta in Argentina has worked out an agreement to rotate the presidency and share power among several military services.¹⁴

Even if the regime does not have regular elections in which the incumbent cannot be re-elected, most dominant party regimes still have mechanisms for peacefully replacing a leader who loses favor with the regime elite. In the wake of Malaysia’s March 2008 election (in which UMNO and its allied parties lost their 2/3 majority in the Assembly necessary to change the Constitution) and amidst continuing corruption scandals, UMNO insiders swept the aside incumbent Prime Minister and UMNO leader Abdullah

14. See Ezrow & Frantz (forthcoming, p.14) and Gugliotta (1986).

Badawi, selecting Najib Razak, Badawi's deputy. Badawi was the hand-picked successor to long-time party leader and Prime Minister, Mohammed Mahatir – who peacefully stepped down in 2003. Even without term limits, UMNO elite have figured how to peacefully replace a retiring leader (Mahatir 2003) and an unpopular leader (Badawi 2009). In the latter case, party insiders lost faith with the incumbent and persuaded him to stand aside as they selected a new leader in an uncontested party vote.¹⁵

In addition to having institutionalized leadership turnover, both party and military regimes have structures that allow elites to coordinate action against the incumbent. In dominant party regimes, party organizations provide elite members with a durable framework wherein to resolve differences, bargain and advance in influence (Brownlee 2007). These organizations also allow regime elite to coordinate action against the incumbent leader without necessarily destabilizing the regime or the elites' access to power. Both Weeks (2008) and Ezrow and Frantz (forthcoming) argue that parties and militaries increase the capacity of regime elite to coordinate and sanction the incumbent, with implications for the regimes' conflict behavior. Ezrow and Frantz take this logic one step further and suggest that the lower coordination costs of elites in these regimes can destabilize the leader by making coups by regime insiders more likely (forthcoming, p. 22).

In short, elites in personalist regimes face substantial coordination barriers because incumbent leaders in these regimes purposefully weaken state institutions that might incubate viable rivals to their power. In contrast, elites in military and party regimes have institutional structures that are not only capable of sanctioning the leader domestically, but can serve as arenas to organize internal opposition to the incumbent by lowering coordination costs. Thus if human rights shaming by international organizations or the media sends a signal of international disapproval to regime elites in party or military dictatorships, and these elites view it in their interest to resolve the issue of international approbation, the relatively low coordination costs faced by elites allow them to organize collectively to replace the incumbent.

A recent example from Iran illustrates the internal tensions within some regimes over how to respond to international shaming campaigns. In April 2009, Iranian-American journalist Roxana Saberi was detained in Iran police custody on charges of buying wine and later, working without press credentials. After Saberi was imprisoned, international organizations and actors began a campaign in the media to pressure the Iranian regime for her release (Yeranian 2009). At the time, some analysts suggested that a moderate faction of the regime elite preferred engagement with the Obama administration to isolation. This faction pressed for action to let Saberi leave once international condemnation mounted and U.S. Secretary Clinton made clear engagement could not take place until Saberi's release (Singh 2009). President Ahmadinejad, who faced re-election a few months later, sided with the perceived majority of voters – who wanted more rapprochement with

15. *Economist* "Um, No Change: Malaysia's ruling party chooses a new leader, but not a new direction." March 26, 2009.

the West – and against the hard-line faction within the regime that backed him in his initial Presidential bid in 2003. Thus one interpretation of the journalist’s release would suggest that international pressure, combined with the electoral threat to Ahmadinejad from a more moderate candidate, pressured the President to intervene with the courts to secure Saberi’s release. Concrete pressure from Western governments may not have been particularly strong (Singh 2009), but some commentators believed Obama’s reprimand was clearly heard within regime circles (Afrasiabi 2009) and Ahmadinejad did face substantial internal pressure – from both reformers and hard-liners. While Western opposition initiated a shaming campaign but did not apply strong coercive pressure,¹⁶ the shaming campaign did send a signal of disapproval to the domestic opposition. Given this signal, internal opposition from regime supporters may have been decisive.

The larger point illustrated by this example suggests the possibility that internal dissent among – and electoral pressure from – the moderate faction of the ruling elite censured the conduct of the President, who in the end, intervened with the courts to secure Saberi’s release. If this interpretation is correct, it would be evidence that elections and the threat they pose to incumbent leaders in Iran constrain their behavior. Internal constraints on the power of the President are evident even after the fraudulent¹⁷ June 2009 elections and subsequent protests. In August 2009, leaders in Parliament have suggested that some of Ahmadinejad’s cabinet nominations will be turned down (Dahl & Hosseinian 2009). This would not mark the first parliamentary rebuke of Ahmadinejad’s appointments, as his nomination for oil minister was vetoed three times in 2005. of the President’s appointments also There are undoubtedly strong splits within the regime elite in Iran (Moslem 2002). However, the presence of a parliamentary tool to censure the President would imply that regime elite can coordinate to threaten and perhaps even replace an incumbent in a peaceful manner that does not threaten the regime elite’s overall hold on power. In fact, employing electoral pressure to censure political leaders may be one method that allows the elite to change policy positions and better capture domestic supporters without losing legitimacy – thus strengthening the elites’ power (Brownlee 2007).

4. Hypotheses

Let us briefly summarize our argument thus far. We expect naming and shaming campaigns to destabilize personalist rulers because these regimes are the most sensitive to the loss of aid and trade revenue and appear to suffer substantial declines in foreign aid and international trade when targeted by a shaming campaign. The loss of external revenue sources strikes at the main mechanism personalist rulers

16. The Obama administration may not have applied any coercive pressure to avoid giving Ahmadinejad an excuse to further demonize U.S. during the electoral campaign.

17. For evidence consistent with vote manipulation, see Berber & Scacco (2009).

employ to retain the support of their coalition, such that the decrease in resources to pay off regime elite may encourage elites to defect from the incumbent and support rivals. Thus the main destabilizing threat faced by personalist leaders targeted by shaming campaigns should be rivals – either from outside the regime elite and/or defectors from among the elite supporters. With out a peaceful mechanism for replacing incumbents in these regimes, shaming campaigns should increase the risk personalist leaders will lose power in an *irregular* manner.

We expect shaming campaigns to destabilize leaders in party and military regimes because if the regime elite want to resolve the international issue by replacing the incumbent leader, they have the institutional capacity to coordinate action to depose the incumbent. In contrast to replacement of incumbents in personalist regimes, we expect shaming to increase the risk of *regular* exit for leaders in party and military regimes because these regimes have institutional structures that allow peaceful transfer of power between members of the elite without jeopardizing the regime itself.

While we do not specify any direct hypotheses regarding the post-exit fate of deposed leaders, note that different types of exit carry with them very distinct post-exit fates. Goemans (2008) show that regular exit rarely poses a direct threat to the life and well-being of the deposed leader, whereas irregular exit frequently mean imprisonment, exile or even death. As we noted in the introduction and discuss further in the conclusion, the distinct threats to deposed leaders from different types of exit and are likely to have implications for how leaders in different types of regimes respond to shaming campaigns. Whether targeted leaders will increase or decrease repression when faced with shaming campaigns may depend on the *type* of exit risk shaming incurs.

5. Data and methods

To test whether and when human rights shaming affects the survival of authoritarian leaders, we use a two-stage Heckman-type selection model. The first stage estimates the probability of being named and shamed by one or more than one type of international actor, and the second stage estimates a model where leader exit (*regular* and *irregular*) is the dependent variable. We consider the effect of three different types of international actors: the media, Amnesty International, and the U.N. Council of Human Rights.

The media and Amnesty International (AI) measures come from Hafner-Burton (2008). The AI score counts the number of press releases or background reports published each year for a particular country. Hafner-Burton argues this AI score measures “one of the NGO advocacy world’s leading organizations working toward reform,” and thus “its activities are a suitable measure of Western advocacy-based media coverage.” (2008, p. 697) This measure does not distinguish different types of state repression, however, and may not reflect human rights advocacy outside the

Western world.¹⁸ The media score measures whether two news publication, *Newsweek* or *The Economist*, published articles on a particular country in a given year with the keywords “human rights.” For both the media and the AI scores, we code a binary variables which captures whether a country has been targeted at least once by the *Media* or *AI* (separate indicators for each). As we discuss below, we also make use of the number of times a country is shamed by using the logged value of these respective measures in the second-stage of the selection equation. The UNCHR variable we employ comes from Lebovic & Voeten (2006). It is a binary measure of whether the UNCHR targets a particular country in a particular year. In some of the second-stage equations, we also employ an ordinal scale which measures the extent of UNCHR punishment, once a country has been targeted by the UNCHR. A public resolution by the UNCHR is the most severe punishment and was the primary explanatory variable used earlier to explore how UNCHR shaming affects aid distribution in different types of regimes.

The dependent variable in the first stage (*SHAME*) can take one of three values: shamed by 0 types, shamed by 1 type or shamed by 2 or more types, where the three types of shaming are the media, Amnesty International, and the UNCHR. This variable has the following distribution in our sample of authoritarian leaders: in 32% of country-years, the leader was not targeted by any international actor; in 39% of observations one (and only one) organization targeted the authoritarian leader; and in 29% of cases, the leader was targeted by two or more sources.¹⁹

Similar to Heckman-type selection models used by Vreeland (2003) and Gandhi (2008), the first stage uses an ordinal probit model to estimate the probability of being in each of three levels of shaming. The second stage equations estimate likelihood of two types of leader failure: regular and irregular (Goemans & Chiozza 2009). The outcome model and includes the selection parameters ($\lambda \equiv$ inverse Mill’s ratio) from the first stage.²⁰ For each first-stage outcome ($j \equiv SHAME \in (0,1,2)$), we estimate the second-stage equation (with λ as a control variable) for each failure outcome ($m \equiv exit \in (regular, irregular)$):

$$P(Y_j = m) = \frac{\exp(\beta_{jm} X_j + \theta_{jm} \lambda_{jm})}{\sum_{m=0}^k \exp(\beta_{jm} X_j + \theta_{jm} \lambda_{jm})} \quad (1)$$

18. See Smith & Lopez (1998) for a discussion of the differences between Northern and Southern NGOs.

19. Breaking this latter category down further, 9% were targeted by all three international actors, and 20% by only two. We use a dependent variable with only 3 categories (0, 1, 2) rather than 4 categories (0, 1, 2, 3) because in so few country-years were targeted by all three actors – producing an unstable second-stage equation for that category (N=173). In unreported results we did use the 4-category dependent variable, producing substantively similar results.

20. Because the first stage is an ordinal probit, we estimate the 1’s in the following manner:

$$\lambda_0 = -\phi(cut1 - lp) / \Phi(cut1 - lp); \lambda_1 = [\phi(cut2 - lp) - \phi(cut1 - lp)] / [\Phi(cut2 - lp) - \Phi(cut1 - lp)];$$

$$\lambda_2 = \phi(cut2 - lp) / (1 - \Phi(cut2 - lp)).$$

This gives us unbiased estimates for β_{jm} for each first-stage outcome of interest for each second-stage failure outcome. We can then calculate the predicted value of the probability of each failure outcome ($P(\hat{Y}_j = m)$) using all the observations, under each condition j and m , where $\hat{\beta}_{jm}$ are the estimated coefficient values from (1):

$$P(\hat{Y}_j = m) = \hat{\beta}_{jm} X \quad (2)$$

Calculating (2) for each first-stage outcome j leaves us with the average values for the predicted probability of each failure outcome m under each level of human rights targeting.

The first stage equations for all four models are reported in the appendix. The explanatory variables in this equation are: a dummy for *Cold War* (pre-1990), *Log(GDP per capita)*, *Log(Population)*, *Repression* scores, *Treaty*, military *Capabilities*, *Membership* on the UNCHR, agreement with the U.S. in the U.N. General Assembly voting (*USAgree*), and a measure of whether the executive in the target country is right-leaning (*RightEx*) or left-leaning (*LeftEx*).²¹ Higher repression by the target state may increase the chances of being targeted by the U.N., the media or Amnesty International for human rights abuses. Repression is an ordinal scale (1-5) from the Political Terror Scale derived from State Department reports. *Treaty* measures whether the target country ratified the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which Lebovic & Voeten (2006) argue, “provides an independent measure of a country’s public commitment to human rights because ratifying the ICCPR is uncorrelated with a state’s human rights record.” (874) *Membership* is a dummy variable which measures participation in the U.N. Council of Human Rights in a given year, and controls for the possibility that members of this council are able to deflect international criticism from their human rights conditions.

USAgree, *RightEx*, and *LeftEx* are included to capture realist explanations of the behavior of international actors (Lebovic & Voeten 2006). To improve the fit of the first stage model, we also include the interaction of each of the three variables with a Cold War dummy (*USAgree*, *RightEx*, *LeftEx*).²² Finally, to control for time dependence, we include a measure of how long the current leader has been in power and its square (*Time*, *Time*²), as well as the logged value of the number of times the country has been targeted in the past (*Log(PastShame)*). In the latter two models, we also include logged oil and gas rents (*Rents*, from Ross (2008)), which slightly reduces the number of observations.

21. Variable definitions and sources are listed in the Appendix. Most of these variables are from Lebovic & Voeten (2006).

22. Lebovic & Voeten (2006) conduct separate tests for the Cold War and post-Cold War periods and find that the effect of some of their explanatory variables varies by period. In the present analysis, we are interested in getting the best fit for the first stage equation and thus exclude the Cold War interaction term on variables for which F-tests suggest they do not belong in the first stage equation.

6. Results

6.1. Naive Model

Before discussing the results of the selection equation, we report baseline naive models, where the main explanatory variable is *SHAME* and the dependent variables are: *irregular exit* and *regular exit*. In models 1 and 3, we include *SHAME* and dummy variables for each main authoritarian regime type (*Personalist* is the excluded category); and in models 2 and 4, we include the interaction between *SHAME* and the regime types indicators. For the models with the interactions, we report the coefficient for the linear combination of $SHAME + RegimeType_r * SHAME$, where $r = (\text{SingleParty}, \text{Military}, \text{Monarchy})$. This gives us a coefficient estimate of the effect of *SHAME* in each regime type for each exit type.

Table 4: Naive models of leader exit				
	Irregular exit		Regular exit	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
SHAME	-0.018 (0.20)	0.169 (0.30)	0.403* (0.17)	-0.067 (0.42)
SHAME*Single-party		-0.284 (0.42)		0.545 (0.44)
SHAME*Military		-0.311 (0.36)		0.535 (0.46)
SHAME*Monarchy		0.128 (0.79)		
Single-party	-0.784** (0.29)	-0.508 (0.51)	0.727* (0.36)	0.106 (0.55)
Military	0.703* (0.32)	1.025+ (0.56)	1.310** (0.35)	0.697 (0.60)
Monarchy	-0.853 (0.86)	-0.903 (1.18)		
Human Rights	0.729 (0.49)	0.758 (0.48)	-0.282 (0.53)	-0.297 (0.53)
Log(GDPpc)	-0.341* (0.14)	-0.329* (0.14)	0.312* (0.14)	0.314* (0.14)
Cold War	0.408 (0.29)	0.431 (0.29)	-0.186 (0.23)	-0.202 (0.23)
Time	-0.072* (0.03)	-0.074* (0.03)	-0.049 (0.04)	-0.049 (0.04)
Time ²	0.002* (0.00)	0.002* (0.00)	0.001 (0.00)	0.001 (0.00)
Log likelihood	-318.884	-318.348	-345.292	-344.505
Observations	1977	1977	1743	1743
SHAME _{Singleparty}		-0.11 (0.34)		0.48* (0.20)
SHAME _{Military}		-0.14 (0.29)		0.47* (0.23)
SHAME _{Monarchy}		0.30 (0.76)		

Logit with Standard errors clustered on country in parentheses. Excluded regime type category is Personalist. Columns 3 and 4 exclude Monarchies (no observed regular exit in this type). Years covered 1977-2000. + p<0.10; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01.

While none of the coefficients for the interaction terms in the first two columns of Table 4 are statistically significant at conventional levels, the results suggest that shaming may increase the likelihood of irregular exit in personalist regimes and monarchies but decrease the chances of this type of exit in military and single party regimes. The positive and statistically significant coefficient for *SHAME* in column 3 suggests that shaming increase the likelihood of regular exit across all dictatorships (except monarchies). However, this finding masks a higher degree of variation among different types of regimes. The results from the final column indicate that shaming has little effect on regular exit in personalist regimes, but increases the likelihood of regular exit in military and single party regimes. We now turn to the selection models.

6.2. Selection Model

The results of the first stage equations (reported in Table 9, in the Appendix) suggest that (as expected) wealthier, larger, and more repressive countries as well as those with more military capabilities, U.N. voting absences, and a history of being targeted are more likely to be shamed. Having ratifying the ICCPR slightly increases the chances of being targeted, while being a member of the UNCHR has little effect. The effect of U.S. agreement varies by period, suggesting that agreement with the U.S. reduces the prospect of human rights shaming only during the Cold War period. The effect of the ideological orientation of the executive also varies by period: left-executives were less likely to be targeted during the Cold War and right-executives more likely.²³ Finally, more dependence on oil and gas rents decreases the likelihood of being targeted for human rights shaming.

Recall that the dependent variable in these models contains information on whether the country was targeted by the UNCHR as well as by the media and Amnesty International. This may be one explanation for why some of these results differ from those reported by Lebovic & Voeten (2006). Second, the sample used here includes only authoritarian regimes, excluding democracies. Third, these first stage models include controls for level of development and population size, which are highly correlated with some of the other explanatory variables. The first stage model, while theoretically informed, is intended to capture the factors that determine selection in human rights shaming; thus we want a model that, while parsimonious in spirit, still captures much of the variation in the model.²⁴

The second stage equations include dummy variables for regime type and the Cold War, economic growth,²⁵ logged GDP per capita, lagged repression scores, logged

23. This result is due almost entirely to targeting by Amnesty International. The results do not change if we include regime type dummies in the first-stage of the model.

24. While inappropriate for many reasons, an OLS regression on the same data yields an R^2 of over 0.50

25. This measure is the lagged two-year moving average. See Gasiorowski (1995).

population, and polynomial transformations of the time in office for the incumbent leader.²⁶ The regime type variables are dummies for single party, military, and monarchies, with personalist regimes as the reference category.²⁷ Because the explanatory variable of interest takes three values ($j \equiv SHAME \in (0,1,2)$), there are three separate outcome models for equation (1) for each type of outcome ($m \in (Regular, Irregular)$).

Tables 5 (*Irregular exit*) and 6 (*Regular exit*) present the results of four models. For each model, we report the mean predicted probability of exit for each regime type.²⁸ The first model includes the *extent of shaming* in the outcome stage. For each type of shaming (media, AI, and UNCHR), the second stage include variables for each that measure the *extent of shaming*. For the media and AI measures, this is the natural log of the number of times the country was shamed in a particular year. The U.N. variable measures the extent of punishment once a country has been targeted with four ordinal values where higher values indicate stronger punishment: 1 only targeted; 2 continued consideration; 3 advisory/critical statement; and 4 public resolution.²⁹ The second model excludes the three variables measuring the extent of shaming from the outcome stage. The third and fourth models are the same as the first two, except they include *Rents* in both the first and second stage equations – slightly lowering the number of observations. The effect of shaming is monotonic – that is, changing in the same direction as *SHAME* moves from zero to one and again as *SHAME* moves from one to more than one – for all regime types with a statistically significant result. To save space, though, these tables only report the results of moving from being shamed by zero types to being shamed by two or more types $SHAME = 0 \rightarrow SHAME = 2$.

The results in Table 5 indicate that naming and shaming human rights abuses destabilizes dictators by increasing the risk of *irregular* exit from power. Looking at the *average* effect across all types of authoritarian leaders, being shamed by two or more types increases the probability of *irregular* exit from 3.8% to 5.2% – or an increase of 38% above the baseline probability. This average, though, obscures how the effect of shaming varies across regime type. In personalist regimes, shaming substantially increases the probability of *irregular* exit to between 70% and 95% above the baseline (around 4%). In dominant single party regimes, the effect of shaming is positive, but substantively very small: the most optimistic result of the four models suggests that shaming increases the probability of *irregular* exit only 0.6% or 26% above a relatively low baseline (approximately 2.3%). The effect of shaming in dominant party regimes is not statistically different from zero in any of the models, even though this is the regime type category with the most observations. In pure military regimes, shaming actually decreases the probability of *irregular* exit, though this result is small and not statistically different from zero. (Leaders in military regimes do have the highest overall risk of irregular removal – a result consistent with Ezrow & Frantz

26. The time polynomials are *Time*, *Time*², and *Time*³. See Carter & Signorino (2008).

27. The single party category includes single party-hybrid regimes. Excluding these regimes does not alter the results. The military category includes military-personalist regimes. F-tests suggests that military-personalist regimes do not need to be included as a separate category, as the coefficients for military and military-personalist in these models are never statistically different from each other.

28. Full second stage results are available from the author, but to economize on space (there are 24 second stage equations) we omit them here.

29. See Lebovic & Voeten 2006.

(forthcoming.) The results from all four models suggest that in monarchies shaming substantially increases the probability of *irregular* exit (more than doubling; in one case tripling the probability, though from a very low baseline). However, this result should be treated with some caution as it hinges on one case: the Iranian Revolution of 1979 which overthrew Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi. If we exclude this case, this result vanishes because there are no other cases in the data where a monarch was targeted by more than one type of shaming.³⁰ Finally, the results suggest that shaming in military-personalist regimes substantially increases the risk of *irregular* removal from power. In absolute terms, the models suggest a 4.2-5.1% increase in the risk of this type of exit, or an increased risk of 45-55% above the baseline.

Table 5: Selection-corrected probabilities of *Irregular* leader exit

$\hat{p}(y_j = \text{IrregularExit}), j \equiv \text{SHAME} \in (0,2)$					
	SHAME = 0	SHAME = 2	Difference	t - test	% change
Model 1: Extent of Shaming in 2nd stage					
All Observations	3.8	5.2	1.4	7.33***	+37%
Personalist	3.8	6.8	3.0	10.27***	+79%
Single-party	2.3	2.5	0.3	0.99	+13%
Military	12.6	11.2	-1.4	-1.15	-11%
Monarchy	1.6	4.4	2.8	6.32***	+175%
Military-Personalist	8.9	13.7	4.8	3.55***	+54%
Model 2: No extent of Shaming in 2nd stage					
All Observations	3.8	5.7	1.9	9.47***	+50%
Personalist	3.8	7.4	3.6	12.53***	+95%
Single-party	2.3	2.9	0.6	5.1***	+26%
Military	12.6	12.0	-0.5	-0.45	-4%
Monarchy	1.6	5.0	3.4	5.43***	+213%
Military-Personalist	8.9	14.0	5.1	3.86***	+57%
Model 3: Extent of Shaming in 2nd stage (with Rents)					
All Observations	4.2	5.3	1.2	5.29***	29%
Personalist	3.9	6.6	2.7	8.83***	70%
Single-party	2.8	2.7	0.1	1.04	3%
Military	12.5	11.2	-1.3	-0.96	-10%
Monarchy	1.9	4.3	2.4	7.21***	126%
Military-Personalist	9.6	13.8	4.2	3.03**	44%
Model 4: No extent of Shaming in 2nd stage (with Rents)					
All Observations	4.2	5.8	1.6	7.48***	38%
Personalist	3.9	7.3	3.4	11.29***	87%
Single-party	2.8	2.9	0.1	0.96	4%
Military	12.5	12.1	-0.4	-0.32	-3%
Monarchy	1.9	4.9	3.0	6.01***	158%
Military-Personalist	9.6	14.0	4.4	3.22**	46%

Mean predicted probability of irregular exit reported in each cell of the first two columns. Means and differences in first three columns are absolute percentages. **p<0.01; ***p<0.001.

30. We should also note that, for monarchies, increasing SHAME from 0 to 1 does not increase the probability of irregular exit.

Table 6: Selection-corrected probabilities of <i>Regular</i> leader exit					
	$\hat{p}(y_j = \text{RegularExit}), j \equiv \text{SHAME} \in (0,2)$				
	SHAME = 0	SHAME = 2	Difference	<i>t</i> - test	% change
Model 1: Extent of Shaming in 2nd stage					
All Observations	5.3	6.8	1.5	6.86***	+28%
Personalist	3.5	2.1	-1.4	-5.78***	-40%
Single-party	7.0	8.6	1.6	4.67***	+23%
Military	5.5	12.3	6.9	12.40***	+125%
Monarchy	-	-	-	-	-
Military-Personalist	7.7	13.4	5.7	5.57***	+74%
Model 2: No extent of Shaming in 2nd stage					
All Observations	5.3	7.2	1.8	8.66***	+34%
Personalist	3.5	2.1	-1.3	-5.62***	-37%
Single-party	7.0	9.1	2.1	6.49***	+30%
Military	5.5	13.0	7.5	15.19***	+136%
Monarchy	-	-	-	-	-
Military-Personalist	7.7	13.6	5.9	6.51***	+77%
Model 3: Extent of Shaming in 2nd stage (with Rents)					
All Observations	5.3	6.4	1.1	4.79***	+21%
Personalist	3.6	2.2	-1.4	-5.71***	-39%
Single-party	6.6	7.9	1.2	3.19***	+18%
Military	5.4	12.3	6.9	10.48***	+122%
Monarchy	-	-	-	-	-
Military-Personalist	7.6	13.9	6.2	5.58***	+82%
Model 4: No extent of Shaming in 2nd stage (with Rents)					
All Observations	5.3	6.7	1.5	6.25***	+28%
Personalist	3.6	2.2	-1.3	-5.68***	-36%
Single-party	6.6	8.4	1.7	4.61***	+25%
Military	5.4	12.6	7.2	11.64***	+133%
Monarchy	-	-	-	-	-
Military-Personalist	7.6	14.0	6.3	6.62***	+83%

Mean predicted probability of regular exit reported in each cell of the first two columns. Means and differences in first three columns are absolute percentages. **p<0.01; *** p<0.001.

Table 6 reports the results of similar models for where *regular* exit is the dependent variable.³¹ Looking at the average effect across all regime types, shaming increases the risk of *regular* removal by about 1.5% or 28% above the baseline. This average obscures the variation across regime type, though. In personalist regimes, shaming is associated with a decreased risk of *regular* turnover (1.4% in absolute value or roughly 40% below the baseline). Shamed leaders in dominant single party regimes are slightly more likely to lose power via regular exit, but this increased risk is relatively modest: 1.2-2.1% absolute increase or roughly 20-30% above the baseline depending on the model. This finding for dominant parties remains even when we exclude the regimes that have regular electoral

31. The second stage equations for these models only include two regime type variables (military and dominant single party) because the dummy for monarchy perfectly predicts the 'no failure' outcome. There are no cases of regular exit from power in monarchies in this sample.

cycles and executive term limits (e.g. the PRI in Mexico or the CCM in Tanzania). Because regular exits in these regimes are defined by the electoral rules, it may not be reasonable to categorize them by the same data generating process as other types of *regular* exit wherein exogenous factors (such as internal or external opposition) can affect the risk of exit. This suggests that shaming in dominant single party regimes may increase the (exogenously determined) risk of losing power via *regular* exit. Shaming in military and military-personalist regimes is associated with a relatively large increased risk of *regular* exit. In pure military regimes, shaming more than doubles this risk - increasing it from roughly 5.5% to over 12%. In military-personalist hybrid regimes, shaming increases the risk by over 75% above the baseline – from 7.6% to nearly 14%. In the data used here, no monarchies experience *regular* exit from power, so we are unable to model the effect of shame on this outcome.

To summarize briefly, the results suggest that shaming is not uniformly destabilizing. The analysis thus far indicates that shaming destabilizes personalist rulers by increasing the risk of irregular exit, but reduces the risk of removal from power via regular exit. If the vast majority of irregular exits from power are simply coups, one interpretation of this finding is that shaming increases the risk of a coup but may keep personalist rulers from handing over power in elections. Shaming has relatively little effect on the risk of irregular exit in dominant single party regimes, though there is some evidence to suggest that shaming increases regular turnover in these regimes. This latter finding is robust even once we exclude those leaders who exited via term limits. If the increased risk of regular exit provides incentives to reduce repression, then our finding that shamed leaders in dominant single party regimes incur this increased risk points towards the possibility that shaming may be effective in reducing repression in these regimes. Substantively, though, the increased risk of regular turnover due to shaming is still quite small. In (pure) military regimes, shaming does not increase the risk of irregular exit but more than doubles the risk of regular exit. Many of these regular exits are in fact exit from authoritarian rule altogether (e.g. Argentina 1983, Brazil 1984, Ecuador 1979, Honduras 1982, Nigeria 1999, Thailand 1992, and Turkey 1983), suggesting that shaming military governments may increase the prospects for democratization. Similar to party regimes, if increased risk of regular exit deters repression, the evidence for military leaders points towards the possibility that shaming may reduce repression in these regimes. The paucity of leadership turnover in monarchies makes any conclusion quite tentative. While the evidence suggests that shaming dramatically increases the risk of irregular exit, this finding hinges on one case – the 1979 Iranian Revolution – and should be noted with caution. Because monarchs did not transfer power in a regular fashion during this time period, the effect of shame on this risk cannot be estimated.

This brings us to the final regime category: military-personalist hybrids. Leaders in these regimes appear to be the most sensitive to shaming because the analysis indicates that shaming increases the risk of both types of exit. Shaming in these regimes may increase the risk of irregular exit by as much as 50% above the baseline and the risk of regular exit by as much as 80% above the baseline. Again, many of the irregular exits from power appear to be coups, while many of the regular exits from power are transitions to democracy. If the risk of coup increases repression but the risk of democratization decreases repression, then there may be no uniform relationship

between shaming and repression in these regimes because shaming is associated with an increase in the risk of both types of exit.

The case of Pinochet's regime in Chile may be illustrative here.³² His regime responded to the first round of international shaming for human rights abuses by holding a sham referendum on his rule, complete with increased repression of opposition organizations. In December 1977, the U.N. voted 96 to 14 to condemn Chile for human rights abuses. Despite the objections of senior military officers, Pinochet punched back with a 1978 referendum that pitted Chilean nationalism (the Chilean flag) against a black box (representing the U.N.), with the language: "Faced with international aggression launched against our fatherland, I support President Pinochet in his defense of the dignity of Chile and reaffirm the legitimacy of the government..."³³ Pinochet won the referendum with the help of a military state-of-siege and a complete black out of opposition media coverage. Dissent from other junta members, including the top military commander General Leigh, did not stop Pinochet from pursuing the referendum. Following rumors of a coup attempt and more public dissent from key regime elite, Pinochet used the "success" of the referendum to oust perhaps his most threatening rival, General Leigh (Spooner 1994 p. 138). Leigh had not only been linked to rumors of an Air Force-led coup, he also committed perhaps the most serious transgression by speculating about a transition to civilian rule to an Italian journalist.³⁴ With his most strident internal critic side-lined, Pinochet's repression continued apace despite international condemnation. According to the terror scale used in much of the cross-national research on repression, 1978 marked the first time Pinochet's regime achieved the most repressive score.³⁵ This episode illustrates both the inability of internal rivals to censure a personalist leader (General Leigh was unable to stop Pinochet's referendum) and his repressive response to international shaming when human rights targeting increased the risk of a coup (the U.N. resolution signaled international disapproval to rival military leaders).

Pinochet's response to international criticism in the mid-to-late 1980s takes a somewhat different turn, combining repression against some political opponents with a very real opening of civil and political freedoms in the months before the 1988 plebiscite on his rule. Political liberties increased in the immediate run-up to the plebiscite, as thousands of exiles returned, an opposition newspaper was granted the right to print (*La Época*), and opposition organizers publicly demonstrated against the regime without reprisal. Both sides were allowed media time on television, and even when former regime supporters appeared publicly at anti-Pinochet rallies, the regime did not respond with more violence. Frederico Willoughby, Pinochet's former press secretary, publicly campaigned in support of the ¡NO! Campaign with a Communist party leader, yet faced no reprisal (Spooner 1994, p. 239). At the same time, Pinochet increased repression in an effort to drive out opposition organizers. Spooner reports

32. Pinochet's regime is coded as a military-personalist hybrid.

33. See Constable & Valenzuela (1991, p. 68).

34. Spooner 1994, p. 138

35. Chile only received the most repressive score one other year, 1981. See Hafner-Burton & Tsutsui 2007.

that in 1987, the Chilean Human Rights Commission found the highest number of kidnappings, incidents of torture, and politically motivated killings in seven years (1994, p. 227). By the mid-to-late 1980s Pinochet was firmly in control of the military and did not fear a coup from rival officers. But he did run the risk of assassination, surviving an attempt on his life by a radical left-wing group. Thus he faced two threats to his rule: the prospect of losing the referendum and handing power to civilian leaders, and assassination by the most extreme left-wing opponents. He faced the risk of both types of exit simultaneously. In response to these threats, he both increased repression and opened up the political space. While most observers would argue that Pinochet was overly optimistic about his prospects of winning the plebiscite, he nonetheless attempted to transform his public appearance to promote a softer image to win back some measure of popularity (Constable & Valenzuela 1993, p. 304-05).

If leaders in military-personalist regimes centralize power in their own hands and in the process antagonize and marginalize fellow military elites, this may create pressure from within the military to execute a coup. Thus, leaders in these regimes share some of the same risks of personalizing power as leaders in purely personalist regimes. Further, leaders in military-personalist regimes may face the same set of incentives to democratize as leaders pure military regimes. In particular, leaders in military-personalist regimes may have the advantage of being able to credibly bargain with pro-democracy forces and negotiate a transition to democratic-civilian rule while still maintaining many of the corporate interests of the military post-transition. Again, the Pinochet case offers a nice illustration. When Pinochet left power, he had strong institutional guarantees of his own and the military's corporate interests: he remained head of the military; he stacked the Supreme Court and Senate with his supporters; and the Constitution guaranteed revenue from copper mines for the military budget. At the same time, he responded with repression against those who threatened to assassinate him. In short, leaders in military-personalist regimes may face some of the same pressures as both pure military and pure personalist rulers, which may explain why shaming is most effective in destabilizing their rule.

7. Discussion

The main findings of this paper may give us some purchase on how shaming campaigns affect repression in different types of authoritarian regimes. Our analysis does not broach the question of whether shaming can be effective in imposing political costs on leaders in democracies and thus leaves us with little leverage to answer the question of whether naming and shaming can deter or decrease repression in targeted democracies. This leaves out roughly a third of the world's population which lives in countries that are both democratic and repressive (Hafner-Burton & Ron 2009, p.

372). However, most of these people live in India.³⁶ Excluding democracies from our analysis may not be problematic once we consider that human rights reform and large scale reductions in repression often occur in the midst of transitions to democracy (Call 2002; Simmons 2008; Moravcsik 1995; Moravcsik 2000). This observation points towards two ways forward in this research agenda.

First, scholars might ask how human rights campaigns affect the prospects for democratization and the transition process itself, especially if we believe that the legacy of different forms of authoritarian rule can affect how those regimes transition from dictatorship to democracy (Geddes 1996, Grzymala-Busse 2002). If the effect of shaming campaigns on the survival of authoritarian leaders differs by regime types, we might also trace this effect through to democratic transitions. For example, if shaming increases the risk of coups in personalist regimes, but leads to regularized turnover in non-personalist regimes, these findings have implications for democratization. Goemans & Marinov (2009) have recently shown that coups often lead to elections – and in the post-Cold War world, increasingly more democratic elections. Thus, while the effect of shaming on democracy via the increased risk of a coup may not show up immediately, this avenue may be fruitfully explored by asking: do shaming campaigns increase the risk of coup and therefore increase the likelihood of subsequent democratic elections in personalist regimes?³⁷ Further, if shaming campaigns can induce military leaders to return to the barracks (i.e. *regular* turnover), this may be another avenue through which naming and shaming can further democracy. However, given the paucity of military regimes in the post-Cold War world – especially in middle income countries – this may not be a particularly common avenue through which shaming campaigns foster democratization in the future.

The second, and perhaps most obvious, next step in this research is to examine how shaming affects repression outcomes across a range of different types of targeted regimes. If we are unable to detect any *average* effect of human rights shaming campaigns on the observed level of repression in targeted countries (Hafner-Burton 2008), the findings in this paper suggest that we might look again, this time exploring how shaming affects the domestic politics within different types of authoritarian regimes. In particular, if shaming campaigns increase the risk of *irregular* turnover in personalist regimes, this may lead the ruler to increase repression in the short-term in an effort to forestall a particularly nasty exit outcome. This points towards the possibility that the effect of shaming on repression may be quite different in the near- and long-term in distinct types of regimes. While, Hafner-Burton (2008) is able to confirm the largely null results for the effect shaming on repression across a wide-range of lagged specifications, the appropriate time lags on the shaming variable may vary by regime type.

36. This suggests that a fruitful approach to studying human rights shaming campaigns in democracies might simply look at variation within India.

37. It is possible that the effect of coups on democratic elections is concentrated in non-personalist regimes. If this were true, there would be little reason to believe that shaming has a positive effect on democracy in personalist regimes.

Hafner-Burton (2008) raises the additional point that targeted countries differ in their capacity to implement human rights laws and curb repression. Some governments, for example, may not have full control over their own territory or of extra-military groups with local monopolies over violence, and thus may not be able to enforce better human rights practices even if there are domestic political incentives to do so. Distinguishing among different types of authoritarian rule, however, may shed light on this variation as well. For example, personalist regimes, where rulers systematically destroy rival political institutions – including the military – may be less capable of implementing human rights reforms even if international actors are able to impose sufficient domestic political costs on the leader.

Finally, the findings in this paper bear some important caveats. To understand how naming and shaming campaigns affect authoritarian survival, we examined two types of leader exit and (up to) five different types of leaders. In doing so, we have parsed the data to the point where some outcome sets are empty. For example, monarchies almost never experience regular turnover of power, and irregular turnover of power is so rare in these regimes that there is only one observation in the sample where the monarch is targeted by more than one type of shaming organization when he is deposed. Thus any conclusions about shaming in monarchies must necessarily be tentative and may be more fruitfully explored by looking at a handful of monarchy cases with the appropriate variation on the dependent variable. While we believe that using a global sample of authoritarian leaders allows us to report some interesting general findings, continued theorizing on the effect of shaming campaigns may benefit from close examination of carefully selected cases.

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Appendix

Table 7: UNCHR Resolution and Foreign Aid (Extension of Lebovic & Voeten 2009: Full Results)						
Models	Bilateral		Multilateral		World Bank	
	RE	FE	RE	FE	RE	FE
Aid per capita _{t-1}	0.536**	0.433**	0.417**	0.313**	0.159**	0.080*
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Personalist	0.035	0.091+	0.045	0.06	0.285**	0.283*
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.11)	(0.14)
Single-Party	-0.022	-0.038	-0.117+	-0.127	-0.199+	-0.343*
	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.1)	(0.11)	(0.16)
Military	-0.102	-0.079	-0.084	0.001	0.007	0.038
	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.14)	(0.16)
Monarchy	-0.363**	-0.15	-0.207+	0.265	-0.390+	0.521
	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.2)	(0.22)	(0.35)
Military-Personalist	-0.003	0.01	0.119	0.174	-0.004	-0.011
	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.11)	(0.16)	(0.23)
UNCHR Resolution	0.248*	0.204*	-0.128	-0.046	-0.312	-0.274
	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.13)	(0.16)	(0.23)	(0.24)
UNCHR Resolution*	-0.539**	-0.565**	-0.490*	-0.518	-0.885*	-0.593+
Personalist	(0.15)	(0.17)	(0.2)	(0.32)	(0.41)	(0.34)
UNCHR Resolution*	-0.330*	-0.257	-0.204	-0.27	0.121	0.239
Party	(0.16)	(0.2)	(0.21)	(0.23)	(0.46)	(0.27)
UNCHR Resolution*	-0.362*	-0.381*	-0.003	-0.188	-0.062	-0.003
Military	(0.18)	(0.16)	(0.25)	(0.31)	(0.41)	(0.41)
UNCHR Resolution*	-0.131	-0.285+	0.503+	0.292	0.186	0.217
Monarchy	(0.23)	(0.16)	(0.3)	(0.29)	(0.44)	(0.26)
UNCHR Resolution*	-0.459**	-0.387**	-0.778**	-0.823**	-0.277	-0.213
Military-Personalist	(0.17)	(0.13)	(0.23)	(0.27)	(0.36)	(0.35)
ΔPTS	-0.033*	-0.039*	0.019	0.009	-0.02	-0.03
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.04)
PTS _{t-1}	-0.014	-0.025	0.02	0.007	-0.046	-0.059
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.05)
ΔCivil Liberties	-0.014	-0.008	0.008	0.007	0.007	0.007
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Civil Liberties _{t-1}	-0.019	-0.009	-0.012	-0.014	0.046	0.034
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.04)
GDP per capita _{t-1}	-0.112**	-0.078+	-0.337**	-0.220**	-0.471**	-0.248*
	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.1)
Log(Population) _{t-1}	-0.185**	-0.890**	-0.317**	-1.084**	-0.098*	0.571
	(0.03)	(0.22)	(0.03)	(0.31)	(0.05)	(0.59)
U.S. Agree _{t-1}	-0.114	-0.291+	0.243	0.332	1.117**	0.53
	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.19)	(0.23)	(0.34)	(0.37)
War	-0.093**	-0.110**	-0.113*	-0.111*	-0.224**	-0.218**
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Capabilities	-0.643	-1.431	0.245	2.907+	-0.8	-2.437
	(0.59)	(1.89)	(0.57)	(1.7)	(0.78)	(2)
Log Likelihood	-1774.812	-1542.015	-2456.413	-2264.808	-2182.214	-2062.399
Observations	2324	2324	2308	2308	1548	1548

Dependent variable is logged Aid per capita. Standard errors in parentheses. *Time* and *Time*² included in all models, but not reported. + p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.

Table 8: UNCHR Resolutions and Trade		
Model	(1)	(2)
Trade (%GDP) _{t-1}	0.737**	0.729**
	(0.04)	(0.04)
Personalist	5.901	7.830+
	(3.82)	(4.04)
Party	7.467*	9.824**
	(3.24)	(3.43)
Military	4.169	5.907
	(3.67)	(3.97)
Military-Personalist	7.123+	9.990*
	(3.70)	(3.97)
UNCHR Resolution	0.637	-1.443
	(2.10)	(2.51)
UNCHR*Personalist	-7.098+	-4.681
	(3.66)	(4.07)
UNCHR*Party	-3.244	-1.545
	(3.38)	(3.58)
UNCHR*Military	-1.369	0.891
	(3.37)	(4.17)
UNCHR* Military-Personalist	-6.937+	-4.487
	(3.92)	(4.63)
Rents	4.100**	4.172**
	(1.49)	(1.48)
ΔPTS		-0.941+
		(0.51)
PTS _{t-1}		-0.477
		(0.57)
ΔCivil Liberties		-0.713
		(0.53)
Civil Liberties _{t-1}		-0.446
		(0.53)
GDP per capita		-0.417
		(1.63)
Log(population)		-16.842
		(12.98)
U.S. Agree		-6.257
		(5.53)
War		-0.365
		(0.98)
Capabilities		20.676
		(35.22)
Time	0.350**	0.593**
	(0.07)	(0.22)
Time ²	0.004*	0.006*
	(0.00)	(0.00)
Time ³	-0.001**	-0.001**
	(0.00)	(0.00)
R ²	0.594	0.598
Observations	1340	1340

Dependent variable *Trade%GDP*. Fixed effects regression. *Monarchy* is the excluded Regime type. Robust standard errors in parentheses. + p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.

Table 9: First-Stage Equations		
Models	1 & 2	3 & 4
Cold War	0.059 (0.24)	0.113 (0.25)
Log(GDPpc)	0.306** (0.06)	0.475** (0.06)
Log(Population)	0.243** (0.04)	0.244** (0.04)
Repression	1.534** (0.15)	1.615** (0.16)
Treaty	0.208* (0.10)	0.188+ (0.10)
Participation	0.444+ (0.25)	0.610* (0.25)
Military capabilities	1.699** (0.52)	2.018** (0.54)
Membership	0.052 (0.08)	0.026 (0.09)
Log(Past Target)	0.866** (0.10)	0.858** (0.10)
U.S. Agree	0.168 (0.57)	0.207 (0.63)
Right-Ex	-0.448 (0.32)	-0.611+ (0.33)
Left-Ex	-0.045 (0.15)	-0.051 (0.16)
Cold War*U.S. Agree	-1.405* (0.66)	-1.596* (0.70)
Cold War*Right-Ex	1.076* (0.47)	1.108* (0.46)
Cold War*Left-Ex	-0.164 (0.16)	-0.186 (0.17)
Time	-0.029** (0.01)	-0.021* (0.01)
Time ²	0.001* (0.00)	0.000 (0.00)
Rents		-0.076** (0.02)
Cut 1	4.518** (0.60)	5.670** (0.71)
Cut 2	6.194** (0.62)	7.373** (0.72)
Log Likelihood	-1453.023	-1386.089
Observations	1977	1902

Dependent variable *SHAME*. Ordered probit estimation. Standard errors in parentheses. + p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.

Table 10: Variable Sources	
<u>Tables 1-3, 6-7</u>	
Regime type	Wright (2008)
All other variables	Lebovic & Voeten (2009)
<u>Tables 4, 5, & 8</u>	
Regime type	Wright (2008)
Log(GDPpc)	Maddison (2006)
Log(population)	Maddison (2006)
Rents	Ross (2008)
Regular, Irregular exit	Goemans et al. (2009)
UN Shame	Lebovic & Voeten (2006)
AI Shame	Hafner-Burton (2008)
Media Shame	Hafner-Burton (2008)
Cold War	authors' calculation
Time	authors' calculation
All other variables	Lebovic & Voeten (2006)

